Time - Man of the Year/Time_Man_of_the_Year_Compact_Publishing_3YX-Disc-1_Compact_Publishing_1993.iso/moy/051892/0518unk.000

Text File | 1992-09-10 | 6KB | 116 lines

                                                                                AMERICA ABORAD, Page  54

Peacekeeping Loves Company


By Strobe Talbott


    Two months ago, a highly classified Pentagon document
known as the Defense Planning Guidance found its way into the
New York Times. A front-page headline proclaimed that the Bush
Administration had a secret plan to "thwart challenges to the
primacy of America" in a "one-superpower world." The nation's
top brass appeared to have endorsed "global unilateralism," the
doctrine promoted by conservatives who believe that the U.S.
essentially must go it alone in enforcing world peace. The Times
called the suddenly famous Pentagon paper "the clearest
rejection to date of collective internationalism" -- a competing
view, favored by liberals, that coalitions, especially ones
sanctioned by the U.N., are the way to keep global order.

    The leak caused an uproar on Capitol Hill, where
legislators are looking to cut costs and share burdens. Senator
Joseph Biden, a Democrat, scoffed at the idea of "America as
`Globocop.'" At a recent international conference in Lisbon,
I found Europeans and Japanese still fretting about the Times's
scoop, which they took as proof that the U.S. is bent on giving
new meaning to old cliches like Pax Americana and Uncle Sam as
the world's policeman.

    A few days later, back in Washington, I had an opportunity
to get a clearer sense of Pentagon thinking. Along with several
other curious civilians, I spent most of a day listening to
American military officers explain how they are adjusting to the
budgetary stringencies and geopolitical complexities of the
post-cold war era. They are under orders to reduce the size of
the U.S. military 25% in the next three years and cut by more
than half the number of G.I.s in Europe.

    All this is happening, of course, because the Soviet Union
and the Warsaw Pact no longer exist. In place of the devil we
knew is a threat represented on the briefers' charts by an
eerie phrase: THE UNKNOWN AND THE UNCERTAIN. Instead of
preparing to fight World War III, the Pentagon is planning to
deal with what the charts call MRCS, or major regional
conflicts. The National Security Agency, which eavesdrops on
real and potential enemies around the world, is retiring Russian
speakers to make room for specialists in Farsi and Swahili. One
of the few categories of procurement that are growing is air-
and sea-lift transports so the U.S. can rush troops to the scene
of an MRC -- or perhaps to two scenes at once. For example,
North Korea might attack the South just when the U.S. is
preoccupied with a new flare-up in the Persian Gulf.

    After listening to the generals and admirals for several
hours, I realized that many of us on the outside have
oversimplified the terms of the debate that is going on within
the defense establishment. In "the Tank," the mahogany-paneled
room where the Joint Chiefs of Staff meet regularly to thrash
out their problems, global unilateralism and collective
internationalism do not seem quite so much like a strategic
dichotomy, an either-or choice that the U.S. must make now and
live with for decades. Instead, the chiefs want to keep all
options open. When necessary, they want the U.S. to be the Lone
Ranger who can go after a bandido like Manuel Noriega of Panama.
But whenever possible, they would prefer to play the sheriff who
leads a posse against the likes of Saddam Hussein.

    However, there is a trickier third contingency. It is all
too easy to imagine a local conflict -- in the Balkans, the
Horn of Africa, Southeast Asia -- threatening to become an MRC.
Foreign intervention is urgently required. The U.S. may not feel
its vital interests are sufficiently threatened to take the
lead, but American participation would increase the credibility
and effectiveness of the operation. In such a case, the U.S.
should be prepared to join a posse led by someone else.

    That prospect clearly made our briefers uneasy. There was
no mention of the U.N. on their many charts, so my fellow
visitor, Samuel Lewis, kept raising the issue. A former American
ambassador to Israel, he is now president of the U.S. Institute
of Peace, a congressionally funded foundation and think tank
devoted to conflict resolution. At his probing, our hosts were
willing to allow that U.S. military units might participate in
a multinational peacekeeping mission under a non-American
general in a U.N. blue beret. But their lack of enthusiasm for
the idea was palpable.

    At the end of our stay, we met with General Colin Powell,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs. He was much less grudging
about multilateral operations in general and the U.N. in
particular. In response to more questions from Lewis, Powell
recalled that the U.N.'s founders established a Military Staff
Committee, composed of representatives of the five permanent
members of the Security Council, to direct peacekeeping
activities. Noting that the committee had been "moribund"
through the cold war, Powell said he would now like to see it
made "more relevant."

    In addition, the U.N. as a whole needs more power and
resources for peacekeeping, including an ability to call on
American troops to serve under the world body's flag. Powell's
subordinates might wince at the thought. But they need not
worry. Since the U.S. has a veto on the Security Council, the
President would not be giving up his ultimate authority or
responsibility as Commander in Chief.

    Powell is still a long way from trading in his green Army
cap for a blue beret, but he is no Globocop either. It is
encouraging that the American soldier who is most willing to
work the U.N. into the Pentagon's plans is also the highest
ranking.