Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0050/00507.txt

Text File | 1991-06-24 | 27KB | 420 lines

$Unique_ID{COW00507}
$Pretitle{220}
$Title{Brazil
Chapter 4D.   Foreign Relations}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{James D. Rudolf}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{brazil
foreign
brazil's
relations
policy
trade
brazilian
world
economic
military}
$Date{1982}
$Log{}
Country:     Brazil
Book:        Brazil, A Country Study
Author:      James D. Rudolf
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1982

Chapter 4D.   Foreign Relations

     Brazilian foreign relations are highly complex and fraught with
subtleties that often defy attempts to peg Brazil in easily definable
categories. During the early 1970s Brazil's rapid economic growth, coinciding
with the rapid expansion of its diplomatic pursuits, frequently led analysts
to refer to Brazil in such sanguine terms as "future world power" and "the
first Southern Hemisphere star in the world galaxy." A decade later the
increases in world petroleum prices, triggered by the Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries, and the growth of Brazil's foreign debt had
dramatically illustrated Brazil's ongoing vulnerabilities and led analysts to
be much more circumspect in their projections of Brazil's future place in the
world. Nevertheless, given that solutions would be found to these important
problems of economic dependency, many observers continued to view Brazil as
emerging into a position as an important world power by the turn of the
twenty-first century.

     The nation's leaders were careful to avoid the expression of such
ambitions in an overt, chauvinistic fashion. Rather, they viewed Brazil's
importance as the inevitable result of its geographic domination of the South
American continent, its large population and, most importantly, its dynamic
economy. Foreign policy was viewed, first and foremost, as a tool for the
nation's economic development. In the early 1980s trade matters (particularly
access to foreign markets in order to finance the balance of paments) topped
the foreign policy agenda. For a nation that had been ruled by the military
for nearly two decades, there was a strikingly small component of military
power projection in its foreign relations.

     The nation's growing economic strength allowed it to pursue foreign
relations during the decade of the 1970s that were increasingly independent of
the hegemonic political interests of the United States in the region. This
orientation was in marked contrast to the periods prior to 1960 and
immediately following the 1964 coup, when Brazil was perhaps the most devoted
follower of United States leadership in the region. By the early 1980s
Brazil's foreign policy orientation had much in common with the so-called
"independent foreign policy" pursued under the administration of President
Goulart during the early 1960s. Whereas Goulart's foreign policy had been the
source of considerable controversy, two decades later similar policies failed
even to evoke a debate prior to the 1982 elections. Whereas abertura sparked
heated criticism of the domestic policies of the military government, in the
arena of foreign policy there existed a remarkable consensus among the
political elites in favor of the government's pragmatic, self-serving "no
automatic alliances" approach.

     Foreign policy continued, as in the past, to be directed by the political
elites surrounding the president. There was little room for policy input by
Congress, academia, business, labor, and other such groups that play roles in
the formation of foreign policy in more democratic countries. The Constitution
requires Congress to approve most presidential actions in foreign affairs,
including treaties, declarations of war and peace, the passage and stationing
of foreign troops, and the participation in international organizations. Since
1964, however, Congress' freedom to disagree with the president has been
severely restricted. This fact was most clearly illustrated in 1974 when,
having criticized Chilean president Augusto Pinochet, a congressman was
prosecuted under the statues of the National Security Law that forbids any
public insult of a foreign head of state. Although this law remained in effect
in 1982, it might be expected that if abertura continued apace during the
1980s, Congress would gain a larger role in foreign relations through the
participation of its foreign affairs committees.

     Even in that event the preponderant role in decisionmaking would continue
to reside with the president, his advisory and staff agencies, the military
hierarchy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (known as Itamaraty, after the
building it formerly occupied in Rio de Janeiro), and a number of other
ministries within the president's cabinet. The delegation of authority and the
interrelationships among these actors have varied according to the style of
decisionmaking preferred by each president. Two trends were discernible: the
growing importance of economics in foreign relations has brought influence to
economically related agencies at the expense of Itamaraty, and the post-1974
political liberalization has lessened the institutional role of the military
in foreign policy decisionmaking.

     While discussions of foreign policy among these actors were more wide
ranging under presidents Geisel and Figueiredo, the final decisions were more
likely to be made at the top. Under previous military presidents, decisions
were often delegated to military officials in the National Security Council
(Conselho de Seguranca Nacional-CSN), the National Intelligence Service
(Servico Nacional de Informacoes-SNI), or in the Armed Forces General Staff
(Estado-Maior das Forcas Armadas-EMFA). By the early 1980s the High Command
of the Armed Forces (Alto-Comando das Forcas Armadas-ACFA) retained an
important foreign policy role through its control over military attaches
stationed in foreign embassies, over the war materiel industry (increasingly
important in Brazil's exports), over the Brazil-United States Military
Commission, and over the Superior War College (Escola Superior de Guerra-ESG),
which remained influential in defining national security concerns. Other
individuals and bodies within the military establishment continued to
influence foreign policy decisions, though largely on an ad hoc, rather than
institutionalized basis.

     Itamaraty has a proud tradition of service of over 100 years. It is
considered one of the most professionally organized bureaucracies within the
government and the most competent diplomatic corps among the nations of Latin
America, or possibly the entire Third World. Candidates for Brazil's foreign
service must have completed a university degree, then compete in a rigid
entrance examination, attend the Rio Branco Institute for diplomats for two
years, then complete two additional years of one-the-job training before
joining the elite diplomatic corps. Promotion is based principally on merit,
although political considerations do play a part. In recent years the minister
of foreign affairs has nearly always been a career diplomat chosen from among
the so-called "inner circle" of Itamaraty. This group also includes the
ministry's secretary general, its chief of staff, and a handful of department
heads.

     As economic matters have grown to dominate Brazilian foreign policy,
numerous parts of the government's economic bureaucracy have entered the
foreign policy stage at the expense of Itamaraty. The degree of influence of
each often depends on the personalities involved. Under Delfim Netto, the
Planning Secretariat played a crucial coordinating role, and the
minister-secretary led many foreign trade missions abroad. During the Medici
administration, Delfim had served as minister of finance, and that ministry
often competed with Itamaraty for influence over foreign policy. The Ministry
of Mines and Energy, with authority over powerful state corporations, such as
Petrobras, Brazilian Nuclear Enterprises (Empresas Nucleares
Brasileiras-Nuclebras), and the Companhia Vale de Rio Doce, which had major
import-export roles, wa