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                                                                                BOOK EXCERPT, Page 42

MY FINAL HOURS


On the eve of his visit to the U.S., the former Soviet leader
reflects on how he lost his job and on his frustrations with
Boris Yeltsin

By MIKHAIL S. GORBACHEV

[(c) 1992 by Mikhail S. Gorbachev, from a book to be published
later this year.]


    On Dec. 14, in the final days of my tenure as the
President of the U.S.S.R., I decided to go to a concert. Claudio
Abbado was conducting Mahler's Fifth Symphony in Moscow. That
unforgettable evening was the first time I'd heard Mahler's
music. For a long time he, just like Wagner, was, as they say,
"not welcome" in our country.

    Great music is an expression of philosophical reflection
and probing. In that particular symphony, there are passages,
particularly in the first movement, when the cellos and the
violas play together, that shake you to the very core of your
being. It's very powerful and moving.

    I had the feeling that Mahler's music somehow touched our
situation, about the period of perestroika, with all its
passions and struggles.

    I had come hoping to relax, but I couldn't. Instead, I had
a feeling of total immersion in the music. For me it was like a
revelation. Raisa Maximovna had the same reaction.

    After the concert we met Claudio Abbado. "You know," Raisa
Maximovna said to him, "I've been shaken by this music. It left
me with a feeling of despondency, a feeling that there is no way
out."

    The conductor strongly objected. "Oh, no!" he said. "There
is a way out!"

    He understood the state she was in, so he repeated, "Yes,
there is a way."

    He was right. If you listen to that overwhelming music,
you hear the themes of life and death. There is also light, but
against the backdrop of darkness, of tragic struggle. In life
there is always conflict and contradiction, but without those
there is no life. Mahler was able to capture that aspect of the
human condition.

    So was Wagner. What a giant! I have to admit that
listening to his music doesn't make one more optimistic or
confident. Quite the contrary, he adds to one's doubts. But man
remains capable of finding a way out of any crisis as long as
he is allowed to explore, to think and to be creative.

    We used to be hemmed in by the system we had in this
country. We were repressed intellectually and forced to conform
with stereotypes. That's why Wagner was supposed to be the last
thing we needed. Everything had to be as simple and clear as
ABC.

    I knew that system from within. Essentially, the idea [of
perestroika] was to break the backbone of the totalitarian
monster. The party was intertwined with the KGB, the government
and other organs of state power. Was I afraid of the KGB? No,
I had no fear. If I had been afraid, I would not have been able
to do anything. But I knew their power! I knew that what I am
able to say today, I couldn't have said then. I had to beat
them at their game.

    Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn once said that following the middle
course is the most difficult thing in politics. I can confirm
how right he was on the basis of my own experience. There was
once a political cartoon that showed me walking a tightrope and
carrying two baskets, one filled with leftists and the other
with rightists. The leftists are saying, "A little bit more to
the left!" and the others are shouting, "A bit more to the
right!" It's a good joke, but more important, it accurately
reflects the situation I found myself in.


    The period roughly between November 1990 and April 1991
[when Gorbachev was maneuvering under pressure from
conservative forces] was particularly difficult. There was an
escalation in confrontation. Early in 1991 there were rallies
and demonstrations in the streets. Troops were called out. The
threat of dictatorship was real. I saw an imminent danger. I
proposed that the leaders of the republics meet immediately at
[a government dacha in] Novo-Ogarevo [a village outside
Moscow].

    It was the right thing to do, but I now believe we should
have done it earlier, in the fall of 1990. It was then that we
should have started looking for certain forms of cooperation.
We should have held some sort of round-table meetings. We should
have closed ranks with the democratic forces so that we could
move more rapidly along the path of reform. Had we done so, the
question of our statehood [i.e., keeping the country together]
would have been handled better and the cost of change would have
been lower.

    As it was, we lost time.

    In the summer of 1991, before leaving Moscow for my
vacation, I began to outline an article in which I would analyze
the experience of perestroika. After arriving at Foros [in the
Crimea], I was going through the books I took with me. One of
them was titled October 1917: The Greatest Event of the Century
-- or a Social Catastrophe? A parallel immediately came to my
mind: pere stroika -- is it a catastrophe or a great event, a
breakthrough for the country?

    That was the impulse for the article that I set about to
write. By Aug. 12, it was finished. So much of it was already
in the mind that it was only a matter of committing it to paper.

    Then, a week later, came the putsch. The consequences were
devastating. The plotters had made it impossible to implement
the Anti-Crisis Program [the Gorbachev government's plan to
stabilize the country's finances and gradually introduce market
mechanisms into the economy]; they made it impossible to
continue the reform of the Communist Party. And they also made
it impossible to sign the union treaty [which would have kept
the country together while granting more power to the individual
republics].

