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abolition-usa-digest      Thursday, April 1 1999      Volume 01 : Number 102




----------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: Wed, 31 Mar 1999 19:08:04 -0800
From: "David Crockett Williams" <[e-mail]>
Subject: (abolition-usa) Nuclear Knife Aimed at America's Heart

[fwd]--One would think that it is a good idea to understand all perspectives
on the abolition issue.  Here is one perspective supporting need for
multilateral abolition....

              A Nuclear Knife Aimed at America's Heart
                           Joel M. Skousen
                           March 25, 1999

In November 1997, President Clinton signed a top-secret Presidential
Decision Directive (PDD-60) directing U.S. military commanders to
abandon the time-honored nuclear deterrence of "launch on warning."
Ironically, this was done in the name of "increased deterrence."
Every sensible American needs to understand why this reasoning is
fraudulent at best and deadly at worst. First, some background.

The impetus to change U.S. strategic nuclear doctrine came on the
heels of Clinton's demand to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in early 1997
that they prepare to unilaterally reduce America's nuclear warhead
deployment to 2,500 in eager anticipation of the ratification of the
START II disarmament treaty. This pact has yet to be ratified by the
Russian Duma.

Gen. John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, responded that
he couldn't comply, since the U.S. military was still operating on a
former Presidential Decision Directive of 1981 to prepare to "win a
protracted nuclear war." A winning strategy couldn't be implemented
without the full contingent of current nuclear strategic warheads.

According to Craig Cerniello of Arms Control Today (November/December
1997 issue), "the administration viewed the 1981 guidelines as an
anachronism of the Cold War. The notion that the United States still
had to be prepared to fight and win a protracted nuclear war today
seemed out of touch with reality, given the fact that it has been six
years since the collapse of the Soviet Union."

Certainly, the apparent collapse of the Soviet Union is the linchpin
in every argument pointing toward the relaxation of Western vigilance
and accelerated disarmament. Indeed, it is the driving argument that
is trumpeted constantly before Congress, U.S. military leaders, and
the American people.

Almost everyone is buying it -- even most conservatives who should
know better.  However, the most savvy Soviet-watchers can point to a
host of evidence indicating that the so-called "collapse" was
engineered to disarm the West and garner billions in direct aid to
assist Russia while inducing the West to take over the economic
burden of the former satellite states.

But the most ominous evidence is found in defectors from Russia who
tell the same story: Russia is cheating on all aspects of
disarmament, and is siphoning off billions in Western aid money to
modernize and deploy top-of-the-line new weapons systems aimed at
taking down the U.S. military in one huge, decapitating nuclear
strike.

Contrast this with the Clinton administration's response. Incredibly,
while still paying lip service to nuclear deterrence, Assistant
Secretary of Defense Edward L. Warner III went before the Congress on
March 31, 1998, and bragged about the litany of unilateral
disarmament this administration has forced upon the U.S. military:

Warner noted the "success" the Clinton administration has had in
recent years, which has:

Eliminated our entire inventory of ground-launched non-strategic
nuclear weapons (nuclear artillery and Lance surface-to-surface
missiles).

Removed all nonstrategic nuclear weapons on a day-to-day basis from
surface ships, attack submarines, and land-based naval aircraft
bases.

Removed our strategic bombers from alert.

Stood down the Minuteman II ICBMs scheduled for deactivation under
Start I.

Terminated the mobile Peacekeeper and mobile small ICBM programs.

Terminated the SCRAM-II nuclear short-range attack missile.  In
January 1992, the second Presidential Nuclear Initiative took further
steps which included:

Limiting B-2 production to 20 bombers.

Canceling the entire small ICBM program.

Ceasing production of W-88 Trident SLBM (submarine-launched missile)
warheads.

Halting purchases of advanced cruise missiles.

Stopping new production of Peacekeeper missiles (our biggest
MIRV-warhead ICBM).  "As a result of these significant changes, the
U.S. nuclear stockpile has decreased by more than 50 percent," Warner
enthused.

All of this has been done without any meaningful disarmament by the
Russians.

The Clinton administration would counter this charge by citing the
"successful" dismantling of 3,300 strategic nuclear warheads by
Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, and the destruction of their 252
ICBMs and related silos -- all paid for with U.S. taxpayer funds to
the tune of $300 million per year. But the real story is otherwise.

