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Guy ADAMS, Bonnie L. Adams, Timothy Adams, Clifton Albright,
Janet Allot, et al., Marvin Klein, Mary Lou Miller, Dwight
W. Williams, Jo Ann Peterson, Ignacia Fuentes, Russel Peterson,
Janet Peterson, Central Life Assurance Co.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD COMPANY, a Delaware Corporation,
Burlington Northern, Inc., a Delaware Corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.

Guy D. ADAMS, Herb Bailey, Barnts Medical Specialties, Benefit
Trust Life Insurance Co., Tom Bradley, Donald L. Brookhart, Central
Life Assurance Co., Russell L. Clark, DMN, Inc., Ray Eiford,
Sherman A. Hill, Bryce A. James, Frank C. Jones, Alan Russell
Kahn, Robert M. Keenholts, Manhattan Life Insurance Company,
Standard Insurance Company, Ellis R. Stanley, Trustmark Life
Insurance Company, Union Central Life Insurance Co., Irene E.
Walters, Woodmen of the World Life Insurance Society, John H.
Zybura, for their own behalf and on behalf of and as Class
representatives of all other persons similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
CSX TRANSPORTATION, a Virginia corporation, Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 94-35461, 94-35618.
United States Court of Appeals,
Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Sept. 14, 1995.

Decided April 10, 1996.

 Classes of bondholders brought separate actions to enforce "gold
clauses" in railroad bonds originally issued nearly a century
earlier.  The United States District Court Western District of
Washington, William L. Dwyer, John C. Coughenour, JJ., dismissed
actions, and plaintiffs appealed.  Appeals were consolidated.  The
Court of Appeals, Canby, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) statute
enacted in 1977 which again authorized enforcement of gold clauses
did not revive enforceability of gold clauses in bonds; (2) bonds
were "issued" at time of first issue to original bondholders for
purposes of 1977 statute; and (3) statute enacted in 1933 which
abrogated gold clauses in private contracts was not unconstitutional.

 Affirmed.

 Robert D. Joffe, Cravath, Swaine & Moore, New York City, Bruce D.
Corker, Seattle, Washington;  R. Harvey Chappell, Jr., Paul W.
Jacobs, II, J. Tracy Walker, IV, Christian, Barton, Epps, Brent &
Chappell, Richmond, Virginia, for defendants-appellees.

 Appeals from the United States District Court Western District of
Washington;  William L. Dwyer, District Judge, Presiding, No.
CV-93-01590-WLD, John C. Coughenour, District Judge, Presiding,
No. CV-93-1827-JCC.

 Before ALARCON and CANBY, Circuit Judges, and FITZGERALD, [FN*]
District Judge.

FN* The Honorable James M. Fitzgerald, Senior United States District
Judge for the District of Alaska, sitting by designation.

 CANBY, Circuit Judge:

 These cases arise from the efforts of bondholders to enforce "gold
clauses" in railroad bonds issued almost a century ago.  A gold clause
requires payment of the bond's obligations in gold dollars valued at
the time the obligation was undertaken.  In 1933, Congress rendered
such gold clauses unenforceable, 48 Stat. 112, 113 (1933), but then
permitted them again in 1977, 91 Stat. 1227, 1229 (1977).  The issues
presented here are whether the 1977 legislation revived these ancient
gold clauses, and whether various actions of the parties have created
new, post-1977 obligations payable in gold.  Our answer to both
questions is "no."

 The bondholders brought a class action to force the Burlington
Northern Railroad Company ("Burlington Northern" or "Railroad")
to pay the interest and principal of its gold bonds, issued in
1896 and 1921, in gold coin.  Class representative Guy Adams appeals
the district court's dismissal of the action under Fed.R.Civ.P.
12(b)(6) and 56.  Because of the identity of issues in this case and
Adams v. CSX Transportation, Inc., No. 94-35618, an appeal from the
district court's dismissal of a class action to enforce the gold
clauses in CSX Transportation ("CSXT") bonds, we consolidate the
cases for purposes of this opinion.  This Court has jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. º 1291.  We affirm the decisions of the district
court in both cases.

