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abolition-usa-digest     Tuesday, December 5 2000     Volume 01 : Number 402




----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2000 13:16:36 -0500
From: Ellen Thomas <[e-mail]>
Subject: (abolition-usa) DOE APPROVING "RELEASE"/"RECYCLING" of ATOMIC Waste, Materials, Sites- Dec 4 Comment deadline

Forward from [e-mail] - action needed!

ALERT- DOE Comment deadline Monday, December 4, 2000.

DOE APPROVING "RELEASE"/"RECYCLING" of ATOMIC Waste, Materials, Sites,
Soils, etc.

Department of Energy (DOE) proposes some limitations on
'Release'/'Recycling' of radioactive METAL, but continues to allow
contaminated materials out.

DOE sets up to RESUME releasing/'recycling' some radioactive metal into
commerce and daily use items!

DOE CONTINUES releasing radioactive wastes, materials, equipment,
property, soils, land, etc.

On Thursday, October 16, 2000 in the Federal Register, 65 FR
198:60653-60656, DOE proposed changes to its internal Order 5400.5 on
public radiation standards regarding RELEASING MATERIALS WITH RESIDUAL
RADIOACTIVITY FROM DOE FACILITIES. Comments due DEC 4!

DOE's proposals:

DOE is clarifying what it needs to do let radioactive wastes and
materials out into general commerce, regular trash and recycling into
the marketplace.

Rather than prohibiting the release of any contaminated materials, DOE
essentially codifying existing procedures, with the appearance of
greater limits on the release of scrap metal.

For scrap metal originating in contaminated areas of DOE sites, DOE will
use commercially available detection equipment to survey and determine
with "reasonable assurance that residual radioactive material is not
detectable on the metal." [proposed DOE Order 5400.5 Chapter V, 4.]

Address comments to:
Harold T. Peterson, Jr.  [phone]  [e-mail]
or
Stephen L. Domotor [phone]  [e-mail]
Air, Water and Radiation Division
Office of Environmental Policy and Guidance
US Department of Energy (EH-41)
1000 Independence Avenue/ Washington, DC 20585.

Send a copy to your US Congressmember (US House of Representatives,
Washington, DC 20515), your Senators (US Senate, Washington, DC 20510)
and to DOE Secretary Bill Richardson, or EH-1 David
Michaels, US DOE, 1000 Independence Ave. SW, Washington, DC 20585.


NIRS general comment:

DOE must PROHIBIT and PREVENT any radioactively contaminated materials
from being released from regulatory control within the DOE complex. No
metals or other materials that are contaminated or potentially
contaminated from DOE activities, at any level, should be released or
recycled into the marketplace or regular or hazardous waste facilities.
Since contamination can be present below economically feasible detection
levels, nothing even potentially contaminated should be released.
Measuring for contamination at the lowest levels of detection would be
an improvement over deliberately releasing contaminated materials at
'DOE authorized levels' but DOE and its contractors cannot be trusted to
monitor adequately and the nuclear industry cannot be trusted to use the
proper technology, mainly for economic reasons. NIRS supports DOE's
implied goal of preventing  release/recycle of scrap metal with any
contamination and encourages that this goal be expanded to cover all
materials, not just scrap metal, but the loopholes must be plugged.

What DOE is proposing:

DOE's proposed changes to Order 5400.5 add a new Chapter V which would
prohibit scrap metals with detectable radioactive contamination on the
surface (from DOE activities) to be released into unrestricted
commerce.  Other contaminated materials could be released if they meet
DOE's
"approved Authorized Levels" of contamination or are calculated, by DOE
field managers or program officers, to give an "acceptable" dose to the
public.

The first part, for scrap metals, SOUNDS good but it has big LOOPHOLES:

1)  DOE procedures, calling for "reasonable assurance," do not guarantee
that the contamination will be detected. Accurate, adequate, systematic,
complete detection is expensive and time consuming. If inadequate
detection is carried out, it can give false assurance and allow DOE
radioactivity out into commerce and consumer goods.

2)  DOE appears to allow 'indirect' release of contaminated metal to the
public by sending it to licensed companies possibly processors---who
don't directly release it to the public, but can make their own
subsequent determination to send it out under their own loopholes and
exemption options.

3)  DOE could let radioactive metal out through reduced oversight of the
material once it is recycled or reused within the DOE complex.

POSITIVE ASPECTS of the Metals Portion of (Ch. V, 3) of the DOE
Proposal-

1)  The GOAL of preventing DOE contamination being released from the
sites is an UNUSUAL IMPROVEMENT in DOE ATTITUDE and is to be
encouraged.  Unfortunately, the implementation has big loopholes that
must be
plugged.

