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╞┼─┼╥┴╠╔╙╘ ╬O. 77

╘HE ┴PPOINTING ╨OWER ├ONTINUED AND ╧THER ╨OWERS OF THE ┼XECUTIVE
 ├ONSIDERED
╞ROM THE ╬EW ┘ORK ╨ACKET.
╞RIDAY, ┴PRIL 4, 1788.

╚┴═╔╠╘╧╬

╘O THE ╨EOPLE OF THE ╙TATE OF ╬EW ┘ORK:
╔╘ ╚┴╙ BEEN MENTIONED AS ONE OF THE ADVANTAGES TO BE EXPECTED
 FROM THE CO-OPERATION OF THE ╙ENATE, IN THE BUSINESS OF
 APPOINTMENTS, THAT IT WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE STABILITY OF THE
 ADMINISTRATION. ╘HE CONSENT OF THAT BODY WOULD BE NECESSARY TO
 DISPLACE AS WELL AS TO APPOINT. ┴ CHANGE OF THE ├HIEF ═AGISTRATE,
 THEREFORE, WOULD NOT OCCASION SO VIOLENT OR SO GENERAL A REVOLUTION
 IN THE OFFICERS OF THE GOVERNMENT AS MIGHT BE EXPECTED, IF HE WERE
 THE SOLE DISPOSER OF OFFICES. ╫HERE A MAN IN ANY STATION HAD GIVEN
 SATISFACTORY EVIDENCE OF HIS FITNESS FOR IT, A NEW ╨RESIDENT WOULD
 BE RESTRAINED FROM ATTEMPTING A CHANGE IN FAVOR OF A PERSON MORE
 AGREEABLE TO HIM, BY THE APPREHENSION THAT A DISCOUNTENANCE OF THE
 ╙ENATE MIGHT FRUSTRATE THE ATTEMPT, AND BRING SOME DEGREE OF
 DISCREDIT UPON HIMSELF. ╘HOSE WHO CAN BEST ESTIMATE THE VALUE OF A
 STEADY ADMINISTRATION, WILL BE MOST DISPOSED TO PRIZE A PROVISION
 WHICH CONNECTS THE OFFICIAL EXISTENCE OF PUBLIC MEN WITH THE
 APPROBATION OR DISAPPROBATION OF THAT BODY WHICH, FROM THE GREATER
 PERMANENCY OF ITS OWN COMPOSITION, WILL IN ALL PROBABILITY BE LESS
 SUBJECT TO INCONSTANCY THAN ANY OTHER MEMBER OF THE GOVERNMENT.
╘O THIS UNION OF THE ╙ENATE WITH THE ╨RESIDENT, IN THE ARTICLE
 OF APPOINTMENTS, IT HAS IN SOME CASES BEEN SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD
 SERVE TO GIVE THE ╨RESIDENT AN UNDUE INFLUENCE OVER THE ╙ENATE, AND
 IN OTHERS THAT IT WOULD HAVE AN OPPOSITE TENDENCY, A STRONG PROOF
 THAT NEITHER SUGGESTION IS TRUE.
╘O STATE THE FIRST IN ITS PROPER FORM, IS TO REFUTE IT. ╔T
 AMOUNTS TO THIS: THE ╨RESIDENT WOULD HAVE AN IMPROPER ╔╬╞╠╒┼╬├┼
 ╧╓┼╥ THE ╙ENATE, BECAUSE THE ╙ENATE WOULD HAVE THE POWER OF
 ╥┼╙╘╥┴╔╬╔╬╟ HIM. ╘HIS IS AN ABSURDITY IN TERMS. ╔T CANNOT ADMIT OF
 A DOUBT THAT THE ENTIRE POWER OF APPOINTMENT WOULD ENABLE HIM MUCH
 MORE EFFECTUALLY TO ESTABLISH A DANGEROUS EMPIRE OVER THAT BODY,
 THAN A MERE POWER OF NOMINATION SUBJECT TO THEIR CONTROL.
╠ET US TAKE A VIEW OF THE CONVERSE OF THE PROPOSITION: "THE
 ╙ENATE WOULD INFLUENCE THE ┼XECUTIVE." ┴S ╔ HAVE HAD OCCASION TO
 REMARK IN SEVERAL OTHER INSTANCES, THE INDISTINCTNESS OF THE
 OBJECTION FORBIDS A PRECISE ANSWER. ╔N WHAT MANNER IS THIS
 INFLUENCE TO BE EXERTED? ╔N RELATION TO WHAT OBJECTS? ╘HE POWER OF
 INFLUENCING A PERSON, IN THE SENSE IN WHICH IT IS HERE USED, MUST
 IMPLY A POWER OF CONFERRING A BENEFIT UPON HIM. ╚OW COULD THE
 ╙ENATE CONFER A BENEFIT UPON THE ╨RESIDENT BY THE MANNER OF
 EMPLOYING THEIR RIGHT OF NEGATIVE UPON HIS NOMINATIONS? ╔F IT BE
 SAID THEY MIGHT SOMETIMES GRATIFY HIM BY AN ACQUIESCENCE IN A
 FAVORITE CHOICE, WHEN PUBLIC MOTIVES MIGHT DICTATE A DIFFERENT
 CONDUCT, ╔ ANSWER, THAT THE INSTANCES IN WHICH THE ╨RESIDENT COULD
 BE PERSONALLY INTERESTED IN THE RESULT, WOULD BE TOO FEW TO ADMIT OF
 HIS BEING MATERIALLY AFFECTED BY THE COMPLIANCES OF THE ╙ENATE. ╘HE
 ╨╧╫┼╥ WHICH CAN ╧╥╔╟╔╬┴╘┼ THE DISPOSITION OF HONORS AND EMOLUMENTS,
 IS MORE LIKELY TO ATTRACT THAN TO BE ATTRACTED BY THE ╨╧╫┼╥ WHICH
 CAN MERELY OBSTRUCT THEIR COURSE. ╔F BY INFLUENCING THE ╨RESIDENT
 BE MEANT ╥┼╙╘╥┴╔╬╔╬╟ HIM, THIS IS PRECISELY WHAT MUST HAVE BEEN
 INTENDED. ┴ND IT HAS BEEN SHOWN THAT THE RESTRAINT WOULD BE
 SALUTARY, AT THE SAME TIME THAT IT WOULD NOT BE SUCH AS TO DESTROY A
 SINGLE ADVANTAGE TO BE LOOKED FOR FROM THE UNCONTROLLED AGENCY OF
 THAT ═AGISTRATE. ╘HE RIGHT OF NOMINATION WOULD PRODUCE ALL THE GOOD
 OF THAT OF APPOINTMENT, AND WOULD IN A GREAT MEASURE AVOID ITS EVILS.