Yes, Americans paid for the dismantling of these systems -- the
oldest and most out-of-date in the Soviet inventory. They were
scheduled for replacement anyway, so the U.S. taxpayer ended up
saving the Russians over a billion dollars, allowing them to use this
and other Western aid to develop and build new systems, coming on
line right now. But that isn't all.

What the administration doesn't say is that they allowed the Russians
to reclaim all the nuclear warheads, and paid them to recycle the
usable material into new, updated warheads. We didn't diminish the
threat at all.  We only helped them to transform it into something
more dangerous.

Thus, the Russians still maintain a more than 3-to-1 advantage over
the United States in both throw-weight and nuclear delivery vehicles.
That disparity is widening dramatically with the Clinton
administration's unilateral disarmament while at the same time
encouraging the Russians to proceed not only with the deployment of
500 new Topol-M missiles (which are mobile-launched and therefore
difficult to target), but to put three MIRVed warheads on each
missile instead of the treaty limit of one warhead -- for a total
deployment of 1,500 warheads.

Not counting the presumed minimum 4,000 to 6,000 warheads in the
current Russian inventory, these 1,500 new warheads would overwhelm a
measly 200-interceptor ABM system in North Dakota -- which the
Clinton administration is insisting should NOT be deployed before
2005. I wonder why?

With our 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs scheduled to be decommissioned in 2003,
that gives the Russians or Chinese a wide-open window for attack,
should they choose to exercise their first-strike,
nuclear-decapitation option.

So much for the "new realism" of the Clinton disarmament team and
their assertion that Russia poses no threat. Judging strictly by
public data from establishment sources (which is always understated
due to Moscow's heavy shroud of secrecy) the Russian threat is much
greater than it ever was, both in quantity and quality of strategic
nuclear forces. This is thanks, in part, to ongoing technology
transfers by IBM and other defense contractors with the knowing
participation and encouragement of this administration.

Now let's take a close look at this presumed "increased deterrence"
the Clinton Department of Defense is promising. The administration
claims its brand of deterrence is still based on the "mutual assured
destruction" (MAD) concept -- a truly appropriate acronym.

This is the presumption that, since both sides have an overwhelming
capability to destroy each other, that no sane leadership would
engage in nuclear war. Let's examine this closely. MAD could only
stand as a viable assumption if:

Both sides had sufficient weapons and delivery vehicles to inflict
total devastation.

Neither side had an effective anti-ballistic-missile system.

Neither side had electronic jamming capability on its incoming ICBMs.

Neither side had hardened shelters protecting its population and
leadership.  These assumptions clearly do not exist today:

First, we barely have enough nuclear warheads to take out the Russian
arsenal as presently constituted if we used them all at once (which
no sane military commander could afford to do, leaving him with no
reserves).  Russia, on the other hand, has enough to devastate our
entire strategic forces and still retain 60 percent of her weapons in
reserve, for a prolonged conflict.

Second, we have no ABM system to protect against ICBMs at all. Our
dumbed-down and slowed-down Patriots are theater weapons (built to
conform to the flawed ABM Treaty) and can barely catch slow,
low-flying Scud missiles, let alone ICBMs that coming screaming in
from space at 6 to 12 kilometers per second. The Russians have (in
violation of the same ABM Treaty) a nationwide system of ABMs tied to
phased-array radars and satellite guidance systems.

Third, we have no electronic jamming on our missiles to help them
penetrate the Russian ABM system, and the Russians claim their newest
Topol-M missiles do have such a capability. Whether or not this claim
is a bluff is immaterial. The fact is, they are building new,
high-tech missiles and our technology is 10 years old and stagnant.
We are not developing or building anything new. This aspect can only
worsen as time goes on.

Fourth, our civilian population is totally unprotected, while a large
portion of the Russian cities have public fallout shelter facilities.
New bunkers are being constructed for the Russian leadership despite
the economic hardships the people suffer. This should tell us
something about Russian leadership intentions.

Is this Mutually Assured Destruction? Hardly. It equates to United
States Assured Destruction! In every category of deterrence, we are
disarming and stagnant, and the Russians are building and deploying.
There is, in fact, only one type of deterrence that is capable of
somewhat balancing the scales: the nuclear response doctrine of
Launch on Warning.