2)   The requirement that DOE field offices coordinate with the public
[Ch. V, 3. b] through local public participation programs is good but
multiple, broad public participation programs must be carried out to
truly involve the communities. Further, since the potential impact is on
the general population at large, local coordination, although essential,
is not adequate. "Coordination"  is not defined and should not be
considered adequate approval of any DOE activities. Since Site Specific
Advisory Boards do not exist at all sites and those that do
have mixed effectiveness, programs involving the public must not rely on
them alone.

Background:

For decades some radioactive materials from nuclear weapons and power
have been sent off-site into daily commerce including regular and
hazardous trash AND recycling  into the marketplace.
Occasionally, it gets caught; not always. Now, the nuclear industry
including DOE and international nuclear promoters want to clearly
legalize the "release" or "clearance" of radioactive wastes, materials,
sites, concrete, equipment, buildings, soil, etc.

Massive Increase in  'Releases' of Radioactive Waste/Materials/Metals
expected:

As DOE attempts to "clean-up" the nuclear weapons complex and as nuclear
power reactors age, projections have been made (by the Environmental
Protection Agency, Department of Energy, International Atomic Energy
Agency and others) of massive amounts of materials with "residual"
radioactive contamination being 'released' or 'cleared' from regulatory
control as if they were not radioactive.

TWO Temporary DOE Moratoria on Radioactive Metal Releases from DOE
sites:

DOE Secretary Bill Richardson temporarily halted the release, from DOE
sites, of metal with radioactive contamination throughout (volumetric
contamination) on January 12, 2000, until the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission acts.

On July 13, 2000 DOE Secretary Richardson suspended the release, from
DOE sites, of metal potentially contaminated on the surface, and
committed that DOE would "ensure American consumers that scrap metal
released from Energy Department facilities for recycling contains no
detectable contamination from departmental activities." The commitment
was that DOE would develop a policy and procedures that will prevent any
metal with radioactive contamination on the surface, from DOE
activities, from going out of the DOE complex. The implication was that
DOE would prevent any contaminated materials from getting out.

DOE announced its proposed policy and procedures on October 16, 2000, in
the Federal Register, as a proposed change and addition to its internal
public radiation standards, DOE Order 5400.5. The proposal was published
for Public Comment on Thursday, October 16, 2000 in the Federal
Register, 65 FR 198:60653-60656, with a December 4, 2000 comment
deadline.

DOE proposal is a Disappointment but Not a Surprise:

INSTEAD OF PREVENTING radioactive metals and other materials from
getting out into the marketplace, DOE's proposed  changes outline the
steps to let contaminated materials out.

DOE will "CONTROL RELEASES of Materials with Residual Radioactive
Contamination from DOE Facilities."

Rather than prohibiting radioactive materials, wastes, property and
equipment from being sold, donated or otherwise sent out of the DOE
complex, the proposed change to DOE Order 5400.5 refers to "DOE-approved
Authorized Limits" for release and provides several options for
releasing contaminated materials.

One of the Department goals of the proposed new Chapter VI of DOE Order
5400.5 is that:

"the level of residual radioactive material in property to be released
is as near background levels as is reasonably practicable consistent
with DOE ALARA process requirements and meets DOE authorized limits"
[proposed DOE 5400.5 Chapter VI 1. (b)].

THIS IS NOT A PROHIBITION ON RELEASE OF CONTAMINATED MATERIALS!

The proposed Requirements for Surveying and Monitoring are inadequate.
For example:

" Where potentially contaminated surfaces are not accessible for direct
measurement (as in pipes, drains, ductwork), such property may be
released only after case-by-case evaluation and documentation that the
inaccessible surfaces are likely to be within DOE approved authorized
limits." [proposed DOE 5400.5 Ch. VI 3.(a) 5. ; also in existing Ch. IV]

What are "DOE-approved Authorized Limits?"

They are "limits approved by DOE to permit the release of property from
DOE control"

Under the proposal [DOE 5400.5 Chapter VI, 3. b], "Authorized limits
must be established to GOVERN THE RELEASE of sites, structures, or
materials (personal and real property). DOE authorized limits are limits
approved by DOE to PERMIT THE RELEASE of property from DOE control"
[EMPHASIS ADDED]

DOE Authorized Limits must  [Ch. VI 3. b]:
- -"be selected *such that potential doses do not exceed and are as far
below the dose limits and constraints as is PRACTICABLE" [Ch.VI 3.b(1)]
- -"be selected to provide a REASONABLE expectation that the release will
not cause the dose limits and constraints to be exceeded for current and
future use of the property." [Ch. VI 3. b(2)]

DOE should be PREVENTING doses, not causing and permitting them!