    The putsch accelerated the disintegration not just of the
state but also, more important, of society as a whole. Fully
aware of the danger that new situation posed to democratic
reform, I considered the resumption of work on the union treaty
as my highest priority. That goal determined all my actions.

    On Nov. 14, the State Council [composed of leaders of the
former Soviet republics] met in Novo-Ogarevo. It was a
difficult but fruitful day. The spirited debate focused on the
central question: Shall we have a union state or a union of
states? It might seem that it was a purely linguistic argument,
but behind it was the all-important question of whether we
should preserve one country or divide into several countries
with all the resulting implications for the issues of
citizenship, the economy, science, armed forces, foreign policy
and so on. For four hours we talked about this universe of
nations living in a vast country. The position of Russia,
enunciated by Boris Yeltsin, was that there would still be a
union. At the end, we all concluded that the best outcome would
be a confederative union state.

    Discussion of the union treaty in the parliament was
broken off in an atmosphere heavy with emotions verging on
panic, fueled in particular by the press in the wake of the
Ukrainian referendum. Despite the famous statement Yel tsin had
made in Novo-Ogarevo -- "The union will exist!" -- the Russian
leadership reversed its position, claiming that Russia had never
agreed to a union without Ukraine. But that was just a pretext.

    The first days of December were overshadowed by anxiety.
On Dec. 1, the people of Ukraine voted overwhelmingly in a
referendum to support their parliament's declaration of
independence from Moscow. On Dec. 3, the German Chancellor,
Helmut Kohl, called me. We are friends, and as always, our talk
was extremely candid.

    "Tell me," he asked, "what is actually happening in your
country?" In particular, he was interested in my assessment of
the situation in Ukraine.

    I told him that the referendum was being interpreted there
as a vote for secession from the union. Independence and
sovereignty were being automatically equated with secession. But
that was not so. Other republics were also sovereign and
independent, but that by no means put them outside the union.
Earlier that same day I had spoken with [Leonid] Kravchuk
[the President of Ukraine], and he had assured me that
cooperation was still possible. But during his election
campaign, he had found himself in the tight embrace of forces
that wanted to provoke complete secession from the union. Would
he be able to extricate himself? If an attempt was made to break
Ukraine away from the union, we could be faced with very
dangerous developments there. The separatist forces must not be
allowed to use the independence of Ukraine for secession.


    I was sure that society would support me, since common
sense suggested that it would be wrong to divide up the country.
If the U.S.S.R. were to split up, we'd have to divide our armed
forces. Ours was a unique defense space, with strategic forces
and early-warning systems that monitored the global military
situation. There was nothing like it anywhere in the world
except in America. Were we really going to rip it apart?

    If something like that happened, the [Soviet] military
would watch what the politicians are doing and say, "Damn it,
this country is in the wrong hands! It's just unbelievable what
we've come to!"

    All we had to do was look at the situation in Yugoslavia
to see where we might be heading. We might get into such a mess
that several generations would have to live with the
consequences.

    Shortly after the Ukrainian referendum, I had a
conversation with Yeltsin setting forth the arguments in favor
of preserving the union. I found, however, that Yeltsin was not
inclined to discuss the substance of this matter. In fact, he
really had nothing much to say. He just kept asking me the same
question: "Now, what about Ukraine? Can you guarantee that it
will join the treaty?"

    I bore down on Yeltsin hard, saying that Ukraine could
still be drawn into the negotiating process; but in order for
that to happen, Russia must first sign the treaty; only then
would Ukraine follow suit.

    During that period I had contact with Yeltsin almost every
day, either on the phone or in my office. We talked about many
things, but the most important was still the question of
preserving the union. When I asked him why the [Russian
parliament] had postponed the debate on the draft of the union
treaty, he said something to the effect that the deputies
wouldn't support it. But as I pointed out, his experts and mine
were working together in an atmosphere of general agreement, so
how did he know that the Russian deputies would oppose the
treaty?

    I realized that the Russian President was dissembling and
that the secessionist position taken by the Ukrainian
leadership was actually a godsend for him, because it played
into his hand as he stalled over the union treaty. He clearly
had his own plan in mind.

    When Yeltsin was about to go to Mensk [on Dec. 7, to meet
with Kravchuk and Stanislav Shushkevich, the leader of
Belarus], I asked him bluntly what he was going to propose
there. He mentioned the possibility that a union of Slavic
republics might come up.

    I told him that was unacceptable.

    On Sunday, Dec. 9, I had a call from Shushkevich.

    "We've reached an agreement," he said, "and I want to read
it to you."

    I asked him what agreement he was talking about.

    "Well," he said, "you know -- it's already been gaining
[international] support. We've had a conversation with
[President George] Bush."

    I stopped him right there: "You've been speaking with the
President of the United States of America, and the President of
this country knows nothing about it? Shame on you!"