BACKGROUND

 In 1896 and 1921, respectively, the Northern Pacific Railway and
the Great Northern Railway Company issued millions of dollars in
"Gold Bonds" to finance their expansion in the Midwestern and
Northwestern states.  The bonds each contain a "gold clause,"
requiring the obligor to pay upon maturity "the [face value number
of] Dollars, gold coin of the United States of America of the present
[1896 or 1921] standard weight and fineness."  The clause also
calls for annual interest payments at a rate of between three and
four per cent, depending on the issue, to be made "in like gold coin."

 Nearly $92 million of the Northern Pacific bonds and approximately
$62 million of the Great Northern bonds remain outstanding.  The bonds
mature between January 1, 1997 and January 1, 2047.  The Burlington
Northern became obligor on these bonds in 1970, when Great Northern
and Northern Pacific merged into it. Both issues trade on the major
exchanges, at prices reflecting the market's belief that the Burlington
Northern will continue to pay its obligations in current legal tender,
rather than in gold coin of the relevant period.  If the method of
payment were to return to gold coin, the value of the bonds would
increase by up to 2000 per cent.

 Since the time the Burlington Northern became the obligor on the
bonds, it has undergone a corporate reorganization, in which its
name was changed, and several mergers.  When it reorganized to
effectuate a name change and to create a holding company, the
Burlington Northern undertook a Supplemental Indenture under its
new name "to authorize the unbroken continuity" of the Railroad's
obligations to the bondholders.

 After a 1981 merger with the Colorado & Southern Railway, the
Railroad undertook another Supplemental Indenture.  The Supplemental
Indenture subjected the former assets of Colorado & Southern to a
lien that the Railroad's mortgage trustee had been required to
maintain on certain blocks of stock in order to secure payment
on the bonds.  The Railroad wanted to free the stock from the lien
so that it could cancel the stock.  The Railroad issued several
other Supplemental Indentures, for the same purpose, after other
subsequent mergers. None of the Supplemental Indentures created
new debt.

 In 1985, the Railroad sought the mortgage trustee's release of
its lienhold on 1.9 million acres of undeveloped property that
had previously served as partial security for the bond debt.  A
class of gold bondholders filed an action, with Alan Reivman as
class representative, to prevent the lienhold release.  In 1987,
the Railroad negotiated a settlement with the bondholders (the
"Reivman Settlement"), paying the class $35.5 million in exchange
for their agreement to drop the action and cease opposition to the
release.  The settlement did not purport to create new bond obligations.

 The CSXT bonds at issue in Adams v. CSX Transportation, Inc. have
a history similar to the Railroad bonds.  In 1899, the Columbus,
Hocking Valley & Toledo Railway Company issued $20 million in bonds
containing gold clauses that governed payment of the interest and
the principal.  In 1930, Hocking Valley merged into the Chesapeake
& Ohio Railway ("C & O").  In 1987, C & O and CSXT, both of which
were wholly owned by the CSX Corporation, merged, leaving CSXT as
the surviving entity.  CSXT executed a Supplemental Indenture in
satisfaction of the original Hocking Valley Mortgage Agreement's
requirements, in which it agreed to "assume the due and punctual
payment of the principal and interest of all the Bonds issued under
[Hocking Valley's first mortgage] according to their tenor...."
Approximately $15.8 million of the original Hocking Valley Bonds
remain outstanding.

 In 1933, Congress passed a Joint Resolution ("the 1933 Statute")
providing that any obligation containing a gold clause "shall be
discharged upon payment, dollar for dollar, in any coin or currency
which at the time of payment is legal tender for public and private
debts."  Ch. 48, 48 Stat. 112, 113 (1933) (formerly codified at
21 U.S.C. º 463).  The statute gave the obligor the option of
paying its debts in any form of legal tender, including gold, and
prevented any obligee from enforcing gold clauses in existing or
future obligations.  The Gold Reserve Act of 1934, however,
foreclosed the obligor's option of paying in gold by banning the
use of gold as legal tender.  See Gold Reserve Act of 1934, ch.
6, 48 Stat. 340 (1934) (repealed).  From 1933 forward, the railroads
made the interest payments on their bonds in currency.

