Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0016/00167.txt

Text File | 1991-06-24 | 34KB | 547 lines

$Unique_ID{COW00167}
$Pretitle{273}
$Title{Argentina
Chapter 4A.   Government and Politics}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Craig H. Robinson}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{government
president
federal
constitution
political
military
power
parties
congress
elected}
$Date{1987}
$Log{Casa Palace*0016701.scf
}
Country:     Argentina
Book:        Argentina, A Country Study
Author:      Craig H. Robinson
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1987

Chapter 4A.   Government and Politics

[See Casa Palace: Casa Rosada, the presidential palace]

     Political parties, personal factions, labor unions, military factions,
and business groups were among the numerous actors in Argentina's political
system-all competing for control of the presidency, for the power to determine
government policy, and for the authority to distribute the patronage that
such control brought. Each actor tended to seek exclusive control of the
government and, once successful, to use that control to harm its competitors.
As a result, virtually all government decisions were determined by weighing
their potential impact on the alignment of political forces supporting or
opposing the government.

     The political competition was not limited by the formal Constitution
and laws of the country, which were typically cited by those actors who
benefited from them and ignored by those who did not. Real political power
was not based on laws but on the control of political resources, such as the
ability to call a general strike, to withhold investment capital, or to take
over the government through force of arms.

     The political resources that brought victory in the competition varied
with the circumstances at any particular time. At one point, force of arms
might bring control of the government, but at another it might not be enough.
Similarly, winning elections might bring the presidency, but keeping it
depended on being able simultaneously to reward supporters with patronage and
policies that benefited them and to prevent opponents from coalescing in an
alliance that could overthrow the government or prevent it from making policy.

     The actors in the system tended to change positions rapidly, aligning
themselves in complex constellations of factions in support of particular
policy questions while producing a completely different alignment on other
policy questions. Thus, it was often difficult to determine who supported the
government and who opposed it, for the patterns shifted as the issues
changed.

     This pattern of continuously shifting coalitions was the dominant
pattern not only of the system as a whole but also of the institutional actors
within it. Virtually all of the organizations that competed in the system-
the military, the political parties, the business associations, and the labor
unions-were divided into factions. Just as each group in the system sought to
use the resources in its possession against its competitors, so internal
factions within the groups also fought for control of those same resources.

     The constantly shifting pattern of political alignment in the system
produced frequent changes of government as well as frequent changes in forms
of government. At times the dominant coalition favored liberal democratic
institutions because those institutions made the resources in their possession
important. At other times the dominant coalition favored authoritarian
institutions for much the same reason. The competition, however, was not over
forms of government which were means to an end, and were to be manipulated or
discarded as the political situation decreased their utility. Rather, the
competition was over the ability to determine government policy and thereby
to manipulate that policy to benefit supporters and punish opponents.

     The complexity of the system, in which alliances of factions within some
organizations formed alliances with factions within other organizations in
pursuit of relatively short-term political gain, produced a marked tendency
toward stalemate in the system, rendering the government unable to take any
action when confronted with an array of forces aligned against it. In such
situations the competition sometimes became violent as groups abandoned legal
political competition for civil war. Since the 1920s, however, violence was
limited, only becoming the dominant pattern of political struggle in the
1970s.

     The transformation of the political system in 1983 from an authoritarian
one based on military rule to a liberal-democratic system based on elected
civilians did not change these fundamental political patterns. Raul Alfonsin
confronted the same shifting pattern of support and opposition as did his
predecessors. Just as the inability of the preceding military governments
to solve the economic problems facing the country led to the transition to
civilian rule, so the survival of constitutional government depended
largely on Alfonsin's ability successfully to manipulate the forces in the
system to stay in power while solving similar economic problems. Whether or
not he succeeded depended little on ideology and even less on observing the
niceties of liberal democracy. Rather, it depended on his ability to marshal
the support of more factions and to sustain that support.

Institutional Structure

Constitutional Background

     The 1853 Constitution, which was still in effect in 1985, was written
and promulgated in the midst of the period of intermittent civil war
between Unitarians and Federalists that marked the country's first
half-century of independence (see The Dictatorship of Rosas, 1829-52, ch. 1).
Several earlier constitutions had been promulgated as part of the conflict,
most notably the strictly centralist 1826 constitution, followed by the
1831 Federal Pact that sanctioned the autonomy of the interior provinces.
The centralist rule of Juan Manuel de Rosas (1829-52) provoked a strong
reaction in the interior provinces, and following his overthrow in 1852, the
governors of most provinces agreed to a new constitution, promulgated in
1853. The province of Buenos Aires, however, boycotted the constitutional
convention and maintained a separate existence. Civil wars between Buenos
Aires and the other provinces followed in 1858 and 1861. Buenos Aires gained
a decisive victory in 1861, under the leadership of Bartolome Mitre, and then
agreed to join the other provinces, after securing some amendments to the
1853 Constitution.

     The 1853 Constitution provides for a federal system of representative
government. The provinces have the right to establish their own governments,
and all powers not specifically accorded to the national government are
reserved for the provinces. Provincial autonomy is limited, however, by a
provision allowing the national government to intervene in the provinces
whenever it deems such action necessary. The structure of the national
government is based on the principle of the separation of powers into there
coequal branches: legislative, executive, and judicial. The president, who
serves as both chief of state and head of government, is to be elected to
a six-year term by an electoral college, whose members are to be chosen by
popular vote. The legislative branch is to consist of a bicameral
Congress-the upper house elected by the legislatures of the provinces and the
lower house by popular election. The judiciary is to be nominated by the
president and confirmed by the upper house of the legislature. The
Constitution may be amended only by a convention summoned for that purpose
by a two-thirds vote of members of Congress. Amending conventions met in
1880, 1890, 1898, 1949, 1957, and 1972.

     The 1853 Constitution remained the formal institutional framework until
1949, when a constitutional convention convened by President Juan Domingo
Peron (1946-55) made substantial amendments to it. Although technically the
1949 constitution was merely an amendment to the 1853 Constitution, it was
treated as an entirely new co