ftp.xmission.com/2014.06.ftp.xmission.com.tar/ftp.xmission.com/pub/lists/abolition-usa/archive/v01.n204

Internet Message Format | 1999-10-24 | 42KB

From: [e-mail] (abolition-usa-digest)
To: [e-mail]
Subject: abolition-usa-digest V1 #204
Reply-To: abolition-usa-digest
Sender: [e-mail]
Errors-To: [e-mail]
Precedence: bulk


abolition-usa-digest     Monday, October 25 1999     Volume 01 : Number 204




----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Sun, 24 Oct 1999 07:11:14 +1000
From: "Helen Caldicott" <[e-mail]>
Subject: Re: (abolition-usa) Fwd: [y2k-nuclear] Y2K AND THE WORLD'S NUCLEAR SYSTEMS: THE DEADLIEST GAMBLE IN HISTOR

Thanks Alice, Love Helen

- ----- Original Message -----
From: ASlater <[e-mail]>
To: <[e-mail]>; <[e-mail]>;
<[e-mail]>
Cc: <[e-mail]>; <[e-mail]>
Sent: Sunday, October 24, 1999 2:06 AM
Subject: (abolition-usa) Fwd: [y2k-nuclear] Y2K AND THE WORLD'S NUCLEAR
SYSTEMS: THE DEADLIEST GAMBLE IN HISTOR


Dear Friends,
The full page ad below appeared in the New York Times yesterday, organize=
d
by
Helen Caldicott.  Please distribute it widely.  We are looking into
reprints so
that it can be run in local newspapers, newsletters, etc.  Alice Slater

