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From: owner-abolition-usa-digest@lists.xmission.com (abolition-usa-digest) To: abolition-usa-digest@lists.xmission.com Subject: abolition-usa-digest V1 #183 Reply-To: abolition-usa-digest Sender: owner-abolition-usa-digest@lists.xmission.com Errors-To: owner-abolition-usa-digest@lists.xmission.com Precedence: bulk abolition-usa-digest Wednesday, September 15 1999 Volume 01 : Number 183 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Wed, 15 Sep 1999 17:58:41 +1000 From: FoE Sydney - Nuclear Campaign <nonukes@foesyd.org.au> Subject: (abolition-usa) FRIENDS OF THE EARTH Y2K PRESS RELEASE RE MONITORING CENTRE/Y2K NEWS ITEMS John Hallam =46riends of the Earth Sydney, 17 Lord street, Newtown, NSW, Australia, =46ax(61)(2)9517-3902 ph (61)(2)9517-3903 nonukes@foesyd.org.au http://homepages.tig.com.au/~foesyd http://homepages.tig.com.au/~foesyd/nuclear/bbletter.html Dear friends, The following includes a press release on the Y2K Strategic Stability Centre, agreement for which was initialled on Sept 13, and a number of Y2K - - nuclear related items, including the press covering the US/Russia Y2K agreement. The item by Rick T Vanelli on the US/Russian Y2K agreement not only mentions at length the letter coordinated by FOE Sydney, but gives the url, which is of course the one above. If your organisation has not yet signed that letter please do so by emailing me at nonukes@foesyd.org.au John Hallam Enjoy! AUSTRALIAN PEACE COMMITTEE/FRIENDS OF THE EARTH PRESS RELEASE 15/9/1999 US/RUSSIA MONITORING AGREEMENT SHOWS Y2K NUKE RISK SERIOUS The risk of Y2K-induced accidental nuclear war, that on Aug. 6th impelled nearly 300 (now nearly 400) environment, peace, disarmament, union, church, and other groups to write to presidents Yeltsin and Clinton, asking for nuclear forces to be taken off hairtrigger alert, has been shown to be serious by the US/Russian joint monitoring agreement initialed Sept. 13 in Moscow by Russian Defence minister Igor Sergeyev and US Secretary of defence William Cohen. According to FOE Sydney nuclear campaigner John Hallam, who coordinated the global letter to Yeltsin and Clinton, and the Australian peace Committee's Irene Gale, "The very fact that this agreement has been signed shows that deep down both the US and Russia know that there is a real risk that in the absence of such measures, that confusion created by Y2K related computer glitches could indeed lead to what Senator Bennett in the US calls 'unintended deadly consequences'. While it is perfectly true that missiles cannot launch themselves, it is entirely possible under the current 'launch on warning' doctrines held by both the US and Russia, for a commander who believes that his country is under nuclear attack, to initiate retaliation when the supposed 'attack' is nothing more than computer-generated false data. This has already occurred on a number of occasions, both in the US and in Russia." "The joint monitoring centre obviously does help reduce the risk of an accidental Armageddon. However it is certainly worrying that it will commence operation only on December 27, and will not operate through =46ebruary. It is simply better than nothing. And even without Y2K, there is always the risk of catastrophic accident as long as there are 5,500 silo-based ICBMs primed for instant launch." "The only measure that will ensure that every day is not a game of Russian roulette with the entire planet is to stand down or de-alert, nuclear forces. This was recommended strongly by the Canberra Commission in 1996, and by subsequent resolutions of the UN General Assembly. De-Alerting is a no risk, no cost measure that will immeasurably improve US/Russian relations and will make the planet a safer place as well as paving the way for the elimination of weapons of universal destruction." Meanwhile, the global letter to Yeltsin and Clinton has now 380 organizations signed on to it including Waverley, Leichhardt, Mitcham, Richmond Rivers, Uralla, Darebin, and Salisbury city councils, 14 federal parliamentarians, 10 major international NGOs, 10 members of the European Parliament, 12 Russian NGOs, 29 New Zealand groups, 85 US groups, 65 European groups, and 26Canadian groups. Contact: John Hallam, 9517-3903, h9810-2598. Irene GaleA.M., A.P.C., 08-8364-2291 US and Russia team up to combat Y2K in missile systems US and Russian defence ministers have agreed to jointly monitor missile launch data as a safeguard against Y2K-related mishaps in a modest step toward improving strained relations between the world's two nuclear heavyweights. US Defence Secretary William Cohen and Russian Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev signed a joint statement establishing a centre in Colorado Springs, Colorado, where US and Russian officers will monitor missile launch data from late December to early January as a safeguard against Y2K-related computer failures. The Pentagon proposed the centre to prevent