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The Arizona Skeptic
A Journal Promoting Critical Thinking
Volume 6, Issue 5             March/April 1993

CSICOP Questions Truth of Movie Based on Travis Walton UFO
Abduction
CSICOP has issued the following press release:
The Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the
Paranormal (CSICOP) challenges the claim of Paramount Pictures
that its new film "Fire in the Sky" which opens on March 12, 1993
is based on a "true story."  In a statement released today Paul
Kurtz,  chairman of CSICOP, commented that "the film is largely
fiction and ought to be labeled  as such.  The public is being
deceived by Paramount's promoting the film as a true story.
          "Fire in the Sky" is based on the claim of Travis Walton, of
Snowflake, AZ, that in late 1975 he was "zapped" and abducted by a
UFO (Unidentified Flying Object) and held hostage1 for five days.
          Philip J. Klass, chairman of CSICOP's UFO Subcommittee, who
spent many months investigating the alleged incident shortly after
it was reported, uncovered extensive  evidence to indicate the
incident was most likely a hoax.  This evidence and details of
Klass' rigorous investigation were reported in his book _UFOs: The
Public Deceived_ (published in 1983 by Prometheus Books).
          Klass learned that shortly before Walton's alleged abduction
he had told his mother that if he was ever abducted by a UFO she
should not worry because he would be all right. Later, when
Travis' mother was informed that her young son had allegedly been
zapped and abducted by a UFO, she took the news calmly and
responded, "Well, that's the way  these things happen," according
to a law enforcement officer who was present.
          During the several days that Travis was "missing" his older
brother Duane was asked if he was concerned for Travis' well-
being.  Duane replied that Travis was  "having the experience of a
lifetime...  All I can say is that I wish I was with him."
          Shortly after Travis reappeared, he was given a "lie
detector" test, administered by Jack McCarthy, then one of the
most experienced and respected polygraph examiners in Arizona.2
After a lengthy test involving Walton's claims of UFO-abduction,
McCarthy reported:  "Gross deception."  Further, McCarthy reported
that Travis was holding his breath to try to "beat the machine."
          Professor Kurtz said:  "The public is being inundated by
Hollywood films and television programs claiming that thousands of
Americans are being abducted by aliens.  These programs offer no
credible scientific evidence or critical dissent.  They seem to be
motivated solely by profits, and no matter how outrageous a claim
there is always somebody willing to turn it into a 'true' movie."
          "None of the cases," stated Klass, "stand up under scrutiny.
They can be given natural, prosaic explanations without
postulating extraterrestrial visitation and kidnapping.  But, of
course, Hollywood wouldn't be able to turn that into a movie."
          "Many in the media release irresponsible and sensationalistic
reports of abductions.  There is a critical need for balanced
reporting and labeling," said Kurtz.
          CSICOP, an organization devoted to the scientific
investigation of claims of the paranormal, includes hundreds of
scientists and skeptical investigators.  CSICOP also publishes the
quarterly journal, the _Skeptical Inquirer_.

Editor's Notes
1.  Presumably "prisoner" is meant.
2.  This should probably not be interpreted to be giving credence
to the claim that a polygraph is a "lie detector."  Certainly one
should be skeptical of such a claim.

MIS-Fire in the Sky
By Chris Rutkowski
I saw "Fire in the Sky" at a preview last night.  There was mixed
reaction from the audience.
          First of all, the movie does not resemble Walton's book in
the least.  I thought his ghostwritten version of what he claimed
was bizarre enough without Tracy Torme's "artistic license."  If
you like movies with lots of gore, shock effects and gallons of
brown goo, this is the one for you.  Walton's original claim of a
sterile, antiseptic alien spaceship and operating room has given
way to an interior that attempts to outdo the "Alien" series of
flicks.  Membraneous pods, "E.T."-like aliens and slimy honeycombs
populate the ship's interior.
          Good news for horror buffs:  the audience liked that stuff.
          What was odd was the complete contrast with the rest of the
movie, in which crusty James Garner grilled the other work crew
about their apparent murder of Walton.  Garner's character, the
sheriff, didn't believe a word of the abduction story, and kept
trying to trip them up through his investigation.  That part of
the movie, including the social and public effects of an alleged
UFO on a community, was actually very good.
          In essence, it's not necessary to debunk the movie because it
bears no resemblance to even the original story.  I'm amazed that
MUFON devoted half of its most recent issue to a preview of the
movie, including a new article by Walton.  In the movie, APRO
investigators, with the group name changed to AFAR, are portrayed
as complete geeks with absolutely no scientific credibility.  Why
a UFO organization would want to be associated with such a
portrayal is beyond me.
          Walton is said to be rewriting his book, _The Walton
Experience_, to be released with the movie title.  A much more
interesting book about the case is Bill Barry's _Ultimate
Encounter_ (Pocket Books, 1978), which gives more background and
includes skeptics' comments.  I doubt if that book will become
available again.
          In summary, "Fire in the Sky" is a misfire.  Although the
investigation process is fairly well detailed and the dynamics of
the characters is acceptably portrayed, the movie skews badly
after Walton is found, degenerating into a slimy horror flick with
no resemblance to the original account, however truthful it was in
the first place.
          Skeptics don't really need to bother with the movie.  It
should be forgotten soon.
_Chris Rutkowski is a Science Educator for the Royal Astronomical
Society of Canada whose last appearance in_ AS _was "The End of
Crop Circles" in the November/December 1992 issue.  This article
was originally posted to the Usenet sci.skeptic group on March 12,
1993._