>>To: [e-mail]
>Cc: [e-mail], [e-mail],
[e-mail], [e-mail]
>From: [e-mail] ([e-mail])
>
>
>_____________________________________________________________
>
>
>        The New York Times, Friday October 22nd, 1999
>
>        Y2K AND THE WORLD'S NUCLEAR SYSTEMS:
>
>               THE DEADLIEST GAMBLE IN HISTORY
>
>_____________________________________________________________
>
>
>The most critical Y2K crisis we face - its potential impact on the world=
's
>nuclear weapons and power plants - has been obscured by news media
>focusing only on the trivial and sensational. There has been a surprisin=
g
>lack of skepticism in reporting official reassurances that "the problem =
is
>being addressed" and the public won't be at risk on January 1, 2000.
>The net effect has been to lull nearly everyone into complacency.
>
>It has also inhibited responsible scientists, politicians, and governmen=
t
>officials who have credible and alarming concerns about Y2K. They haven'=
t
>spoken out more forcefully because they fear ridicule and humiliation in
>the
>present media climate. But among their peers, in professional journals, =
and
>even in Congressional hearings, they raise grave questions about the
>profound - and unnecessary - risk we face.
>
>Every historical and environmental disaster in the 20th century might we=
ll
>have been avoided, in retrospect, if people had acted differently at the
>critical moment when danger became clear. That moment is now.
>
>_____________________________________________________________
>
>
>"Probably one out of five days I wake up in a cold sweat thinking [Y2K] =
is
>much bigger than we think, and then the other four days I think maybe we
>really are on top of it. Everything is so interconnected, it's hard to k=
now
>with any precision whether we have got it fixed."
>
>- U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre
>
>_____________________________________________________________
>
>
>Less than three months before Jan. 1, 2000, hundreds of thermonuclear
>missiles and atomic reactors remain vulnerable to "Y2K bugs." These bugs=
,
>the basic glitches that arise because many computers cannot tell the
>difference between the years 1900 and 2000, lurk among millions of embed=
ded
>chips and software. When we enter the new millennium, many computer syst=
ems
>all over the world will undoubtedly fail, inducing chaos in some countri=
es
>and minor dislocations in others.
>
>The one industry that must not be allowed to fail is the nuclear industr=
y.
>Yet no precautions now being taken in the world's nuclear arsenals and
>nuclear power plants are enough to prevent the possibility of catastroph=
e.
>
>
>Y2K Risks in Nuclear Weapons
>
>4400 nuclear weapons both in Russia and America are on hair trigger aler=
t,
>ready to be "launched on warning" by a combination of possible inaccurat=
e
>computer data componded by the likelihood of human error. There is a ver=
y
>real danger that Y2K will multiply the false hostile launch reports whic=
h
>have in the past brought both Russian and U.S. forces within minutes of
>launching before the mistake is discovered.
>
>Russia has only recently acknowledged that its military systems have Y2K
>problems, and its deteriorating economic condition woefully limits any
>meaningful fix. Many of Russia's nuclear weapons computer systems were
>stolen from the U.S. The Pentagon's efforts to find their own problems a=
re
>behind schedule. The reassurances we've received to date are unacceptabl=
e,
>because the Pentagon - which has the largest and most complicated
>interfacing computer systems in the world - has not been open and honest
>about its Y2K problems.
>
>A recent decision by the U.S. and Russia to establish a joint early warn=
ing
>room does not obviate the potentially dangerous situation inherent in th=
e
>hardware, software and embedded chips in both countries' early warning
>systems. It is a palliative measure, but not a cure.
>
>The only sure way to prevent the mistaken launch of nuclear missiles is =
to
>de-alert the nuclear warheads, disabling the weapons systems.
>
>Currently, all other nuclear weapons states are in de-alert status,
>guaranteeing that these weapons cannot be launched by computer or
>human error.
>
>
>Y2K Risks in Nuclear Power Plants
>
>We are also gambling with our nuclear power systems. 433 nuclear power
>plants worldwide are at risk - 103 in the U.S. alone. France, the nation
>most heavily dependent on nuclear plants, is so uncertain of its nuclear
>safety that it plans to shut down all its nuclear facilities except the
>nuclear power plants during the week of January 1, 2000.
>
>While Y2K can pose a danger to routine reactor control systems, the majo=
r
>risk involves a power blackout engulfing the plant, failure of back-up
>generating systems, loss of cooling, and meltdown - the consequences of
>which, within the space of one or two hours, could match the Chernobyl
>disaster.
>
>Compared to Y2K's military risks, it seems relatively straightforward to
>ensure that reliable reactor emergency cooling systems are ready for Y2K
>blackouts. Thirty-five U.S. nuclear power plants are not yet in complian=
ce
>less than three months before Jan. 1, 2000. The Y2K status of hundreds o=
f
>other power and research reactors around the world are unknown.
>
>There is still time. There are still solutions.
>
>If the computer systems which now restrain nuclear technology cannot be
>relied on to perform within acceptable parameters during the Y2K period =
- -
>then people must intervene. Less than three months before Y2K we face a
>frightening vacuum in political leadership. The rest of us must act.
>President Clinton and other leaders will take action only if you do.
>
>
>CALL, FAX AND EMAIL PRESIDENT CLINTON DEMANDING THAT HE:
>
>1. Negotiate an agreement with President Yeltsin that all 2400 U.S. and
>    2000 Russian nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert be "de-alerted"
>    before January 1, 2000.
>
>2. Mobilize the deployment of the required number of reliable emergency
>    back up electrical generators at every nuclear reactor in the world.
>
>Telephone:  [phone]
>
>Fax:  [phone]
>
>Email:  [e-mail]
>
>_____________________________________________________________
>
>
>This emergency statement, based on the latest reports concerning Y2K and
>the nuclear sector, is endorsed by the following concerned experts and
>citizens. Among them are eminent physicists who played key roles in the
>earliest development of nuclear weapons systems.
>
>Sir Joseph Rotblat
>Nobel Peace Laureate
>
>Philip Morrison
>Physicist, Institute Professor (Emeritus), MIT
>
>George M. Woodwell
>Biologist, Director, The Woods Hole Research Center
>
>Ted Taylor
>Nuclear Physicist - Los Alamos Labs 1949-1957,
>Staff Member, Theoretical division responsible for design of new
>nuclear weapons
>
>Ira Helfand
>MD, Co-Founder and Past President - Physicians for Social Responsibility
>
>Mary Olson
>Nuclear Waste Specialist - Nuclear Information and Resource Service
>
>Helen Caldicott, MD
>Founding President - Physicians foer Social Responsibility,
>Founder - Women's Action for Nuclear Disarmament
>
>Ian Prior, MD
>Wellington Medical School, New Zealand,
>Past Secretary, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear W=
ar
>
>Barry S. Levy, MD, MPH
>Adjunct Professor of Community Health, Tufts University School of Medici=
ne
>
>James Riccio
>Staff Attorney - Public Citizen's Critical Mass
>
>Patch Adams, MD
>
>(Affiliations for identification only)
>
>_____________________________________________________________
>
>
>For further updated information and analysis, go to the following websit=
es:
>
>http://www.y2kwash.org
>
>http://www.basicint.org
>
>http://www.trendmonitor.com/y2kad.htm
>
>
>For inquiries email <[e-mail]> or write:
>Dr. Helen Caldicott, Y2K Nuclear Alert Campaign, 466 Green Street,
>Suite 300, San Francisco CA 94133.
>
>_____________________________________________________________
>
>
>The November edition of 'The Ecologist' magazine will focus exclusively =
on
>the legacy of nuclear energy - arguably the most poisonous industry in
>human history. For your copy, send a check or postal order for $6 to:
>
>The Ecologist
>1920 Martin Luther King Jr Way
>Berkeley
>CA 94709
>USA
>
>UK (=A34) and Europe (=A35) orders to:
>
>The Ecologist
>Unit 18
>Chelsea Wharf
>15 Lots Road
>London SW10 0QJ
>UK
>
>
>The special edition will be displayed in full by mid-November at:
>http://www.gn.apc.org/ecologist
>
>
>We encourage you to reproduce and distribute this ad.
>
>______________________________________________________________
>
>
>
>
>
>
>------------------------------------------------------------------------
>Java or juggling?.  Everybody learns something at Learn2.com.  Where
>you'll find thousands of free 2torials, affordable online courses, and
>useful tips for everyday life.  http://clickhere.egroups.com/click/1246
>
>
>eGroups.com home: http://www.egroups.com/group/y2k-nuclear
>http://www.egroups.com - Simplifying group communications
>
Alice Slater
Global Resource Action Center for the Environment (GRACE)
15 East 26th Street, Room 915
New York, NY 10010
tel:  [phone]
fax:  [phone]
email:  [e-mail]

