The Best of the Bureau/The_Best_of_the_Bureau_Bureau_Development_Inc._1992.iso/dp/0103/01038.txt

Text File | 1992-08-07 | 29KB | 488 lines

$Unique_ID{bob01038}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Chapter 9B   The NSC Reconsiders Iran Policy}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Various}
$Affiliation{}
$Subject{mcfarlane
iran
ledeen
ghorbanifar
israelis
israeli
hostages
tows
president
israel}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Title:       Iran-Contra Affair: The Report
Author:      Various
Date:        1987

Chapter 9B   The NSC Reconsiders Iran Policy

     When he returned to the United States, Ledeen told NSC staff member
Donald Fortier that the Israelis were interested in working with the United
States on Iran.  At the time, Fortier was working closely with CIA National
Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia, Graham Fuller, who was
updating the Special National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) on Iran at
McFarlane's request.  A SNIE represents the U.S. intelligence community's
short-term assessment of a given country or situation in response to a
specific need.  Both the SNIE circulated on May 20 and a memo submitted by
Fuller three days earlier to CIA Director Casey, included a recommendation of
arms sales through an ally as one of a number of options for pursuing an
opening to Iran.  The NSC staff concluded that Israel should be that country,
although Fortier continued to question whether Ledeen was the appropriate
intermediary through which the United States should deal with Israel.

     On June 3, 1985, McFarlane approved a second Ledeen trip to Israel, but
Ledeen's return to Israel was delayed when Secretary of State George P. Shultz
protested Ledeen's earlier trip.  Shultz had heard from the U.S. Ambassador to
Israel that Ledeen had been in Israel talking to Israeli officials about
obtaining intelligence on Iran, without notice to the U.S. Embassy.  Shultz
complained to McFarlane that neither he nor the U.S. Ambassador to Israel had
been informed of the trip, and pointed out that Israel and the United States
had differing interests in Iran.  He also questioned the wisdom of relying
upon Israeli intelligence about Iran. McFarlane told Shultz that Ledeen had
taken the May trip "on his own hook."  He also said he was "turning [the Iran
initiative] off entirely."  In fact, McFarlane told Ledeen to postpone, not
cancel, the trip.

     Major policy changes call for consultation with the Secretaries of State
and Defense and an opportunity for the President to consider their views.
McFarlane thus began the established process of interdepartmental policy
formulation.  He had earlier requested the CIA to prepare the updated SNIE on
Iran, and in June he asked members of his staff to prepare a draft National
Security Decision Directive (NSDD).  An NSDD is a Presidential directive
establishing policy in a particular area.  It is the result of an analytical
process, including discussions among the interested parties.

     Fortier and Howard Teicher of the NSC staff submitted the draft NSDD to
McFarlane on June 11, and on June 17, McFarlane circulated this draft to
Secretary Shultz, Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, and CIA Director
Casey.  The draft NSDD recommended, among other things, that anti-Khomeini
factions in Iran should be supported, and that U.S. allies and friendly states
should be encouraged to "help Iran meet its import requirements . . .
includ[ing] provision of selected military equipment."  To bolster the NSC's
analysis, McFarlane cited the CIA's earlier intelligence estimate that had
recommended such arms sales, and warned of the Soviet threat to Iran.

     Only Casey endorsed the draft NSDD.  Secretary Weinberger wrote on the
transmittal note accompanying the draft, "This is almost too absurd to comment
on . . . .  It's like asking Quadaffi to Washington for a cozy chat."
Weinberger's response to the National Security Adviser was less sarcastic but
unambiguously negative.  Secretary Shultz's response was also negative.  He
criticized the idea of relaxing the arms embargo against Iran, warned against
the danger of strengthening Iran, and disagreed with the notion that Iran was
in danger of falling into Soviet hands.

     During the same period, the President was sharply critical of Iran.  In a
speech to the American Bar Association on July 8, 1985, the President declared
Iran to be part of a "confederation of terrorist states . . . a new
international version of Murder Incorporated."  He added, "Let me make it
plain to the assassins in Beirut and their accomplices that America will never
make concessions to terrorists."

The Discussions Continue

     While the Secretaries of State and Defense were opposing any relaxation
of the arms boycott of Iran, Israel was receiving different signals from the
NSC staff.  Ledeen testified that McFarlane had authorized him to tell Prime
Minister Peres that Israel could engage in a one-time arms sale to Iran of
artillery shells or pieces, "but just that and nothing else."  One of the
Israeli participants reported to another Israeli participant, however, that
the authorization conveyed by Ledeen from McFarlane was for a transfer of TOW
missiles.

     By early June, the Israelis were considering a transaction linking the
sale of TOWs to the release of the American hostages.  However, the Israelis
were unwilling to proceed without evidence of a clear, express, and binding
consent by the U.S. Government to the proposed transaction.

     On June 19, Ghorbanifar, accompanied by Furmark, met in Israel with the
Israeli team.  Ghorbanifar proposed that the Israelis sell 100 TOWs to Iran
through him.  He also agreed to set up a meeting with an Iranian official.

     The Israelis reported these developments to McFarlane.  In late June,
according to McFarlane's testimony, David Kimche, the Director General of the
Israeli Foreign Ministry, became involved in the project.  Kimche had an
established relationship with McFarlane and Ledeen.  While in Washington for
another purpose in early July, he briefed McFarlane on the ongoing contacts of
Israeli and Iranian officials, and the Iranians' interest in establishing
contact with the United States.  Kimche recommended that the discussions with
the Iranians continue.  McFarlane told Secretary Weinberger about the meeting,
and Weinberger's military assistant, Lt. Gen. Colin Powell, recalled that
McFarlane discussed both the sale of arms to Iran and the hostages.

     On July 8, 1985, members of the Israeli team met in Hamburg with
Ghorbanifar, Khashoggi, Khashoggi's son-in-law, and the First Iranian.  Before
the meeting, Ghorbanifar told the Israelis that the sale of 100 TOWs was
essential to enhance his credibility with Iran, and claimed that the sale
would be followed by the release of the American hostages.

     Ghorbanifar described the First Iranian as a politically powerful
individual in his own right, with close personal connections to Khomeini, and
a leader of one of Iran's revolutionary organizations.

     At the meetings, the First Iranian spoke of the need for a party who
could act as a bridge between Iran and the United States, of the threat of
Soviet influence in Iran, and of the risks he had taken in meeting with Israel
in order to promote opening with the United States.  The participants also
discussed missiles and hostages.  The First Iranian promised to present a
comprehensive written proposal within a week.

     Shortly after that meeting, according to Ledeen's testimony, Schwimmer
flew to Washington and met with Ledeen on July 11, 1985.  He briefed Ledeen on
Ghorbanifar's proposal to obtain the release of the American hostages in
exchange for TOW missiles.  Ledeen then wrote McFarlane, "The situation
[concerning Iran] has fundamentally changed for the better."  On July 13, he
briefed McFarlane orally on the Israeli talks with the Iranians.

     After meeting with Ledeen, McFarlane cabled Secretary Shultz with a
summary of the proposal conveyed by Israel:

The short term dimension concerns the seven hostages; the long term dimension
involves the establishment of a private dialogue with Iranian officials on the
broader r