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                                                                                THE BALKANS, Page 60

Saving Bosnia -- At What Price?


There is a moral case for intervention, but neither the U.S.
nor Europe is ready to shoulder the military cost

By GEORGE J. CHURCH -- With reporting by William Mader/London,
Frederick Ungeheuer/Paris and Bruce van Voorst/Washington


    Multiple-choice test for global strategists: if Western
military forces intervened in Bosnia, they would face a
situation most like a) the Vietnam War, b) Desert Storm, c)
Northern Ireland, d) none of the above. Since history rarely
repeats itself exactly, the most likely answer is d. But there
are enough points of similarity to a and c -- and of
dissimilarity to b -- to give pause to the U.S. and Europe.

    Western leaders are moving steadily closer to going ahead
anyway. Public revulsion at the killing shown on television and
a sense of impotence in the supposed new world order are
beginning to build pressure in Washington, London, Paris and
Bonn to do something. Economic sanctions against Serbia promise
no quick solution. Even the airlift of supplies into Sarajevo
that began last week seems likely only to stave off starvation.

    But successful intervention requires strong leadership
that sets clear and achievable political objectives and
assembles sufficient forces -- conditions met in Desert Storm
but not so far in the Balkans. The U.S., conspicuously, wants
the European nations to take the lead. They have been just as
conspicuously unwilling. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney last
week said American planes would supply air cover and support to
an international expedition, but insisted that under no
circumstances would American troops be sent into ground combat
in what he calls "an internal civil war."

    To some allies this sounds like an invitation for their
soldiers to do the dying. According to a senior French official,
George Bush last week telephoned President Francois Mitterrand
to try out an idea for joint air strikes against Serbian
positions around Sarajevo and along the road to Split, the
Adriatic port from which relief supplies might be sent overland.
Mitterrand, says the official, refused because that might expose
the 250 French soldiers flown into Sarajevo airport last week
to Serbian reprisals. White House officials snort that Bush
proposed no such thing. But the story illustrates the
unwillingness of Europeans to commit ground troops unless
American G.I.s share the risks.

    In any case, how much force would be required and how many
casualties might be expected depends heavily on what political
objectives the allies set. Even the minimum objective --
securing the area around the airport so that relief flights can
land safely -- might require taking out Serbian gun positions
and tanks in the surrounding hills. Guesses of the force needed
range from 45,000 to 100,000. French Colonel Jean-Louis Dufour,
author of a book on the gulf war, thinks that it would take
75,000 troops grouped in three contingents, each including two
tank regiments and two artillery regiments.

    Some experts doubt that a full-scale airlift could bring
in enough food to do more than help Sarajevo's 400,000
residents survive. A genuine end to the siege might require
opening an overland corridor from Split. That would be a still
more difficult task if relief convoys negotiating shell-pocked
roads also had to shoot their way past Serbian roadblocks.

    Even a decisive relief of Sarajevo while Serbian
aggression raged on elsewhere in Bosnia would be no great
victory. In Washington there is talk of establishing protected
islands of security throughout the country. The extreme option
would be reconquest of Bosnian territory already taken over by
the Serbs. Some British sources estimate that would require at
least 300,000 troops and up to a year of intense battle. "In the
gulf war, the allies' high-tech stuff worked well," says Michael
Dewar, deputy director of London's International Institute of
Strategic Studies. But in mountain guerrilla warfare, "smart
weapons are of little use. It would mean tough infantry combat
from tree to tree."


    Such predictions might turn out to be no more accurate
than the early forecasts of a long and bloody ground war in
Kuwait. But one parallel to Vietnam looks ominous: limited
military actions succeed but the civil war goes on, so the U.S.
and friends are drawn step by step into more extensive fighting.
Or the allied forces might impose an uneasy truce but then be
unable to leave lest the slaughter resume. Says John
Steinbruner, director of international studies at the
Washington-based Brookings Institution: "This has all the
earmarks of Northern Ireland," where British troops have fought
for more than 20 years.

    There is still a moral basis for intervention, and the
U.N. dare not flunk a test case of its ability to cope with the
ethnic wars that increasingly loom as the greatest threat to
world peace. So far, however, public opinion in the U.S. and
Western Europe has not seen any strategic or humanitarian
interests at sufficient risk to justify the sacrifice of one
soldier's life. Even a carefully planned intervention that
matches adequate force to clear and achievable political aims
may not change that opinion. A slapdash expedition for unclear
ends would have no chance at all.