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Chief Justice Rehnquist, with whom Justice White and ì Justice Thomas join, dissenting. Concerned about the safety and esthetics of its streets ì and sidewalks, the city of Cincinnati decided to do something ì about the proliferation of newsracks on its street corners. ì Pursuant to an existing ordinance prohibiting the distribution of ì "commercial handbills" on public property, the city ordered ì respondents Discovery Network, Inc., and Harmon Publishing ì Company, Inc., to remove their newsracks from its sidewalks ì within 30 days. Respondents publish and distribute free of ì charge magazines that consist principally of commercial speech. ì Together their publications account for 62 of the 1,500-2,000 ì newsracks that clutter Cincinnati's street corners. Because the ì city chose to address its newsrack problem by banning only those ì newsracks that disseminate commercial handbills, rather than ì regulating all newsracks (including those that disseminate ì traditional newspapers) alike, the Court holds that its actions ì violate the First Amendment to the Constitution. I believe this ì result is inconsistent with prior precedent. ≡7É3 è "Our jurisprudence has emphasized that `commercial speech ì [enjoys] a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its ì subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values,' and ì is subject to `modes of regulation that might be impermissible in ì the realm of noncommercial expression.'" Board of Trustees of ì State Univ. of New York v. Fox, 492 U. S. 469, 477 (1989) ì (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Assn., 436 U. S. 447, 456 ì (1978)); see also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U. S. ì 60, 64-65 (1983). We have advanced several reasons for this ì treatment, among which is that commercial speech is more durable ì than other types of speech, since it is -the off- spring of ì economic self-interest.- Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. ì Public Service Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 564, n. 6 ì (1980); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens ì Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772, n. 24 (1976). ì Commercial speech is also "less central to the interests of the ì First Amendment" than other types of speech, such as political ì expression. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., ì 472 U.S. 749, 758, n. 5 (1985) (opinion of Powell, J.). Finally, ì there is an inherent danger that conferring equal status upon ì commercial speech will erode the First Amendment protection ì accorded noncommercial speech, "simply by a leveling process of ì the force of the Amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter ì kind of speech." Ohralik, supra, at 456. In Central Hudson, we set forth the test for analyzing ì the permissibility of restrictions on commercial speech as ì follows: .lm 1.00" á At the outset, we must determine whether the expression ì á is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial ì á speech to come within that provision, it at least must ì á concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, ì á we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is ì á substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, ì á we must determine whether the regulation directly ì á advances the governmental interest asserted, and ì á whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to ì á serve that interest. 447 U.S., at 566. .lm 0.00" I agree with the Court that the city's prohibition against ì respondents' newsracks is properly analyzed under Central Hudson, ì see ante, at 5, but differ as to the result this analysis should ì produce. As the Court points out, "respondents do not challenge ì their characterization as `commercial speech,'" and "[t]here is ì no claim in this case that there is anything unlawful or ì misleading about the contents of respondents' publications." ì Ibid. "Nor do respondents question the substantiality of the ì city's interest in safety and esthetics." Ibid. This case turns, ì then, on the application of the last part of the Central Hudson ì analysis. Although the Court does not say so, there can be no ì question that Cincinnati's prohibition against respondents' ì newsracks "directly advances" its safety and esthetic interests ≡7É3 ìèbecause, if enforced, the city's policy will decrease the number ì of newsracks on its street corners. This leaves the question ì whether the city's prohibition is "more extensive than necessary" ì to serve its interests, or, as we elaborated in Fox, whether ì there is a "reasonable fit" between the city's desired ends and ì the means it has chosen to accomplish those ends. See 492 U. S., ì at 480. Because the city's -commercial handbill- ordinance was ì not enacted specifically to address the problems caused by ì newsracks, and, if enforced, the city's prohibition against ì respondents' newsracks would result in the removal of only 62 ì newsracks from its street corners, the Court finds "ample support ì in the record for the conclusion that the city did not establish ì [a] reasonable fit." Ante, at 6 (internal quotation marks ì omitted). I disagree. According to the Court, the city's decision to invoke an ì existing ordinance "to address its recently developed concern ì about newsracks- indicates that -it has not `carefully ì calculated' the costs and benefits associated with the burden on ì speech imposed by its prohibition." Ante, at 7. The implication ì being that, if Cincinnati had studied the problem in greater ì detail, it would have discovered that it could have accomplished ì its desired ends by regulating the "size, shape, appearance, or ì number" of all newsracks, rather than categorically banning only ì those newsracks that disseminate commercial speech. Ibid. ì Despite its protestations to the contrary, see ante, at 7, n. 13, ì this argument rests on the discredited notion that the ì availability of "less restrictive means" to accomplish the city's ì objectives renders its regulation of commercial speech ì unconstitutional. As we observed in Fox, "almost all of the ì restrictions disallowed under Central Hudson's fourth prong have ì been substantially excessive, disregarding far less restrictive ì and more precise means." 