GRACE is a member of Abolition 2000, a global network working for a treat=
y
to
eliminate nuclear weapons.

- -
 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]=
m"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.



- -
 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 24 Oct 1999 02:04:14 -0700 (PDT)
From: Timothy Bruening <[e-mail]>
Subject: (abolition-usa) # Of Sub Critical Tests

How many sub critical tests have there been?


- -
 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 24 Oct 1999 03:13:53 -0700 (PDT)
From: Timothy Bruening <[e-mail]>
Subject: (abolition-usa) Ellen

At 02:47 PM 10/21/99 -0400, you wrote:
>Here's the e-mail list of the people who registered for the Ann Arbor
>meeting October 8-11.  If you would like to consider yourself part of the
>U.S. Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, please send me your email and
>other addresses and I'll update the list.
Dear Ellen:

Please sign me up.

Sincerely

Timothy Bruening
1439 Brown Drive
Davis, CA 95616
[e-mail]


- -
 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.

------------------------------

Date: Sun, 24 Oct 1999 12:13:42 -0500
From: "Boyle, Francis" <[e-mail]>
Subject: (abolition-usa) German Judges!: HELP!: Trident 2000 ,Sheriffs decision

- -----Original Message-----
From: [e-mail] [mailto:[e-mail]]
Sent: Sunday, October 24, 1999 10:24 AM
To: [e-mail]; [e-mail]; [e-mail];
[e-mail]
Subject: FW: HELP!: Trident 2000 ,Sheriffs decision


Dear Francis, Milady deserves all our solidarity, she is a great woman. With
your
appeal for supporting letters, yo spoke right out of my heart. Thanks,
Ulf.



Sunday, October 24th, 1999


Open Letter to Sheriff Margaret Gimblett

Milady,
On behalf of two hundred German judges and prosecutors of our inititive
'Judges
and Prosecutors for Peace', I send a fervent thank you to Rothesay on the
Isle of
Bute and to the Sheriff's Courthouse in Greenock.
We are quite aware of the fact that there are many differences between the
legal
system of the UK and the one in Germany that have a profound influence on
the
work of a judge. However, what we judges of  these two different systems
have in
common, is our shared task as members of the judiciary body in a democratic
and
open society: the obligation to search for the truth and to administer
justice
with all our efforts, professional skills, energy and thoroughness.
This task is difficult enough, but sometimes it does not only need
professionality, but also a lot of courage.
Milady, you searched for the truth and you have found it, and also you have
found
the courage to overcome your fears and deliver justice, regardless the
personal
consequences. Thus, you have demonstrated the independence of the judiciary
as a
whole, and your personal indepence, from the executive power, as it is
constituent for the democratic system.
You very well knew that, by delivering justice as you understood it by your
legal
expertise, you would become the target of criticism of politicians, of high
ranking executive officials, of the media, may be even your peers. But
nevertheless, you did what you felt you had to do. You have gained, we are
convinced, the trust of the people in the independence of the judiciary.
You have all our admiration and solidarity.

