Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0017/00171.txt

Text File | 1991-06-24 | 38KB | 595 lines

$Unique_ID{COW00171}
$Pretitle{273}
$Title{Argentina
Chapter 4E.   The Politics of Democratic Restoration}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Craig H. Robinson}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{military
government
alfonsin
economic
political
parties
announced
percent
cgt
elections}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Country:     Argentina
Book:        Argentina, A Country Study
Author:      Craig H. Robinson
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1987

Chapter 4E.   The Politics of Democratic Restoration

The End of Military Rule

     In March 1976, when the armed forces deposed Isabel de Peron, the move
was supported by almost the entire upper class, large sectors of the middle
and lower classes, and even some Peronist leaders. With inflation running at
some 450 percent and guerrillas fighting each other in the streets, most felt
that the country was in complete chaos. Only the military seemed capable of
extricating the country from the crisis (see The Peronist Restoration, 1973
-76, ch. 1).

     The military established an institutional government in which the
commanders of the three services collectively served as the head of
government, choosing the president and filling the entire state apparatus with
military officers. Videla was named president (see The Military in Power, ch.
1).

     The military established two goals for its government-the eradication of
"terrorism" and the restoration of economic stability. To accomplish its first
goal, Videla's government directed the military and police forces to win the
civil war, placing no restrictions on how that was to be accomplished. Victory
was achieved after three years of limited open fighting and a stream of
kidnappings, "disappearances," bombings, and killings that brought a total
breakdown of due process for those suspected of being connected with the
guerrillas. By June 1978 the guerrillas were all but eliminated, and the
military declared victory. By 1980 the last vestiges of the terrorist groups
had died out, and the disappearances had stopped.

     The Videla government was initially supported in its efforts by an
apparent majority of the population. Most of the political parties welcomed
the end of the political violence and economic chaos that had threatened their
lives and livelihoods in 1975 and 1976. Many business and financial leaders
participated as advisers to the government, as did some prominent individuals
from the more conservative political parties. A second line of "critical
supporters" included sectors of the major agricultural and industrial groups,
major newspapers such as La Prensa and La Nacion, and the hierarchy of the
Roman Catholic Church. Participation by civilians was not limited to the
right, however. In 1979 a government intelligence study revealed that 52
percent of the country's 1,679 sitting mayors were what it described as
"political activists." Of these, it identified about 33 percent as members
of the UCR and over 20 percent as members of the PJ. Despite the concern
abroad, concern for human rights inside the country remained a minor sideshow,
confined to small groups and to the several hundred relatives of the
disappeared who marched each Thursday in the Plaza de Mayo in downtown Buenos
Aires.

     The Videla government placed Minister of Economy Martinez de Hoz in
charge of restoring economic stability. He sought to do this by opening the
highly protected economy to foreign competition, reducing state intervention
in the marketplace, and transferring most state production activities to the
private sector. His policies seemed to work in the short run. Foreign reserves
jumped from US$20 million in 1976 to US$10 billion by mid-1980. Farm output
also grew, paced by a 52-percent rise in wheat production during the 1978-79
season over the previous harvest.

     Despite the apparent economic success and the victory over the
guerrillas, the military was divided over its future course. As early as 1978
the air force commander proposed that a process leading to a return to
civilian rule be initiated. The military became divided into hard-liners and
moderates. The hard-liners wanted to continue the high level of repression
they called "an ideological war of national purification." The moderates,
including Videla and the army commander, Viola, wanted to reach an agreement
with civilian political and social forces. A third group, led by Admiral
Emilio Massera, sought to forge an alliance with the more conservative
elements among the Peronists.

     While the military leaders debated their future course, the political
parties were unable to agree on a common strategy to push for elections. In
April 1979 an ideologically diverse group of political parties issued a
statement calling for unrestricted political activity and elections. The
Radicals, preferring to seek a separate pact with the military, refused to
participate. In August several parties issued statements critical of the
government's economic policy and calling for elections, but the MID, although
agreeing to call for changes in economic policy, refused to join the call for
elections, and the Radicals refused to participate at all.

     The economy worsened during the 1979 and a large number of domestic
industrial firms declared bankruptcy. A chorus of protests against Martinez de
Hoz from wide sectors of the population failed to cause the government to
alter its policies.

     At the end of 1979 Videla announced that the government was ready to
begin laying the foundation for the creation of a democratic government
although, no schedule was set nor a mechanism announced for the process. In
March 1980 he announced that consultations to discuss the basis of a new
political system with party leaders would soon begin. However, the
onset of a new financial crisis interrupted the process, for several major
banks collapsed following a large number of bankruptcies. In June 1980
Ricardo Balbin, leader of the UCR, indicated that the UCR was not prepared
to discuss a transition to civilian rule while the country was in economic
crisis. In August, however, several small, center-left parties demanded an
immediate return to civilian rule. Videla responded in September 1980 by
prohibiting all party gatherings. In the meantime, economic conditions
worsened, and by mid-1981 the country was in a deep economic recession.

     Videla retired in March 1981, and the army commander, General Viola was
selected by the junta to replace him. The choice, however, was not unanimous;
although the army and the airforce supported him, the navy voted against him.
The navy, firm supporters of Martinez de Hoz economic policies, distrusted
Viola. The SRA and the UIA urgently requested relief from the financial plight
of their members and the chaotic state of the exchange and finance markets. A
package of economic measures was announced on March 31. Its most important
feature was a 23-percent currency devaluation, which effectively dismantled
the central instrument-an overvalued peso-of Martinez de Hoz economic policy.

     In addition, Viola offered to include critics from the SRA and the UIA
in his cabinet and to include party leaders in discussions on the political
transition. His moderation and his apparent desire to talk to the political
parties were welcomed by human rights organizations but earned him the
distrust of many officers, particularly his successor as army commander,
General Leopoldo Galtieri, who publicly warned Viola not to seek popularity
by dissociating himself from direct responsibility for the repression of
the guerrillas and who criticized Viola's attempts to reach an understanding
with the civilian politicians. The navy command, in contrast, seemed to
support Viola by issuing a statement indicating its view that a time limit
should be set on the military's exercise of governing power.

     In the midst of the political uncertainty, the financial crisis
continued. There were three major runs on the peso between Viola's
inauguration and June 1981. As firm