492 U. S., at 479 (internal quotation ì marks omitted). That there may be other-less restrictive- means ì by which Cincinnati could have gone about addressing its safety ì and esthetic concerns, then, does not render its prohibition ì against respondents' newsracks unconstitutional. Nor does the fact that, if enforced, the city's ì prohibition would result in the removal of only 62 newsracks from ì its street corners. The Court attaches significance to the lower ì courts' findings that any benefit that would be derived from the ì removal of respondents' newsracks would be -`minute'- or ì -`paltry.'- Ante, at 7. The relevant inquiry, though, is not the ì degree to which the locality's interests are furthered in a ì particular case, but rather the relation that the challenged ì regulation of commercial speech bears to the -overall problem- ì the locality is seeking to alleviate. Ward v. Rock Against ì Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 801 (1989). This follows from our test for ì reviewing the validity of -time, place, or manner- restrictions ì on noncommercial speech, which we have said is -substantially ì similar- to the Central Hudson analysis. Board of Trustees of ì State Univ. of New York v. Fox, supra, at 477 (internal quotation ì marks omitted). Properly viewed, then, the city's prohibition ì against respondents' newsracks is directly related to its efforts ≡7É3 ìèto alleviate the problems caused by newsracks, since every ì newsrack that is removed from the city's sidewalks marginally ì enhances the safety of its streets and esthetics of its ì cityscape. This conclusion is not altered by the fact that the ì city has chosen to address its problem by banning only those ì newsracks that disseminate commercial speech, rather than ì regulating all newsracks alike. Our commercial speech cases establish that localities may ì stop short of fully accomplishing their objectives without ì running afoul of the First Amendment. In Posadas de Puerto Rico ì Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U. S. 328, 342 ì (1986), where we upheld Puerto Rico's ban on promotional ì advertising of casino gambling aimed at Puerto Rico residents, we ì rejected the appellant's argument that the ban was invalid under ì Central Hudson because other types of gambling (e.g., horse ì racing) were permitted to be advertised to local residents. More ì to the point, in Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U. S. 490 ì (1981) (plurality opinion), where we upheld San Diego's ban of ì offsite billboard advertising, we rejected the appellants' ì argument that the ban was invalid under Central Hudson because it ì did not extend to onsite billboard advertising. See 453 U. S., ì at 511 ("[W]hether onsite advertising is permitted or not, the ì prohibition of offsite advertising is directly related to the ì stated objectives of traffic safety and esthetics. This is not ì altered by the fact that the ordinance is underinclusive because ì it permits onsite advertising"). See also City Council of Los ì Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U. S. 789, 810-811 (1984) ì (rejecting the argument that the city's prohibition against the ì posting of signs on public property could not be justified on ì esthetic grounds because it did not extend to the posting of ì signs on private property). Thus, the fact that Cincinnati's ì regulatory scheme is underinclusive does not render its ban on ì respondents' newsracks unconstitutional. The Court offers an alternative rationale for ì invalidating the city's policy: viz., the distinction Cincinnati ì has drawn (between commercial and noncommercial speech) in ì deciding which newsracks to regulate -bears no relationship ì whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has ì asserted.- Ante, at 14 (emphasis in original). That is, because ì newsracks that disseminate noncommercial speech have the same ì physical characteristics as newsracks that disseminate commercial ì speech, and therefore undermine the city's safety and esthetic ì interests to the same degree, the city's decision to ban only ì those newsracks that disseminate commercial speech has nothing to ì do with its interests in regulating newsracks in the first place. ì The city does not contend otherwise; instead, it asserts that its ì policy is grounded in the distinction we have drawn between ì commercial and noncommercial speech. "In the absence of some ì basis for distinguishing between `newspapers' and `commercial ì handbills' that is relevant to an interest asserted by the city," ì however, the Court refuses "to recognize Cincinnati's bare ì assertion that the `low value' of commercial speech is a ì sufficient justification for its selective and categorical ban on ≡7É3 ìènewsracks dispensing `commercial handbills.'" Ante, at 17. Thus, despite the fact that we have consistently ì distinguished between commercial and noncommercial speech for the purpose of determining whether the regulation of speech ì is permissible, the Court holds that in attempting to alleviate ì its newsrack problem Cincinnati may not choose to proceed ì