Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0074/00743.txt

Text File | 1991-06-24 | 32KB | 492 lines

$Unique_ID{COW00743}
$Pretitle{233E}
$Title{Caribbean Commonwealth
Chapter 1C.   Political Independence}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Franklin W. Knight}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{political
caribbean
british
trinidad
class
jamaica
barbados
century
new
middle}
$Date{1987}
$Log{St. John's Parish Church*0074301.scf
}
Country:     Caribbean Commonwealth
Book:        Caribbean Commonwealth, An Area Study: Introduction
Author:      Franklin W. Knight
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1987

Chapter 1C.   Political Independence

Changes in the Social Base of Political Power

     Although the riots of the late 1930s brought swift political changes, the
conditions that precipitated the explosion had been building slowly for more
than half a century. The long period of direct and modified crown colony
government after the Morant Bay disturbances produced two political patterns
throughout the British Caribbean. The first, to which allusion has already
been made, was based on strong executive power in the hands of a governor.
Whereas this undoubtedly made administration easier for governors, it had
negative effects on the social basis of political power and political
development. As Carl Campbell so eloquently put it, ""[Crown colony
government] sought constantly to increase the area of government and decrease
the area of politics."" He was, of course, describing the situation in
Trinidad in thw middle of the nineteenth century, but his portrayal would have
been apt for any British colony at the beginning of the twentieth century.
Colonial governors were not inhibited by the threat of vetoes of their
decisions by the legislatures nor by the kind of obstructionism that had
characterized the legislatures before 1865. Colonial governors were
responsible only to the secretary of state for the colonies in London. By
appointing to the legislature members whose views were compatible with the
goals of empire, the governors reduced the range of experience and advice
available to them. They were not interested in local opinion and local advice.
If they had been, they would not have stifled public opinion by consistently
discouraging political organizations and insisting that only individuals could
express their views.

     Not surprisingly, the dominant views of the local governments were those
of the planter classes, especially the older, more established planter
classes. Nevertheless, by the end of the nineteenth century, the planter class
not only was divided but also was being challenged by the popular classes.
This challenge created a series of recurring political crises among the
governors, the legislatures, and the Colonial Office in London, leading to
some modest reforms in the system in the early twentieth century.

     After emancipation, dissolution of the old caste structure of the
Caribbean slave society, which was based on the confusing divisions of race,
occupation, and status, gave rise to a new, more complex class society. Class
divisions within the declining castes generated new groups and produced new
tensions. For example, the planter class, which had never been homogeneous,
became even more variegated.

     In the nineteenth century a new petit bourgeois class emerged, consisting
of merchants, successful estate owners without the ancestry and traditions of
the older landed class, members of the professions, and an expanding
managerial sector. This class was far more heterogeneous than the class it was
gradually displacing in economic and political affairs. In Jamaica a very
large number of Jews were given the franchise and participated actively in
politics. Remarkably, Jews obtained equality in Jamaica and sat in the House
of Assembly long before they secured such privileges in Britain. In Barbados a
small number of free nonwhites and Jews moved up, but the resilience of the
planter aristocracy inhibited the opening of opportunities found elsewhere. In
Trinidad the white elites included those of English, French, Scottish, and
Spanish descent, and the religious division along Catholic and Protestant
lines was as great as along political and social lines. Although governors
might prefer the older planter families, especially those of English ancestry,
the new reality was inescapable, and gradually the appointments to high
political office reflected the social arrival of these new individuals. They
tended to be politically conservative, but theirs was a less rigid
conservatism than had prevailed for centuries in the Caribbean.

     Although the small, predominantly planter and merchant elites retained
political control until the 1940s, increasing social and political
democratization of the Caribbean societies occurred. This democratization
derived from four sources: economic diversification, which opened up economic
opportunities; the expanded education system, which produced a new
professional class; the dynamic expansion of organized religion; and the rise
of labor unions. Although not of equal weight, all these forces contributed to
the formation of the strong tradition of democratic government that has
characterized the British Caribbean during the twentieth century.

     Between 1880 and 1937, expanded economic opportunities helped create a
new, broader based middle class throughout the British Caribbean. Much of this
middle class was non-European--formerly from the free nonwhite community of
the days of slavery, reinforced by the East Indians and other new immigrant
groups of the late nineteenth century. Thus, the black and colored middle
class in the Caribbean has antecedents going as far back as the white class.
The nonwhite middle class expanded significantly during the post-slavery
period.

     The lower ranks of the civil service had always provided an opening for
nonwhite talent because in a typical colony not enough Europeans could be
found to fill all vacancies. On some of the more populated islands, such as
Jamaica, nonwhites from these islands could staff all low-level civil service
slots. However, other islands, such as Trinidad, had labor shortages, thus
requiring them to staff their civil service with nonwhites from other parts of
the British Caribbean. For example, the police force of Trinidad was composed
mainly of immigrants from Barbados, although the senior officers were always
European. Bridget Brereton points out that in 1892 only 47 of 506 policemen in
Trinidad were local (7.8 percent), compared with 292 from Barbados (57.7
percent) and 137 from the other islands (27 percent).

     New exports, such as rice, bananas, limes, cacao, nutmeg, and arrowroot,
provided the means for a few people to join the middle economic classes and
for their offspring to rise even higher. Rice cultivation, although primarily
a peasant activity in Trinidad, also helped propel a number of its black, East
Indian, and Chinese producers into the ranks of the middle class. Wealth, of
course, was not enough to endow middle-class status, but it often facilitated
the upward social mobility of the sons of peasants, who with the requisite
education could aspire to middle-class status.

     Education was the great social elevator of the British Caribbean masses.
Beginning in the middle of the nineteenth century, public education expanded
rapidly. A primary-level education that was combined with some knowledge of
Spanish was useful in commercial concerns because most of the British
Caribbean states conducted much of their commerce with neighboring
Spanish-speaking countries. A secondary-level education was helpful in getting
into the lower ranks of the bureaucracy and essential for entering the
professions. A system of scholarships enabled lower class children with
ability to move into secondary schools and into the professions. The number
was never large, but the stream was constant, and the competition for
scholarships was fierce. Studying for these scholarships was more than an
individual effort--it was a family enterprise. Moreover, by the early decades
of the twen