- -DOE is proposing to adopt the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
decommissioning rule (10 CFR 20 Subpart E) which allows as much or more
exposure from a closed site as it allows from an operating site.
Although this may be considered an improvement to DOE standards by some,
it is inadequate for protection of the public health and safety.  EPA
has expressed concern that the NRC decommissioning rule could leave
sites contaminated enough to be declared Superfund sites, especially due
to groundwater contamination.

Give DOE your Comments on 'Release' and 'Recycling' of Radioactive
Materials into Commerce and on site-release by Dec. 4, 2000.

For more information contact: Diane D'Arrigo, Nuclear Information and
Resource Service, 202-328-0002 ext 16; [e-mail]-ID:
<[e-mail]>
Date: Tue, 28 Nov 2000 13:33:54 -0500
From: diane d'arrigo <[e-mail]>
Reply-To: [e-mail]
Organization: NIRS
X-Mailer: Mozilla 4.04 [en] (Win95; U)
MIME-Version: 1.0
To: Nuke Waste list <[e-mail]>,
    Border Env Ntwk listserve <[e-mail]>,
    WIPP list <[e-mail]>
Subject: ALERT DOE Setting Radioactive Waste + Site "Release"/"Recycle"
Standard- Dec 4 Comment deadline
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit

ALERT- DOE Comment deadline Monday, December 4, 2000.

DOE APPROVING "RELEASE"/"RECYCLING" of ATOMIC Waste, Materials, Sites,
Soils, etc.

Department of Energy (DOE) proposes some limitations on
'Release'/'Recycling' of radioactive METAL, but continues to allow
contaminated materials out.

DOE sets up to RESUME releasing/'recycling' some radioactive metal into
commerce and daily use items!

DOE CONTINUES releasing radioactive wastes, materials, equipment,
property, soils, land, etc.

On Thursday, October 16, 2000 in the Federal Register, 65 FR
198:60653-60656, DOE proposed changes to its internal Order 5400.5 on
public radiation standards regarding RELEASING MATERIALS WITH RESIDUAL
RADIOACTIVITY FROM DOE FACILITIES. Comments due DEC 4!

DOE's proposals:

DOE is clarifying what it needs to do let radioactive wastes and
materials out into general commerce, regular trash and recycling into
the marketplace.

Rather than prohibiting the release of any contaminated materials, DOE
essentially codifying existing procedures, with the appearance of
greater limits on the release of scrap metal.

For scrap metal originating in contaminated areas of DOE sites, DOE will
use commercially available detection equipment to survey and determine
with "reasonable assurance that residual radioactive material is not
detectable on the metal." [proposed DOE Order 5400.5 Chapter V, 4.]

Address comments to:
Harold T. Peterson, Jr.  [phone]  [e-mail]
or
Stephen L. Domotor [phone]  [e-mail]
Air, Water and Radiation Division
Office of Environmental Policy and Guidance
US Department of Energy (EH-41)
1000 Independence Avenue/ Washington, DC 20585.

Send a copy to your US Congressmember (US House of Representatives,
Washington, DC 20515), your Senators (US Senate, Washington, DC 20510)
and to DOE Secretary Bill Richardson, or EH-1 David
Michaels, US DOE, 1000 Independence Ave. SW, Washington, DC 20585.


NIRS general comment:

DOE must PROHIBIT and PREVENT any radioactively contaminated materials
from being released from regulatory control within the DOE complex. No
metals or other materials that are contaminated or potentially
contaminated from DOE activities, at any level, should be released or
recycled into the marketplace or regular or hazardous waste facilities.
Since contamination can be present below economically feasible detection
levels, nothing even potentially contaminated should be released.
Measuring for contamination at the lowest levels of detection would be
an improvement over deliberately releasing contaminated materials at
'DOE authorized levels' but DOE and its contractors cannot be trusted to
monitor adequately and the nuclear industry cannot be trusted to use the
proper technology, mainly for economic reasons. NIRS supports DOE's
implied goal of preventing  release/recycle of scrap metal with any
contamination and encourages that this goal be expanded to cover all
materials, not just scrap metal, but the loopholes must be plugged.