 ╒PON A COMPARISON OF THE PLAN FOR THE APPOINTMENT OF THE
 OFFICERS OF THE PROPOSED GOVERNMENT WITH THAT WHICH IS ESTABLISHED
 BY THE CONSTITUTION OF THIS ╙TATE, A DECIDED PREFERENCE MUST BE
 GIVEN TO THE FORMER. ╔N THAT PLAN THE POWER OF NOMINATION IS
 UNEQUIVOCALLY VESTED IN THE ┼XECUTIVE. ┴ND AS THERE WOULD BE A
 NECESSITY FOR SUBMITTING EACH NOMINATION TO THE JUDGMENT OF AN
 ENTIRE BRANCH OF THE LEGISLATURE, THE CIRCUMSTANCES ATTENDING AN
 APPOINTMENT, FROM THE MODE OF CONDUCTING IT, WOULD NATURALLY BECOME
 MATTERS OF NOTORIETY; AND THE PUBLIC WOULD BE AT NO LOSS TO
 DETERMINE WHAT PART HAD BEEN PERFORMED BY THE DIFFERENT ACTORS. ╘HE
 BLAME OF A BAD NOMINATION WOULD FALL UPON THE ╨RESIDENT SINGLY AND
 ABSOLUTELY. ╘HE CENSURE OF REJECTING A GOOD ONE WOULD LIE ENTIRELY
 AT THE DOOR OF THE ╙ENATE; AGGRAVATED BY THE CONSIDERATION OF THEIR
 HAVING COUNTERACTED THE GOOD INTENTIONS OF THE ┼XECUTIVE. ╔F AN ILL
 APPOINTMENT SHOULD BE MADE, THE ┼XECUTIVE FOR NOMINATING, AND THE
 ╙ENATE FOR APPROVING, WOULD PARTICIPATE, THOUGH IN DIFFERENT
 DEGREES, IN THE OPPROBRIUM AND DISGRACE.
╘HE REVERSE OF ALL THIS CHARACTERIZES THE MANNER OF APPOINTMENT
 IN THIS ╙TATE. ╘HE COUNCIL OF APPOINTMENT CONSISTS OF FROM THREE TO
 FIVE PERSONS, OF WHOM THE GOVERNOR IS ALWAYS ONE. ╘HIS SMALL BODY,
 SHUT UP IN A PRIVATE APARTMENT, IMPENETRABLE TO THE PUBLIC EYE,
 PROCEED TO THE EXECUTION OF THE TRUST COMMITTED TO THEM. ╔T IS
 KNOWN THAT THE GOVERNOR CLAIMS THE RIGHT OF NOMINATION, UPON THE
 STRENGTH OF SOME AMBIGUOUS EXPRESSIONS IN THE CONSTITUTION; BUT IT
 IS NOT KNOWN TO WHAT EXTENT, OR IN WHAT MANNER HE EXERCISES IT; NOR
 UPON WHAT OCCASIONS HE IS CONTRADICTED OR OPPOSED. ╘HE CENSURE OF A
 BAD APPOINTMENT, ON ACCOUNT OF THE UNCERTAINTY OF ITS AUTHOR, AND
 FOR WANT OF A DETERMINATE OBJECT, HAS NEITHER POIGNANCY NOR DURATION.
 ┴ND WHILE AN UNBOUNDED FIELD FOR CABAL AND INTRIGUE LIES OPEN, ALL
 IDEA OF RESPONSIBILITY IS LOST. ╘HE MOST THAT THE PUBLIC CAN KNOW,
 IS THAT THE GOVERNOR CLAIMS THE RIGHT OF NOMINATION; THAT ╘╫╧ OUT
 OF THE INCONSIDERABLE NUMBER OF ╞╧╒╥ MEN CAN TOO OFTEN BE MANAGED
 WITHOUT MUCH DIFFICULTY; THAT IF SOME OF THE MEMBERS OF A
 PARTICULAR COUNCIL SHOULD HAPPEN TO BE OF AN UNCOMPLYING CHARACTER,
 IT IS FREQUENTLY NOT IMPOSSIBLE TO GET RID OF THEIR OPPOSITION BY
 REGULATING THE TIMES OF MEETING IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO RENDER THEIR
 ATTENDANCE INCONVENIENT; AND THAT FROM WHATEVER CAUSE IT MAY
 PROCEED, A GREAT NUMBER OF VERY IMPROPER APPOINTMENTS ARE FROM TIME
 TO TIME MADE. ╫HETHER A GOVERNOR OF THIS ╙TATE AVAILS HIMSELF OF
 THE ASCENDANT HE MUST NECESSARILY HAVE, IN THIS DELICATE AND
 IMPORTANT PART OF THE ADMINISTRATION, TO PREFER TO OFFICES MEN WHO
 ARE BEST QUALIFIED FOR THEM, OR WHETHER HE PROSTITUTES THAT
 ADVANTAGE TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF PERSONS WHOSE CHIEF MERIT IS THEIR
 IMPLICIT DEVOTION TO HIS WILL, AND TO THE SUPPORT OF A DESPICABLE
 AND DANGEROUS SYSTEM OF PERSONAL INFLUENCE, ARE QUESTIONS WHICH,
 UNFORTUNATELY FOR THE COMMUNITY, CAN ONLY BE THE SUBJECTS OF
 SPECULATION AND CONJECTURE.
┼VERY MERE COUNCIL OF APPOINTMENT, HOWEVER CONSTITUTED, WILL BE
 A CONCLAVE, IN WHICH CABAL AND INTRIGUE WILL HAVE THEIR FULL SCOPE.