incrementally by burdening only commercial speech first. Based ì on the different levels of protection we have accorded commercial ì and noncommercial speech, we have previously said that localities ì may not favor commercial over noncommercial speech in addressing ì similar urban problems, see Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, supra, ì at 513 (plurality opinion), but before today we have never even ì suggested that the converse holds true. It is not surprising, ì then, that the Court offers little in the way of precedent ì supporting its new rule. The cases it does cite involve ì challenges to the restriction of noncommercial speech in which we ì have refused to accept distinctions drawn between restricted and ì nonrestricted speech on the ground that they bore no relationship ì to the interests asserted for regulating the speech in the first ì place. See ante, at 14, citing Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members ì of New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U. S. --, -- (1991); ì Carey v. Brown, 447 U. S. 455, 465 (1980). Neither of these ì cases involved the regulation of commercial speech; nor did they ì involve a challenge to the permissibility of distinctions drawn ì between categories of speech that we have accorded different ì degrees of First Amendment protection. The Court's reliance on ì Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., see ante, at 16-17, is also ì misplaced. In that case we said that the State's interest in ì "shield[ing] recipients of mail from materials that they are ì likely to find offensive" was invalid regardless of the type of ì speech- commercial or noncommercial-involved. See 463 U. S., at 71-72. By contrast, there can be no question here that the ì city's safety and esthetic interests justify its prohibition ì against respondents' newsracks. This at least is the teaching of ì Metromedia. There, seven Justices were of the view that San ì Diego's safety and esthetic interests were sufficient to justify ì its ban on offsite billboard advertising, even though the city's ì reason for regulating these billboards had nothing to do with the ì content of the advertisements they displayed. See 453 U. S., ì 507-510 (opinion of White, J., joined by Stewart, Marshall, and ì Powell, JJ.); id., at 552-553 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part); ì id., at 559-561, 563 (Burger, C. J., dissenting); id., at 569-570 ì (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Without even attempting to ì reconcile Metromedia, the Court now suggests that commercial ì speech is only subject to lesser protection when it is being ì regulated because of its content (or adverse effects stemming ì therefrom). See ante, at 5, n. 11, 15. This holding, I fear, ì will unduly hamper our cities' efforts to come to grips with the ì unique problems posed by the dissemination of commercial speech. If (as I am certain) Cincinnati may regulate newsracks ì that disseminate commercial speech based on the interests it has ì asserted, I am at a loss as to why its scheme is unconstitutional ì because it does not also regulate newsracks that disseminate ≡7É3 ìènoncommercial speech. One would have thought that the city, ì perhaps even following the teachings of our commercial speech ì jurisprudence, could have decided to place the burden of its ì regulatory scheme on less protected speech (i.e., commercial ì handbills) without running afoul of the First Amendment. Today's ì decision, though, places the city in the position of having to ì decide between restricting more speech -fully protected speech- ì and allowing the proliferation of newsracks on its street corners ì to continue unabated. It scarcely seems logical that the First ì Amendment compels such a result. In my view, the city may order ì the removal of all newsracks from its public right-of-ways if it ì so chooses. See Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U. ì S. 750, 780-781 (1988) (White, J., joined by Stevens and ì O'Connor, JJ., dissenting). But however it decides to address ì its newsrack problem, it should be allowed to proceed in the ì manner and scope it sees fit so long as it does not violate ì established First Amendment principles, such as the rule against ì discrimination on the basis of content. "[L]ittle can be gained ì in the area of constitutional law, and much lost in the process ì of democratic decisionmaking, by allowing individual judges in ì city after city to second-guess . . . legislative . . . ì determinations" on such matters as esthetics. Metromedia, supra, ì at 570 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Cincinnati has burdened less speech than necessary to ì fully accomplish its objective of alleviating the problems caused ì by the proliferation of newsracks on its street corners. Because ì I believe the city has established a -reasonable fit- between its ì substantial safety and esthetic interests and its prohibition ì against respondents' newsracks, I would hold that the city's ì actions are permissible under Central Hudson. I see no reason to ì engage in a -time, place, or manner- analysis of the city's ì prohibition, which in any event strikes me as duplicative of the ì Central Hudson analysis. Cf. Board of Trustees of State Univ. of ì New York v. Fox, 492 U. S., at 477. Nor do I think it necessary ì or wise, on the record before us, to reach the question whether ì the city's regulatory scheme vests too much discretion in city ì officials to determine whether a particular publication ì constitutes a "commercial handbill." See ante, at 13, n. 19. It ì is undisputed, by the parties at least, that respondents' ì magazines constitute commercial speech. I dissent.