misunderstandings if Russia's early warning satellites are blinded by computer outtages with the advent of the year 2000, a date which some computer systems could misread. Mr Cohen said the head of the Russian strategic forces had accepted a US invitation to visit the US Strategic Command, which is responsible for the US nuclear missile force, in the fall. "That's another good step forward," he said. This Bulletin: Tue, 14 Sep 1999 2:58 AEST YEAR 2000 NEWS Russia Agrees to Joint Nuclear Monitoring Center By Rick T. Vannelli September 14, 1999 In March 1998, John Koskinen, Presidential Advisor and Chairman of the President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion, was claiming that the concern with nuclear missiles was not that they would actually go off, but that a computer malfunction could trigger a false alarm of a missile attack. What he failed to specify was that such a false alarm, occurring as a result of incorrect data or miscalculations, could give rise to accidental nuclear war. The "launch on warning" policy utilized by the United States and Russia requires a commander who believes a nuclear attack has occurred to retaliate immediately. The risk of such a launch gave rise to the creation of a joint letter to U.S. President Bill Clinton and Russian President Boris Yeltsin from almost 300 organizations around the world expressing their grave concerns about this possibility. (See letter at http://homepages.tig.com.au/~foesyd/nuclear/bbletter.html). The bold letter warns that according to Alexandr Arbatov, of the Defense Committee of the Russian State Duma, "U.S.- Russian relations are at the worst, most acute and most dangerous juncture since the U.S.-Soviet Berlin and Cuban missile crises." Given (1) this current adversarial situation, (2) several past events evidencing that spurious data can falsely alert commanders of enemy missile launches, and (3) the fact that none of the nuclear nations can guarantee that their nuclear systems are Y2K compliant, the signatories strongly urged the two presidents "to remove all strategic and tactical nuclear weapons from 'hair trigger' alert, and place them in a status in which at least hours and preferable days would be required to launch them." The chance of the United States and Russia taking nuclear forces off alert before December 31, 1999 is slim, since the two countries have just formed an agreement about the joint warning center that was proposed in September 1998 as part of the post-Cold War plan to share early warning missile-launch data. The Center for Y2K Strategic Stability, located at the Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado, would solve the problem of a combination of Y2K failures, inaccurate early warning data, and potentially compromised command centers, by putting the United States and Russia in direct communication with each other. The center would be staffed with both American and Russian teams that would watch for missile launches and Y2K problems by monitoring satellite data, ground sensors, and data flowing from the nearby North American Aerospace Defense Command (which can track missile launches worldwide). Discussions about the center were suspended when Russia froze all military-to-military cooperation during the U.S.-led NATO bombing of Yugoslavia. Subsequent and repeated invitations to commence further talks went unanswered. Finally last month, the Russians agreed to post officers at the center, and a formal meeting to pound out the details was scheduled for September 13, 1999. U.S. Defense Secretary William Cohen flew to Russia to meet with Russian Defense Minister General Igor Sergeyev, and according to Voice of America's Peter Heinlein, the September 13 meeting went well. The center will operate 24 hours a day starting late December 1999 and continuing through January 2000. Unfortunately, the United States and Russia are only two of the eight major nuclear weapon nations. The other six countries are the United Kingdom, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and France. Moreover, there is widespread nuclear weapon proliferation in other areas. John D. Holum, Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, recently stated that although Iraq's nuclear weapons program was dismantled six years ago, "Iraq continues to hide documentation and equipment relating to key aspects of its past nuclear activities. Moreover, the Iraqi government has yet to document that it no longer has nuclear weapon ambitions." Likewise, although North Korea agreed to work toward nonproliferation with its weapons program, delays and other concerns with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) make it unclear when this objective will be reached. Furthermore, the DPRK "is developing missiles of increasingly longer range -- missiles eventually capable of striking parts of the United States." Countries such as Egypt and Syria are importing missiles from North Korea. Finally, Iran "continues a procurement pattern for nuclear technologies=C9and is pursuing a nuclear weapon capability under the guise of a complete nuclear fuel cycle." Of the estimated 36,000 - 43,000 nuclear weapons existing in the world, about 5,000 are on "high alert" status (they can be fired within 15 minutes and reach their target city within 30 minutes). Although the U.S.