 In 1977, Congress amended the 1933 Statute by providing that it
did  "not apply to obligations issued on or after the date of
enactment of this section."  91 Stat. 1227, 1229 (1977).  The 1933
statute and its amendment were then recodified in 1982 as follows:
An obligation issued containing a gold clause or governed by a gold
clause is discharged on payment (dollar for dollar) in United
States coin or currency that is legal tender at the time of payment.
This paragraph does not apply to an obligation issued after October
27, 1977.
31 U.S.C. º 5118(d)(2).  In 1985, Congress reauthorized the use of
gold coin as legal tender when it provided for the minting of $50
"Gold Eagle" coins.  See Gold Bullion Coin Act of 1985, Pub.L.
No. 99-185, 99 Stat. 1177 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. º 5112
(1994)).

 Adams filed these two class actions in the district court in
1993.  In  Adams v. Burlington Northern Railroad, No. 94-35461,
Adams sought a declaration that the original terms of the bonds,
requiring payment of annual interest and principal at maturity in
gold coin of the time (1896 and 1921), are enforceable.  Adams
also sought damages accruing from the Railroad's failure to pay
interest in gold coin from the time any new obligations issued,
as determined by the court, to the present.  The district court
dismissed the action for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), and found that the
Railroad also had met its burden for a grant of summary judgment
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56.

 Adams brought his second class action, Adams v. CSX Transportation,
Inc., No. 94-35618, on behalf of all Hocking Valley gold bondholders.
He sought a declaration that CSXT must make all future interest
and principal payments in gold coin of the time (the year 1899)
and damages for CSXT's failure to pay interest in gold from the
time of the 1987 merger with C & O until the time of the judgment.
The district court dismissed Adams' action for failure to state
a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6).

 Adams appeals from the district court's dismissal of his claim
and summary judgment against him in his action against the
Burlington Northern, and from the district court's dismissal of
his action against CSXT.

ANALYSIS
 I. Adams v. Burlington Northern Railroad

 A. Standard of Review.

 Adams contends that the district court's dismissal of his claim
under  Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) was improper because the court
considered material beyond the pleadings, and that the Railroad's
motion should have been treated as a Rule 56 motion for summary
judgment.  We assume for purposes of decision that the district
court entered summary judgment, and affirm on that basis.  We
review summary judgments de novo, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party, to determine
whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and
whether the district court correctly applied the relevant
substantive law.  Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441
(9th Cir.1995), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1261, 134
L.Ed.2d 209 (1996).

 B. The 1933 Statute and the 1977 Amendment.

 Adams contends that the district court erred in determining that
the 1933 Statute continues to render unenforceable gold clauses
embodied in obligations issued before October 27, 1977.  We
reject that contention.

 As now codified, the 1933 statute and its 1977 amendment are
clear on their face. [FN1]  Obligations payable in gold are
discharged by payment in any United States legal tender, but
that command does not apply to obligations issued after October
27, 1977.

FN1. The 1933 statute and the 1977 amendment were equally clear
as separately enacted;  the 1982 recodification was not intended
to effect any substantive changes.  See H.R.Rep. No. 651, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1895, 1895-98.

 The legislative history of the 1977 amendment supports this
plain meaning.  Senator Helms, sponsor of the bill amending
the 1933 Statute, stated that the bill would "make enforceable,
gold clause contracts entered into after the enactment of the
bill.  It is intended to stand neutral with regard to the
enforceability of gold clause obligations issued in the past."
123 Cong. Rec. 633, 635 (1977).  Senator Helms was aware of
pending cases which were to decide the amendment's effect on
pre-1933 gold bonds, and he stated his intent to allow courts
to resolve that issue.  See id.  Almost immediately, one of
the gold clauses in issue in this case was held unenforceable
in Feldman v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 428 F.Supp. 979
(S.D.N.Y.1977).  Feldman held that gold bonds issued prior to
1933 still could be paid "dollar for dollar, in legal tender of
the United States," and need not be paid in gold.  Id. at 987.