Launch on Warning takes advantage of the fact that long-range
ballistic missiles take time to arrive on target -- up to 25 minutes,
depending on where the missiles are fired from. If the Russians were
to launch a first strike, our satellites would detect and confirm
that launch within seconds.  In a Launch on Warning doctrine, our
missiles (if on alert status) could be launched before the Russian or
Chinese missiles hit our silos. There is also time to retarget our
missiles so that they are not wasted on Russian silos that are now
empty.

Thus, one of the great advantages for a Launch on Warning doctrine is
that it allows the nation that launches second to have an advantage
over the nation that launches first. The one to launch first wastes a
certain number of its missiles on our silos that are now empty. By
contrast, our missiles (utilizing real-time targeting data from
satellites) strike targets that are still viable.

Now that is deterrence -- a deterrence that we presently do not have
due to PDD-60.

Clinton national security aide Robert Bell proudly proclaimed to a
group of disarmament advocates, "In this PDD, we direct our military
forces to continue to posture themselves in such a way as to not rely
on Launch on Warning -- to be able to absorb a nuclear strike and
still have enough force surviving to constitute credible deterrence."

This is patently preposterous. Respond with what?

We have no mobile missiles to avoid being targeted. We have already
unilaterally agreed to keep over half of our ballistic missile
submarines in port at any one time, so they can easily be targeted.
After all, we don't want our Russian "allies" to feel insecure!

All of our Navy and Air Force strategic forces are incapable of
withstanding a nuclear strike. Even the remaining Trident subs on
patrol would be unable to respond when communication links and
satellites are downed in a first strike.

PDD-60 removes all alternate submarine launch codes so that our subs
cannot fire without direct communication with the president. Those
vital communications links will assuredly not survive a massive first
strike.  When you tell the Russians we are going to absorb a first
strike, you induce them to make sure they hit us with everything
necessary to make sure we cannot respond.

This is not deterrence. This is suicide.

Joel M. Skousen is a political scientist by training and former
chairman of the Conservative National Committee. He is a specialist
in security matters and consults nationwide on "Strategic Relocation"
- -- the title of his latest book.


- -
 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 1 Apr 1999 01:38:58 EST
From: [e-mail]
Subject: Re: (abolition-usa) Nuclear Knife Aimed at America's Heart

I appreciate the effort to provide all points of view. But David, that is why
we are supposed to read the daily press. This source (I shortened the post to
make it easy to get from the heading to the guy's ID) is a hard line anti-
Communist conservative trying to make a living in the post-Cold War era by
playing on old fears.

I wouldn't censor this list for the world, but I also sort of hope you won't
post this kind of thing regularly. I get all kinds of weird posts, some giving
the official positions of Korea, etc., which are hopelessly out of touch with
reality - as Mr. Skousen is. It takes up space on the net. At best it is far
right wing propaganda. No one has the time to take Mr. Skousen apart piece by
piece, line by line - and we don't have this list for that reason.

Peace,
David McReynolds

<< From:    [e-mail] (David Crockett Williams)
 Sender:    [e-mail]
 Reply-to:    [e-mail]
 To:    [e-mail] (Abolition 2000 USA)

 [fwd]--One would think that it is a good idea to understand all perspectives
 on the abolition issue.  Here is one perspective supporting need for
 multilateral abolition....

               A Nuclear Knife Aimed at America's Heart
                            Joel M. Skousen
                            March 25, 1999

 In November 1997, President Clinton signed a top-secret Presidential
 Decision Directive (PDD-60) directing U.S. military commanders to
 abandon the time-honored nuclear deterrence of "launch on warning."
 Ironically, this was done in the name of "increased deterrence."
 Every sensible American needs to understand why this reasoning is
 fraudulent at best and deadly at worst. First, some background.

 The impetus to change U.S. strategic nuclear doctrine came on the
 heels of Clinton's demand to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in early 1997
 that they prepare to unilaterally reduce America's nuclear warhead
 deployment to 2,500 in eager anticipation of the ratification of the
 START II disarmament treaty. This pact has yet to be ratified by the
 Russian Duma.