What DOE is proposing:

DOE's proposed changes to Order 5400.5 add a new Chapter V which would
prohibit scrap metals with detectable radioactive contamination on the
surface (from DOE activities) to be released into unrestricted
commerce.  Other contaminated materials could be released if they meet
DOE's
"approved Authorized Levels" of contamination or are calculated, by DOE
field managers or program officers, to give an "acceptable" dose to the
public.

The first part, for scrap metals, SOUNDS good but it has big LOOPHOLES:

1)  DOE procedures, calling for "reasonable assurance," do not guarantee
that the contamination will be detected. Accurate, adequate, systematic,
complete detection is expensive and time consuming. If inadequate
detection is carried out, it can give false assurance and allow DOE
radioactivity out into commerce and consumer goods.

2)  DOE appears to allow 'indirect' release of contaminated metal to the
public by sending it to licensed companies possibly processors---who
don't directly release it to the public, but can make their own
subsequent determination to send it out under their own loopholes and
exemption options.

3)  DOE could let radioactive metal out through reduced oversight of the
material once it is recycled or reused within the DOE complex.

POSITIVE ASPECTS of the Metals Portion of (Ch. V, 3) of the DOE
Proposal-

1)  The GOAL of preventing DOE contamination being released from the
sites is an UNUSUAL IMPROVEMENT in DOE ATTITUDE and is to be
encouraged.  Unfortunately, the implementation has big loopholes that
must be
plugged.

2)   The requirement that DOE field offices coordinate with the public
[Ch. V, 3. b] through local public participation programs is good but
multiple, broad public participation programs must be carried out to
truly involve the communities. Further, since the potential impact is on
the general population at large, local coordination, although essential,
is not adequate. "Coordination"  is not defined and should not be
considered adequate approval of any DOE activities. Since Site Specific
Advisory Boards do not exist at all sites and those that do
have mixed effectiveness, programs involving the public must not rely on
them alone.

Background:

For decades some radioactive materials from nuclear weapons and power
have been sent off-site into daily commerce including regular and
hazardous trash AND recycling  into the marketplace.
Occasionally, it gets caught; not always. Now, the nuclear industry
including DOE and international nuclear promoters want to clearly
legalize the "release" or "clearance" of radioactive wastes, materials,
sites, concrete, equipment, buildings, soil, etc.

Massive Increase in  'Releases' of Radioactive Waste/Materials/Metals
expected:

As DOE attempts to "clean-up" the nuclear weapons complex and as nuclear
power reactors age, projections have been made (by the Environmental
Protection Agency, Department of Energy, International Atomic Energy
Agency and others) of massive amounts of materials with "residual"
radioactive contamination being 'released' or 'cleared' from regulatory
control as if they were not radioactive.

TWO Temporary DOE Moratoria on Radioactive Metal Releases from DOE
sites:

DOE Secretary Bill Richardson temporarily halted the release, from DOE
sites, of metal with radioactive contamination throughout (volumetric
contamination) on January 12, 2000, until the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission acts.

On July 13, 2000 DOE Secretary Richardson suspended the release, from
DOE sites, of metal potentially contaminated on the surface, and
committed that DOE would "ensure American consumers that scrap metal
released from Energy Department facilities for recycling contains no
detectable contamination from departmental activities." The commitment
was that DOE would develop a policy and procedures that will prevent any
metal with radioactive contamination on the surface, from DOE
activities, from going out of the DOE complex. The implication was that
DOE would prevent any contaminated materials from getting out.

DOE announced its proposed policy and procedures on October 16, 2000, in
the Federal Register, as a proposed change and addition to its internal
public radiation standards, DOE Order 5400.5. The proposal was published
for Public Comment on Thursday, October 16, 2000 in the Federal
Register, 65 FR 198:60653-60656, with a December 4, 2000 comment
deadline.

DOE proposal is a Disappointment but Not a Surprise:

INSTEAD OF PREVENTING radioactive metals and other materials from
getting out into the marketplace, DOE's proposed  changes outline the
steps to let contaminated materials out.

DOE will "CONTROL RELEASES of Materials with Residual Radioactive
Contamination from DOE Facilities."

Rather than prohibiting radioactive materials, wastes, property and
equipment from being sold, donated or otherwise sent out of the DOE
complex, the proposed change to DOE Order 5400.5 refers to "DOE-approved
Authorized Limits" for release and provides several options for
releasing contaminated materials.

One of the Department goals of the proposed new Chapter VI of DOE Order
5400.5 is that:

"the level of residual radioactive material in property to be released
is as near background levels as is reasonably practicable consistent
with DOE ALARA process requirements and meets DOE authorized limits"
[proposed DOE 5400.5 Chapter VI 1. (b)].