On behalf of 'Judges and Prosecutors for Peace'

Ulf Panzer, District Court Judge, Hamburg/Germany.

P.S.

Dear Ms. Gimblett,
I take the liberty to add another personal remark:
I experencied a lot of our fellow peers that take their authority out of
their
robes and wigs. That is why their proceedings are stiff, very formal and
sometimes fearsome. It is hard to search for the truth in an atmosphere of
fear
and distrust.
You do not take your authority out of your cute wig. You take it from your
office
and from yourself. You have a natural authority that stems from your legal
experience, from your ability to feel the personality of peole, your
readiness to
hear what the defendants want to convey to you. It is this honesty,
seriousness,
and sincerity that makes the atmosphere in your courtroom so relaxed for
all, the
prosecution, the defence, the defendants, the jury (even the witnesses).That
is
the perfect basis to search for justice. I always wanted to be a judge like
you.
I ask for your forbearance, but I had the urgent feeling to say all that to
you.
And I want to add that it was not primarily the acquittal of the three
courageous
women that made me say this. The short time I spent in your courtroom giving

evidence( and i did not no the outcome) I felt that you were a special
person
that struggled for justice.

If I were the Queen, Milady, you would make the TOP of the Queeen's List of
Honours.

Thankfully and most sincerely yours,
Ulf Panzer.





- -
 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 25 Oct 1999 10:03:01 -0400 (EDT)
From: Global Network Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space <[e-mail]>
Subject: (abolition-usa) Space Plane for Space Dominance

 SECURING SPACE FOR THE MILITARY


Hypersonic military spaceplanes
go quietly about their business


BY BILL SWEETMAN (Janes Defense Weekly)

Some time next year, the rocket-powered Lockheed Martin X-33 lifting-body
demonstrator is due to make its first flight from Edwards Air Force Base
(AFB). A few miles away, Boeing engineers will be working on the Future-X
prototype at Palmdale. Both these programs, at the cutting edge of high-speed
aerodynamic and material technology, are sponsored by the NASA Marshall Space
Flight Center and are ostensibly intended to foster the development of civil
and scientific spaceflight.

Few people realize that they are also prototypes for a military
spaceplane which the US Air Force's (USAF's) scientific advisors believe
could be under full-scale development within three years. It would provide
the USAF with the means to perform reconnaissance, space control and strike
missions from orbit.

Dozens of projects - black, white and grey - for military
spaceplanes have been proposed since the late 1950s. The technical snags were
severe, but the fundamental problem was always the absence of a clear
military need, combined with the reluctance of civilian leaders to
'militarize' space. That situation may be changing.

A quiet revolution in military affairs has taken place since the
1990-91 Gulf War. That conflict saw the first extensive use of
satellite systems for communications, warning and navigation. Today, military
operations without them are almost impossible to contemplate.

A National Missile Defense system will likewise depend entirely on
space-based warning and communications systems. The US intelligence community
relies on imaging and electronic surveillance satellites, and even
air-breathing platforms rely on high-bandwidth satellite communications.

The implications of this change are ominous and not widely
recognized. In fact, former US military leaders have charged that current
administration policy is hampering changes that are critically needed for
preventing that revolution from directly
endangering US military capabilities in the future.

Space systems reside in a medium where the US has no exclusive access and no
direct defense against attack. "If the DSCS satellites or the MILSTAR
satellites went out of commission, even some of them, we'd be devastated,"
former Air Combat Command chief General Mike Loh remarked at a roundtable
organized last year by the Washington-based Center for Security Policy. "We
depend on space communications to knit together a theater battle management
system that all of the services will use. It is dependent on space. There is
no more 'belt-and-suspenders'." Loh went on to note that he knows of no
current weapons-delivery or guidance system that does not rely on GPS (Global
Positioning System).

At the same meeting, former vice-Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Stan
Arthur commented: "I was fortunate enough to participate in an Air Force war
game recently - Global Engagement '97, played in 2012 - where we were working
a problem with a near peer who had the ability to influence events in space -
and utter chaos ensued." These officers and others see a widening gap between
the US military's dependence on space and its ability to secure its position
outside the atmosphere.

