Media Share 9/MEDIASHARE_09.ISO/business/effdocs.zip/EMAILPRV.RSH

Text File | 1992-11-11 | 14KB | 297 lines

The recent discussion on email privacy provoked me into trying to formalize the
employee privacy policy we have here at Digital Research.  Currently, there is
nothing in writing concerning any privacy issues.  Here are some references I
have found which some of you might find interesting.  In addition, I've just
come across some references to Computerworld articles (Jan 14, 1991; Aug 13,
1990) which I will summarize under separate cover.  I've divided case
sightings into two groups: US Constitutional law, and California law.

In addition, PLEASE NOTE that I am cross posting this to misc.legal.  PLEASE
EDIT YOUR HEADERS when posting follow ups so that the postings are delivered to
appropriate news groups.


====

I.  U.S. Constitution


    "... [S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed
    by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and
    substance. ... Various guarantees create *zones of privacy*.  The right
    of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one
    ..."
            [Griswold v Connecticut, US Supreme Court, 1965]



    "The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.  In
    a line of decisions, however, ... the Court has recognized that a
    *right of personal privacy*, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones
    of privacy, does exist under the Constiution.  This right of privacy
    ... is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to
    terminate her pregnancy."

        {note: discussion on abortsions to appropriate news groups,
        please}
            [Roe v. Wade, US Supreme Court, 1973]


    "Individuals do not lose Fourth Amendment rights merely because they
    work or the government instead of a private employer.  The operational
    reality of the workplace, however, may make *some* employee's
    expectations of privacy unreasonable ... Public employees' expectations
    of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like similar
    expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by
    virtue of actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate
    regulation. ... Given the great variety of work environments in the
    public sector, the question of whether an employee has a *reasonable
    expectation of privacy* must be addressed on a case-by-case basis."

            [Majority Opinion, O'Conner v. Ortega, US Supreme
            Court, 1987]


    "... [T]he reality of work in modern time, whether done by public or
    private employees, erveals why a public employee's *expectation of
    privacy* in the workplace *should be carefully safeguarded* and not
    lightly set aside.  It is, unfortunately, all too true that the
    workplace has become another home for most working Americans.  Many
    employees spend the better part of their days and much of their
    evenings at work. ... Consequently, an employee's private life must
    intersect with the workplace, for example, when the employee takes
    advantage of work or lunch breaks to make personal telephone calls, to
    attend to personal business, or to receive personal vistors in the
    office.  As a result, th etidy distuctions ... between the workplace
    and professional affairs, on the one hand, and personal possessions and
    private activities, on the other, do not exist in reality."

            [Dissenting Opinion, O'Conner v. Ortega (above)]


    "There are few activities in our society more personal or private than
    the passing of urine.  most people describe it by euphemisms if they
    talk about it at all.  It is a function traditionally performed without
    public observation; indeed, its performance in public is generally
    prohibited by law as well as social custom. ...  Because it is clear
    that the collection and testion of urine intrudes upon *expectations of
    privacy that society has long recognized* as reasonable, ... we agree
    that these intrusions must be deemed searches under the Fourth
    Amendment. ...

    The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches and seizures, but
    only those that are unreasonable. ...  The expectation of privacy of
    (railroad) employees are diminished by reason of their particiption in
    an industry that is regularted pervasively to ensure safety, a goal
    dependent, in substatial part, on the health oand fitness of employees.
    ...  We conclude, therefore, that the testing procedures pose only
    limited threats to the *justifiable expectations of privacy* of covered
    employees.  By contrast, the government interest in testing ... is
    complelling.  Employees subject to the tests discharge duties fraught
    with such risks of injury to others that even a momentary lapse of
    attention can have disastrous consequences."