    I was flabbergasted. While Shushkevich was telling me what
had happened, Boris Nikolayevich [Yeltsin] was on the phone
with Bush!

    I asked to speak with Yeltsin. When he called on me after
his return from Mensk, the conversation was tense.

    "You've been off meeting in the woods and shutting down
the Soviet Union. Some people in this country even have
interpreted it as a kind of political coup, carried out behind
the back of the supreme soviets of the republics. The President
of the United States learned about all of it before the
President of the U.S.S.R.!"

    The action taken in Mensk faced the Central Asian
republics with a fait accompli. Frankly, it was an insult to
their sovereignty and national dignity. As to Ukraine, or more
precisely its politicians, everything was clear. Their behavior
was in keeping with their objective of ruining the union.

    Later I had a talk with Yeltsin and asked him if the
independent states were to have their own armies. He said, "Yes,
but excluding the strategic forces."

    "That means Ukraine will have an army of 470,000 men,
right? That's 100,000 men more than the army of the united
Germany!"

    Despite my profound conviction that Yeltsin, Kravchuk and
the others had made a huge mistake, I still had to accept the
Commonwealth as a new reality and do what I could to promote the
process and keep it as much as possible within a legitimate
framework.

    The international community was still sympathetic to the
idea of preserving the union, but the leaders of the West
regarded the Belovezhskaya Pushcha initiative and the principle
of commonwealth as reason for hope -- as a step in the direction
of preserving our community of nations.

    On Dec. 13, in a phone conversation with President Bush,
I shared with him my assessments of the situation.


    "The Mensk Agreement is just a sketch," I said, "an
improvisation. It leaves many questions unanswered. Further
discussion of the draft union treaty in the parliaments has been
made virtually impossible. The agreements between me and the
leaders of the republics have been thrown out the window. The
meeting produced a rather facile statement that the union no
longer exists. But then that means there are no laws regulating
public order, defense, frontiers, international obligations, and
so on."

    The next day [French President] Francois Mitterrand
called, and later I talked with Kohl, [British Prime Minister
John] Major and other leaders. They did not hide their concern
over the escalating process of disintegration in our country.
They were worried not only about nuclear security but also
about political and economic implications that posed a threat
of instability in Europe and throughout the whole world.

    [In mid-December] Bush sent James Baker to the Soviet
Union. I told the Secretary of State what I'd already said to
the President -- that the Mensk agreement was far too vague to
be the basis for the orderly transformation of our country. I
added that I did not want to go into the causes of everything
that had happened. That was our problem and our responsibility:
"There may have been miscalculations and even serious mistakes
on my part too, but that's not the point now. I see a role for
myself in using the political means available to me to prevent
even greater disintegration in the process of creating the
Commonwealth of Independent States. Time is running out, and we
have to act quickly.

    "I want the leaders of the republics to succeed, although
I don't believe that they can. Still, I want them to, because if
they don't, all that we have accomplished will be in jeopardy.
So will the future itself."

    Baker stressed that the U.S. Administration was doing
everything possible not to let itself be drawn into our internal
affairs. He said that the U.S. was interested in an orderly
process of transformation.

    "We share your view that the Mensk agreement is just a
shell," Baker continued. He had already met with Yeltsin, and
Baker said he doubted that the Commonwealth could form a common
defense structure. "From my talks here," he said, "I can't see
how there can be common defense if there are 10 separate foreign
policies. Who will give orders to the commander in chief of the
joint armed forces?"

    "You're right, Jim," I replied. "I anticipated this. My
prophecies are beginning to come true very quickly. I've already
had to intervene. I've spoken with Kravchuk and Yeltsin several
times. Kravchuk has declared himself the commander in chief [of
Soviet armed forces in Ukraine]. I can't help being worried.
Russia may decide to put its foot down and say it's sick and
tired of this whole mess. What then? If the republics do not
come to terms, disintegration could escalate, and the result
could be dictatorship. The people are in such desperate straits
that they might even support a dictatorship. That's why I want
the agreement on the Commonwealth to succeed."

    Asked by Baker what the Americans should do in that
situation, I felt it necessary to say that the most important
thing for the Commonwealth was additional food aid. There was
a real danger that the situation could get critical and simply
explode, sweeping away all governments. "The $5 billion to $10
billion we need to achieve the convertibility of the ruble is
peanuts compared with the price we'd all have to pay if
everything were to blow up."


    On Dec. 19, I received a call from Kohl. Bring me up to
date, he said, what is happening? "What will your place be in
the future Commonwealth?" he asked. He sounded concerned, even
worried, which was quite out of character.

    I reiterated my conviction that it was a major political
mistake of strategic significance to dismember our state.