USAF Space Command's present leader, Gen Richard Myers, and his predecessor,
Gen Howell Estes, have made no secret of their view that the USAF must fill
that gap. To protect US military and commercial assets, to prevent
adversaries from using space-based systems against US interests, and -
eventually - to permit US space-based systems to strike ground targets, the
USAF needs to dominate and control space as it dominates the air today.

Space Command's ambitions have gathered support within the USAF as the
problems of projecting air power with a smaller number of forward bases
become apparent. Events such as the Saudi restriction on the use of its air
bases to launch strikes against Iraq, and the bombing of the Khobar Towers
and US embassies in Africa, have underlined the difficulties of maintaining
forward bases and the imprudence of relying upon them. Space-based systems
are assuming increasing importance in the USAF's new doctrine of 'global
engagement'.

However, this doctrine and Space Command's long-term plans run counter to the
policy of the US administration, which remains committed to avoiding the
militarization of space. The USAF is permitted to study needs for future
military space systems, and to develop some of the technology for them, but
is neither authorized nor funded to deploy them or conduct large-scale
demonstrations.

This anomalous position has created a new alliance. After a long period in
which the US government had three distinct communities in space - NASA, the
USAF's 'white' side, and the 'black' world of intelligence operations - the
different groups are collaborating as never before.

In the USAF view, the key to future space operations is better
access to space. Better does not only mean cheaper (the Evolved Expendable
Launch Vehicle meets that need), but also more responsive, so that payloads
can be launched at shorter notice. The USAF wants the ability to maneuver
outside the atmosphere - giving its systems greater freedom of movement than
those of its adversaries - and to place systems in orbit that can be
recovered and reused. NASA is also interested in improved access to space,
because launch cost drives the cost of its civilian and scientific programs.

In February 1997, NASA and the USAF Space Command formed a partnership
council to harmonize their future spaceflight plans and needs. The National
Reconnaissance Office - responsible for intelligence-gathering spacecraft -
joined this council in December. A subgroup of this council, the Space
Technology Alliance, oversees cooperation in space vehicle technology.

Space Command, with technical support from the USAF's Phillips Laboratory,
has drafted a concept of operations for an Aerospace Operations Vehicle
(AOV), the first step to defining a requirement for such a vehicle. The AOV
(also called the Space Operations Vehicle, SOV) is the successor to the
Military Spaceplane, which was due to start in Fiscal Year (FY) 1998 but was
terminated by the Clinton administration's line-item veto. This has since
been ruled unconstitutional. As currently defined, the AOV is a
two-stage-to-orbit system comprising a reusable booster and a
mission-specific upper stage. The booster would follow a 'pop-up' flight
profile, carrying about 5.5 tonnes of payload to a speed of M15-17 and an
altitude of 300,000ft.

In a report published in November, the USAF Scientific Advisory Board
recommended that the USAF should develop technology for the AOV, so that it
would be ready for a full-scale go-ahead in 2002. In line with this
recommendation, NASA and Space Command are collaborating on at least two
dual-use programs, and the USAF is working on technologies with purely
military applications.

Probably the leading candidate for the AOV booster would be a design based on
Lockheed Martin's X-33 reusable launch vehicle technology demonstrator. The
launch of this program in September 1996 represented a new start in USAF/NASA
collaboration, because it drew technology from previously classified USAF
programs.

The X-33's primary goal is to demonstrate technology for the
VentureStar single-stage-to-orbit heavy launch vehicle. The first
flight was originally scheduled for July, but may now slip for
almost a year. It was first delayed until December this year, due to problems
with building the linear aerospike rocket engine. Then, in January, one of
the composite liquid hydrogen tanks suffered major damage while stabilizing
patches were being cured in place. This is likely to delay the flight until
mid-2000.

The most important new technologies to be demonstrated on the X-33 are the
engine, the thermal protection system (TPS), and the stability and control of
a lifting-body vehicle under re-entry conditions. The performance of the
linear aerospike engine will be affected by the airflow around the vehicle,
and flight test is the only way to confirm computer predictions of these
effects. The TPS and other structural features are drawn from black USAF
programs of the 1980s, aimed at creating a military spaceplane, and it is
speculated that other, still-classified precursor projects may have proven
other X-33 technologies, such as the engine - which, officially, has never
been fired in flight.

A NASA experimental program, in which a linear aerospike engine was to be
tested at transonic speeds on an SR-71, was terminated in November without
firing the engine, adding weight to the speculation that the engine has been
flown before.