            [Majority Opinion, Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives
            Assoc., US Supreme Court, 1989]


    "... [T]he majority today joins those shortsighted courst which have
    allowed basic consitutional rights to fall prey to momentary
    emergencies. ...  The majority's acceptance of dragnet blood and urine
    testing ensures that the first, and worse, casualty of the war on drugs
    will be the precious liberties of our citizens. ...  There is no drug
    exception to the Constitution, any more than there is a communism
    exception or an exception for other real or imagined sources of
    domestic unrest. ...  The immediate victims of the majority's
    constiutional timorousness will be those railroad workers whose bodily
    fluids the Government may now forcibly collect and analyze.  But
    ultimately, totday's decision will reduce the *privacy all citizans
    may enjoy*, for, as Justice Holmes understood, principles of law, once
    bent, do not snap back easily."

            [Justice Marshall's Dissenting Opinion, Skinner v.
            Railway Laber Executive's Assoc., (above)]


    "Unlike most private citizens or government employees in general,
    employees involved in drug interdiction reasonably should expect
    effective inquiry into their fitness and probity.  Much of the same is
    true of employees who are required to carry fireamrs.  Because
    successful performance of their duties depends uniquely on their
    judgment and dexterity, these employees cannot reasonably expect to
    keep from the (Customs) Service personal information that bears
    directly on their fitness.  While reasonable tests designed to elicit
    this information doubtless infinge some *privacy expectations*, we do
    not believe these expectations outweigh the Government's compelling
    interest in safety and in the integrity of our borders."

            [Majority Opinion, National Treasury Employees Union v.
            Von Raab, US Supreme Court, 1989]


    "In my view the Customs Service rules are a kind of immolation of
    *privacy and human dignity* in symbolic opposition to drug use. ...
    What better way to show that the Government is serious about its 'war
    on drugs' than to subject its employees on the front line of that war
    to this invasion of their privacy and affont to their dignity? ...
    Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
    when the Goverment's purposes are beneficent. ...  Those who lose
    because of lack of understanding that begot the present exercise in
    symbolism are not just the Customs Service employees, whose dignity is
    thus offended, but all of us -- who suffer a coarsening of our national
    manners that ultimately give the Fourth Amendment its content ..."

            [Justice Scalia's Dissenting Opinion, National Treasury
            Employees Union v. Von Raab (above)]

    "The constitutional right of any citizen not to be searched without a
    reasonable basis of individual suspicion is basic to our freedome.
    Preservaction of this right was crucial to the creation of our form of
    government when we revolted from a system that failed to honor it.  If
    a serious problem arises there is often a temptation to solve it by
    relaxing Fourth Amendment protections.  Just as a beautiful sand dune
    crumbles if continously eroded by ocean waves, so will *this essential,
    precious right* become a victim if it is modified at times of stress.
    ... [T]he requirement compelling all attorneys accepted for employment
    int he (Justice) Department's Antitrus Division to submit to a
    pre-screening urine druge test in absence of any basis for
    individualized suspicion of druge use offends the Fourth Amendment and
    is invalid ..."

            [Willner v. Thornburgh, US District Court for DC, 1990]


    "No matter how carefully tailored, all urinalysis programs implicate
    *serious privacy concerns*. ...  We readily agree that pre-employment,
    reasonable suspicion, post-accident, and post-rehabilitation tests ...
    are less intrusive (than random testing) because they are triggered by
    the employee's own acto or conduct, or by a definable event.  The
    absence of individualized suspicion increases the intrusiveness of
    testing on an employee's privacy.  We conclude, however, that ... the
    privacy interest implicated by random testing in the pipeline industry
    is outweighed by the goverment's interest in detecting and deterring
    drug use."

            [IBEW Local 1234 v. Skinner, Ninth Circuit, 1990]



II.  California Constitution

    "In November 1972, the voters of California specifically amended
    article I, section 1 of our state Constitution to include among the
    various 'inalienable' rights of 'all people' the *right of 'privacy.'*
    Although the general concept of privacy relates, of course, to an
    *enormously broad and diverse* field of personal action and belief, the
    moving force behind the new constitutional provision was a more focused
    privacy concern, relating to the accelerating encroachment on personal
    freedom and security caused by increased surveillance and data
    collection activity in contemporary society."