-Russian Center for Y2K Strategic Stability greatly decreases the chance of an accidental hostile weapons launch, it does not completely eradicate the potential for global nuclear disaster. - -------------------------------------------------- [Federal Computer Week] - ----------------------------------------------------------- SEPTEMBER 13, 1999 . . . 13:10 EDT - ----------------------------------------------------------- Russians agree to Y2K warning center BY DANIEL VERTON (dan_verton@fcw.com) More than six months after negotiations began, U.S. and Russian Federation officials today signed a statement supporting the creation of a joint warning center that would help avoid an accidental launch of nuclear weapons that could result from system malfunctions caused by Year 2000-related computer problems. Defense Secretary William Cohen and Russian Federation Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev signed the agreement today in Moscow, after extensive delays caused by increasing tensions over the war in Yugoslavia. The new Center for Year 2000 Strategic Stability will be located at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, Colo., and will be staffed by Russian and U.S. military representatives during the Year 2000 transition period from late December 1999 through mid-January 2000. Military officers from both countries will sit side by side and exchange information related to Year 2000 in an effort to avoid misperceptions surrounding the status of each other's nuclear forces. The center also will be linked via voice communications networks to other command centers in the United States and Russia. The creation of the joint warning center stems from concerns that Year 2000 failures could cause some nuclear command and control systems to crash, which could be interpreted as the sign of an impending first strike. However, Defense Department officials and officials from the U.S. Strategic Command have assessed the likelihood of an accidental launch as "extremely remote," adding that nuclear missiles cannot be launched by a computer alone. ----------------------------------------------------------- [deseretnews.com] Deseret News, Tuesday, September 14, 1999, 12:00 AM MDT Russians are coming =D1 to ensure missiles don't Bennett says Y2K center will guard against false alarms By Lee Davidson Deseret News Washington correspondent WASHINGTON =D1 Sen. Bob Bennett, R-Utah, praised Russia Monday for agreeing to send officials to a Colorado Springs command center designed to detect false missile attack alarms caused by the year 2000 computer bug. "The greatest Y2K danger comes not from the threat of an accidental launch but from the threat of Y2K glitches being misinterpreted by personnel on either side of the Atlantic," said Bennett, chairman of a special Senate Y2K committee. So the military is establishing a command center where Russia and the United States can share information and monitoring before and after New Year's Day. Of course, the Y2K bug comes because older programs stored only two digits for a four-digit year. So the "00" when the year 2000 arrives would be interpreted as 1900 and could make systems crash. "To successfully weather Y2K, we must cooperate to avoid human errors that could have unintended deadly consequences, " Bennett said. "The establishment of the Colorado Springs center is a well-written insurance policy against Y2k-induced conflict among the preeminent nuclear powers." Bennett and Sen. Chris Dodd, D-Conn., the ranking Democrat on the Y2K committee, said they support keeping the Colorado Springs center operational until March. It is now scheduled to close Jan. 15. They say that is too soon. Dodd said, "The effects of Y2K will be felt long after January." Defense Secretary William Cohen and his Russian counterpart, Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev, are expected to sign a formal agreement establishing the Colorado Springs Center in Moscow this week. Russia earlier threatened to withdraw participation in protest of U.S. policy in Kosovo. -------------------------------- The Real Nuclear Risk of Y2K By Chris Gilbey and Jan Wyllie September 9, 1999 [Chris Gilbey] Y2K nuclear issues that have been raised in = the press have substantially related to a potent= ial for accidental nuclear strike as a result of computer failu= re. However the Y2K czars have used the opportunity to deny the probability of this happening to derail debate about the broader issues of Y2K and nuclear energy. The critical issue is that supply chain failures in the ene= rgy sector will create a very real potential for there to be ri= sk to the power