The X-33 may be more likely to lead to an AOV than to a commercial launcher,
because the AOV booster is a less risky departure from the X-33 than
VentureStar. It is smaller and suborbital, so that it can accomplish its
goals even if it has a higher structural weight fraction or a less efficient
engine than the VentureStar.

The X-33 is not the only possible solution. Boeing, working on
reusable booster concepts, is leaning towards a horizontal-landing solution
with a blended wing-body configuration, based on its Boeing and Rockwell
heritage, rather than a vertical take-off, vertical landing type similar to
the McDonnell Douglas Delta Clipper. Moreover, there are commercial programs
that could be suited to the AOV role. Space Access, for example, is proposing
a two-stage horizontal-take-off/horizontal landing launch system with
air-breathing ejector ramjet engines. The company claims that it could be
fully operational in 2003.

The most important goal for an AOV booster can be described as 'aircraft-like
operations'. This means being able to launch at short notice, to operate in
all conditions from a variety of launch sites, and to recover the vehicle and
ready it quickly for another mission. Rapid launch implies the use of
non-toxic, easily handled fuels such as LOX/kerosene or LOX/ hydrogen. The
key to being able to use many launch sites is reliability - avoiding the
necessity for an over-water trajectory. A pre-requisite for the ability to
launch in all conditions is that the vehicle is recoverable.

The AOV's sub-orbital trajectory covers a ground distance of
2,200km, so a launch from the continental US means a recovery elsewhere in
the US, probably at Malmstrom AFB or one of the other northern-tier bomber
bases. This requires a reliable all-weather automatic landing system, and a
means of returning the vehicle to its launch point. The NASA/Orbital Sciences
X-34 program is aimed at demonstrating technology to deal with these issues.

Development work is also under way on three optional upper stages for the
AOV. The most sophisticated of these is the Space Maneuver Vehicle (SMV),
designed to provide the USAF with a new level of flexibility in space
operations. Today's spacecraft are limited in their ability to change their
orbital paths. Any maneuver eats into the vehicle's finite fuel supply, and
hence its lifetime. The SMV is a small spacecraft that carries a relatively
large fuel supply, and when its fuel is used it can be recovered and refueled.

The SMV has a wide variety of uses. As a reconnaissance system, it can
provide much faster response to a commander's needs than the National
Reconnaissance Office's spacecraft, and can perform rapid orbital changes to
approach a target at an unexpected time. In the space control mission, it
uses its agility to perform a co-orbital maneuver or a fly-by, using multiple
sensors to examine a suspicious spacecraft at close range. The logical
extension of this role is to equip the SMV with the means to put a spacecraft
out of action if it appears to be hostile.

The SMV is inexpensive enough to be used as a substitute or
supplement for conventional satellites. With its own solar arrays and
batteries, it has an endurance of up to 12 months. This would mean that SMVs
could be stationed on-orbit as short-notice gap-fillers for LEO (low Earth
orbit) satellite constellations.

NASA and the USAF are developing and building an SMV demonstrator. In
December, NASA selected Boeing to build the first of a series of Future-X
prototypes: the Boeing Advanced Technology Vehicle (ATV), which is expected
to carry the designation X-37. Designed by the former Rockwell unit at Seal
Beach, California, the ATV is based on a 1993 concept called Refly, which was
being pursued under USAF
funding before the NASA contract was awarded. Last August, a low-speed test
vehicle, designated X-40A, was released from a helicopter at 9,000ft above
Holloman AFB in New Mexico, and glided safely to an autonomous landing.

Boeing will design and build the ATV at Palmdale, California. The 7.8m long
vehicle will have a wingspan of 4.5m, an empty weight of 1,680kg, and a
loaded weight of 5,350kg, including a 540kg payload in a 1.2 x 1.2 x 2.1m
bay. It will be powered by a Rocketdyne AR-4 rocket engine burning RP-1
(kerosene) and hydrogen peroxide. The primary structure will comprise
high-temperature graphite/bismaleimide composites, and will be protected by
an advanced tile and blanket TPS.

The onboard electronics will use an open systems architecture and will
provide the same support for the payload as a spacecraft 'bus'. The basic
NASA program calls for the vehicle to use battery power on orbit, but it is
designed to include solar-electric panels in the payload bay doors.

