Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0070/00709.txt

Text File | 1991-06-24 | 33KB | 537 lines

$Unique_ID{COW00709}
$Pretitle{366}
$Title{Cameroon
Chapter 5A.   Social Systems}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Harold D. Nelson}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{fon
fulani
bamileke
lamido
members
social
associations
marriage
traditional
land}
$Date{1974}
$Log{}
Country:     Cameroon
Book:        Area Handbook for the United Republic of Cameroon
Author:      Harold D. Nelson
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1974

Chapter 5A.   Social Systems

     In 1973 a variety of social systems existed among the country's numerous
ethnic groups, the scope of traditional sociopolitical units ranging from
small clans to highly structured chiefdoms. Despite the government's efforts
at national integration, most Cameroonians were still caught up in the
micropolitics.

     Amidst this diversity of local systems, three major societal patterns
could be discerned within as many geographic regions. In the northern savanna
existed a number of conquest states in which there was a clear distinction
between the governing Fulani and the various ethnic groups they had subdued
during the past century. Typical of the highly organized structures in the
western highlands were the Bamileke chiefdoms with their absolute rulers,
systems of ranks and titles, important men's associations, and ancestor
worship focused on dead and living chiefs. Egalitarian Pahouin society was
representative of the southern pattern and of certain remote portions of the
north that were outside Fulani influence. In both these areas political
control traditionally did not transcend the limits of tiny dispersed
communities in which descendants of the same ancestor lived grouped around the
family head, who assigned land and agricultural tasks and who negotiated the
marriages of his children.

     Of the three basic societal patterns, only the Fulani had experience in
building multiethnic states, and their organizing ability and political
acumen had earned them the most important place among the national leaders. At
the same time the practice of Islam and an attachment to feudal values set the
Fulani apart from other Cameroonians.

     Western highlanders conceived of larger political units as embracing only
people related by kinship-a system that could not serve as the model for a
modern state. Moreover, dwindling land resources and certain features of
traditional social organization drove many Bamileke to rebellion and migration
to other parts of the country. The Bamileke had become the country's foremost
economic force, but they were widely resented because of their quasi-monopoly
of African activity in commerce, transport, and moneylending.

     The lack of political cohesiveness and social hierarchy made it easier
for individual Pahouin to free themselves from traditional controls and to
adapt to change. Among them were found the greatest number of Christians and
the highest percentage of people in modern professions.

     The Fulani, the Bamileke, the Pahouin, and members of the numerous other
ethnic groups that make up the mosaic of the Cameroonian population have only
a limited chance to interact. As a matter of policy, administrative officials
are often posted outside their home areas, but contacts with local people are
usually confined to working hours. Few marriages are made across ethnic
lines. The beginnings of a national society can be detected only among
members of a small intellectual elite who, to some extent, share the same
values and life-styles. Links have been forged among individuals who have
gone to the same schools, the same religious institutions, or the same
foreign countries. Where such links exist, they have generally been among
people from the south or the west but rarely with those from the north.

Fulani Society

     Since the era of conquests that began in the nineteenth century,
traditional Fulani society has rested on the distinction between victor and
vanquished-between people who were free and those who were not. After their
conquest of the northern part of the territory that later became Cameroon, a
modus vivendi established itself between the victorious Muslim herders, who
in time adopted semisedentary or totally sedentary ways of life, and the
defeated non-Muslim cultivators, who henceforth lived in various forms of
servitude (see ch. 2; ch. 4).

Social Structure

     Free men included not only all Fulani but also other Muslims like the
Hausa, the Bornuans, and the Choa Arabs, from whom the Fulani had taken
elements of culture and social organization. Peoples not considered free were
the conquered cultivators who became either slaves or tribute-paying vassals.
The distinction between those who were free and those who were not free was
abolished under colonial rule, and both the constitutions of 1961 and of 1972
adhered to the principle that all Cameroonians are free and equal.
Nonetheless, in early 1973, northern peoples continued to be fully conscious
of their traditional place in the social hierarchy and usually acted as such
and expected to be treated accordingly.

     There are no less than twenty-one lamidats (Fulani territories) ranging
in size from a few square miles to many thousands; each is headed by a lamido
(pl., lamibe, from the Fulani word lamago, meaning to govern). The lamibe are
spiritual and temporal rulers whose powers originally were limited only by the
dictates of Islam and Fulani customs. They used to vie with one another to
increase their power and areas of influence. In modern times they are loosely
united in resentment over the encroachment of modern political institutions,
but they have not forgotten their traditional hostilities.

     The lamibe, moreover, have retained a fair measure of their traditional
power. They still have a personal representative on the staff of the
prefecture of their areas to serve as their ambassadors and intermediaries.
In the north the prefect is almost always a Fulani.

     The lamido, who never ventures out without a large retinue, is assisted
by a fada (ministerial council). Most influential among its members are the
chief minister, the imam (Muslim prayer leader), and the alkali (judge). The
council's prerogatives include naming a successor to the lamido, and the three
principal members often agree on a choice before the full council convenes.
The successor is chosen for his intelligence and ruling ability from among the
sons, or often the younger brothers, of the lamido.

     Traditionally, the entire lamidat was considered the property of all the
Fulani. The lamido administered it in the interest of the collectivity, and
he was supposed to leave the territory intact to his successor. No
one-whether Fulani or stranger-could build a house or cultivate a new field
without permission of the lamido.

     In accordance with this concept, which identified the lamido with the
lamidat, his servants were considered servants of the state. They included
such vassal peoples as the Mboum and certain Baya and Dourou, who had
submitted to the Fulani conqueror to avoid being totally defeated and
enslaved (see ch. 4). They kept their social organization, political
hierarchy, and their land but had to pay tribute to the lamido. Their chiefs,
nominated as always by an assembly of family heads, were appointed only with
the consent of the lamido. After colonial rule was established, such chiefs
were appointed by the colonial officials, who took the advice of the lamido
before approving the village assembly's choice. Eventually, however, support
by the colonial government helped the various vassal chiefs to free themselves
more and more from their former dependency upon the lamido. But they continued
to be an integral part of the lamidat and to make payments and give presents
to the traditional ruler.

     Other vassal peoples, such as the Kaka, the Niam-Niam, and certain Baya,
lost their lands. They were resettled en bloc by the Fulani in agricultural
colonies in fertile regions and had the same obligations and rights as the
other v