            [White v. Davis, Cal. Supreme Court, 1975]


    "The *breadth of the concept of privacy* ... has been upheld in a
    multitude of fact contexts but as yet remains a concept of as yet
    'undetermined parameters' albeit in process of almost daily growth. ...
    A Person's medical profile is an area of privacy infinitely mor
    eintimate, more personal in quality and nature than many areas already
    judicially recognized and protected. ... The state of a person's
    gastointestinal tract is as much entitled to privacy from unauthorized
    public or bureaucratic snooping as is that person's bank account, the
    contents of his library or his membership in the NAACP."

            [From Division of Medical Quality v. Gherardini, Cal
            Court of Appeal, 1979]


    "The right of privacy is the right to be left alone.  It is a
    fundamental and compelling interest.  It protects our homes, our
    families, our thoughts, our emotions, our expressions, our
    personalities, our freedom of communion and our freedom to associate
    with the people we choose.  This righ tshould be abridged only when
    there is a compelling public need. ... If there is a *quintessential
    zone of human privacy* it is the mind.  Our ability to exclude others
    from our mental processes is intrinsic to hte human personality. ...  A
    polygraph examination is specifically designed to overcome this privacy
    by compelling communication of thoughts, sentiments and emotions which
    the examinee may have chosen not to communicate."

            [Long Beach City Employees Assoc v. City of Long Beach,
            Cal Supreme Court, 1986]


    "The question of drug testing obviously implicates *important personal
    rights.*  To the best of our knowledge, however, no court has held that
    the right to be free from drug testing is one that cannot be negotiated
    away..."

            [Utility Workers Local 246 v. Souther California Edison
            Co., Ninth Circuit, 1988]


    "Common experience with the increasing use of computers in contemporary
    society confirms  that (article I, section 1) was needed and intended
    to *safeguard individuals' privacy* from intrusion by both private and
    governmental action.  That common experience makes it only too evident
    that personal privacy is threatened by the information-gathering
    capabilities and activities not just of the government, but of private
    business as well.  If the right of privacy is to exist as more than a
    memory or a dream, the power of both public and private insitutions to
    collect and preserve data about individual citizens must be subject to
    constiutional control. ...

    The general concept of privacy can be viewed as encompassing a broad
    range of peronal action and belief.  However, that right, much as any
    other constiutional right, is not absolute.  A court must engage in a
    balancing of interests rather than a deduction from principle to
    determine its boundaries.  ...  Stated another way, a court should not
    play the trump card of unconstutionality to protect absolutely every
    assertion of individual privacy."

            [Wilkinson v. Times Mirror Corp., Cal Court of Appeal,
            1989]


    "While an employee sacrifices some privacy rights when he enters the
    workplace, the employee's privacy expecations must be balanced agains
    the employer's interests. ... The *right of privacy* is unquestionably
    *a fundamental interest of our society*. ...  We think that thtere is a
    public policy concern in an individual's right to privacy. ...  While
    rights are won and lost by the individual actions of people, the
    assertion of the right establishes it and benefits all Californians in
    the same way that an assertion of free speech right benefits all of
    us."

            [Semore v. Pool, Cal Court of Appeal, 1990]



    "... California accords *privacy* the constitutional status of *an
    inalienable right*, on a par with defending life and possessing
    property. ...  The constitutional right to privacy does not prohibit
    all incursion into individual privacy, but provides that any such
    intervention must be justified by a compelling interest."

            [Luck v. Souther Pacific Transportation Co., Cal Court
            of Appeal, 1990]



    "(Plaintiff) contends that the California right to privacy is not
    negotiable and cannot be affected by a collective bargaining agreement.
    We have expressly declined to construe *California's privacy guarantee*
    as a non-waiveable right. ...  The right to privacy under California
    law is based in major part upon the parties' reasonable expecations and
    these, of necessity, involve the working conditions agreed upon in the
    collective baraining agreement."

            [Stikes v. Chevron USA, Inc., Ninth Circuit, 1990]


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