 ╘HEIR NUMBER, WITHOUT AN UNWARRANTABLE INCREASE OF EXPENSE, CANNOT
 BE LARGE ENOUGH TO PRECLUDE A FACILITY OF COMBINATION. ┴ND AS EACH
 MEMBER WILL HAVE HIS FRIENDS AND CONNECTIONS TO PROVIDE FOR, THE
 DESIRE OF MUTUAL GRATIFICATION WILL BEGET A SCANDALOUS BARTERING OF
 VOTES AND BARGAINING FOR PLACES. ╘HE PRIVATE ATTACHMENTS OF ONE MAN
 MIGHT EASILY BE SATISFIED; BUT TO SATISFY THE PRIVATE ATTACHMENTS
 OF A DOZEN, OR OF TWENTY MEN, WOULD OCCASION A MONOPOLY OF ALL THE
 PRINCIPAL EMPLOYMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT IN A FEW FAMILIES, AND WOULD
 LEAD MORE DIRECTLY TO AN ARISTOCRACY OR AN OLIGARCHY THAN ANY
 MEASURE THAT COULD BE CONTRIVED. ╔F, TO AVOID AN ACCUMULATION OF
 OFFICES, THERE WAS TO BE A FREQUENT CHANGE IN THE PERSONS WHO WERE
 TO COMPOSE THE COUNCIL, THIS WOULD INVOLVE THE MISCHIEFS OF A
 MUTABLE ADMINISTRATION IN THEIR FULL EXTENT. ╙UCH A COUNCIL WOULD
 ALSO BE MORE LIABLE TO EXECUTIVE INFLUENCE THAN THE ╙ENATE, BECAUSE
 THEY WOULD BE FEWER IN NUMBER, AND WOULD ACT LESS IMMEDIATELY UNDER
 THE PUBLIC INSPECTION. ╙UCH A COUNCIL, IN FINE, AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR
 THE PLAN OF THE CONVENTION, WOULD BE PRODUCTIVE OF AN INCREASE OF
 EXPENSE, A MULTIPLICATION OF THE EVILS WHICH SPRING FROM FAVORITISM
 AND INTRIGUE IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC HONORS, A DECREASE OF
 STABILITY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE GOVERNMENT, AND A DIMINUTION
 OF THE SECURITY AGAINST AN UNDUE INFLUENCE OF THE ┼XECUTIVE. ┴ND
 YET SUCH A COUNCIL HAS BEEN WARMLY CONTENDED FOR AS AN ESSENTIAL
 AMENDMENT IN THE PROPOSED ├ONSTITUTION.
╔ COULD NOT WITH PROPRIETY CONCLUDE MY OBSERVATIONS ON THE
 SUBJECT OF APPOINTMENTS WITHOUT TAKING NOTICE OF A SCHEME FOR WHICH
 THERE HAVE APPEARED SOME, THOUGH BUT FEW ADVOCATES; ╔ MEAN THAT OF
 UNITING THE ╚OUSE OF ╥EPRESENTATIVES IN THE POWER OF MAKING THEM. ╔
 SHALL, HOWEVER, DO LITTLE MORE THAN MENTION IT, AS ╔ CANNOT IMAGINE
 THAT IT IS LIKELY TO GAIN THE COUNTENANCE OF ANY CONSIDERABLE PART
 OF THE COMMUNITY. ┴ BODY SO FLUCTUATING AND AT THE SAME TIME SO
 NUMEROUS, CAN NEVER BE DEEMED PROPER FOR THE EXERCISE OF THAT POWER.
 ╔TS UNFITNESS WILL APPEAR MANIFEST TO ALL, WHEN IT IS RECOLLECTED
 THAT IN HALF A CENTURY IT MAY CONSIST OF THREE OR FOUR HUNDRED
 PERSONS. ┴LL THE ADVANTAGES OF THE STABILITY, BOTH OF THE ┼XECUTIVE
 AND OF THE ╙ENATE, WOULD BE DEFEATED BY THIS UNION, AND INFINITE
 DELAYS AND EMBARRASSMENTS WOULD BE OCCASIONED. ╘HE EXAMPLE OF MOST
 OF THE ╙TATES IN THEIR LOCAL CONSTITUTIONS ENCOURAGES US TO
 REPROBATE THE IDEA.
╘HE ONLY REMAINING POWERS OF THE ┼XECUTIVE ARE COMPREHENDED IN
 GIVING INFORMATION TO ├ONGRESS OF THE STATE OF THE ╒NION; IN
 RECOMMENDING TO THEIR CONSIDERATION SUCH MEASURES AS HE SHALL JUDGE
 EXPEDIENT; IN CONVENING THEM, OR EITHER BRANCH, UPON EXTRAORDINARY
 OCCASIONS; IN ADJOURNING THEM WHEN THEY CANNOT THEMSELVES AGREE
 UPON THE TIME OF ADJOURNMENT; IN RECEIVING AMBASSADORS AND OTHER
 PUBLIC MINISTERS; IN FAITHFULLY EXECUTING THE LAWS; AND IN
 COMMISSIONING ALL THE OFFICERS OF THE ╒NITED ╙TATES.
┼XCEPT SOME CAVILS ABOUT THE POWER OF CONVENING ┼╔╘╚┼╥ HOUSE OF
 THE LEGISLATURE, AND THAT OF RECEIVING AMBASSADORS, NO OBJECTION HAS
 BEEN MADE TO THIS CLASS OF AUTHORITIES; NOR COULD THEY POSSIBLY
 ADMIT OF ANY. ╔T REQUIRED, INDEED, AN INSATIABLE AVIDITY FOR
 CENSURE TO INVENT EXCEPTIONS TO THE PARTS WHICH HAVE BEEN EXCEPTED
 TO. ╔N REGARD TO THE POWER OF CONVENING EITHER HOUSE OF THE
 LEGISLATURE, ╔ SHALL BARELY REMARK, THAT IN RESPECT TO THE ╙ENATE AT
 LEAST, WE CAN READILY DISCOVER A GOOD REASON FOR IT. ┴╙ THIS BODY
 HAS A CONCURRENT POWER WITH THE ┼XECUTIVE IN THE ARTICLE OF
 TREATIES, IT MIGHT OFTEN BE NECESSARY TO CALL IT TOGETHER WITH A
 VIEW TO THIS OBJECT, WHEN IT WOULD BE UNNECESSARY AND IMPROPER TO
 CONVENE THE ╚OUSE OF ╥EPRESENTATIVES. ┴S TO THE RECEPTION OF
 AMBASSADORS, WHAT ╔ HAVE SAID IN A FORMER PAPER WILL FURNISH A
 SUFFICIENT ANSWER.