 Almost everyone is buying it -- even most conservatives who should
 know better.  However, the most savvy Soviet-watchers can point to a
 host of evidence indicating that the so-called "collapse" was
 engineered to disarm the West and garner billions in direct aid

 But the most ominous evidence is found in defectors from Russia who
 tell the same story: Russia is cheating on all aspects of
 disarmament, and is siphoning off billions in Western aid money to


 Contrast this with the Clinton administration's response. Incredibly,
 while still paying lip service to nuclear deterrence, Assistant
 Secretary of Defense Edward L. Warner III went before the Congress on
 March 31, 1998, and bragged about the litany of unilateral
 disarmament this administration has forced upon the U.S. military:

 Warner noted the "success" the Clinton administration has had in
 recent years, which has:

 Eliminated our entire inventory of ground-launched non-strategic
 nuclear weapons (nuclear artillery and Lance surface-to-surface
 missiles).

 Removed all nonstrategic nuclear weapons on a day-to-day basis from
 surface ships, attack submarines, and land-based naval aircraft
 bases.

 Removed our strategic bombers from alert.

 Stood down the Minuteman II ICBMs scheduled for deactivation under
 Start I.

 Terminated the mobile Peacekeeper and mobile small ICBM programs.

 Terminated the SCRAM-II nuclear short-range attack missile.  In
 January 1992, the second Presidential Nuclear Initiative took further
 steps which included:

 Limiting B-2 production to 20 bombers.

 Canceling the entire small ICBM program.

 Ceasing production of W-88 Trident SLBM (submarine-launched missile)
 warheads.

 Halting purchases of advanced cruise missiles.

 Stopping new production of Peacekeeper missiles (our biggest
 MIRV-warhead ICBM).  "As a result of these significant changes, the
 U.S. nuclear stockpile has decreased by more than 50 percent," Warner
 enthused.

 All of this has been done without any meaningful disarmament by the
 Russians.

 The Clinton administration would counter this charge by citing the
 "successful" dismantling of 3,300 strategic nuclear warheads by
 Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, and the destruction of their 252
 ICBMs and related silos -- all paid for with U.S. taxpayer funds to
 the tune of $300 million per year. But the real story is otherwise.

 Yes, Americans paid for the dismantling of these systems -- the
 oldest and most out-of-date in the Soviet inventory. They were
 scheduled for replacement anyway, so the U.S. taxpayer ended up
 saving the Russians over a billion dollars, allowing them to use this
 and other Western aid to develop and build new systems, coming on
 line right now. But that isn't all.

  Thus, the Russians still maintain a more than 3-to-1 advantage over
 the United States in both throw-weight and nuclear delivery vehicles.
 That disparity is widening dramatically with the Clinton
 administration's unilateral disarmament

 With our 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs scheduled to be decommissioned in 2003,
 that gives the Russians or Chinese a wide-open window for attack,
 should they choose to exercise their first-strike,
 nuclear-decapitation option.

  Neither side had hardened shelters protecting its population and
 leadership.  These assumptions clearly do not exist today:

 First, we barely have enough nuclear warheads to take out the Russian
 arsenal as presently constituted if we used them all at once (which

 Second, we have no ABM system to protect against ICBMs at all. Our

 Fourth, our civilian population is totally unprotected, while a large
 portion of the Russian cities have public fallout shelter facilities.
 New bunkers are being constructed for the Russian leadership despite
 the economic hardships the people suffer. This should tell us
 something about Russian leadership intentions.

 Joel M. Skousen is a political scientist by training and former
 chairman of the Conservative National Committee. He is a specialist
 in security matters and consults nationwide on "Strategic Relocation"
 -- the title of his latest book.




- -
 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 01 Apr 1999 11:11:54 -0500
From: ASlater <[e-mail]>
Subject: Re: (abolition-usa) Re: stats

In response to Dave McReynolds stunning statistics, you may want to check out
the World Game website, to see Buckminster Fuller's World Game Institute
amazing one page chart on "What the World Needs and How to Pay For It Using
Military Expenditures".

  http://www.worldgame.org/wwwproject/


Alice Slater
Global Resource Action Center for the Environment (GRACE)
15 East 26th Street, Room 915
New York, NY 10010
tel:  [phone]
fax:  [phone]
email:  [e-mail]

GRACE is a member of Abolition 2000, a global network working for a treaty
to eliminate nuclear weapons.