supply and grid stability. (See "The Millenniu= m Reckoning," September 1999 Update - --http://www.trendmonitor.com -- for a full report). In the event that such a supply fail= ure should happen there will be no fail-safes in place in nucle= ar generation installations. This is a very real and all too possible scenario. If it should come to pass it would impac= t everyone in Europe and ultimately also in the rest of the world. Unfortunately they are not yet aware of the real issues. In brief here are some of the key facts that are dealt with= in The Millennium Reckoning report in detail: * According to Russian experts it is almost certain that the Russian natural gas pipeline that supplies both Easter= n and Western Europe will be interrupted. * Oil stops flowing at freezing temperatures. * It will be very difficult to start the gas flowing aga= in with sub-zero temperatures and an uncertain electricit= y supply. * This means that pipelines and refineries are at risk, even if there are relatively short power outages. (In the U.S., where the energy sector is far ahead of Russia in preparations, major oil companies are reportedly adopt= ing a fix on fail (FOF) policy on wells, pipelines and refineries). * The bottom line is that if electricity fails, some nuclear plants may have difficulty cooling their cores if they are to be shut down, creating a real danger of accidental meltdowns. The economic, environmental and social implications of the failure of the Russian gas and oil pipeline network are enormous -- for Europe and the rest of the world. Since Europe has a significant dependency on Russian oil an= d gas, at minimum, the countries and people of Europe are at risk of having to deal with the consequences of severe energy shortages and subsequent energy price increases. At the oth= er end of the scale is the unthinkable -- one or more nuclear accidents of the magnitude of Chernobyl. There is one difference though. Having had one Chernobyl, and knowing th= at Y2K is almost upon us, and taking an actuarial approach, ho= w can we conceive that a meltdown could be described as an accident? If we can predict it to any extent it can't be [Image]described as an accident. Although it is not certain that this scenario will come tru= e the seriousness of the multiple risks warrant immediate emergency action on a "just in case" basis. Regardless of t= he cost, an investment in sustainable energy systems is requir= ed both for deployment around nuclear sites and within communities. The task could be doable in the time remaining= if an international crash program were implemented in the next few weeks. What is critical is to communicate the facts to as m= any people as possible in order to leverage governments to rele= ase the money in order to secure the future. This needs to be accomplished very quickly. The breadth of this problem is well known, but there is a continuing tendency to ignore the issues of supply chain failure that have become visible as a result of Y2K. The problems are complex. No one would argue that. However the continuing denial of the possible magnitude of the risk to = key energy systems by governments and even the media is a clear and present danger. It stands in the way of people and companie= s making contingency preparations at a macro level. It stands= in the way of ordinary people making contingency plans at a mi= cro level. (It is truly amazing how many companies are making contingency plans for possible failure of critical supplies for business continuity but neglect to educate their employees that similar plans need to be made at a personal level.) It woul= d also seem totally reasonable that the same businesses that have already come to understand the potential for damage to thei= r industries and the economy as a whole should lobby governme= nts to try to enact changes at a global level. By acknowledging the challenge and acting, not only would a short-term problem be solved, but the implementation of an economical long-term solution could also be accomplished within a time that is reasonable. By not acting each individual, e= ach company and each government is putting at risk the global economy, the environment and every one on the planet. Jan Wyllie is a principal of Trend Monitor, one of the lead= ing trend analysis companies in Europe. -------------------------------------------------- News Story Avoid Y2K Complacency By: David McGuire, Newsbytes. September 13, 1999 URL: http://www.currents.net/newstoday/99/09/13/news15.html Sept. 9 has come and gone, and as another Y2K-related milestone passes without incident, Y2K experts are warning people not to get overly complacent about the upcoming millennial date roll over. "No one should think this success means the work on Y2K is done," Bruce McConnell, director of the International Y2K Cooperation Center told Newsbytes today. "It just underscores the importance of (making) comprehensive preparations before these rollover events