╫E HAVE NOW COMPLETED A SURVEY OF THE STRUCTURE AND POWERS OF
 THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, WHICH, ╔ HAVE ENDEAVORED TO SHOW,
 COMBINES, AS FAR AS REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES WILL ADMIT, ALL THE
 REQUISITES TO ENERGY. ╘HE REMAINING INQUIRY IS: ─OES IT ALSO
 COMBINE THE REQUISITES TO SAFETY, IN A REPUBLICAN SENSE, A DUE
 DEPENDENCE ON THE PEOPLE, A DUE RESPONSIBILITY? ╘HE ANSWER TO THIS
 QUESTION HAS BEEN ANTICIPATED IN THE INVESTIGATION OF ITS OTHER
 CHARACTERISTICS, AND IS SATISFACTORILY DEDUCIBLE FROM THESE
 CIRCUMSTANCES; FROM THE ELECTION OF THE ╨RESIDENT ONCE IN FOUR
 YEARS BY PERSONS IMMEDIATELY CHOSEN BY THE PEOPLE FOR THAT PURPOSE;
 AND FROM HIS BEING AT ALL TIMES LIABLE TO IMPEACHMENT, TRIAL,
 DISMISSION FROM OFFICE, INCAPACITY TO SERVE IN ANY OTHER, AND TO
 FORFEITURE OF LIFE AND ESTATE BY SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTION IN THE
 COMMON COURSE OF LAW. ┬UT THESE PRECAUTIONS, GREAT AS THEY ARE, ARE
 NOT THE ONLY ONES WHICH THE PLAN OF THE CONVENTION HAS PROVIDED IN
 FAVOR OF THE PUBLIC SECURITY. ╔N THE ONLY INSTANCES IN WHICH THE
 ABUSE OF THE EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY WAS MATERIALLY TO BE FEARED, THE
 ├HIEF ═AGISTRATE OF THE ╒NITED ╙TATES WOULD, BY THAT PLAN, BE
 SUBJECTED TO THE CONTROL OF A BRANCH OF THE LEGISLATIVE BODY. ╫HAT
 MORE COULD BE DESIRED BY AN ENLIGHTENED AND REASONABLE PEOPLE?
╨╒┬╠╔╒╙.


╞┼─┼╥┴╠╔╙╘ ╬O. 78

╘HE ╩UDICIARY ─EPARTMENT
╞ROM ═C╠┼┴╬'╙ ┼DITION, ╬EW ┘ORK.

╚┴═╔╠╘╧╬

╘O THE ╨EOPLE OF THE ╙TATE OF ╬EW ┘ORK:
╫┼ ╨╥╧├┼┼─ NOW TO AN EXAMINATION OF THE JUDICIARY DEPARTMENT OF
 THE PROPOSED GOVERNMENT.
╔N UNFOLDING THE DEFECTS OF THE EXISTING ├ONFEDERATION, THE
 UTILITY AND NECESSITY OF A FEDERAL JUDICATURE HAVE BEEN CLEARLY
 POINTED OUT. ╔T IS THE LESS NECESSARY TO RECAPITULATE THE
 CONSIDERATIONS THERE URGED, AS THE PROPRIETY OF THE INSTITUTION IN
 THE ABSTRACT IS NOT DISPUTED; THE ONLY QUESTIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN
 RAISED BEING RELATIVE TO THE MANNER OF CONSTITUTING IT, AND TO ITS
 EXTENT. ╘O THESE POINTS, THEREFORE, OUR OBSERVATIONS SHALL BE
 CONFINED.
╘HE MANNER OF CONSTITUTING IT SEEMS TO EMBRACE THESE SEVERAL
 OBJECTS: 1ST. ╘HE MODE OF APPOINTING THE JUDGES. 2D. ╘HE TENURE BY
 WHICH THEY ARE TO HOLD THEIR PLACES. 3D. ╘HE PARTITION OF THE
 JUDICIARY AUTHORITY BETWEEN DIFFERENT COURTS, AND THEIR RELATIONS TO
 EACH OTHER.
╞IRST. ┴S TO THE MODE OF APPOINTING THE JUDGES; THIS IS
 THE SAME WITH THAT OF APPOINTING THE OFFICERS OF THE ╒NION IN
 GENERAL, AND HAS BEEN SO FULLY DISCUSSED IN THE TWO LAST NUMBERS,
 THAT NOTHING CAN BE SAID HERE WHICH WOULD NOT BE USELESS REPETITION.
╙ECOND. ┴S TO THE TENURE BY WHICH THE JUDGES ARE TO HOLD
 THEIR PLACES; THIS CHIEFLY CONCERNS THEIR DURATION IN OFFICE; THE
 PROVISIONS FOR THEIR SUPPORT; THE PRECAUTIONS FOR THEIR
 RESPONSIBILITY.
┴CCORDING TO THE PLAN OF THE CONVENTION, ALL JUDGES WHO MAY BE
 APPOINTED BY THE ╒NITED ╙TATES ARE TO HOLD THEIR OFFICES ─╒╥╔╬╟ ╟╧╧─
 ┬┼╚┴╓╔╧╥; WHICH IS CONFORMABLE TO THE MOST APPROVED OF THE ╙TATE
 CONSTITUTIONS AND AMONG THE REST, TO THAT OF THIS ╙TATE. ╔TS
 PROPRIETY HAVING BEEN DRAWN INTO QUESTION BY THE ADVERSARIES OF THAT
 PLAN, IS NO LIGHT SYMPTOM OF THE RAGE FOR OBJECTION, WHICH DISORDERS
 THEIR IMAGINATIONS AND JUDGMENTS. ╘HE STANDARD OF GOOD BEHAVIOR FOR
 THE CONTINUANCE IN OFFICE OF THE JUDICIAL MAGISTRACY, IS CERTAINLY
 ONE OF THE MOST VALUABLE OF THE MODERN IMPROVEMENTS IN THE PRACTICE
 OF GOVERNMENT. ╔N A MONARCHY IT IS AN EXCELLENT BARRIER TO THE
 DESPOTISM OF THE PRINCE; IN A REPUBLIC IT IS A NO LESS EXCELLENT
 BARRIER TO THE ENCROACHMENTS AND OPPRESSIONS OF THE REPRESENTATIVE
 BODY. ┴ND IT IS THE BEST EXPEDIENT WHICH CAN BE DEVISED IN ANY
 GOVERNMENT, TO SECURE A STEADY, UPRIGHT, AND IMPARTIAL
 ADMINISTRATION OF THE LAWS.
╫HOEVER ATTENTIVELY CONSIDERS THE DIFFERENT DEPARTMENTS OF POWER
 MUST PERCEIVE, THAT, IN A GOVERNMENT IN WHICH THEY ARE SEPARATED
 FROM EACH OTHER, THE JUDICIARY, FROM THE NATURE OF ITS FUNCTIONS,
 WILL ALWAYS BE THE LEAST DANGEROUS TO THE POLITICAL RIGHTS OF THE
 ├ONSTITUTION; BECAUSE IT WILL BE LEAST IN A CAPACITY TO ANNOY OR
 INJURE THEM. ╘HE ┼XECUTIVE NOT ONLY DISPENSES THE HONORS, BUT HOLDS
 THE SWORD OF THE COMMUNITY. ╘HE LEGISLATURE NOT ONLY COMMANDS THE
 PURSE, BUT PRESCRIBES THE RULES BY WHICH THE DUTIES AND RIGHTS OF
 EVERY CITIZEN ARE TO BE REGULATED. ╘HE JUDICIARY, ON THE CONTRARY,
 HAS NO INFLUENCE OVER EITHER THE SWORD OR THE PURSE; NO DIRECTION
 EITHER OF THE STRENGTH OR OF THE WEALTH OF THE SOCIETY; AND CAN
 TAKE NO ACTIVE RESOLUTION WHATEVER. ╔T MAY TRULY BE SAID TO HAVE
 NEITHER ╞╧╥├┼ NOR ╫╔╠╠, BUT MERELY JUDGMENT; AND MUST ULTIMATELY
 DEPEND UPON THE AID OF THE EXECUTIVE ARM EVEN FOR THE EFFICACY OF
 ITS JUDGMENTS.
