TIME: Almanac 1990s

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<text id=90TT2306> <title> Sep. 03, 1990: Sitzkrieg In The Sand </title> <history> TIME--The Weekly Newsmagazine--1990 Sep. 03, 1990 Are We Ready For This? </history> <article> <source>Time Magazine</source> <hdr> THE GULF, Page 37 Sitzkrieg in the Sand </hdr> <body> If he is smart, Saddam will hunker down and try to prove that the best offense is a good defense By Bruce W. Nelan--Reported by Ron Ben-Yishai/Jerusalem, David S. Jackson/Cairo and Bruce van Voorst/Washington He was dressed in a natty business suit, not a military uniform. He smiled and tousled the hair of a young boy named Stuart Lockwood, asking him what he had eaten for breakfast (cornflakes and milk) and marveling at how the lad fared better than some Iraqi children. Talking cheerfully to a tense group of British hostages, he presented himself as a benign and misunderstood leader who had no choice but to act truculently. Taking a leaf from some outdated p.r. manual, Saddam Hussein went on the airwaves last week in a miscalculated attempt to revise his image and turn up the pressure on his enemies. He should have known better. His crude hypocrisy of fondling children may help convince the Iraqi masses that their self-styled Knight of the Arab World is not such a bad guy. But it was testimony to his isolation that he believed such a transparent performance would move the West. Viewers could only stare in outraged fascination at Saddam's staged-for-television meeting with the hostages at an undisclosed location. In several rambling and convoluted monologues, he offered kindly explanations of how they were not human shields to be used in a war but a prevention against danger. "Your presence here," he told the captives, "is meant to avoid war. You are not hostages." For all the piety, he occasionally lapsed into the malign, warning that Iraq would "destroy any aggressor." After 45 minutes of playing Mr. Nice Guy, Saddam departed with a wish that he could have stayed for lunch. If Saddam had hoped his bizarre turn in front of the camera would revise opinions in the West, he was quickly disillusioned. The State Department called it "shameful theatrics." British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd said it was "the most sickening thing I've seen for a long time." Two days later Saddam held an impromptu news conference in Baghdad with journalists accompanying Austrian President Kurt Waldheim, who secured the release of 80 Austrian hostages. The foreign nationals he was holding, Saddam said, are "to prevent attacks from happening." Saddam vowed to remain in Kuwait and derided the kingdom's former rulers for "sitting around gambling tables wasting millions." U.S. and Western intervention in the gulf was "naked aggression," Saddam charged, warning, "Whoever collides with Iraq will find columns of dead bodies, which may have a beginning but not an end." These appearances prove that the clever dictator is working all the angles to shore up his position. Baghdad has yet to gain a major ally, and few cracks have fractured the international consortium ranged against it. Iraq's economy and morale are under siege, its pipelines closed, supply routes in doubt and food supplies dwindling. The unattractive nature of his options must be coming clear to Saddam. Yet he is not without strengths as he ponders what move to make next. He still poses a potent military threat: he might not win on the battlefield, but he could make the contest bloody. Or he could ignite a conflagration so broad and so intense it would burn everyone. Or he could simply fold his tent, in the same pragmatic way he handed peace to Iran two weeks ago, and retire to fight another day. But for now, his best play is probably to sit tight. The military confrontation in the gulf seems to be congealing into a 1990 version of the sitzkrieg. As Germany did after blitzing Poland, Saddam is consolidating his position and gazing across the frontier as his foes assemble their armies. His 56-division, 1.5 million-man force--last week he called up his reserves--is clearly on the defensive. In occupied Kuwait his soldiers are digging in. Elite Republican Guard units have been pulled back to join 15 divisions deployed to protect Basra and Baghdad--or perhaps Saddam himself. He must be disconcerted by the size and speed of the American buildup, now bolstered by ships, planes and men from 22 other nations. The opportunity to attack is probably gone. If he were to move, he would risk having his invasion force destroyed by American air power, and he could be almost certain that key military and economic targets in Iraq would be demolished by strategic bombers. His best bet, analysts agree, is to try to wait out the opposition: use his 20,000 hostages for maximum political impact, probe for weaknesses, and leave the next move up to the U.S. and its allies. All week long, Saddam has been testing the other side's nerves. He has pushed hard at Western determination to keep embassies in Kuwait open in the face of harsh Iraqi threats. He is running his tankers through the international armada, pressing to see if they will be forcibly stopped. Both these gambits could easily set off a military clash. At the same time, Saddam has issued almost daily statements claiming he is open to negotiations without preconditions. So far, no one has taken those very seriously, but one day they might. "Time is now on Saddam's side," says a senior Israeli intelligence officer. "The longer this standoff drags on, the better his chances of survival." That is true up to a point. Saddam's hope, of course, is that he can outlast the embargo decreed by the United Nations and enforced by massed fleets. The odds have to be read against him because Iraq does not have large stockpiles of food, 75% of which it imports; its funds abroad are frozen; and he cannot export his oil. But with tight rationing and scrimping, and some leakage of supplies and spare parts, the country can probably squeak through from several months to a year or more