happen." Like the most recent Y2K related milestone date - the fiscal Year 2000 rollover that occurred earlier this summer for many state governments - 9/9/99 caused few if any real problems, reports from around the world indicate. Sept. 9 was a "non-event," McConnell said. Y2K observers had expressed concern that because certain programmers had used sets of nines to trigger "end file" commands, the date 9/9/99 could cause a slew of computer failures. But FY 2000 and 9/9/99 are to Jan. 1, 2000 what a light breeze is to a full- fledged hurricane, experts say. =46Y 2000 threatens only easily fixed budgetary systems and 9/9/99 posed, at most, a localized problem that was readily spotted and remediated, President's Council on Year 2000 Conversion Chair John Koskinen said earlier this week. The Y2K bug, by contrast, has the potential to wreak havoc on all types of computer systems, including those governing power grids, financial transactions, nuclear fail-safe devices and a slew of other critical systems. While US and International Y2K authorities have lately begun expressing increasing optimism that mission critical systems and infrastructures - at least in developed countries - will survive the date roll-over, much work remains to be done, McConnell said. The primary danger in the uneventful passages of 9/9/99 and FY 2000 is that the governments and entities which have done the least work on Y2K remediation may begin to get complacent, he added. "Those who aren't ready will be sorry," McConnell said. - - To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "majordomo@xmission.com" with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message. For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send "help" to the same address. Do not use quotes in your message. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 15 Sep 1999 02:52:04 -0700 (PDT) From: Timothy Bruening <tsbrueni@wheel.dcn.davis.ca.us> Subject: (abolition-usa) Ted Turner's e-mail, and Y2K Does Ted Turner have an e-mail address? I would like to e-mail him about the y@K nuclear problem. - - To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "majordomo@xmission.com" with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message. For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send "help" to the same address. Do not use quotes in your message. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 15 Sep 1999 03:23:21 -0700 (PDT) From: Timothy Bruening <tsbrueni@wheel.dcn.davis.ca.us> Subject: (abolition-usa) CTBT Letter Below is the start of a CTBT letter. How should I continue it? Re: Battle looms on nuke test ban (September 1, Sacramento Bee) I am overjoyed that the Clinton administration is finally pushing to get the three year old Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). I agree with Clinton that without the treaty, "Countries all around the world will feel more pressure to develop and test weapons in ever more destructive verities and sizes, threatening the security of everyone on Earth." I believe that the CTBT would reduce the danger of nuclear proliferation by banning all nuclear weapons tests, and that the intent is to pave the way for the abolition of nuclear weapons. - - To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "majordomo@xmission.com" with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message. For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send "help" to the same address. Do not use quotes in your message. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 15 Sep 1999 21:02:56 +1000 From: FoE Sydney - Nuclear Campaign <nonukes@foesyd.org.au> Subject: (abolition-usa) RUSSIAN POLICE HARRASS N-CAMPAIGNER PLEASE SIGN PROTEST LETTER NXT 24 HRS Dear People, VLADIMIR Sliviak, Russias most prominent antinuclear campaigner is being threatened with blackmail and arrest by the Moscow police, working for the FSB. He needs your support urgently. (See Vladimirs press release below). I would like to fax this by end thursday Australian time (US time is 15-21 hours behind Sydney time) If you could all sign it for Vladimir that would be most helpful. TO: MINISTRY OF POLICE RUSSIA, 7-095-239-08-62 MINISTRY OF JUSTICE RUSSIA, 7-095-916-2903 MOSCOW CHIEF OF POLICE 7-095-200-93-05 F.S.B, MOSCOW, 7-095-975-24-70 cc Amnesty International Human Rights Watch Laurie Brereton, Shadow Minister for Foreign Affairs Alexander Downer Minister for Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer, German Minister for Foreign Affairs Maj-Britt Theorin, European Parliament Ernst Gulcher, European Parliament U.S. State Department, Russia Desk Dear Minister of Police, Minister for Justice, FSB, and Chief of Police Moscow, We are writing out of deep concern for a friend and colleague, Vladimir Sliviak, Director of the antinuclear campaign of Ecodefense, who we understand was temporarily arrested and released recently outside his Moscow home and who appears to be the object of police harassment. Mr. Sliviak's