╘HIS SIMPLE VIEW OF THE MATTER SUGGESTS SEVERAL IMPORTANT
 CONSEQUENCES. ╔T PROVES INCONTESTABLY, THAT THE JUDICIARY IS BEYOND
 COMPARISON THE WEAKEST OF THE THREE DEPARTMENTS OF POWER1; THAT
 IT CAN NEVER ATTACK WITH SUCCESS EITHER OF THE OTHER TWO; AND THAT
 ALL POSSIBLE CARE IS REQUISITE TO ENABLE IT TO DEFEND ITSELF AGAINST
 THEIR ATTACKS. ╔T EQUALLY PROVES, THAT THOUGH INDIVIDUAL OPPRESSION
 MAY NOW AND THEN PROCEED FROM THE COURTS OF JUSTICE, THE GENERAL
 LIBERTY OF THE PEOPLE CAN NEVER BE ENDANGERED FROM THAT QUARTER; ╔
 MEAN SO LONG AS THE JUDICIARY REMAINS TRULY DISTINCT FROM BOTH THE
 LEGISLATURE AND THE ┼XECUTIVE. ╞OR ╔ AGREE, THAT "THERE IS NO
 LIBERTY, IF THE POWER OF JUDGING BE NOT SEPARATED FROM THE
 LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE POWERS."2 ┴ND IT PROVES, IN THE LAST
 PLACE, THAT AS LIBERTY CAN HAVE NOTHING TO FEAR FROM THE JUDICIARY
 ALONE, BUT WOULD HAVE EVERY THING TO FEAR FROM ITS UNION WITH EITHER
 OF THE OTHER DEPARTMENTS; THAT AS ALL THE EFFECTS OF SUCH A UNION
 MUST ENSUE FROM A DEPENDENCE OF THE FORMER ON THE LATTER,
 NOTWITHSTANDING A NOMINAL AND APPARENT SEPARATION; THAT AS, FROM
 THE NATURAL FEEBLENESS OF THE JUDICIARY, IT IS IN CONTINUAL JEOPARDY
 OF BEING OVERPOWERED, AWED, OR INFLUENCED BY ITS CO-ORDINATE
 BRANCHES; AND THAT AS NOTHING CAN CONTRIBUTE SO MUCH TO ITS
 FIRMNESS AND INDEPENDENCE AS PERMANENCY IN OFFICE, THIS QUALITY MAY
 THEREFORE BE JUSTLY REGARDED AS AN INDISPENSABLE INGREDIENT IN ITS
 CONSTITUTION, AND, IN A GREAT MEASURE, AS THE CITADEL OF THE PUBLIC
 JUSTICE AND THE PUBLIC SECURITY.
╘HE COMPLETE INDEPENDENCE OF THE COURTS OF JUSTICE IS PECULIARLY
 ESSENTIAL IN A LIMITED ├ONSTITUTION. ┬Y A LIMITED ├ONSTITUTION, ╔
 UNDERSTAND ONE WHICH CONTAINS CERTAIN SPECIFIED EXCEPTIONS TO THE
 LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY; SUCH, FOR INSTANCE, AS THAT IT SHALL PASS NO
 BILLS OF ATTAINDER, NO EX-POST-FACTO LAWS, AND THE LIKE.
 ╠IMITATIONS OF THIS KIND CAN BE PRESERVED IN PRACTICE NO OTHER WAY
 THAN THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF COURTS OF JUSTICE, WHOSE DUTY IT MUST BE
 TO DECLARE ALL ACTS CONTRARY TO THE MANIFEST TENOR OF THE
 ├ONSTITUTION VOID. ╫ITHOUT THIS, ALL THE RESERVATIONS OF PARTICULAR
 RIGHTS OR PRIVILEGES WOULD AMOUNT TO NOTHING.
╙OME PERPLEXITY RESPECTING THE RIGHTS OF THE COURTS TO PRONOUNCE
 LEGISLATIVE ACTS VOID, BECAUSE CONTRARY TO THE ├ONSTITUTION, HAS
 ARISEN FROM AN IMAGINATION THAT THE DOCTRINE WOULD IMPLY A
 SUPERIORITY OF THE JUDICIARY TO THE LEGISLATIVE POWER. ╔T IS URGED
 THAT THE AUTHORITY WHICH CAN DECLARE THE ACTS OF ANOTHER VOID, MUST
 NECESSARILY BE SUPERIOR TO THE ONE WHOSE ACTS MAY BE DECLARED VOID.
 ┴S THIS DOCTRINE IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE IN ALL THE ┴MERICAN
 CONSTITUTIONS, A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE GROUND ON WHICH IT RESTS
 CANNOT BE UNACCEPTABLE.
╘HERE IS NO POSITION WHICH DEPENDS ON CLEARER PRINCIPLES, THAN
 THAT EVERY ACT OF A DELEGATED AUTHORITY, CONTRARY TO THE TENOR OF
 THE COMMISSION UNDER WHICH IT IS EXERCISED, IS VOID. ╬O LEGISLATIVE
 ACT, THEREFORE, CONTRARY TO THE ├ONSTITUTION, CAN BE VALID. ╘O DENY
 THIS, WOULD BE TO AFFIRM, THAT THE DEPUTY IS GREATER THAN HIS
 PRINCIPAL; THAT THE SERVANT IS ABOVE HIS MASTER; THAT THE
 REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE ARE SUPERIOR TO THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES;
 THAT MEN ACTING BY VIRTUE OF POWERS, MAY DO NOT ONLY WHAT THEIR
 POWERS DO NOT AUTHORIZE, BUT WHAT THEY FORBID.
