In operation since the 1960s, the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is a central component of the world's commitment to control the spread of nuclear weapons. Under agreements that states conclude with the IAEA, agency inspectors regularly visit nuclear facilities to verify records that state authorities keep on the whereabouts of nuclear material under their control, check IAEA-installed instruments and surveillance equipment and confirm physical inventories of nuclear materials. They then prepare detailed reports to the state concerned and to the IAEA. Taken together, these and other safeguard measures provide independent, international verification that governments are living up to their commitments to peaceful uses of nuclear technology.
The rapid development of nuclear energy and the growing acceptance of IAEA safeguards are reflected in the volume of safeguarded nuclear facilities and materials. Safeguards are applied most intensively at facilities containing materials (namely, plutonium and highly enriched uranium) that could be used to manufacture a nuclear explosive. Inspection goals, which take into account potential diversion paths and other technical criteria, are formulated accordingly and give top priority to safeguards at such facilities and to verifying the whereabouts of these materials. Overall, the IAEA, within the limits of its authority and resources, has been able to improve attainment of inspection goals throughout the entire civilian nuclear fuel cycle. The levels provide assurance that no diversion for military purposes has occurred within safeguarded activities.
The system consists of three major components:
Accountancy, i.e. reporting by states on the whereabouts of the fissionable material under their control, on stocks of fuel and of spent fuel, on the processing and reprocessing of nuclear materials, etc.;
Containment and surveillance techniques, such as seals which allow conclusions that no material has disappeared, film and TV cameras which record any action occurring in a particular area of a nuclear installation;
Inspection by agency inspectors, checking instruments and seals installed, verifying books, confirming physical inventories of fuel or spent fuel.
A basic feature of safeguards is that verification can take place only on the basis of an agreement with the state in which the inspection is to occur. The IAEA is not a organization with powers to impose inspections on any state. Acceptance of safeguards is a voluntary act. The state is not giving up anything. It is issuing an invitation to inspection that it finds to be in its own interest.
A great many IAEA agreements on safeguards envisage agency verification of all present and future fissionable material in a given state. They are referred to as full-scope safeguards agreements. Under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the Tlatelolco and Rarotonga Treaties, contracting states are obliged to conclude agreements of this scope with the agency. Other safeguards agreements are concluded to cover individual nuclear installations or individual quantities of fissionable material, normally as a result of an agreement between a supplier and a recipient state. Lastly, safeguards agreements have been worked out between the IAEA and all five nuclear-weapon states, under which the latter invite the agency to apply safeguards to all or some of the peaceful nuclear installations in their territory.
To be credible, safeguards must be thorough and systematic. To operate the safeguards system is a major responsibility for the IAEA. Even after some 35 years of experience, new challenges arise. Complicated installations are built that handle large quantities of fissionable material which have to be safeguarded. Verification techniques which were once satisfactory become obsolete. Today the discussion of disarmament on many fronts has opened up a much greater general readiness to accept verification than existed at the time when safeguards were the first swallows in the air. IAEA safeguards will benefit both in cost efficiency and credibility if they are allowed to keep up with the advances made in other verification schemes.
Safeguards at a Glance
Inspectors:
The most visible components of the IAEA's safeguards systems are the designated inspectors. Under agreed rights of access, they regularly visit nuclear installations to verify records, check instruments and surveillance equipment and confirm physical inventories of nuclear materials; they later prepare detailed reports to the state concerned and to the IAEA. In Member States of the European Union (EU), IAEA inspectors work with the inspectors of the European Atomic Energy Commission (Euratom). In 1993, 2042 safeguards inspections were performed at 460 facilities and other locations worldwide.
Containment and Surveillance:
At many nuclear installations, the IAEA uses surveillance cameras and other electronic techniques to continuously and automatically record activities in key places. Also used are specially designed small metal seals which are fixed on the camera housings and other IAEA equipment to prevent undetected tampering, or at nuclear material storage areas or containers to safeguard the contents. Films and seals are regularly analyzed. During 1993, 2847 surveillance films and 3072 video tapes were reviewed. In addition, nearly 21,000 affixed seals were successfully verified by agency inspectors.
Verification of Nuclear Material:
On a regular basis, the IAEA receives and analyzes reports from state authorities on the whereabouts of nuclear material under their control. Reports cover stocks of nuclear fuel and the export/import of safeguarded materials and equipment. Annually, about one million data entries are processed and stored in IAEA computers.
Field and Laboratory Testing:
The fact that nuclear materials have distinctive radioactive characteristics makes it possible to detect and measure them; consequently, they can be accounted for with a high degree of accuracy. During inspections, IAEA inspectors conduct independent measurements for on-the-spot confirmation of the enrichment level and content of nuclear material. They also collect samples of certain types of safeguarded nuclear materials that are later tested and measured at the IAEA's Safeguards Analytical Laboratory (SAL) near Vienna, Austria, or at some national analytical laboratories. SAL and 18 laboratories in various parts of the world form a cooperative network.
Agreements:
Legal agreements are the basis of IAEA safeguards. Many are popularly known as full-scope agreements because they extend to all peaceful nuclear activities and materials in the state. These mainly relate to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and also to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco) and to the South Pacific Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty (the Rarotonga Treaty). Other safeguards agreements cover individual nuclear installations or individual quantities of nuclear material. At the end of 1993, 194 safeguards agreements were in force in 116 states (and Taiwan, China). This includes safeguards agreements which were in force with 100 states pursuant to the NPT. The greater part of the safeguards activities was in those states where safeguards were being applied pursuant to full scope safeguards agreements (INFCIRC/153 type). Safeguards were also being applied to facilities, equipment, and non-nuclear material under agreements covering individual facilities (INFCIRC/66 Rev. 2 type). Due to the dissolution of the former USSR and the formation of various newly independent states, at year's end 1993, there were eight states with significant nuclear activities but without any safeguards agreements in force.
Safeguards in Non-Nuclear Weapon States:
As of 1 April 1994, 159 Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) had adhered to the NPT in addition to China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America and have thus entered into an international legal commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in any manner whatsoever.
Safeguards in Nuclear-Weapon States:
IAEA safeguards are applied in the Nuclear-Weapon States in a limited number of facilities selected by the IAEA under so-called voluntary-offer agreements concluded with the agency.
Other Safeguards:
There are eight states not party to the NPT or the Treaty of Tlatelolco which have nuclear facilities in operation or under construction. In some of these states, only some installations are under safeguards and there are unsafeguarded nuclear facilities known to be in operation or under construction.
In 1993, the agency monitored Iraq's compliance to UNSC Resolution 687 by conducting the destruction and removal of materials. The spent fuel in Iraq was shipped to the Russian Federation for processing and storage.