beliefs and actions concerning nuclear energy and other policies of the Russian government may not be to the liking of some elements in your government but his beliefs and commitment are widely shared around the world. We understand that he was stopped outside his home on September 6, by members of the Moscow police, (MUR) who said they were investigating an explosion of August 31, 1999. It seems that Vladimir was shown marijuana, and told that if he did not cooperate it would be placed in his bag and he would then be arrested and jailed for three years. He was released after 1.5 hours. We also understand another colleague of his, Mr. Kozlov, was similarly threatened. Vladimir Sliviak is well known to the environmental community worldwide, and respected. There is no way that he could be involved in activities of the type with which the police seem to wish to associate him. The right to protest and to question and oppose government policies, is enshrined in the democratic tradition and is an integral part of civil society. It is also enshrined in a number of United Nations conventions. It is not a luxury, to be dispensed with in times of difficulty. The environmental movement in the U.S., Australia, and Europe is held in high respect even by those it opposes. Green political parties have prominent representation in many European parliaments and in the European Parliament, and the German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer is from the Green Party. Other political parties have largely adopted parts of the environment movements agenda. You may be sure that the activities of the Moscow police and authorities with respect to Mr. Sliviak are being very well observed by a large and sympathetic worldwide community. We trust that these incidents were in error and will not be repeated, that the law will be respected and enforced above all by those whose duty it is to do so. John Hallam, Nuclear Campaigner, Friends of the Earth Sydney. Michael Mariotte Executive Director Nuclear Information and Resource Service Washington, DC Reply-To: "Vladimir Slivyak" <ecodefense@glasnet.ru> For immediate release Moscow EXPLOSION DETAILS While all newspapers and TV channels discuss "Chechen", "Dagestan" and "revolutionary writers" versions of the explosion at Manezh square, provided by intelligence services, these services themselves persecute ecologists and look for whom to blame among the witnesses of another notorious political process. People from Moscow Criminal Investigation Department (MUR) captured Vladimir Slivyak, Director of Antinuclear campaign of Socio-Ecological Union (SEU). The formal reason for the arrest was documents control, while the real reasons were investigation actions within Manezh square explosion suit. People in civilian stopped the activist of environmental movement when he was going out of his house; they refused to introduce themselves and to explain the reason of the arrest. After documents control and numerous questions about Slivyak's job, environmental organizations and environmental movement in general, senior lieutenant of MUR 6th department A.S. Kosterov (the only person whose documents were possible to look at) stated that he "deals with terrorists" including investigation of circumstances of the explosion at Manezh square. At the place of detention Kosterov took a package with marijuana and threatened to "find it in the bag" of the Director of Antinuclear campaign if he does not facilitate actively enough "the course of the investigation". It appeared that MUR staff is interested in Kochkarev Yakov Vladimirovich who must appear here in the nearest future according to intercepted phone call. REFERENCE: Y.V. Kochkarev is a witness for the defense in so called "Krasnodar suit", notorious political process in the beginning of which it was repeatedly stated about "prevention of murderous assault at Krasnodar kray governor Nikolay Kondratenko". In the course of investigation of this suit searches and interrogations of witnesses were performed with numerous violations of Criminal and Judicial Procedure Code of RF. However the suit broke up and the inquest failed to prove the accusation in political terrorism. Obviously intelligence services were not satisfied with the results achieved. In the "conversation" with the detained Director of Antinuclear campaign and then with other persons of this organization arrived to the place of the event, senior lieutenant Kosterov stated that he personally deals with "Krasnodar suit" from its very beginning and is absolutely confident in the relationship between this suit and recent explosion at Manezh, as well as that "all traces lead to environmental organizations". Kosterov also stated that he knows for sure who committed this act of terrorism. Obviously the scandal "Krasnodar suit" is early to consider finished. There is direct evidence of its transition to probably even more notorious "terrorist trial". Apparently its main canvas has not been "knitted" yet - that is why the method of shaking marijuana packages before one's face and "conversations" without proceedings are again applied: the information obtained in this way can be later filed there in the way the most suitable for the inquest. During "Krasnodar suit" "criminal group" was searched among informal groups with radical views, but nothing serious came out of it, except that someone lost laurels of the main fighter with terrorists. Probably bodies investigating explosion at Manezh believe that ecologists are more serious people and thus can be accused of more serious plot? Apparently working out of this scenario took place during "Krasnodar suit", already then they tried to have up many ecologists as witnesses. LATEST NEWS: September 7th FSB people contacted via phone A.Yu. Kozlov, representative of Voronezh division of SEU Antinuclear Campaign. They demanded him to come for "informal conversation" on the topic of antinuclear camp took place in September in vicinity of Novovoronezh nuclear power plant. As an argument for his coming they stated: "Your Moscow colleagues have problems, you do no want the same, do you?". Obviously the "problems" meant marijuana package in hands of MUR officer Kosterov, because official accusations to the Director of Antinuclear campaign have never been brought. Only at parting MUR officers said to him: "If we do not capture Kochkarev, consider yourself arrested". Information on activities of Antinuclear campaign and about the camp near Novovoronezh nuclear power plantcan be found in the Internet: www.ecoline.ru/antinuclear About "Krasnodar suit": www.ecoline.ru/actions/bomba www.ipclub.ru/identity/pres/ John Hallam Friends of the Earth Sydney, 17 Lord street, Newtown, NSW, Australia, Fax(61)(2)9517-3902 ph (61)(2)9517-3903 nonukes@foesyd.org.au http://homepages.tig.com.au/~foesyd http://homepages.tig.com.au/~foesyd/nuclear/bbletter.html - - To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "majordomo@xmission.com" with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message. For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send "help" to the same address. Do not use quotes in your message. ------------------------------ Date: Thu, 16 Sep 1999 13:32:42 +1000 From: FoE Sydney - Nuclear Campaign <nonukes@foesyd.org.au> Subject: (abolition-usa) Re: [y2k-nuclear] Re: FRIENDS OF THE EARTH Y2K PRESS RELEASE At 2:44 AM +1000 16/9/1999, Robyn Wolf wrote: Dear Alan and dear Robyn I'm afraid that I still consider that what I put in the release is accurate and is the line that we should be pushing. In fact I think it is absolutely essential that we stress that de-alerting is cvost and risk-free, and politically highly counterproductive (and inaccurate) to do otherwise. It is not correct that there are risks involved in de- alerting. This is precisely the argument used by the other side and it is NOT accurate. It is also NOT the case that de- alerting or standing down nuclear forces necessareily involves separation of warheads at all. It may be no more than the removal of electrical leads and or the pinning open of switches. In fact, the removal of warheads at this stage is probably NOT what we should be asking for with only 108 days to Y2K, and I have very carefully not asked for it. I doubt that removal and separation of arheads can be done at all in 100 days. It is probably correct to say that at this point there is not the time to do it, and this particular option is indeed also involving significant cost. To repeat myself, that is why I have not asked for that option. I do NOT consider the issue of verifiability to be one that has the significance in practical terms that our opponents say it has. The change in the 'notice to fire' in the UK nuclear forces is NOT verifiable. It would certainly be better if it was, but the fact is that verifiable or not, the UKs initiative on this matter is the opposite of destabilising. Do we suggest that because the UK option is not verifiable that they should not have done it at all? That would be utterly perverse, and its precisely the kind of utterly dishonest argument that our opponents might use. No, we ask for such verification as is possible to take place, noting that even if it does not we are still much much better off! The same is true of Chinese forces. We understand that chinese rockets are kept without fuel, and that days would be required to change this status. This is NOT verifiable. But it really doesn't matter, or if it does its still better to have them (unverifiably) in this status, than on hairtrigger alert. (and in this status, LOW is impossible) Even vague rumours that one side or the other MIGHT have de-alerted without telling anyone would be quite the opposite of destabilising. They would in fact serve to lower rather than increase the alert status of the other side. Official statements that reductions in alert status had taken place even if not verifiable would in the real world have an immmense