╔F IT BE SAID THAT THE LEGISLATIVE BODY ARE THEMSELVES THE
 CONSTITUTIONAL JUDGES OF THEIR OWN POWERS, AND THAT THE CONSTRUCTION
 THEY PUT UPON THEM IS CONCLUSIVE UPON THE OTHER DEPARTMENTS, IT MAY
 BE ANSWERED, THAT THIS CANNOT BE THE NATURAL PRESUMPTION, WHERE IT
 IS NOT TO BE COLLECTED FROM ANY PARTICULAR PROVISIONS IN THE
 ├ONSTITUTION. ╔T IS NOT OTHERWISE TO BE SUPPOSED, THAT THE
 ├ONSTITUTION COULD INTEND TO ENABLE THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
 PEOPLE TO SUBSTITUTE THEIR ╫╔╠╠ TO THAT OF THEIR CONSTITUENTS. ╔T
 IS FAR MORE RATIONAL TO SUPPOSE, THAT THE COURTS WERE DESIGNED TO BE
 AN INTERMEDIATE BODY BETWEEN THE PEOPLE AND THE LEGISLATURE, IN
 ORDER, AMONG OTHER THINGS, TO KEEP THE LATTER WITHIN THE LIMITS
 ASSIGNED TO THEIR AUTHORITY. ╘HE INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS IS THE
 PROPER AND PECULIAR PROVINCE OF THE COURTS. ┴ CONSTITUTION IS, IN
 FACT, AND MUST BE REGARDED BY THE JUDGES, AS A FUNDAMENTAL LAW. ╔T
 THEREFORE BELONGS TO THEM TO ASCERTAIN ITS MEANING, AS WELL AS THE
 MEANING OF ANY PARTICULAR ACT PROCEEDING FROM THE LEGISLATIVE BODY.
 ╔F THERE SHOULD HAPPEN TO BE AN IRRECONCILABLE VARIANCE BETWEEN THE
 TWO, THAT WHICH HAS THE SUPERIOR OBLIGATION AND VALIDITY OUGHT, OF
 COURSE, TO BE PREFERRED; OR, IN OTHER WORDS, THE ├ONSTITUTION OUGHT
 TO BE PREFERRED TO THE STATUTE, THE INTENTION OF THE PEOPLE TO THE
 INTENTION OF THEIR AGENTS.
╬OR DOES THIS CONCLUSION BY ANY MEANS SUPPOSE A SUPERIORITY OF
 THE JUDICIAL TO THE LEGISLATIVE POWER. ╔T ONLY SUPPOSES THAT THE
 POWER OF THE PEOPLE IS SUPERIOR TO BOTH; AND THAT WHERE THE WILL OF
 THE LEGISLATURE, DECLARED IN ITS STATUTES, STANDS IN OPPOSITION TO
 THAT OF THE PEOPLE, DECLARED IN THE ├ONSTITUTION, THE JUDGES OUGHT
 TO BE GOVERNED BY THE LATTER RATHER THAN THE FORMER. ╘HEY OUGHT TO
 REGULATE THEIR DECISIONS BY THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS, RATHER THAN BY
 THOSE WHICH ARE NOT FUNDAMENTAL.
╘HIS EXERCISE OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION, IN DETERMINING BETWEEN TWO
 CONTRADICTORY LAWS, IS EXEMPLIFIED IN A FAMILIAR INSTANCE. ╔T NOT
 UNCOMMONLY HAPPENS, THAT THERE ARE TWO STATUTES EXISTING AT ONE
 TIME, CLASHING IN WHOLE OR IN PART WITH EACH OTHER, AND NEITHER OF
 THEM CONTAINING ANY REPEALING CLAUSE OR EXPRESSION. ╔N SUCH A CASE,
 IT IS THE PROVINCE OF THE COURTS TO LIQUIDATE AND FIX THEIR MEANING
 AND OPERATION. ╙O FAR AS THEY CAN, BY ANY FAIR CONSTRUCTION, BE
 RECONCILED TO EACH OTHER, REASON AND LAW CONSPIRE TO DICTATE THAT
 THIS SHOULD BE DONE; WHERE THIS IS IMPRACTICABLE, IT BECOMES A
 MATTER OF NECESSITY TO GIVE EFFECT TO ONE, IN EXCLUSION OF THE OTHER.
 ╘HE RULE WHICH HAS OBTAINED IN THE COURTS FOR DETERMINING THEIR
 RELATIVE VALIDITY IS, THAT THE LAST IN ORDER OF TIME SHALL BE
 PREFERRED TO THE FIRST. ┬UT THIS IS A MERE RULE OF CONSTRUCTION,
 NOT DERIVED FROM ANY POSITIVE LAW, BUT FROM THE NATURE AND REASON OF
 THE THING. ╔T IS A RULE NOT ENJOINED UPON THE COURTS BY LEGISLATIVE
 PROVISION, BUT ADOPTED BY THEMSELVES, AS CONSONANT TO TRUTH AND
 PROPRIETY, FOR THE DIRECTION OF THEIR CONDUCT AS INTERPRETERS OF THE
 LAW. ╘HEY THOUGHT IT REASONABLE, THAT BETWEEN THE INTERFERING ACTS
 OF AN ┼╤╒┴╠ AUTHORITY, THAT WHICH WAS THE LAST INDICATION OF ITS
 WILL SHOULD HAVE THE PREFERENCE.
┬UT IN REGARD TO THE INTERFERING ACTS OF A SUPERIOR AND
 SUBORDINATE AUTHORITY, OF AN ORIGINAL AND DERIVATIVE POWER, THE
 NATURE AND REASON OF THE THING INDICATE THE CONVERSE OF THAT RULE AS
 PROPER TO BE FOLLOWED. ╘HEY TEACH US THAT THE PRIOR ACT OF A
 SUPERIOR OUGHT TO BE PREFERRED TO THE SUBSEQUENT ACT OF AN INFERIOR
 AND SUBORDINATE AUTHORITY; AND THAT ACCORDINGLY, WHENEVER A
 PARTICULAR STATUTE CONTRAVENES THE ├ONSTITUTION, IT WILL BE THE DUTY
 OF THE JUDICIAL TRIBUNALS TO ADHERE TO THE LATTER AND DISREGARD THE
 FORMER.
╔T CAN BE OF NO WEIGHT TO SAY THAT THE COURTS, ON THE PRETENSE
 OF A REPUGNANCY, MAY SUBSTITUTE THEIR OWN PLEASURE TO THE
 CONSTITUTIONAL INTENTIONS OF THE LEGISLATURE. ╘HIS MIGHT AS WELL
 HAPPEN IN THE CASE OF TWO CONTRADICTORY STATUTES; OR IT MIGHT AS
 WELL HAPPEN IN EVERY ADJUDICATION UPON ANY SINGLE STATUTE. ╘HE
 COURTS MUST DECLARE THE SENSE OF THE LAW; AND IF THEY SHOULD BE
 DISPOSED TO EXERCISE ╫╔╠╠ INSTEAD OF ╩╒─╟═┼╬╘, THE CONSEQUENCE WOULD
 EQUALLY BE THE SUBSTITUTION OF THEIR PLEASURE TO THAT OF THE
 LEGISLATIVE BODY. ╘HE OBSERVATION, IF IT PROVE ANY THING, WOULD
 PROVE THAT THERE OUGHT TO BE NO JUDGES DISTINCT FROM THAT BODY.