The first step in the ATV program will be to upgrade the X-40A so that it can
be released at M0.8 and 40,000ft from NASA's NB-52. The ATV itself will be
air-launched for about 30 envelope-expansion test flights, starting in early
2001. As currently planned, this will lead to a Shuttle-launched orbital
flight in late 2001 or early 2002, supporting the Scientific Advisory Board's
recommended decision date for a full-scale AOV program.

The second upper stage for the AOV is the Modular Insertion Stage (MIS), a
small expendable rocket designed to orbit a payload of 900-1,800kg. The
principal goal for MIS is low cost: the USAF is looking at a price tag of
US$600,000 or less. Technologies under development for MIS include low-cost
composite fuel tanks; uncooled, ablative nozzles; and a pressure-fed
propulsion system using kerosene and either LOX or hydrogen peroxide.

The third (and potentially most controversial) upper stage for the AOV is the
Common Aero Vehicle (CAV). The CAV is a lifting-body boost-glide vehicle
designed to attack time-sensitive ground targets. Launched by an AOV booster,
the CAV would re-enter the atmosphere in a hypersonic glide, descending to a
speed and altitude where it could dispense conventional, aircraft-type
precision-guided munitions. Plans and documents suggest that the CAV would
have a range of about 14,000km and would weigh between 700-1,100kg. A CAV
demonstration program has been identified by the USAF as the X-41.

The USAF plans to launch the CAV with both the AOV and a
conventional ballistic missile (CBM). The USAF is already conducting an
Advanced Concept Technology Demonstration (ACTD) for the CBM. Textron Systems
is developing a GPS-guided re-entry vehicle with a non-nuclear hard-target
warhead. It will be mated to a surplus Minuteman II Inter-Continental
Ballistic Missile booster and guidance bus, and a flight test from Vandenberg
AFB to Kwajalein Missile Range is planned for FY01. Unlike most ACTDs, this
program will not result in the deployment of operational systems, but the
USAF expects this to lead to the development of a CAV-armed CBM, possibly
with a new booster.

These are not 'on-orbit' weapons, so they technically avoid the US
administration's ban on placing weapons in orbit. However, the fact that the
AOV is potentially a strike system runs counter to the belief that space
should be free from weapons.

The same kind of sensitivity applies to the invisible boundary in
space control, between 'surveillance' and 'negation'. One program in this
area is the XSS-10 'microsat', being jointly explored by Space Command and
NASA. This 20kg spacecraft is designed to autonomously acquire and track
targets in space, rendezvous with them and perform
an imaging inspection. Formerly called Clementine II, the project was halted
in late 1997 by the same (now reversed) line-item veto, as the AOV. The first
XSS-10 will be ready for launch aboard the Shuttle in April 2000. Future
microsats could be launched by the AOV/MIS combination.

The next US administration is going to have to tackle the question of space
warfare, and the AOV will be the most visible symbol of what may be an
energetic controversy. The rights and wrongs of an increased military
presence in space may be debated, but there is no disputing that the
technical means to establish such a presence are closer to reality today than
they have been in decades.







- -
 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.

------------------------------

Date: Mon, 25 Oct 1999 09:57:56 -0500
From: "Boyle, Francis" <[e-mail]>
Subject: (abolition-usa) Using Greenock:Trident2 Condemned in Scotland: Summary of Greenoc k ruling