 According to Adams, the 1933 Act (at least when combined with
the 1934 abolition of gold as legal tender) created an
impossibility defense to the payment of gold to the bondholders.
He argues that the 1977 Amendment and the 1985 Act authorizing
the use of gold as legal tender removed this "impediment,"
reviving the Railroad's obligations.  This interpretation
conflicts with the plain meaning of the 1933 statute.  That
statute does not simply forbid payment in illegal tender; it
affirmatively authorizes payment in any tender legal at the
time of payment.  Indeed, gold was legal tender in 1933 and
did not become illegal until enactment of the Gold Reserve Act
of 1934, 48 Stat. 337, 340 (1934).  The 1985 statute removes
the barrier of the 1934 Act, but it does nothing to impair the
1933 statute.  The effect of the 1985 statute is to permit the
Burlington Northern to make payment in gold coins if it wishes
to, but its debts are discharged if it pays in any legal tender.
Section 5118(d)(2) so states.

 C. Adams' Claim that the Bonds Were Issued After October 27,
1977.

 Adams argues, in the alternative, that for purposes of the
1977 amendment the Railroad bonds were "issued" after October
27, 1977.  He contends that sale and transfer of the bonds, as
well as certain business transactions and reorganizations, such
as mergers and a change in the security for the bond debt,
effected a new issuance of bonds after 1977.  Adams' claim raises
a question of statutory interpretation regarding the meaning of
the term "issued" in the 1977 Amendment.

 The 11th Circuit has held that a lease obligation is "issued"
within the meaning of the 1977 amendment when the lease is
"entered into." Rudolph v. Steinhardt, 721 F.2d 1324, 1330
(11th Cir.1983);  see also 123 Cong. Rec. 635 (1977).  In the
context of bonds, the term has a similar and even better-understood
meaning.  A bond obligation is "entered into," or "issued" when
the bond first "comes into the hands of a holder, so executed and
delivered as to bind the obligor."  6A Fletcher Cyc. Corp. º 2688
(1989). While the "date of issue ... usually means the arbitrary
date fixed as the beginning of the term for which [the bonds]
run," "in the sense in which the term [issued] is ordinarily
used a bond is not issued until it is delivered to some one
who claims it as a debt against the corporation."  Id.  Under
Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which covers negotiable
instruments, "an issue means the first delivery of an instrument
to a holder or remitter." Id. Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial
Code applies by analogy to bonds.  Id.  We adopt this
interpretation and hold that bonds are "issued" within the
meaning of the 1977 amendment when they are delivered to the
first holder.

 The Alaska Supreme Court has interpreted the meaning of "issued"
in the 1977 Amendment in accordance with this ordinary
understanding of the term.  See Gold Bondholders, Etc. v.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Company, 649 P.2d 947 (Alaska 1982).
Gold Bondholders was an action brought by persons who in 1980 had
purchased railroad bonds with gold clauses.  Id. at 948.  The
railroad had originally issued the bonds in 1895.  Id. The
bondholders argued that the bonds had not been "issued" to them
until they were delivered to them in 1980, so that the 1933 Act and
1977 amendment did not prevent them from enforcing the gold clauses.
Id. at 950.  The Alaska Supreme Court held that the gold clauses
were unenforceable under the 1933 Act, explaining that it "[knew]
of no authority which would consider each purchase of the bond
after its first purchase to be a new issue of the bond."  Id. [FN2]

FN2. The bonds at issue in Gold Bondholders contained terms stating
that the bonds were transferable, and that any purchaser could
surrender the bond and that "a new registered bond will be issued
to the transferee in exchange therefor."  Id. The Alaska Supreme
Court nonetheless found that the 1933 Act was intended to vitiate
such obligations "insofar as they required payment in gold
specie," and was unpersuaded that the bonds were first issued
to the bondholders in 1980.  Id. at 950-51.

