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$Unique_ID{bob00479}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Rwanda
Chapter 2B. Events Leading to Independence}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{The Director Foreign Area Studies}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{hutu
tutsi
rwanda
political
belgian
government
administration
assembly
belgium
elections
see
tables
}
$Date{1990}
$Log{See Table 2.*0047901.tab
See Table 3.*0047902.tab
}
Title: Rwanda
Book: Area Handbook for Rwanda
Author: The Director Foreign Area Studies
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date: 1990
Chapter 2B. Events Leading to Independence
In February 1957 the High Council of Rwanda, composed entirely of Tutsi,
released its "Statement of Views" calling for definite action leading toward
self-government through rapid preparation of the elite. Because of its
emphasis on the training of the elite to prepare them for greater
responsibilities and participation in Government, the document brought an
immediate response from Hutu leaders who saw, in the ideas expressed, a Tutsi
attempt to perpetuate their dominant status.
The following month a counterdocument, "The Manifesto of the Bahutu,"
signed by Gregoire Kayibanda and eight other Hutu leaders, was made public.
Although agreeing that Africans should be allowed greater participation in
Government, the Manifesto declared that the basic problem of the country was
the political, economic, and social domination of the Hutu majority by a Tutsi
minority. The Manifesto demanded a continuation of Belgian Trusteeship until
such time as this situation could be corrected.
[See Table 2.: Results of 1956 Elections in Rwanda-Burundi]
The Manifesto of the Bahutu was the first indication of organized Hutu
opposition; a further step was taken in June 1957 when the nine signers joined
in the formation of the Hutu Social Movement "... to promote democratization
of institutions and to combat abuses." Together, the Manifesto and the
Statement articulated the conflicting principles which promoted the continuing
alienation of the Hutu and Tutsi. The 1960 Visiting Mission reported that it
was greeted by two contradictory slogans: "Immediate independence. Get rid
of the Belgians for us" and "Down with Tutsi feudalism. Long Live Belgian
Trusteeship."
A second Hutu organization was formed in November 1957. This was the
Association for the Social Betterment of the Masses (Association pour la
promotion sociale de la masse-APROSOMA), founded by Joseph Habyarimana
Gitera. Through its newspaper, Ijwa rya rubanda rugafi (The Voice of the
Common People), APROSOMA launched strong attacks on the entire system of Tutsi
domination.
Throughout 1958 the Hutu leaders attempted to convince the Mwami and the
High Council of the gravity of the problem of Hutu-Tutsi relations. In June
a Hutu delegation presented the Hutu case before the High Council. Its views
were not accepted, and the APROSOMA newspaper declared that there was reason
"to honestly wonder if the Bahutu still have anything to hope for from the
Batutsi for their emancipation."
Political activity gained momentum in 1959. Riots in Leopoldville in
January caused the Belgian Government to announce its intention to accelerate
the program for Congo independence. The possibility of similar action for
Rwanda-Burundi motivated both Hutu and Tutsi to attempt to strengthen their
positions.
The sudden, unexpected, and mysterious death of Mwami Mutara III on
July 24, 1959 initiated a period of intense political activity. Mutara was
reported to have died after an injection of an antibiotic, and the Tutsi
biru acted quickly to name a successor, Jean-Baptiste Ndahindurwa, a son of
Musinga and half-brother to Mutara. The Belgian Vice Governor learned of the
selection only after the fact, but felt compelled to accept the choice of the
biru, and the new Mwami was later invested as Kigeri V Ndahindurwa.
The rising tempo of political activity was manifested in the formation
of a number of political parties during the next few months. APROSOMA had
already been transformed into a political party in January. On September 3
the Rwanda National Union Party (Union nationale ruandaise-UNAR) was founded
with the goals of immediate self-government and total independence in 1962
under a hereditary constitutional monarchy Appealing for the unity of all
Rwandans, UNAR accused Belgian administrators and missionaries of having
divided the country.
Another party, the Rwanda Democratic Rally (Rassemblement Democratique
Ruandaise-RADER), was established on September 14. Advocating an "authentic
democracy in harmonious relationship with the various constituent groupings
of the Rwandese people," RADER proposed a constitutional monarchy and the
election of chiefs through universal suffrage. In addition, the party listed
among its purposes the maintenance of good relations with Belgium, the
spreading of the Gospel, internal autonomy in 1964, and independence in 1968.
The UNAR group charged that RADER was nothing more than a tool of the Belgian
administration. RADER played little part in the agitations leading to the
subsequent civil disorders.
On October 9, 1959, the Hutu Social Movement was transformed into a
fourth political party, the Party of the Hutu Emancipation Movement (Parti
du mouvement de l'emancipation Hutu-PARMEHUTU). The declared goals of this
party were the termination of Tutsi hegemony and the ending of the feudal
system. It called for sweeping land reforms and for ready access by the Hutu
to all levels of education. Kayibanda emerged as the leader of the party and,
in keeping with the Manifesto of the Hutu published some 2 years earlier,
rejected the concept of internal autonomy as another means of perpetuating
Tutsi domination. Independence, according to PARMEHUTU, would be possible
only after there were guarantees of genuine democracy.
The day after the formation of PARMEHUTU, the Governor of Rwanda-Burundi
prohibited all political meetings. Tensions had been increasing daily during
October, and the Governor's order was issued with a view to the restoration of
calm.
Tensions continued to mount, however, principally because of what was
seen as a UNAR-sponsored campaign of intimidation of members of opposition
parties through threats and assaults. There was also an attempt by the
Belgian Administration to discipline three highly placed Tutsi chiefs for
alleged UNAR political activities which were detrimental to the Government.
Mwami Kigeri allied himself with the chiefs and declared the action of the
administration illegal. The conflict led to a break between the administration
and UNAR.
In November the tensions culminated in a series of attacks and
counterattacks between Hutu and Tutsi groups. On November 3 a group of Tutsi
youths attacked a leader of PARMEHUTU, who was also one of the few Hutu
subchiefs. The following day, when it was falsely reported that the Hutu chief
had died, Hutu and Tutsi groups clashed and two Tutsi notables were killed.
These incidents touched off a wave of violence in which the Hutu pillaged
and burned thousands of Tutsi huts, and Tutsi commando bands attacked and
killed several PARMEHUTU and APROSOMA leaders.
By November 14 the Administration was able to restore order by
declaring a state emergency, calling in troops from the Congo, and bringing
in two companies of Belgian paratroopers. A number of UNAR leaders were
arrested and subsequently convicted by a military court. Several other UNAR
leaders fled to Tanganyika or Uganda to avoid prosecution.
One immediate result of the civil disorders was a serious refugee
problem. Nearly 5,000 Tutsi huts had been burned, and the number of Tutsi
refugees unable to return to their homes reached 7,000. Two more incidents
of burning in March and April of 1960 added substantially to the number of
refugees. The matter of refugees was made a strong political issue by Tutsi
leaders, and the administration charged them with impeding solution of the
problem becau