- -
 To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
 with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
 For information on digests or retrieving files and old messages send
 "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.

------------------------------

Date: Thu, 01 Apr 1999 12:05:54 -0500
From: Bob Tiller <[e-mail]>
Subject: Re: (abolition-usa) Nuclear Knife Aimed at America's Heart

Some thoughts in response:

1. If PDD-60 is top secret, how can we trust this (or any) report of
what it says?

2. The U.S. military is required by current U.S. law to maintain
deployment of nuclear weapons at the START I level, i.e. 6,000 warheads
deployed.  Period.  No exceptions.  It is ridiculous, but it's the law.
(By the way, the START II level is not 2,500.  It is 3,500.)

3. Launch-on-warning places everyone at greater risk, because or the
possibility of misreading or misunderstanding the data.  Incinerating
others (and probably ourselves) in response to a warning seems a rather
stupid way to act, because the warning could be about something as
benign as a weather rocket.

4. Satellites will not be downed in a first strike, and communications
capacity will not totally disappear in a first strike.  It is absurd to
say that U.S. naval strategic forces could not withstand a first strike.
Even if half the U.S. Trident force were eliminated, the U.S. could
still launch many hundreds of nuclear weapons from the remaining
Tridents.

5. With the massive deterioration of Russia's military and the shrinkage
of Russia's economy, no serious observer believes that Russia would be
able to launch 4,000 to 6,000 warheads today.

6. Where is the evidence to support the claim that Russia has a
nationwide ABM system?

7. No one in Congress or the Administration has claimed that missile
defense would work against a massive first strike of nuclear weapons
against the U.S.   It just can't be done, and everyone knows that.  The
current debate about missile defense is about protecting against a small
number of weapons (presumably launched by a "rogue" state.)

8. It is impossible for the Clinton Administration to assume credit or
blame for actions taken by the U.S. in 1992.

9. The U.S. is not undertaking unilateral nuclear disarmament.  Rather
the opposite is occuring.  The U.S. is engaging in "subcritical" tests
on plutonium in order to perfect its nuclear weapons, is engaging in
research on pure fusion weapons, and much more. (Also see #2 above.)

10. Finally, why would any sane person discourse about "taking out" all
the nuclear weapons in Russia, or in the U.S.?  If some nation (Russia,
U.S., or any other) uses as few as 40 nuclear weapons, all life on earth
would be radically transformed, especially in the industrialized world.
Every single dimension of our lives -- agriculture, banking, medicine,
transportation, communication, politics, education -- would be so
totally different that we can not even imagine what things would be like
following the use of a small number of nuclear weapons.  After the
launch of a few dozen nuclear warheads, millions of people would be dead
and dying, while millions more would have no electricity, no food
supply, no gasoline, etc.  We can not pretend that using nuclear weapons
is in anyway comparable to dropping some conventional bombs.