stabilising effect. Not as much maybe as the verifiable removal of warheads but still immense. Finally, I have to say that the position I am advocating is also not distunguishable in practical terms from 'no-low'. I fail completely to see -( indeed I declare that there is nothing at all to see)- what could be the practical real world difference between an 'quick n dirty' de-alert as per the UK, and No-LOW. All we are doing is placing nuclear forces in a position where it will take days rather than seconds to launch. That is certainly no- LOW. You say that you have written before on the 'difference' between NO-LOW and de-alerting. I think you are dead wrong about this. In practical terms, in the terms of the kind of measures that can be adopted between now and the end of the year there IS NO DIFFERENCE WORTH TALKING ABOUT BETWEEN NO-LOW AND DE-ALERTING! The sooner we realise that we are actually talking about the same thing the sooner this rather silly debate will cease. I reiterate that de- alerting is indistinguishable in practical terms from NO-LOW, and that not only is it cost and risk free but that it is our responsibility to keep saying so. Otherwise we are going to accept the arguments of those who want to see nuclear weapons systems kept on hairtrigger alert for the rest of all eternity. John Hallam >Dear Alan, I've read your comments twice and agree co-heartedly witht what >you say and encourage you to be persistent with your message. And mahalo >for your participation in this essential task to create a world where >nuclear weapons are a thing of the past. My heart sings when I even think >that thought. My message is for adults to create their lives as the heroic >adventure that we be heroes and sheroes for our youth and children. The >peace of the blue sky to you. Robyn Wolf >---------- >>From: Aphil1998@aol.com To: nonukes@foesyd.org.au, y2k-nuclear@egroups.com, y2k-nukes@envirolink.org, Abolition-caucus@igc.org, abolition-usa@lists.xmission.com, abolition-europe@vlberlin.comlink.de, nukenet@envirolink.org >>Subject: [y2k-nuclear] Re: FRIENDS OF THE EARTH Y2K PRESS RELEASE >>Date: Wed, Sep 15, 1999, 6:43 AM >> > >>With great respect and admiration for John Hallam's work and Friends of the >>Earth, I have to make this comment. I have written before on the difference >>between "de-alerting" and "no launch on warning". >> >>I note that Friends of the Earth say in the body of their press release: >>"De-Alerting is a no risk, no cost measure...". >> >>This is not true. The costs and risks are small compared with the huge >>costs >>and risks of maintaining nuclear deterrence, but they are not near zero. >> >>The risk is that one of the former superpowers might see an opportunity >>for a >>"disarming first strike", banking on the unavoidable delay before launching >>for the non-cheating side, and the vulnerability of the process. Military >>men have worked the whole of their professional careers on the basis that >>any >>delay in the ability to retaliate would be an invitation to the enemy. >> >>The cost of arranging to remove war-heads or other components, and storing >>them safely at a distance with facilities for prompt return and >>re-installation, would not be small. >> >>The cost of setting up and maintaining verification would be very >>substantial >>in civilian terms, but I do not know whether it would be millions or >>billions >>of dollars. And until they take the next steps towards abolition, there >>would be little reduction in the current cost of maintaining "deterrence". >> >>On the other hand, I believe that "No Launch-on-Warning" is almost free of >>risk, and would have little or no cost - maybe even savings. So as an >>interim step (this year) we could say that No L-o-W "is a no risk, no cost >>measure...". >> >>We certainly should press for full de-alerting (with the verification >>that is >>the least the military will insist upon), and it will make the world a much >>safer place. But let us try to be accurate, and not over-state our position. >> >>Best wishes to all, >>Alan Phillips. >>Physicians for Global Survival, Canada. >> >>------------------------------------------------------------------------ >>MyPoints-Free Rewards When You're Online. >>Start with up to 150 Points for joining! >>http://clickhere.egroups.com/click/805 >> >> >>eGroups.com home: http://www.egroups.com/group/y2k-nuclear >>http://www.egroups.com - Simplifying group communications >> >> >> >> >> > >------------------------------------------------------------------------ >MyPoints-Free Rewards When You're Online. >Start with up to 150 Points for joining! >http://clickhere.egroups.com/click/805 > > >eGroups.com home: http://www.egroups.com/group/y2k-nuclear >http://www.egroups.com - Simplifying group communications - - To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "majordomo@xmission.com" with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message. 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