THIS IS NOT A PROHIBITION ON RELEASE OF CONTAMINATED MATERIALS!

The proposed Requirements for Surveying and Monitoring are inadequate.
For example:

" Where potentially contaminated surfaces are not accessible for direct
measurement (as in pipes, drains, ductwork), such property may be
released only after case-by-case evaluation and documentation that the
inaccessible surfaces are likely to be within DOE approved authorized
limits." [proposed DOE 5400.5 Ch. VI 3.(a) 5. ; also in existing Ch. IV]

What are "DOE-approved Authorized Limits?"

They are "limits approved by DOE to permit the release of property from
DOE control"

Under the proposal [DOE 5400.5 Chapter VI, 3. b], "Authorized limits
must be established to GOVERN THE RELEASE of sites, structures, or
materials (personal and real property). DOE authorized limits are limits
approved by DOE to PERMIT THE RELEASE of property from DOE control"
[EMPHASIS ADDED]

DOE Authorized Limits must  [Ch. VI 3. b]:
- -"be selected *such that potential doses do not exceed and are as far
below the dose limits and constraints as is PRACTICABLE" [Ch.VI 3.b(1)]
- -"be selected to provide a REASONABLE expectation that the release will
not cause the dose limits and constraints to be exceeded for current and
future use of the property." [Ch. VI 3. b(2)]

DOE should be PREVENTING doses, not causing and permitting them!

- -DOE is proposing to adopt the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's
decommissioning rule (10 CFR 20 Subpart E) which allows as much or more
exposure from a closed site as it allows from an operating site.
Although this may be considered an improvement to DOE standards by some,
it is inadequate for protection of the public health and safety.  EPA
has expressed concern that the NRC decommissioning rule could leave
sites contaminated enough to be declared Superfund sites, especially due
to groundwater contamination.

Give DOE your Comments on 'Release' and 'Recycling' of Radioactive
Materials into Commerce and on site-release by Dec. 4, 2000.

For more information contact: Diane D'Arrigo, Nuclear Information and
Resource Service, 202-328-0002 ext 16; [e-mail]
______________________________________________________________

*   Peace Through Reason - http://prop1.org - Convert the War Machines!  *
        Online Petition - http://www.PetitionOnline.com/prop1/petition.html
            NucNews - Today and Archives -
http://prop1.org/nucnews/briefslv.htm
______________________________________________________________

- -
 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.

------------------------------

Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2000 11:22:56 -0800
From: [e-mail] (marylia)
Subject: (abolition-usa) NEW stuff on Tri-Valley CAREs web site

Dear peace and enviro colleagues:

Here are some new and interesting items on Tri-Valley CAREs web site. Go to
http://www.igc.org/tvc and you will find our November newsletter posted
with:

        * an article on Tri-Valley CAREs two, important Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) lawsuits -- one charging DOE with illegally
withholding National Ignition Facility documents and one charging DOE with
similar, illegal withholding of records regarding the agency's so-called
mega-strategy for augmenting and moving around various nuclear weapons
activities. These two lawsuits could have national implications for both
DOE and all future FOIA cases.

        * an article on another, key NIF lawsuit filed by Tri-Valley CAREs
and the Natural Resources Defense Council charging DOE with multiple
violations of the Federal Advisory Committee Act in the preparation of the
NIF cost and schedule "rebaseline" for Congress.

        * your INVITATION to attend a free, day-long community health
training on Saturday, December 9 in Livermore, CA. Featured speakers
include Dr. Marvin Resnikoff on the hazards of radiation, Dr. Peggy
Reynolds on health studies of Livermore Lab workers and the community and
Diane Quigley on community participation in health decision-making.

        * Tri-Valley CAREs' "Print Bites," community calendar and more!

Also on our web site, you will find our latest report on stockpile
stewardship in convenient pdf format, activist-oriented postcards you can
download and send, a sample letter to Congress on NIF and lots of
additional, very useful stuff.

Marylia Kelley
Tri-Valley CAREs
(Communities Against a Radioactive Environment)
2582 Old First Street
Livermore, CA USA 94550

<http://www.igc.org/tvc/> - is our web site, please visit us there!

[phone] - is our phone
[phone] - is our fax

Working for peace, justice and a healthy environment since 1983, Tri-Valley
CAREs has been a member of the nation-wide Alliance for Nuclear
Accountability in the U.S. since 1989, and is a co-founding member of the
Abolition 2000 global network for the elimination of nuclear weapons, the
U.S. Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons and the Back From the Brink
campaign to get nuclear weapons taken off hair-trigger alert.



- -
 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.

