TIME - Man of the Year/CompactPublishing-TimeMagazine-TimeManOfTheYear-Win31MSDOS.iso/moy/030292/0302990.000

Text File | 1992-08-28 | 5.7 KB | 117 lines

                                                                                MIDDLE EAST, Page 32

Vengeance Is Mine


Israel hits back hard at Lebanon's Shi`ites. Getting tough could
help Shamir, but will it hurt the peace talks?

By JILL SMOLOWE -- Reported by Lisa Beyer/Jerusalem and J.F.O.
McAllister/Washington


    Peace talks or no, the Middle East is once again showing
its true color: the blood red of vengeance. The escalation of
violence began Feb. 14 when Arab guerrillas infiltrated an
Israeli army camp and hacked three soldiers to death. Two days
later in southern Lebanon, Israeli Apache helicopters fired
three missiles on the motorcade of Sheik Abbas Musawi, leader
of the Iranian-backed Hizballah. The long-planned strike killed
not only Musawi but also his wife and six-year-old son. From
there, hostilities spiraled rapidly. Hizballah launched scores
of Katyusha rockets into Israel's self-declared security zone
in southern Lebanon and into the Galilee panhandle of Israel
proper. The Jewish state fired back on about 20 Lebanese
villages, then sent a column of armored vehicles beyond the
security zone toward two Hizballah strongholds, Kafra and Yater,
where eight U.N. peacekeepers were wounded in the cross fire.

    While no one could say when the dismally familiar spiral
of violence might end, Jerusalem maintained repeatedly from the
start that its attacking forces were limited in number and that
their mission would be short. On Friday the troops were pulled
back to the security zone, but officials promised they would
return if Hizballah did not halt its rocket attacks.

    Much to Washington's relief, Israel's actions seemed to
have no disruptive impact on the Middle East peace process. On
the day of Musawi's killing, both Lebanon and Syria announced
that they would attend the third round of talks convening this
week in Washington, an indication of how little support
Hizballah enjoys in the Arab world. Even after Israel's attack
on Kafra and Yater, no parties pulled out. Only the
Palestinians, incensed by Israel's recent detention of two of
their delegates, threatened not to show -- then reversed course.

    In taking out Musawi, Israel's leaders knew that they
risked diplomatic opprobrium -- as well as retaliation from
Hizballah. So why did they hit him? Before Musawi took command
of Hizballah in mid-1991, he was a member of its military
command, which Israel holds responsible for such atrocities as
the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut. Still,
Israel entertained hopes that he might pursue a more moderate
course, since he had close ties to Iran's more pragmatic
leaders. But attacks by his militia on Israeli targets only
increased. After two previous failed attempts on his life, the
Israelis hit him last week because he was there, just where they
knew he would be when he publicized his plans to attend a
memorial service in the village of Jibshit. "There is a
legitimate principle called settling an account," says Yossi
Peled, former head of Israel's northern command. "That means
eliminating the person who made the decisions to take innocent
lives."

    Although the assassination was planned for months, the
timing proved especially appealing. The raid on the Israeli army
camp two days earlier was carried out most probably by
Palestinians, not Lebanese Shi`ites, but it provided the guise
of a provocation. The easy infiltration of the army camp
humiliated the military and spurred it to demonstrate its
competence. Since the U.S. hostages once held by Hizballah were
free, there was little concern about a serious outcry from
Washington. (Beyond deploring the "rising cycle of violence,"
the U.S. State Department warned of the increased danger of
terrorist attacks against Americans in the region.) And Israel's
concerns for its missing airman, Ron Arad, who fell into
Hizballah's hands after a 1986 Israeli raid, have shifted; he
is now believed to be dead or held by different captors.

    Then there were electoral considerations, never far from
any Israeli politician's mind. Coming into the week, the ruling
Likud bloc and the Labor Party were both preparing to name
leaders to run for Prime Minister in national elections on June
23. For Likud, Sunday's assault on Musawi was a well-timed
reminder to voters that it is implacably committed to the
country's physical security. As expected, Prime Minister Yitzhak
Shamir got the nod from his bloc. In Israel's first primary
ever, Labor members elected Yitzhak Rabin to replace Shimon
Peres.

    Now Shamir faces a far stiffer battle in June. He could
have depicted Peres as a left-winger who would negotiate away
too much. But Rabin is a hero of the 1967 Six-Day War who, as
Defense Minister from 1984 to '90, reinforced his tough image
by employing harsh tactics to quell the Palestinian intifadeh.
While he advocates trading parts of the occupied territories for
peace and opposes the expansion of Jewish settlements in those
areas, no Israeli mistakes him for a dove. Rabin will try to
convince voters that he alone can achieve peace, and he is
expected to make so strong a showing that he may force a new
national unity government.

    In the interim, Shamir will need to keep the peace process
percolating so Labor cannot blame him for its failure. At the
same time, he will not want the bargaining to proceed to any
yea-or-nay decision that might antagonize Likud's far-right-wing
voters. After last week's show of force in Lebanon, he can
probably afford the appearance of a little give-and-take. As
disheartening as the renewed hostilities are, perhaps they will
underscore for negotiators how acute the need is to achieve a
lasting peace.