of blockade without giving in to Western demands. A year is a long time in coalition politics. Saddam may be betting that tensions and disagreements will develop between European capitals and Washington, between the Western and Arab states. International resolve could well weaken, or the Arab man in the street might grow restive under the heavy foreign presence. After a year in the desert of the Arabian Peninsula, the huge army taking shape there is likely to be run down and frustrated. Saddam may also be contemplating what Middle East experts have dubbed the Samson scenario, lashing out in desperate attempts to relieve the siege, even if his efforts pull him down too. Some suggest he might invade Jordan in order to provoke Israeli intervention and turn the struggle into an Arab-Israeli war. Others believe he might launch air and missile attacks on Saudi Arabia's oil fields, take millions of barrels of oil out of production and create a world financial crisis. And there is widespread worry that he might torture or kill his hostages. While those are serious possibilities, they would carry heavy prices. Pulling Israel, with the Middle East's best army and air force, into a war would open a second front and speed Saddam's military defeat. Executing hostages or attacking Saudi oil fields would instantly bring massive bombardment down on Iraq. "He would kill a lot of people," says the Brookings Institution's Judith Kipper, "but Iraq would be devastated and he'd be dead. He cannot believe he can win." Saddam is well aware that the U.S. would launch any offensive with its air power, and he has kept his own 513-plane air force at home. It would have to be swept from the sky before American bombers could operate freely. Iraqi Mirages and MiGs, armed with air-to-air missiles, would take their toll of attacking U.S. F-15 and F-14 interceptors. Air-defense missiles would probably down some B-52 and F-111 bombers. Thousands of anti-aircraft guns ringing missile launchers, military bases and nuclear and chemical plants would destroy some low-flying F-16 and A-6 attack bombers. Once the shooting war began, the U.S. would have to go all the way in order to liberate Kuwait and eliminate Iraq as a threat, and that would ultimately require a long and bloody attack on the ground. For all its strength, Iraq's military is not up to American or European standards. Only about 20% of its troops have proved themselves in combat, and only about 500 of its tanks are of the most modern type. Its air force was timid in attacks on Iran, and its military intelligence has nothing like the satellite and electronic capabilities of the U.S. What Iraq is good at is fighting defensively. And when the going got worse, Saddam would probably fire his poison-gas weapons, much as he did against Iran when defeat looked imminent. He would also probably launch his missiles at Saudi oil installations. The resulting destruction could unhinge the world's economy. Given those prospects, the West might decide instead to negotiate. And Saddam could find that very appealing. "I don't think the Iraqis are looking for it now," says a U.S. official. "But what they might be after, as pressure begins to take effect, is a solution that preserves as many gains as possible from their conquest of Kuwait." Some experts, like Richard Murphy, a senior fellow at the New York Council on Foreign Relations, think that if such a point is reached, both sides will acquiesce. "Money will be paid to an aggressor, or land," he says, in a deal arranged by Saddam's Arab neighbors. "We're not going to devise it, we're not going to bless it. The question is if we're going to tolerate it." In addition to the moral distaste, the West would also have to swallow something worse: leaving Iraq with the army and the nuclear potential that made it such a threat this time around. Saddam could then celebrate his reputation as the Arab leader who stood up to the U.S., and live to challenge the region again. The logic of power aside, there is no certainty what choice Saddam will make. British diplomats reported last week that Palestine Liberation Organization Chairman Yasser Arafat had held talks with Saddam in Baghdad. According to the report, Arafat found Saddam nervous and often confused during their discussions. He was particularly furious at the personal attacks on him by Bush and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. This mood may account for Saddam's strange appearance on television as the misunderstood statesman. If his judgment is that poor, he may yet turn his country into a battlefield. WHAT HUSSEIN'S WEAPONS CAN DO Over the past ten years Iraq has amassed an arsenal of mostly Soviet-made weapons, including these formidable items: LONG RANGE WEAPONS <table> Characteristics Purpose AL HUSEEIN: a Scud B surface-to- An inaccurate missile used surface launcher with a range of against densely populated more than 350 miles (550 km). areas; can be equipped with chemical warheads. AL ABBAS: a Scud B still in Same as Al Hussein, but with development, with a longer range a longer reach; both could used of 550 miles (900 km). be used against the Saudi oilfields. EXOCET: French air-to-surface An accurate antiship missile missile launched by Mirage also effective against oil fighters or attack helicopters tankers; can hit ground for a combined range of more installations and can also than 450 miles (725 km). carry chemical warheads. </table> Iraq's 513 combat aircraft are a potent force but would probably be outnumbered and outflown. Its air defense of 4,000 antiaircraft guns and more than 270 surface-to-air launchers could exact a heavy toll. SHORT RANGE WEAPONS <table> Characteristics Purpose ABABIL, surface-to-surface Devastating against ground launcher with a range of troops, this system delivers 60 miles (100 km). cluster bombs that cover in one salvo a larger area than a battery of howitzers. </table> Iraq's 5,500 tanks and 3,000 pieces of artillery may be its strongest asset and would inflict heavy casualties in any ground fighting. </body> </article> </text>