 Taking a different tack from that of the plaintiffs in Gold
Bondholders, Adams frames his argument in terms of novation,
arguing that new obligations to pay in gold arose after October
27, 1977.  He argues that because a novation may result from
the agreed substitution of an obligee on indebtedness, novations
and, consequently, new issuances, occurred each time gold bonds
were purchased and sold.  This argument misunderstands the
requirements for a novation, [FN3] and is inapposite in the context
of bond obligations.  Adams' novation argument is essentially the
same as the argument that the Alaska Supreme Court rejected, and
that we also reject for the same reasons.  The date of issue of
bonds is the date when they are first issued, not when they
are resold.

FN3. Novations generally require that the parties intend to
extinguish the old obligation and to create a new obligation.
66 C.J.S. Novation, º 11(b)(1).  See also MacPherson v. Franco,
34 Wash.2d 179, 208 P.2d 641, 642 (1949).

 Adams argues that novations also occurred when the Railroad
undertook a Supplemental Indenture after a corporate reorganization
in which it changed its name, and when it undertook Supplemental
Indentures after several other mergers, some of which involved
the substitution of different collateral to secure the debt.
In support of his argument, Adams points to cases in which
novations rendered gold clauses in leases enforceable.  See,
e.g., Wells Fargo Bank v. Bank of America, 32 Cal.App.4th 424,
38 Cal.Rptr.2d 521 (1995); Fay Corp. v. BAT Holdings I, Inc.,
646 F.Supp. 946 (W.D.Wash.1986), aff'd sub nom.  Fay Corp. v.
Frederick & Nelson Seattle, Inc., 896 F.2d 1227 (9th Cir.1990).

 Our response to this argument is much the same as our response
to the contention that the sale of a bond constitutes a
novation and new "issue."  The date of issue of a bond is the
date of first issue;  the fact that the obligor has continued
to be bound, or has agreed to continue to be bound, despite
reorganizations and mergers, does not alter the controlling
first issue date. Whatever may be the rule regarding transfer
of leases, bonds must continue to be viewed as issued on the
date of first issue.  See Wells Fargo, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d at 528
n. 5 (stating that novation doctrine applicable to leases
would not apply to bonds).  For purposes of the 1977 amendment,
determinations regarding the issuance date of a bond should
"[focus] on the legal structure of the bonds and not novation."
Id. (citing Gold Bondholders, 649 P.2d at 950).

 If either the sale of bonds, or the merger of the obligor with
an agreement to honor outstanding bonds, were to effectuate a
new issue of the bonds, the prospective nature of the 1977
amendment would be almost entirely defeated in the major area of
corporate bonds.  It was the intent of the 1977 amendment to
remain "neutral" concerning bonds issued prior to 1977, not to
render virtually all of them payable in gold, which would be the
effect were Adams' doctrine of novation applied to bond
obligations.  Moreover, the issuance of corporate bonds is
subject to a well-developed, specialized body of law, and the
general law of novation is not easily injected into that context.
Although sometimes described as a specific type of contract,
bonds are financial instruments inherently different from leases,
which were at issue in the cases that Adams cites.  Bonds are
regularly sold and purchased in large, impersonal markets, by
corporations that frequently undergo corporate changes, while
leaseholds generally involve a small number of readily ascertainable
and stable parties who can engage in the type of bargaining
and mutual consent necessary for a novation.  See 66 C.J.S.
Novation º 8(b) (1950) ("the same parties necessary for the
making of the original contract are essential to the making
of the contract of novation");  see generally, 66 C.J.S.
Novation ºº 8-21 (1950).  We are unable to accept the view
that Congress intended to alter so radically the obligations of
bonds that have been in public circulation for nearly a century,
when the language and history of its amendment suggests a
contrary purpose.  We conclude that none of the theories of
novation advanced by Adams are sufficient to cause us to recede
from the view that the Railroad's bonds were "issued" on the
date of first issue, in 1896 or 1921, as the case may be. [FN4]
They consequently are subject to the 1933 statute and may be
paid with any legal tender.