Shalom,
Bob Tiller



David Crockett Williams wrote:
>
> [fwd]--One would think that it is a good idea to understand all perspectives
> on the abolition issue.  Here is one perspective supporting need for
> multilateral abolition....
>
>               A Nuclear Knife Aimed at America's Heart
>                            Joel M. Skousen
>                            March 25, 1999
>
> In November 1997, President Clinton signed a top-secret Presidential
> Decision Directive (PDD-60) directing U.S. military commanders to
> abandon the time-honored nuclear deterrence of "launch on warning."
> Ironically, this was done in the name of "increased deterrence."
> Every sensible American needs to understand why this reasoning is
> fraudulent at best and deadly at worst. First, some background.
>
> The impetus to change U.S. strategic nuclear doctrine came on the
> heels of Clinton's demand to the Joint Chiefs of Staff in early 1997
> that they prepare to unilaterally reduce America's nuclear warhead
> deployment to 2,500 in eager anticipation of the ratification of the
> START II disarmament treaty. This pact has yet to be ratified by the
> Russian Duma.
>
> Gen. John Shalikashvili, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, responded that
> he couldn't comply, since the U.S. military was still operating on a
> former Presidential Decision Directive of 1981 to prepare to "win a
> protracted nuclear war." A winning strategy couldn't be implemented
> without the full contingent of current nuclear strategic warheads.
>
> According to Craig Cerniello of Arms Control Today (November/December
> 1997 issue), "the administration viewed the 1981 guidelines as an
> anachronism of the Cold War. The notion that the United States still
> had to be prepared to fight and win a protracted nuclear war today
> seemed out of touch with reality, given the fact that it has been six
> years since the collapse of the Soviet Union."
>
> Certainly, the apparent collapse of the Soviet Union is the linchpin
> in every argument pointing toward the relaxation of Western vigilance
> and accelerated disarmament. Indeed, it is the driving argument that
> is trumpeted constantly before Congress, U.S. military leaders, and
> the American people.
>
> Almost everyone is buying it -- even most conservatives who should
> know better.  However, the most savvy Soviet-watchers can point to a
> host of evidence indicating that the so-called "collapse" was
> engineered to disarm the West and garner billions in direct aid to
> assist Russia while inducing the West to take over the economic
> burden of the former satellite states.
>
> But the most ominous evidence is found in defectors from Russia who
> tell the same story: Russia is cheating on all aspects of
> disarmament, and is siphoning off billions in Western aid money to
> modernize and deploy top-of-the-line new weapons systems aimed at
> taking down the U.S. military in one huge, decapitating nuclear
> strike.
>
> Contrast this with the Clinton administration's response. Incredibly,
> while still paying lip service to nuclear deterrence, Assistant
> Secretary of Defense Edward L. Warner III went before the Congress on
> March 31, 1998, and bragged about the litany of unilateral
> disarmament this administration has forced upon the U.S. military:
>
> Warner noted the "success" the Clinton administration has had in
> recent years, which has:
>
> Eliminated our entire inventory of ground-launched non-strategic
> nuclear weapons (nuclear artillery and Lance surface-to-surface
> missiles).
>
> Removed all nonstrategic nuclear weapons on a day-to-day basis from
> surface ships, attack submarines, and land-based naval aircraft
> bases.
>
> Removed our strategic bombers from alert.
>
> Stood down the Minuteman II ICBMs scheduled for deactivation under
> Start I.
>
> Terminated the mobile Peacekeeper and mobile small ICBM programs.
>
> Terminated the SCRAM-II nuclear short-range attack missile.  In
> January 1992, the second Presidential Nuclear Initiative took further
> steps which included:
>
> Limiting B-2 production to 20 bombers.
>
> Canceling the entire small ICBM program.
>
> Ceasing production of W-88 Trident SLBM (submarine-launched missile)
> warheads.
>
> Halting purchases of advanced cruise missiles.
>
> Stopping new production of Peacekeeper missiles (our biggest
> MIRV-warhead ICBM).  "As a result of these significant changes, the
> U.S. nuclear stockpile has decreased by more than 50 percent," Warner
> enthused.
>
> All of this has been done without any meaningful disarmament by the
> Russians.
>
> The Clinton administration would counter this charge by citing the
> "successful" dismantling of 3,300 strategic nuclear warheads by
> Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus, and the destruction of their 252
> ICBMs and related silos -- all paid for with U.S. taxpayer funds to
> the tune of $300 million per year. But the real story is otherwise.
>
> Yes, Americans paid for the dismantling of these systems -- the
> oldest and most out-of-date in the Soviet inventory. They were
> scheduled for replacement anyway, so the U.S. taxpayer ended up
> saving the Russians over a billion dollars, allowing them to use this
> and other Western aid to develop and build new systems, coming on
> line right now. But that isn't all.
>
> What the administration doesn't say is that they allowed the Russians
> to reclaim all the nuclear warheads, and paid them to recycle the
> usable material into new, updated warheads. We didn't diminish the
> threat at all.  We only helped them to transform it into something
> more dangerous.
>
> Thus, the Russians still maintain a more than 3-to-1 advantage over
> the United States in both throw-weight and nuclear delivery vehicles.
> That disparity is widening dramatically with the Clinton
> administration's unilateral disarmament while at the same time
> encouraging the Russians to proceed not only with the deployment of
> 500 new Topol-M missiles (which are mobile-launched and therefore
> difficult to target), but to put three MIRVed warheads on each
> missile instead of the treaty limit of one warhead -- for a total
> deployment of 1,500 warheads.
>
> Not counting the presumed minimum 4,000 to 6,000 warheads in the
> current Russian inventory, these 1,500 new warheads would overwhelm a
> measly 200-interceptor ABM system in North Dakota -- which the
> Clinton administration is insisting should NOT be deployed before
