Countries of the World/COUNTRYS.BIN/dp/0015/00157.txt

Text File | 1991-06-24 | 30KB | 476 lines

$Unique_ID{COW00157}
$Pretitle{273}
$Title{Argentina
Chapter 1F.   The National Reorganization Process, 1976-83}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Elizabeth de Lima-Dantas}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{argentina
military
argentine
political
economic
war
government
islands
rights
end}
$Date{1987}
$Log{Leaders of Argentina*0015701.scf
The Perons*0015702.scf
}
Country:     Argentina
Book:        Argentina, A Country Study
Author:      Elizabeth de Lima-Dantas
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1987

Chapter 1F.   The National Reorganization Process, 1976-83

The Military in Power

     The bloodless coup d'etat was welcomed by the landed and business
interests, most of the middle and working classes, the major newspapers, the
church, the UCR, and some Peronists who longed for economic stability and the
end of subversion. The military had three major goals: to reorganize the
country politically; to end the guerrilla civil war that had plagued Argentina
since the late 1970s; and to end inflation and the economic chaos inherited
from the Peronist administration.

     Before Peron's return to the presidency, guerrilla activities had
developed among radicalized portions of the middle and working classes and
were sometimes sponsored by the Peronists. After a brief interlude, Peron
disavowed the activism of the youth movement, which led to a new era of
underground terrorism. It reached even larger proportions after Peron's death
and undermined the survival of Peronism in Argentina. The government responded
by launching a war on subversion and creating its own kind of terror through
the use of paramilitary troops such as the AAA (see The War Against
Subversion, ch. 5).

     The political structure of the military regime was legitimized by a
constitutional amendment-the Statute for the National Reorganization Process
-of March 31, 1976. It established a military junta composed of the commanders
of the three armed forces-General Videla, Admiral Emilio Massera, and
Brigadier Orlando Ramon Agosti-as the supreme organ of the nation. This
body was responsible for the appointment of the president, who held both
executive and legislative powers after Congress was dismissed. The Legislative
Advisory Committee was created to assist the president in drafting and
approving the laws by decree.

     The first act of the junta was to appoint Videla to the presidency. He
was inaugurated in May 1976 to restructure completely the political, economic,
and social organization of the country under the terms of the military's
National Reorganization Process (see Public Industrial Policies, ch. 3;
Constitutional Provisions and Treaty Obligations, ch. 5). Once fully vested
with power, Videla undertook a war against subversion, which became known as
the "dirty war." In August 1978 Videla resigned from the army and from the
junta to assume the presidency of Argentina as a civilian. His successor in
the junta was General Roberto Viola. During the 1976-79 period, both the
government and the guerrillas bypassed all legal limitations and engaged in
open warfare. Countless numbers of kidnappings, killings, bombings, and
disappearances were charged against both sides. Government counterinsurgency
actions were carried out by special paramilitary units under armed forces
leadership. The whole repressive network was highly decentralized, which made
it very difficult to assemble proof of direct military involvement. In the
absence of due process, the victims of the dirty war were denied all rights
and were subjected to torture at hundreds of special detention centers
throughout the country.

     With the support of the civilian elites, the military resorted to open
violence and complete disregard for human rights. The country was kept under
the fear of reprisals because almost any activity could be considered
subversive and charged as a crime against national security. The war against
subversion was broadened to encompass potentially disruptive elements.
Censorship was applied to the media, the universities, and other learning
institutions. A more hideous form of censorship that derived from the terror
was self-censorship, which proved to be a castrating weapon against
scholarship and artistic creation. Many who escaped the terror, along with
the few released from prison, emigrated, resulting in a tremendous loss for
Argentina. Aside from a handful of people, most of the victims never surfaced
again and became part of the estimated 10,000 to 30,000 who "disappeared."
Most likely they were executed; their bodies were buried in countless mass
graves or, in some cases, dropped into the ocean.

     Human rights violations provoked little reaction in Argentina but
elicited widespread condemnation abroad. In 1979 a special commission from the
Organization of American States (OAS) was sent to Argentina to verify charges
of human rights violations. The government acknowledged the existence of 3,500
political prisoners, and it disavowed any responsibility for human rights
violations. In June, while prisoners were being tortured and murdered, the
government allowed the people to celebrate the World Cup soccer match held in
Argentina; the crowd at the stadium was not ideologically homogeneous but
could congregate around a common bond of sport. Like the old Roman circus,
soccer in Argentina-entertainment for the masses-was used to mask the most
abject reality of human rights violations. Despite all the funds expended to
present a positive picture of Argentina abroad, the coercion and fears of its
citizens were exposed by the international media. It became even more clear
that the regime operated through a dual structure-the formal institutional
government apparatus and the fearsome informal paramilitary structure.

     International criticism attracted attention to the problems inside
Argentina and undercut the Videla regime's efforts to cover up its human
rights violations. During the 1970s the only domestic protests against the
government had been the regular Thursday vigils of the Mothers of the Plaza de
Mayo, who held the administration responsible for the "disappearance" of their
sons and daughters The situation in Argentina ignited criticism abroad,
especially in the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany), France, Mexico,
Sweden, and the United States. The United States imposed a series of economic
sanctions against Argentina. The moral condemnation of Videla's regime was
enhanced in 1980 by the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Adolfo Perez
Esquivel, a poet, human rights activist, and critic of the Argentine
government.

     Another diversion from the main issues that plagued Argentine political
life was a crisis over the territorial dispute with Chile in the Beagle
Channel. Arbitration had taken place from time to time since 1902, and by the
end of 1978 both countries were preparing to wage war against each other. The
crisis developed from a 1973 agreement to accept British arbitration on the
basis of a 1902 treaty. The 1976 arbitration award was in favor of Chile's
claim and was not accepted by Argentina. Increased tensions were only
partially halted in 1979, when both parties agreed to accept the arbitration
of the Vatican (see Relations with Other Countries, ch. 4).

     Despite worldwide disgust, the military regime declared victory in the
dirty war against subversion in late 1978. Dissension surfaced within the
military junta over the question of the future democratization of the
political structure, however. There were three main factions. Generals Videla
and Viola led the moderate faction, which sought a certain degree of
accommodation with opposition political forces but nevertheless banned labor
unions from political activity. The hardliners advocated the continuation of
repression through an ideological crusade and were represented by generals
Carlos Suarez Mason, Iberico Saint Jean, and Luciano Benjamin Menendez. The
third group, led by Massera (a member of the junta until August 1978),
advocated