FN4. Even if novation analysis were appropriate, the
circumstances surrounding the corporate transactions in this
case would not meet the formal requirements for a novation.
Under Washington law, which applies in this case, a novation
requires the substitution of a new obligation for an old one,
and not merely of a new paper or note.  Davis v. Gutheil, 87
Wash. 596, 152 P. 14, 16 (1915).  All of these Supplemental
Indentures expressly indicated a continuity of the original
obligations to the bondholders, the old obligations were never
extinguished, and no new obligor was substituted.
Adams also contends that the Reivman Settlement constituted a
novation. Again, there was no new bond issuance because the
Railroad did not undertake any new debt obligation.

 D. Adams' Additional Claims.

 [Adams also contends that the 1933 Statute was unconstitutional.
This issue has been litigated repeatedly and resolved;  Congress's
abrogation of the gold clauses was constitutional.  See Norman
v. B. & O. R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 316, 55 S.Ct. 407, 419, 79
L.Ed. 885 (1935) (finding that Congress acted within the scope
of its Constitutional powers in enacting the 1933 Statute);
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Henwood, 307 U.S. 247, 259, 59 S.Ct.
847, 853-54, 83 L.Ed. 1266 (1939) (holding that the 1933
Statute did not offend the Fifth Amendment);  Feldman v. Great
N. R.R., 428 F.Supp. 979, 982, 984 (1977) (holding that the
1933 Statute still applied even after the emergency prompting
it had abated).

 Adams' argument regarding the Railroad's breach of an implied
duty of good faith and fair dealing is misguided.  The 1933 Act
authorized the Railroad to discharge its bond obligations by
payment of any legal tender;  it did not create an "impediment"
to payment which the Railroad had any good faith obligation
to avoid.  The Railroad was legally excused from meeting its
original obligations under the gold clauses and remains so.

 We have reviewed Adams' other arguments and find them to be
without merit.  We affirm the district court's judgment
dismissing Adams' action against the Burlington Northern.
Adams did not demonstrate that there are any disputed issues
of material fact regarding whether the Railroad's bonds were
first issued in 1896 and 1921, respectively.  Nor did Adams
demonstrate that additional discovery could lead to evidence
raising a triable issue.

 II. Adams v. CSX Transportation, Inc.

 We review de novo the district court's Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)
dismissal of Adams' suit against CSXT.  Stone v. Travelers Corp.,
58 F.3d 434, 436-37 (9th Cir.1995).

 Adams' claim against CSXT fails for the same reasons as his
suit against the Railroad.  There was only one issuance of
Hocking Valley bonds, at the time of their sale in 1899.  These
original debt obligations continued, and were assumed in their
entirety, by CSXT.  The original Hocking Valley Indenture
specified that in the event of a merger the successor corporation
would assume the same obligation as the original obligor.
No new debt was created, and the only relevant "obligation" for
purposes of the 1977 Amendment was that which arose upon the
issuance of the Hocking Valley bonds in 1899.

 The 1933 Act bars the enforcement of the gold clauses in the
CSXT bonds.  We thus affirm the district court's dismissal of
Adams' claim for failure to state a claim.

CONCLUSION

 We affirm the district court's dismissal of Adams' claims in
both Adams v. Burlington Northern Railroad, No. 94-35461, and
Adams v. CSX Transportation, Inc., No. 94-35618, because the
gold bonds in both cases were "obligations issued" prior to
October 27, 1977.  Accordingly, the 1933 Act bars the bondholders
from enforcing the gold clauses against the obligors.

 AFFIRMED.