> 2005. I wonder why?
>
> With our 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs scheduled to be decommissioned in 2003,
> that gives the Russians or Chinese a wide-open window for attack,
> should they choose to exercise their first-strike,
> nuclear-decapitation option.
>
> So much for the "new realism" of the Clinton disarmament team and
> their assertion that Russia poses no threat. Judging strictly by
> public data from establishment sources (which is always understated
> due to Moscow's heavy shroud of secrecy) the Russian threat is much
> greater than it ever was, both in quantity and quality of strategic
> nuclear forces. This is thanks, in part, to ongoing technology
> transfers by IBM and other defense contractors with the knowing
> participation and encouragement of this administration.
>
> Now let's take a close look at this presumed "increased deterrence"
> the Clinton Department of Defense is promising. The administration
> claims its brand of deterrence is still based on the "mutual assured
> destruction" (MAD) concept -- a truly appropriate acronym.
>
> This is the presumption that, since both sides have an overwhelming
> capability to destroy each other, that no sane leadership would
> engage in nuclear war. Let's examine this closely. MAD could only
> stand as a viable assumption if:
>
> Both sides had sufficient weapons and delivery vehicles to inflict
> total devastation.
>
> Neither side had an effective anti-ballistic-missile system.
>
> Neither side had electronic jamming capability on its incoming ICBMs.
>
> Neither side had hardened shelters protecting its population and
> leadership.  These assumptions clearly do not exist today:
>
> First, we barely have enough nuclear warheads to take out the Russian
> arsenal as presently constituted if we used them all at once (which
> no sane military commander could afford to do, leaving him with no
> reserves).  Russia, on the other hand, has enough to devastate our
> entire strategic forces and still retain 60 percent of her weapons in
> reserve, for a prolonged conflict.
>
> Second, we have no ABM system to protect against ICBMs at all. Our
> dumbed-down and slowed-down Patriots are theater weapons (built to
> conform to the flawed ABM Treaty) and can barely catch slow,
> low-flying Scud missiles, let alone ICBMs that coming screaming in
> from space at 6 to 12 kilometers per second. The Russians have (in
> violation of the same ABM Treaty) a nationwide system of ABMs tied to
> phased-array radars and satellite guidance systems.
>
> Third, we have no electronic jamming on our missiles to help them
> penetrate the Russian ABM system, and the Russians claim their newest
> Topol-M missiles do have such a capability. Whether or not this claim
> is a bluff is immaterial. The fact is, they are building new,
> high-tech missiles and our technology is 10 years old and stagnant.
> We are not developing or building anything new. This aspect can only
> worsen as time goes on.
>
> Fourth, our civilian population is totally unprotected, while a large
> portion of the Russian cities have public fallout shelter facilities.
> New bunkers are being constructed for the Russian leadership despite
> the economic hardships the people suffer. This should tell us
> something about Russian leadership intentions.
>
> Is this Mutually Assured Destruction? Hardly. It equates to United
> States Assured Destruction! In every category of deterrence, we are
> disarming and stagnant, and the Russians are building and deploying.
> There is, in fact, only one type of deterrence that is capable of
> somewhat balancing the scales: the nuclear response doctrine of
> Launch on Warning.
>
> Launch on Warning takes advantage of the fact that long-range
> ballistic missiles take time to arrive on target -- up to 25 minutes,
> depending on where the missiles are fired from. If the Russians were
> to launch a first strike, our satellites would detect and confirm
> that launch within seconds.  In a Launch on Warning doctrine, our
> missiles (if on alert status) could be launched before the Russian or
> Chinese missiles hit our silos. There is also time to retarget our
> missiles so that they are not wasted on Russian silos that are now
> empty.
>
> Thus, one of the great advantages for a Launch on Warning doctrine is
> that it allows the nation that launches second to have an advantage
> over the nation that launches first. The one to launch first wastes a
> certain number of its missiles on our silos that are now empty. By
> contrast, our missiles (utilizing real-time targeting data from
> satellites) strike targets that are still viable.
>
> Now that is deterrence -- a deterrence that we presently do not have
> due to PDD-60.
>
> Clinton national security aide Robert Bell proudly proclaimed to a
> group of disarmament advocates, "In this PDD, we direct our military
> forces to continue to posture themselves in such a way as to not rely
> on Launch on Warning -- to be able to absorb a nuclear strike and
> still have enough force surviving to constitute credible deterrence."
>
> This is patently preposterous. Respond with what?
>
> We have no mobile missiles to avoid being targeted. We have already
> unilaterally agreed to keep over half of our ballistic missile
> submarines in port at any one time, so they can easily be targeted.
> After all, we don't want our Russian "allies" to feel insecure!
>
> All of our Navy and Air Force strategic forces are incapable of
> withstanding a nuclear strike. Even the remaining Trident subs on
> patrol would be unable to respond when communication links and
> satellites are downed in a first strike.
>
> PDD-60 removes all alternate submarine launch codes so that our subs
> cannot fire without direct communication with the president. Those
> vital communications links will assuredly not survive a massive first
> strike.  When you tell the Russians we are going to absorb a first
> strike, you induce them to make sure they hit us with everything
> necessary to make sure we cannot respond.
>
> This is not deterrence. This is suicide.
>
> Joel M. Skousen is a political scientist by training and former
> chairman of the Conservative National Committee. He is a specialist
> in security matters and consults nationwide on "Strategic Relocation"
> -- the title of his latest book.
>
> -
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------------------------------