    Two days later [after 11 republics agreed to join the
Commonwealth, sealing the U.S.S.R.'s fate -- and Gorbachev's],
I talked to Francois Mitterrand. From his very first words,
which were warm and friendly as always, I sensed that he
understood what had happened. I informed him that within the
next few days I was going to make public my decision to leave
the office of the President.

    On Dec. 23, at 6 p.m., during a conversation with Yeltsin,
I received a call from Major. We had developed very good
relations, close on a human level and marked by trust and mutual
understanding on a political level.

    "We are thinking of you," he said.

    "Yes," I replied, "even if I take the most optimistic view
of things, developments in our country can only be described as
difficult. Here's what I'm thinking: even without the union, we
must not let everything that is happening in the country now
cause even greater losses for us here and for you. The
important thing now is that whatever happens next happens within
the framework of a political process, constitutional norms and
concord. For the time being, I see no danger that we'll go the
way of Yugoslavia. For me, that's what counts most. I hope it's
the same for you, John. In the end, life will take care of the
rest; everything will fall into place.

    "Since noon, already for six hours in a row, I've been
talking with Yeltsin. We recognize our shared responsibility to
the country and the world to ensure that everything started
over the past years be continued. Despite the differences of
approach, I will try to help the Commonwealth survive. I want
to help Yeltsin. It's not going to be easy for him. I've told
him that as long as the democratic changes and reforms continue,
I'll support him and defend him from attacks."

    Toward the end of our conversation, I said to Major, "I
have one request: help the Commonwealth, and above all Russia."
Then, in conclusion: "Thank you for your friendship. From me and
Raisa Maximovna, our most cordial and warm greetings to Norma."

    On Dec. 25, I talked with President Bush. I informed him
that in about two hours I would make my final statement
[resigning the presidency]. I shared with him my thoughts
about the current situation:

    "There is no question, George, that the states of the
Commonwealth must be recognized. However, I would request that
you bear in mind the following: it's very important for Europe
and the world to avoid an escalation of contradictions within
the Commonwealth. That's why it's so important to support the
Commonwealth as an interstate entity, not just its individual
members. We must promote cooperation rather than disintegration
and destructive processes. This is our common responsibility.
I emphasize this point.

    "The second point is the need to support Russia, which
will bear the brunt of the burden of reforms.

    "I have a decree on my desk. Since I'm terminating my
responsibilities as commander in chief, I am transferring the
right to use nuclear arms to the President of the Russian
Federation. I attach great importance to the fact that this
aspect is under effective control. The decree will come into
effect immediately after my final statement. You may therefore
feel at ease as you celebrate Christmas and sleep quietly
tonight.

    "For my part, I'm not running away to hide in the taiga
[forest]. I will remain active in politics and in public
affairs. I want to help the processes under way in this country
and promote new thinking in world politics."

    Here's what George Bush said in reply:

    "I'd like to assure you that we will stay involved in your
affairs. We will do our best to help, particularly the Russian
republic, given the problems that it is now facing and that
could get critical in winter."

    He concluded by saying, "I hope our paths will soon cross.
We will be glad to welcome you, once things settle down,
perhaps here in Camp David . . . And so, on this special day of
the year, at this historic crossroads, I salute you and thank
you for all that you have done for the world. And thank you for
your friendship."

    "Thank you, George," I said, "and goodbye."


    Right after my [farewell] address [to the nation] and
a brief press conference, there was a ceremony for the transfer
of the so-called nuclear button. Boris Yeltsin refused to
attend this act of momentous significance for the state and the
world, even though he and I had agreed in advance on the format
of the event. I was told that the President of Russia was
displeased with my address, that he was angry and refused to
show up at the agreed place. He saw fit to propose meeting
instead on "neutral ground."

    Marshal [Yevgeni] Shaposhnikov [the chief of staff of
the Commonwealth armed forces] arrived, along with the
officers who provided technical support for the nuclear command
system.

    There was no other ceremony to bid farewell to the
President of the U.S.S.R., as is the custom in civilized
countries. Of the Presidents of the sovereign states -- the
former republics of the U.S.S.R. -- with whom in most cases I
had been linked by many years of close and friendly relations,
not one came to Moscow during those days or even called me.

    Do I regret having had to leave the post of President?
From the very beginning of my time in office, I began
deliberately to delegate power. I do not care about power for
its own sake. Now that I have a different status, I have
far-reaching plans. I have been receiving many offers, including
those from my foreign friends, but the focus of my activities
will be here, in Russia.

    [Martin Luther] King was right: power is transitory, and
it's not the best thing to have. Power as such, as "the supreme
value" . . . well, I wouldn't have wanted that. I could give it
all up. There is another mission: to revive this country, this
land that contains a vast world -- long suffering, tormented
and demoralized -- to bring it back to normal life, and to
restore to its people a feeling of human dignity.