------------------------------

Date: Tue, 5 Dec 2000 17:49:12 -0800
From: Abolition 2000 <[e-mail]>
Subject: (abolition-usa) US Report Transatlantic Security Strategies for the 21st Century

US Report Transatlantic Security Strategies for the 21st Century

    The US Department of Defense (DoD) Strategy Report for Europe
and NATO was released on 1 December 2000.  The report, entitled
"Strengthening Transatlantic Security" outlines US plans to prepare
itself and Allies, NATO states in particular, to meet challenges in
the Translatlantic and global communities in the 21st century.  The
document underlines that the fundamental point of US strategy is to
maintain NATO as the preeminent organization of American engagement
in Europe.  NATO enlargement is clearly a US objective and the report
stresses US support for the Membership Action Plan (MAP) as a means
to outreach to potential members.  Of notable interest is a
reiteration of US reliance on deterrence as a cornerstone of security
and a commitment to US nuclear forces remaining in Europe (see
section below on NATO and US Nuclear Forces).  The document also
includes arguments for ballistic missile defenses as a viable means
of protection from states of concern (see below).  Below are excerpts
from sections of interest to those working in nuclear weapons
abolition.  The full report can be downloaded in pdf format at:
Http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/eurostrategy2000.pdf

US, NATO and Globalization

    "In this era of globalization, America and Europe have common
interests  in dealing with security challenges on the periphery of
the European continent and beyond that can have important
ramifications for democracy and prosperity within our transatlantic
community.  Globalization and the information revolution bring
enormous benefits to the transatlantic community, including its
security structures, but they also increase its vulnerabilities.
They facilitate efforts by potential adversaries-both hostile states
and increasingly sophisticated terrorists-to develop or acquire
nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons and the means to
deliver them.  Humanitarian disasters beyond Europe can have an
important impact on transatlantic interest and require joint
US-European responses."  (Pg. 3)

European Cooperation

    "The defense of North America remains inextricably tied to
the defense of Europe.  The United States tried and failed to isolate
itself from the devastating wars in Europe during the 20th century,
which were fought with weapons that are markedly primitive by today's
standards.  We could not isolate ourselves at all from the
catastrophic effects of an attack against Europe in the 21st century,
especially if it involved weapons of mass destruction (WMD)...
    "The United States seeks to prevent the proliferation of NBC
weapons and the means to deliver them, since such proliferation
directly threatens our security and that of our Allies...
    "The US military presence in Europe plays a critical role in
protecting our economic interests, as well as facilitating US
military deployments for both crisis and non-crisis missions to
assist allies and friends in neighboring regions."  (Pgs 7-8)

    "Secretary Cohen also reiterated that, in the face of NATO's
conventional military superiority, hostile states are looking to NBC
weapons and increasingly long-range and accurate ballistic and cruise
missiles to offset that superiority.  NATO, therefore, needs to
develop and field the capabilities, doctrine and plans to deal
effectively with these growing threats."  (Pg. 14)

Defense Budgets

    "As we encourage our Allies to improve their defense
capabilities, we are also taking important steps to improve our own
capabilities and reform our national policies to facilitate the
sharing of technology...
    "Over-all, the United States has embarked on its largest
sustained increase in defense spending in 15 years.
    "We have provided commanders and staffs with policy,
strategy, and doctrinal guidelines for the planning and execution of
joint and multi-national military operations in NBC environments. The
guidelines effect not only passive defense capabilities, such as
medical capabilities, but also active defense and counterforce
capabilities to enable US military forces to survive, fight, and win
in NBC-contaminated environments.
    "In addition, the United Kingdom, Canada and others have
announced increases in defense spending, in real terms, over the next
several years-the first such increases since the end of the Cold War.
Still, many Allies have indicated that their current plans are to
implement fully a disappointingly small number of Force Goals.
Moreover, some Allies are headed in the wrong direction, either
seriously considering or carrying out real reductions in defense
spending.  This trend will have to be reversed."  (Pgs. 16-17)

NATO and Russia

    "The transatlantic community cannot be truly secure if its
enormous nuclear-armed neighbor, with its rich human and natural
resources, withdraws behind a new curtain of hostility and
authoritarian rule or collapses economically." (Pg. 33)

The US Strategy toward the Russian Federation:
    "First, we seek to minimize Russian perceptions of the United
States and NATO as potential threats to Russia's national security...
    "Second, we seek to expand programs of practical cooperation
with the Russian Federation on security-related issues...
    "Third, when Russia's actions or policies raise serious
concerns about its commitment to values important to the
transatlantic and wider international communities, we will not remain
silent."