╔F, THEN, THE COURTS OF JUSTICE ARE TO BE CONSIDERED AS THE
 BULWARKS OF A LIMITED ├ONSTITUTION AGAINST LEGISLATIVE
 ENCROACHMENTS, THIS CONSIDERATION WILL AFFORD A STRONG ARGUMENT FOR
 THE PERMANENT TENURE OF JUDICIAL OFFICES, SINCE NOTHING WILL
 CONTRIBUTE SO MUCH AS THIS TO THAT INDEPENDENT SPIRIT IN THE JUDGES
 WHICH MUST BE ESSENTIAL TO THE FAITHFUL PERFORMANCE OF SO ARDUOUS A
 DUTY.
╘HIS INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDGES IS EQUALLY REQUISITE TO GUARD
 THE ├ONSTITUTION AND THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS FROM THE EFFECTS OF
 THOSE ILL HUMORS, WHICH THE ARTS OF DESIGNING MEN, OR THE INFLUENCE
 OF PARTICULAR CONJUNCTURES, SOMETIMES DISSEMINATE AMONG THE PEOPLE
 THEMSELVES, AND WHICH, THOUGH THEY SPEEDILY GIVE PLACE TO BETTER
 INFORMATION, AND MORE DELIBERATE REFLECTION, HAVE A TENDENCY, IN THE
 MEANTIME, TO OCCASION DANGEROUS INNOVATIONS IN THE GOVERNMENT, AND
 SERIOUS OPPRESSIONS OF THE MINOR PARTY IN THE COMMUNITY. ╘HOUGH ╔
 TRUST THE FRIENDS OF THE PROPOSED ├ONSTITUTION WILL NEVER CONCUR
 WITH ITS ENEMIES,3 IN QUESTIONING THAT FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF
 REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT, WHICH ADMITS THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO ALTER
 OR ABOLISH THE ESTABLISHED ├ONSTITUTION, WHENEVER THEY FIND IT
 INCONSISTENT WITH THEIR HAPPINESS, YET IT IS NOT TO BE INFERRED FROM
 THIS PRINCIPLE, THAT THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE, WHENEVER A
 MOMENTARY INCLINATION HAPPENS TO LAY HOLD OF A MAJORITY OF THEIR
 CONSTITUENTS, INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE PROVISIONS IN THE EXISTING
 ├ONSTITUTION, WOULD, ON THAT ACCOUNT, BE JUSTIFIABLE IN A VIOLATION
 OF THOSE PROVISIONS; OR THAT THE COURTS WOULD BE UNDER A GREATER
 OBLIGATION TO CONNIVE AT INFRACTIONS IN THIS SHAPE, THAN WHEN THEY
 HAD PROCEEDED WHOLLY FROM THE CABALS OF THE REPRESENTATIVE BODY.
 ╒NTIL THE PEOPLE HAVE, BY SOME SOLEMN AND AUTHORITATIVE ACT,
 ANNULLED OR CHANGED THE ESTABLISHED FORM, IT IS BINDING UPON
 THEMSELVES COLLECTIVELY, AS WELL AS INDIVIDUALLY; AND NO
 PRESUMPTION, OR EVEN KNOWLEDGE, OF THEIR SENTIMENTS, CAN WARRANT
 THEIR REPRESENTATIVES IN A DEPARTURE FROM IT, PRIOR TO SUCH AN ACT.
 ┬UT IT IS EASY TO SEE, THAT IT WOULD REQUIRE AN UNCOMMON PORTION OF
 FORTITUDE IN THE JUDGES TO DO THEIR DUTY AS FAITHFUL GUARDIANS OF
 THE ├ONSTITUTION, WHERE LEGISLATIVE INVASIONS OF IT HAD BEEN
 INSTIGATED BY THE MAJOR VOICE OF THE COMMUNITY.
┬UT IT IS NOT WITH A VIEW TO INFRACTIONS OF THE ├ONSTITUTION
 ONLY, THAT THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDGES MAY BE AN ESSENTIAL
 SAFEGUARD AGAINST THE EFFECTS OF OCCASIONAL ILL HUMORS IN THE
 SOCIETY. ╘HESE SOMETIMES EXTEND NO FARTHER THAN TO THE INJURY OF
 THE PRIVATE RIGHTS OF PARTICULAR CLASSES OF CITIZENS, BY UNJUST AND
 PARTIAL LAWS. ╚ERE ALSO THE FIRMNESS OF THE JUDICIAL MAGISTRACY IS
 OF VAST IMPORTANCE IN MITIGATING THE SEVERITY AND CONFINING THE
 OPERATION OF SUCH LAWS. ╔T NOT ONLY SERVES TO MODERATE THE
 IMMEDIATE MISCHIEFS OF THOSE WHICH MAY HAVE BEEN PASSED, BUT IT
 OPERATES AS A CHECK UPON THE LEGISLATIVE BODY IN PASSING THEM; WHO,
 PERCEIVING THAT OBSTACLES TO THE SUCCESS OF INIQUITOUS INTENTION ARE
 TO BE EXPECTED FROM THE SCRUPLES OF THE COURTS, ARE IN A MANNER
 COMPELLED, BY THE VERY MOTIVES OF THE INJUSTICE THEY MEDITATE, TO
 QUALIFY THEIR ATTEMPTS. ╘HIS IS A CIRCUMSTANCE CALCULATED TO HAVE
 MORE INFLUENCE UPON THE CHARACTER OF OUR GOVERNMENTS, THAN BUT FEW
 MAY BE AWARE OF. ╘HE BENEFITS OF THE INTEGRITY AND MODERATION OF
 THE JUDICIARY HAVE ALREADY BEEN FELT IN MORE ╙TATES THAN ONE; AND
 THOUGH THEY MAY HAVE DISPLEASED THOSE WHOSE SINISTER EXPECTATIONS
 THEY MAY HAVE DISAPPOINTED, THEY MUST HAVE COMMANDED THE ESTEEM AND
 APPLAUSE OF ALL THE VIRTUOUS AND DISINTERESTED. ├ONSIDERATE MEN, OF
 EVERY DESCRIPTION, OUGHT TO PRIZE WHATEVER WILL TEND TO BEGET OR
 FORTIFY THAT TEMPER IN THE COURTS: AS NO MAN CAN BE SURE THAT HE
 MAY NOT BE TO-MORROW THE VICTIM OF A SPIRIT OF INJUSTICE, BY WHICH
 HE MAY BE A GAINER TO-DAY. ┴ND EVERY MAN MUST NOW FEEL, THAT THE
 INEVITABLE TENDENCY OF SUCH A SPIRIT IS TO SAP THE FOUNDATIONS OF
 PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CONFIDENCE, AND TO INTRODUCE IN ITS STEAD
 UNIVERSAL DISTRUST AND DISTRESS.