Dear Friends:
    Over the weekend, I was asked by some anti-nuclear resisters for
whom I have great respect to offer some preliminary observations on the
Greenock decision. Right now the entire British nuclear "deterrent" consists
of the Trident2 nuclear submarines, missiles and warheads located in
Scotland right down the road from Greenock. Last week, after an extensive
trial, a Scottish Judge ruled that the Trident2s were illegal under
International Law, United Kingdom Law and Scottish Law. This is what we
hockey parents call a "hat trick"--3 goals in one game. In other words, the
ENTIRE British nuclear weapons establishment now stands condemned as ILLEGAL
under international law, UK Law and Scottish Law. Britain is one of the Five
Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council. Britain is also
one of the Five nuclear weapons states parties to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. This gross illegality of the entire British
nuclear weapons establishment under international law, UK Law and Scottish
Law shall STAND unless and until the Greenock decision is overturned on
Appeal. This gives us a remarkable window of opportunity to use the Greenock
decision in order to go after the Nuclear Weapons Establishments in ALL the
other nuclear weapons states. Since the entire British Nuclear Weapons
Establishment stands condemned as illegal, the Nuclear Weapons
Establishments in all the other Nuclear Weapons States are also illegal
under international law, their respective constitutions and domestic laws
for similar reasons. In particular, and most specifically, we should be able
to use the Greenock decision to go directly after the Trident2s deployed by
the United States, as well as the nuclear weapons submarines deployed by the
other Nuclear Permanent Members of the Security Council. We should also be
able to use the Greenock decision to head off the threatened nuclear arming
of Japan and any other State giving serious consideration to developing
nuclear weapons. We should also be able to use the Greenock decision to stop
the further development of the Nuclear Weapons Establishments in Israel,
India and Pakistan, inter alia. We should be able to use the Greenock
decision to set free Mordechai Vanunu. We should be able to use the Greenock
decision to kill any proposed new nuclear weapons systems of whatever
type--for example, the so-called Stockpile Stewardship Program in the United
States and its equivalents elsewhere. We should also be able to use the
Greenock decision to shore up the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty after the
blow the United States government inflicted upon it a week ago. Etc.
    Obviously, there is no way I can spell out all the implications of
the Greenock decision in this little message. But I think you get my point.
I leave it to your own creativity to figure out how to use the Greenock
decision in order to rid the entire  world of nuclear weapons.
    Yours very truly,
    Francis A. Boyle
    Professor of International Law
- -----Original Message-----
From: Scottish CND [mailto:[e-mail]]
Sent: Monday, October 25, 1999 7:00 AM
To: Multiple recipients of list
Subject: Summary of Greenock ruling


Sheriff Margaret Gimblett's ruling on Trident, Greenock 20 October 1999

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) was asked by the UN General
Assembly to give an advisory opinion on the legality of the threat or use of
nuclear weapons.  That opinion was given in July 1996.  Sheriff Gimblett
quoted sections from the opinion including the comment by the President of
the ICJ - "I cannot overemphasise that the inability of the court to go
further than the formal pronouncement at which it has arrived cannot in any
way be interpreted as a half-open door to recognition of the legality of the
threat or use of nuclear weapons."

She also read out a quote from Lord Murray, a former Lord Advocate, who said
of the position taken by the ICJ judges - " .. an absolute majority of the
court, ten out of fourteen - a two-thirds majority - judged that threat or
use of nuclear weapons is either entirely illegal or generally illegal
subject to one possible exception. That is, a two-thirds majority of the
judges rejected the general lawfulness of nuclear weapons."

A further passage from Lord Murray's article was also read out by the
Sheriff.  This refers to the relevant international law and says - "These
then are the principles on which the lawfulness of the proposed use of a
particular weapon is to be assessed. It is to be noted that in so far as
they consist of international customary law they are part of the domestic
law of this country."

During the trial, evidence had been heard from Professor Francis Boyle of
Illinios University, an expert in International law, Professor Paul Rogers
of the School of Peace Studies at Bradford University, Rebecca Johnson, a
leading authority on international nuclear disarmament and Professor Jack
Boag, a leading authority on the effects of nuclear weapons. During these
submissions it was established that the way in which Trident was deployed,
at the time of the alleged offence, was a threat.

Sheriff Gimblett said:

"I listened carefully to Professor Boyle and have taken into account all the
evidence in this case from him and the other experts and in the absence of
any expert contradictory evidence from the crown, I have to conclude that
the three accused in company with many others were justified in thinking
that Great Britain in their use of Trident, not simply possession, the use
and deployment of Trident allied with that use and deployment at times of
great unrest, coupled with a first strike policy and in the absence of
indication from any government official then or now that such use fell into
any strict category suggested in the ICJ opinion, then the threat or use of
Trident could be construed as a threat, has indeed been construed by others
as a threat and as such is an infringement of international and customary
law.

"The three took the view that if Trident is illegal, given the horrendous
nature of nuclear weapons, they had the obligation in terms of international
law to do whatever little they could to stop the deployment and use of
nuclear weapons in situations which could be construed as a threat.

"It follows, if I consider that Angie Zelter, Ulla Roder and Ellen Moxley
were justified in the first leg of their defence and having given that as
the principle reason the crown has a duty to rebut that defence. They have
not done so and so I uphold the three defence submisions in so far as they
refer to malicious and willful damage."


- -
 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.

------------------------------

End of abolition-usa-digest V1 #204
***********************************

-
 To unsubscribe to $LIST, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe $LIST" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.