    "In the bilateral arena, the US commitment to stabilizing
reductions in each side's strategic nuclear forces testifies to our
desire not to return to the dangerous nuclear competition of the Cold
War era. These reductions will be accompanied by nuclear-related
confidence building measures (for example, the recent agreement to
establish a joint US-Russian center in Moscow to exchange information
on ballistic missile launches) that demonstrate our desire to work
with Russia to avoid possible misunderstandings. High-level
consultations between American and Russian defense and military
officials also serve as a primary vehicle to improve each side's
understanding of the other's military doctrines and policies...

    "For example, under the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative,
the United States is enhancing and enlarging existing programs that
over the past eight years have helped the Russians to: deactivate
thousands of nuclear warheads; destroy hundreds of missiles, bombers
and ballistic missile submarines; improve security of nuclear weapons
and materials at dozens of sites; prevent the proliferation of
biological weapons and associated capabilities; begin safe
destruction of the world's largest stocks of chemical weapons; and
provide opportunities and inducements for thousands of former Soviet
weapons scientists to participate in peaceful commercial and research
activities.

    "As part of our strategy, we seek to improve our ability to
cooperate with Russia in crisis response operations by arranging
joint US-Russian exercises and by cooperating with Russia on theater
missile defense technologies...

    "In the final analysis, our ability to work with Russia to
reduce Cold War arsenals, prevent the proliferation of WMD, and ease
the transformation of its political, economic and social institutions
toward more democratic and free market practices will depend heavily
on decisions made by Russia."  (Pg. 33-36)

NATO and US Nuclear Forces

    "In addition to its formidable conventional capabilities to
respond to any aggression directed against NATO, the United States
maintains non-strategic nuclear weapons, under highly secure
conditions, at storage sites in several NATO countries. Since the end
of the Cold War, the United States, in consultation with its Allies,
has dramatically reduced the numbers and types of US non-strategic
nuclear weapons in Europe. For example, all nuclear artillery and
ground-launched short-range nuclear missiles have been eliminated.
Together with Allies, we also have modified the readiness criteria
for forces with a nuclear role and terminated standing peacetime
nuclear contingency plans.
    The fundamental purpose of US nuclear forces based in Europe
is-and will remain-to preserve peace and prevent coercion. They
pro-vide an essential political and military link between the
European and North American members of the Alliance, as well as
linkage to US strategic nuclear systems. They make the risks of
aggression against NATO incalculable and unacceptable in a way that
conventional forces alone cannot. The participation of non-nuclear
Allies in NATO's nuclear posture demonstrates Alliance solidarity,
determination, and willing-ness to share the risks and
responsibilities of collective defense. The circumstances in which
any use of nuclear weapons might have to be contemplated by NATO are
extremely remote, but prudent security planning dictates that we
maintain an appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear capabilities
for the foreseeable future." 15 The UK and France maintain
independent nuclear forces. Like the United States, they have reduced
the size of their respective nuclear forces since the end of the Cold
War.
(Pgs. 47-48)

Deterrence

    "The United States deters threats and potential threats to
its national security, including those from NBC weapons states, by
maintaining powerful nuclear and conventional forces.  Those who
would threaten America or its allies in Europe or elsewhere with NBC
weapons should have no doubt that any attack on us would meet an
overwhelming and devastating response.  DoD also has undertaken a
comprehensive program to equip, train, and prepare US forces to
prevail in conditions in which an adversary threatens to use or
actu-ally uses these weapons against our populations, territories, or
military forces. This combination of offensive and defense
capabilities both strengthens deterrence and ensures that we will
prevail should deterrence fail." (Pgs. 50-51)

Ballistic Missile Defense
Theater Missile Defense
    "As part of broader efforts to enhance the security of the
United States, Allied and coalition forces against ballistic missile
strikes and to complement our counterproliferation strategy, the
United States is pursuing opportunities for TMD cooperation with NATO
Partners. The objectives of United States cooperative efforts are to
provide effective missile defense for coalition forces in both
Article 5 and non-Article 5 operations against short to medium range
missiles. In its Strategic Concept, NATO reaffirmed the risk posed by
the proliferation of NBC weapons and ballistic missiles, and the
Alliance reached general agreement on the framework for addressing
these threats. As part of NATO's DCI, Allies agreed to develop
Alliance forces that can respond with active and passive defenses
from NBC attack. Allies further agreed that TMD is necessary for
NATO's deployed forces.
    "Several Allies currently field or will shortly acquire lower
tier TMD systems. For example, Germany and the Netherlands both field
the PAC-2 missile and naval forces of several Allies are considering
cooperation with the United States to field maritime missile
defenses. An important development in the operational TMD area was
the creation in December 1999 of a trilateral US-German-Dutch
Extended Air Defense Task Force. The Alliance is undertaking a
feasibility analysis for a layered defense architecture. As the
ballistic missile threat to Europe evolves in the direction of longer
ranges, the Alliance will need to consider further measures of
defense incorporating upper-tier TMD and/or a defense against
longer-range missiles."  (Pg. 53)