╘HAT INFLEXIBLE AND UNIFORM ADHERENCE TO THE RIGHTS OF THE
 ├ONSTITUTION, AND OF INDIVIDUALS, WHICH WE PERCEIVE TO BE
 INDISPENSABLE IN THE COURTS OF JUSTICE, CAN CERTAINLY NOT BE
 EXPECTED FROM JUDGES WHO HOLD THEIR OFFICES BY A TEMPORARY
 COMMISSION. ╨ERIODICAL APPOINTMENTS, HOWEVER REGULATED, OR BY
 WHOMSOEVER MADE, WOULD, IN SOME WAY OR OTHER, BE FATAL TO THEIR
 NECESSARY INDEPENDENCE. ╔F THE POWER OF MAKING THEM WAS COMMITTED
 EITHER TO THE ┼XECUTIVE OR LEGISLATURE, THERE WOULD BE DANGER OF AN
 IMPROPER COMPLAISANCE TO THE BRANCH WHICH POSSESSED IT; IF TO BOTH,
 THERE WOULD BE AN UNWILLINGNESS TO HAZARD THE DISPLEASURE OF EITHER;
 IF TO THE PEOPLE, OR TO PERSONS CHOSEN BY THEM FOR THE SPECIAL
 PURPOSE, THERE WOULD BE TOO GREAT A DISPOSITION TO CONSULT
 POPULARITY, TO JUSTIFY A RELIANCE THAT NOTHING WOULD BE CONSULTED
 BUT THE ├ONSTITUTION AND THE LAWS.
╘HERE IS YET A FURTHER AND A WEIGHTIER REASON FOR THE PERMANENCY
 OF THE JUDICIAL OFFICES, WHICH IS DEDUCIBLE FROM THE NATURE OF THE
 QUALIFICATIONS THEY REQUIRE. ╔T HAS BEEN FREQUENTLY REMARKED, WITH
 GREAT PROPRIETY, THAT A VOLUMINOUS CODE OF LAWS IS ONE OF THE
 INCONVENIENCES NECESSARILY CONNECTED WITH THE ADVANTAGES OF A FREE
 GOVERNMENT. ╘O AVOID AN ARBITRARY DISCRETION IN THE COURTS, IT IS
 INDISPENSABLE THAT THEY SHOULD BE BOUND DOWN BY STRICT RULES AND
 PRECEDENTS, WHICH SERVE TO DEFINE AND POINT OUT THEIR DUTY IN EVERY
 PARTICULAR CASE THAT COMES BEFORE THEM; AND IT WILL READILY BE
 CONCEIVED FROM THE VARIETY OF CONTROVERSIES WHICH GROW OUT OF THE
 FOLLY AND WICKEDNESS OF MANKIND, THAT THE RECORDS OF THOSE
 PRECEDENTS MUST UNAVOIDABLY SWELL TO A VERY CONSIDERABLE BULK, AND
 MUST DEMAND LONG AND LABORIOUS STUDY TO ACQUIRE A COMPETENT
 KNOWLEDGE OF THEM. ╚ENCE IT IS, THAT THERE CAN BE BUT FEW MEN IN
 THE SOCIETY WHO WILL HAVE SUFFICIENT SKILL IN THE LAWS TO QUALIFY
 THEM FOR THE STATIONS OF JUDGES. ┴ND MAKING THE PROPER DEDUCTIONS
 FOR THE ORDINARY DEPRAVITY OF HUMAN NATURE, THE NUMBER MUST BE STILL
 SMALLER OF THOSE WHO UNITE THE REQUISITE INTEGRITY WITH THE
 REQUISITE KNOWLEDGE. ╘HESE CONSIDERATIONS APPRISE US, THAT THE
 GOVERNMENT CAN HAVE NO GREAT OPTION BETWEEN FIT CHARACTER; AND THAT
 A TEMPORARY DURATION IN OFFICE, WHICH WOULD NATURALLY DISCOURAGE
 SUCH CHARACTERS FROM QUITTING A LUCRATIVE LINE OF PRACTICE TO ACCEPT
 A SEAT ON THE BENCH, WOULD HAVE A TENDENCY TO THROW THE
 ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE INTO HANDS LESS ABLE, AND LESS WELL
 QUALIFIED, TO CONDUCT IT WITH UTILITY AND DIGNITY. ╔N THE PRESENT
 CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS COUNTRY, AND IN THOSE IN WHICH IT IS LIKELY TO
 BE FOR A LONG TIME TO COME, THE DISADVANTAGES ON THIS SCORE WOULD BE
 GREATER THAN THEY MAY AT FIRST SIGHT APPEAR; BUT IT MUST BE
 CONFESSED, THAT THEY ARE FAR INFERIOR TO THOSE WHICH PRESENT
 THEMSELVES UNDER THE OTHER ASPECTS OF THE SUBJECT.
╒PON THE WHOLE, THERE CAN BE NO ROOM TO DOUBT THAT THE
 CONVENTION ACTED WISELY IN COPYING FROM THE MODELS OF THOSE
 CONSTITUTIONS WHICH HAVE ESTABLISHED ╟╧╧─ ┬┼╚┴╓╔╧╥ AS THE TENURE OF
 THEIR JUDICIAL OFFICES, IN POINT OF DURATION; AND THAT SO FAR FROM
 BEING BLAMABLE ON THIS ACCOUNT, THEIR PLAN WOULD HAVE BEEN
 INEXCUSABLY DEFECTIVE, IF IT HAD WANTED THIS IMPORTANT FEATURE OF
 GOOD GOVERNMENT. ╘HE EXPERIENCE OF ╟REAT ┬RITAIN AFFORDS AN
 ILLUSTRIOUS COMMENT ON THE EXCELLENCE OF THE INSTITUTION.
╨╒┬╠╔╒╙.
1 ╘HE CELEBRATED ═ONTESQUIEU, SPEAKING OF THEM, SAYS: "╧F THE
 THREE POWERS ABOVE MENTIONED, THE JUDICIARY IS NEXT TO
 NOTHING." "╙PIRIT OF ╠AWS." VOL. I., PAGE 186.
2 ╔DEM, PAGE 181.
3 ╓IDE "╨ROTEST OF THE ═INORITY OF THE ├ONVENTION OF
 ╨ENNSYLVANIA," ═ARTIN'S ╙PEECH, ETC.