Date: Thu, 01 Apr 1999 11:17:19 -0500
From: Peter Weiss <[e-mail]>
Subject: Re: (abolition-usa) In Belgrade, Ramsey Clark calls for end of NATO

While I would agree with Ramsey Clark that NATO should have been
dissolved ten years ago and that the bombing violates the UN Charter, it
should also be borne in mind that Ramsey is the lawyer for Radovan
Karadzic in the class action suit brought against Karadzic by the
victims of the anti-Bosnian genocide. And has he said anything about
what is currently going on in Kosovo, or is that solely the fault of the
US?

                        Peter Weiss

David Crockett Williams wrote:
>
> Last night at about 3AM I saw on CSPAN a Serbian Television account of
> former
> Carter Administration Attorney General Ramsey Clark now in Belgrade touring
> hospitals, war damage, meeting with civilians, and an interview with SerbTV
> journalist translated back to English apparently by CSPAN translator.  The
> gist of his message was that NATO should have been dissolved 10 years ago at
> the end of the cold war and that the current military offensive by NATO was
> a violation of the UN charter and should be stopped.   I wonder if this
> interview will make the mainstream news today.  It was announced that the
> University in Belgrade had awarded him an honorary Doctoral degree in
> respect of his efforts for peace.
>
> -
>  To unsubscribe to abolition-usa, send an email to "[e-mail]"
>  with "unsubscribe abolition-usa" in the body of the message.
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>  "help" to the same address.  Do not use quotes in your message.



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------------------------------

Date: Thu, 1 Apr 1999 12:49:11 -0800
From: "David Crockett Williams" <[e-mail]>
Subject: (abolition-usa) Duma to vote on impeaching Russian President Yeltsin mid-April

- -----Original Message-----
From: Steve Habib Rose <[e-mail]>
To: [e-mail] <[e-mail]>
Date: Thursday, April 01, 1999 5:45 AM
Subject: PeaceBuilders - Duma to vote on impeaching Russian President
Yeltsin mid-April


>Peace.
>
>A friend who lives in Russia has just informed me that the Duma (Russian
>parliament) will be voting on impeachment of Russian President Boris
Yeltsin in
>mid-April.  Hard-liners are poised to take power in Russia, and if they
take
>power, they may well send forces to defend Serbia.
>
>Unless somebody makes NATO understand the consequences of their actions
>(particularly the refusal to consider Serbian President Milosevic's
agreement to
>resume peace talks if the bombing is stopped), there is a realistic
possibility
>that NATO may be in direct conflict with Russia by the end of April or
early
>May.
>
>I'd like to suggest that PeaceBuilders who have contacts with high
government
>officials (particularly in Canda and other nations which might be
receptive) use
>those contacts to try to make NATO see reason.
>
>Yours,
>
>Habib
>Host of The Garden
>Web:   http://www.thegarden.net
>Email: [e-mail]
>ICQ:   7649155
>


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------------------------------

End of abolition-usa-digest V1 #102
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