The Best of the Bureau/The_Best_of_the_Bureau_Bureau_Development_Inc._1992.iso/dp/0108/01083.txt

Text File | 1992-08-07 | 21KB | 374 lines

$Unique_ID{bob01083}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Chapter 24A  Covert Action in a Democratic Society}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Various}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{covert
intelligence
activities
president
action
committee
cia
actions
committees
executive}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Title:       Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Author:      Various
Date:        1987

Chapter 24A  Covert Action in a Democratic Society

     The Iran-Contra Affair raises fundamental and troublesome questions about
the secret intelligence operations of the U.S. Government.  Can such
operations, and particularly covert action, be authorized and conducted in a
manner compatible with the American system of democratic government and the
rule of law?  Is it possible for an open society such as the United States to
conduct such secret activities effectively?  And if so, by what means can
these operations be controlled so as to meet the requirements of
accountability in a democratic society?

     These questions became the center of public debate in the mid-1970's,
after revelations of controversial Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
activities and extensive investigations by a Presidential Commission and
Select Committees of the House and the Senate.

     The result of those inquiries was a concerted effort by the executive and
legislative branches to adopt laws and procedures to control secret
intelligence activities, including covert actions, and to ensure that they
would be conducted only with the prior authorization of the President and
timely notice to Congressional committees specially constituted to protect the
secrecy necessary for effective operations.

     Experience has shown that these laws and procedures, if respected, are
adequate to the task.  In the Iran-Contra Affair, however, they often were
disregarded.  The flexibility built into the legislation and rules to allow
the executive branch to deal with extraordinary situations was distorted
beyond reasonable bounds.  Laws intended to reflect a spirit of comity between
the branches were abused when that commitment to cooperation was abandoned.

     The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, William J. Casey, and
other Government officials showed contempt for the democratic process by
withholding information that Congress was seeking and by misrepresenting
intelligence to support policies advocated by Casey.

What Is Covert Action?

     The term "covert action" refers to a specific type of clandestine
activity that goes beyond the collection of secret intelligence.  It is an
attempt by a government to influence political behavior and events in other
countries in ways that are concealed.

     Covert action is not defined in statute.  Executive Order 12333, however,
issued by President Reagan in 1981, refers to covert action as special
activities which are defined as:

Special activities mean activities conducted in support of national foreign
policy objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of
the United States government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly, and
functions in support of such activities . . . .

     This definition excludes diplomatic activities, the collection and
production of intelligence, or related support functions.  The Executive order
also provides that the authorized special activities may not include
activities that are "intended to influence United States political processes,
public opinion, policies, or media."

     Peacetime covert action became an instrument of U.S. foreign policy in
response to the expansion of Soviet political and military influence following
World War II.  The overt U.S. policies at that time included the commitment of
military assistance under the Truman Doctrine, the surge of economic aid
through the Marshall Plan, the efforts to establish a democratic regime in
West Germany, and the dramatic airlift to break the Soviets' Berlin blockade.
Accompanying the overt policies were covert actions designed to counter Soviet
political influence and to prepare for behind-the-lines resistance in case of
a Soviet invasion of Europe.  When a Communist-organized coup overthrew the
Government of Czechoslovakia in February 1948, and a series of general strikes
orchestrated by Communist-controlled labor unions swept Western Europe, U.S.
officials decided that this covert political action and support should be
intensified to reinforce the still-fragile free institutions of the postwar
world.

     In this atmosphere, President Truman directed the development of a covert
action capability.  A 1948 National Security Council Directive, NSC 10/2,
defined covert actions to be:

propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage,
anti-sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile
states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas
and refugee liberation groups, and support of indigenous anti-communist
elements.

Since 1948, U.S. covert actions have included most of these activities.

     What makes such activities "covert" is not their effect, but their
implementation in a manner permitting "plausible denial," a concept that NSC
10/2 also codified.  U.S. action in support of indigenous groups were to be:

so planned and executed that any U.S. government responsibility for them is
not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the U.S. Government
can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.

     This concept was an important element in the measures which the Truman
and Eisenhower Administrations implemented to strengthen democratic trade
unions, the fledgling postwar political parties, and the free press in the
war-ravaged parts of the world.  For American support had its own danger: it
might have tainted the recipients and exposed them to charges of being in the
service of "Yankee imperialism."  Means had to be found to camouflage the
American connection.  Financing and other support, in case of unwelcome
publicity, was to be nonattributable to the U.S. Government, and allegations
about such support were to be deniable in a plausible manner.

     As originally defined in NSC 10/2, "plausible denial" meant concealing
the U.S. Government's role from unauthorized inquiry - not avoiding
responsibility and accountability to other agencies of the Government,
including Congress.  One of the main issues identified by Congressional
investigations in the mid-1970's, however, was the misuse of "plausible
denial."

Covert Action and the Law

     Covert action operations pose challenges for the political processes of
the United States.  As with other secret intelligence programs and more
sensitive defense projects, appropriations and expenditures of these
operations must necessarily be kept from the public domain.  Thus, covert
assistance to foreign governments and groups does not receive the open debate
other assistance programs do.

     Paramilitary covert actions are in the "twilight area" between war, which
only Congress can declare, and diplomacy, which the President must manage.
This type of activity is especially troublesome as a constitutional separation
of powers issue.

     While covert actions can be legitimate instruments of foreign policy,
they can, if inconsistent with the national policy, undermine U.S. interests
abroad.  Even if the covert action is consistent with U.S. policy, disclosure
sometimes can be harmful to U.S. interests.

     The executive and legislative branches have agreed that covert actions
must be subject to specific legal controls.  Statutes, executive orders, and
national security directives establish a framework for the authorization and
conduct of these activities.  The system was intended to insure careful review
and accountability and to meet the practical need of securing political
support.

     The National Security Act of 1947 created both the National Security
Council (NSC) and the Central Intelligence Agency.  The law authorized the CIA
to advi