National Missile Defense
    "Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea do not need long-range
missiles to intimidate their neighbors; they already have
shorter-range missiles to do so. Instead, they want long-range
missiles to coerce and threaten more distant countries in North
America and Europe. They presumably believe that even a small number
of missiles, against which we have no defense, could be enough to
inhibit US actions in support of our Allies or coalition partners in
a crisis.
    "Based on our assessment of these trends, the United States
has concluded that we must counter this threat before one of these
states attempts to blackmail the United States from protecting its
interests, including commitments to our Allies in Europe and
elsewhere. Thus, the United States is developing a NMD system that
would protect all 50 states from a limited attack of a few to a few
tens of warheads.
    "NATO's Strategic Concept recognizes that "(t)he Alliance's
defense posture against the risks and potential threats of the
proliferation of (nuclear, biological, and chemical) weapons and
their means of delivery must continue to be improved, including
through work on missiles de-fenses." As the US. NMD effort
progresses, we need to continue close consultations with our Allies
on relevant policy and technical issues.
    "Although Moscow argues to the contrary, the limited NMD
system the United States is developing would not threaten the Russian
strategic deterrent, which could overwhelm our defense even if
Russian strategic forces were much lower than levels foreseen under
existing US-Russian strategic arms reduction agreements. Moreover,
the US proposal to modify the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty include measures of cooperation and transparency that would
give Russia confidence that the NMD system was not being expanded
beyond its limited scale. China has a more modest nuclear force than
Russia, but has a multi-faceted nuclear modernization program that
predates NMD. Our NMD system is not designed to neutralize China's
strategic capabilities. NMD is a complement to our policies of
deterrence and prevention, not a substitute. We will continue to rely
on diplomacy, arms control and traditional deterrence-the credible
threat of an overwhelming and devastating response-to dissuade states
of concern from attacking or coercing their neighbors or anyone
else.17 But today, when a state of concern might attempt to coerce
the United States or it Allies, it is not prudent to rely exclusively
on deterrence by overwhelming response, especially when we have the
option of a limited, but effective defense.
    "The NMD we envisage would reinforce the credibility of US
security commitments and the credibility of NATO as a whole. Europe
would not be more secure if the United States were less secure from a
missile attack by a state of concern. An America that is less
vulnerable to ballis-tic missile attack is more likely to defend
Europe and common Western security interests than an America that is
more vulnerable. As consultations proceed with our Allies on NMD, we
realize that Allies will continue to consider the appropriate role of
missile defenses in their respective national security strategies. In
keeping with the fun-damental principle of the Alliance that the
security of its members is indivisible, the United States is open to
discussing possible cooperation with Allies on longer-range ballistic
missile defense, just as we have with our discussions and cooperation
in the area of TMD. As President Clinton said in May 2000, "every
country that is part of a responsible inter-national arms control and
nonproliferation regime should have the benefit of this protection."
    "In September 2000, President Clinton announced that while
NMD was sufficiently promising and affordable to justify continued
develop-ment and testing, there was not sufficient information about
the techni-cal and operational effectiveness of the entire NMD system
to move forward with deployment. In making this decision, he
considered the threat, the cost, technical feasibility and the impact
on our national security of proceeding with NMD. The President's
decision will provide flexibility to a new administration and will
preserve the option to deploy a national missile defense system in
the 2006-2007 time frame."
17 Similarly, the independent British and French nuclear deterrents
would not be undermined by the NMD  capabilities allowed under the US
proposal to modify the ABM Treaty.
(Pgs. 54-55)
- --


Carah Lynn Ong
Coordinator, Abolition 2000


"He aha te nui mea o te ao? He tangata, he tangata, he tangata" (A
Maori saying)

Translation: "What is the most important thing in the world? It is
the people, the people, the people."

PMB 121, 1187 Coast Village Rd, Suite 121
Santa Barbara, California  93108
Tel:  [phone]  Fax:  (805)  568-0466
email:  [e-mail]
URL: http://www.abolition2000.org

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