Linda Napolitano UFO Abduction Case Criticized
By Jim Lippard
In several presentations at UFO conferences and in articles in the
September and December 1992 issues of the _MUFON UFO Journal_,
abduction researcher Budd Hopkins has promoted an alleged UFO
abduction case in New York City involving Linda "Cortile" (since
revealed to be a pseudonym for Linda Napolitano).  The case has
attracted attention because of several alleged independent
eyewitnesses to the abduction, including a prominent public
official.  (It was later claimed that this person was former
United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar.)
          Now this case has come under considerable fire from Joseph J.
Stefula (former MUFON State Director for New Jersey, who resigned
as a result of this case), Richard Butler (a former law
enforcement and security police specialist for the U.S. Air
Force), and George P. Hansen (a parapsychology researcher and
CSICOP critic--see "Articles of Note," _AS_, May/June 1992 and
January/February 1993).  Stefula, Butler, and Hansen have issued a
25-page report which they have circulated themselves, both
electronically and on paper, pointing out numerous flaws in the
evidence.  They have heavily criticized Hopkins, as well as Jerome
Clark (editor of the _International UFO Reporter_), Walter Andrus
(head of MUFON), and David Jacobs (UFO researcher, author, and
history professor at Temple University) for their handling of the
case and the overall role they play in ufology--the report
compares their actions to players in a role-playing game such as
Dungeons and Dragons.  Clark and Andrus are singled out for the
heaviest attack for allegedly attempting to suppress criticisms of
the case, a charge which Clark disputes.  (Clark has since agreed,
despite personal animosity between himself and Hansen, to publish
an article from Butler, Stefula, and Hansen criticizing the case.)
          Linda Napolitano claims to have been kidnapped and assaulted
by federal agents named Richard and Dan who were eyewitnesses to
her UFO abduction, which led Butler, Stefula, and Hansen to ask
why this hadn't been reported to the proper law enforcement
authorities.  This in turn led to a vitriolic exchange of
correspondence between Clark and Hansen, in which Clark stated
that he was unconvinced that the kidnapping and assault actually
took place.
          Butler, Stefula, and Hansen identify a possible source of
Napolitano's story in the science fiction novel _Nighteyes_ by
Garfield Reeves-Stevens, which was published a few months before
Linda Napolitano first claimed to have been abducted.  Two pages
of their report list similarities between the novel and elements
of Napolitano's abduction reports.
          Copies of the Butler, Stefula, and Hansen report may be
obtained for $4 from Bob Girard, 1443 S.E. Port St. Lucie, Port
St. Lucie, FL 34952, or via download from GEnie's PSI-NET software
library.

Book Review
_The Retreat to Commitment_ by William Warren Bartley III
2nd revised edition, Open Court Publishing, 1984, 283pp.
Reviewed by David A. Snodgrass
Persons who consider themselves skeptics would no doubt also be
willing to consider themselves rationalists.  It is safe to say
that it is difficult to imagine that anyone could be a skeptic
without at the same time being a rationalist.  (An exception might
have to be made for so-called radical skeptics.)  The essence of
the skeptic's approach to paranormal claims, for example, is that
he, in thinking about and investigating those claims, is first and
foremost concerned to be rational in that thinking and
investigating.  We can generalize this concept beyond the realm of
investigation of paranormal claims.  The essence of the skeptic's
approach to the world and to life in general is that he makes a
conscious and constant effort to be rational in that approach.
Since the practice of skepticism is inseparable from the practice
of rationality, it behooves us to think critically about what the
practice of rationality consists of.
          In his book _The Retreat to Commitment_, William Warren
Bartley III presents an original and important theory about what
it is to practice rationality.  Bartley makes two central claims
in his theory of rational practice.  The first claim is that the
practice of rationality is identical with the practice of
criticism, and that there exist no logical barriers that would in
any way limit the practice of criticism.  (Bartley concedes that
there are, of course, other barriers that limit the practice of
criticism, and therefore of rationality; subjective barriers such
as neuroses, and objective barriers such as those discovered by
physics, for example, the uncertainty principle or the speed of
light.  The point of Bartley's claim about the logically unlimited
character of criticism, and therefore of rationality, is that in
the course of the critical examination of, and argument about, for
example, theories of psychology and physics, it is never logically
necessary to say:  "Here all criticism must stop.")  The second
claim is about why the unlimited nature of rationality (or
criticism) has generally gone unnoticed, at least in the main
rationalist traditions of our culture.  It has generally gone
unnoticed because it has generally been assumed that the practice
of criticism is inseparable from the practice of justifying our
theories, ways of life, and so on.  According to most
rationalists, in order to critically support a theory, it is
necessary to rationally justify it.  A common way of rationally
justifying a theory is to claim that its rational justification is
based on the fact that there is empirical evidence for it.  The
original and important facet of Bartley's theory of rationality is
that it clearly shows how the ubiquitous and apparently innocuous
practice of rationally justifying theories, ways of life, etc. is
really not so innocuous after all.  In fact, the practice of
rational justification has made it impossible for persons who
strive to practice rationality to consistently claim that they in
fact practice rationality in all aspects of their lives, simply
because they are unable to consistently claim that they practice
rationality with regard to the most fundamental principles of
rational practice:  the fundamental principles of rational
practice itself.  But why is a rationalist who claims that
rational practice consists of the justification of, for example,
theories, unable to consistently make the claim that he practices
rationality with respect to rationality itself?
          Consider again the common method of rationally justifying a
theory by showing it to be based upon empirical evidence.  What if
the rationalist is now asked to justify this fundamental principle
of rational justification itself?  What criterion of rational
justification is he to appeal to?  Well, the options are pretty
limited.  In fact, there is just one:  An empirical rationalist
can only justify his own fundamental principle of rational
justification by claiming that it, too, is based upon empirical
evidence.  But this really amounts to no justification at all,
because the critic of the empirical rationalist will simply point
out that the "justification" of the practice of rationally
justifying everything by appeal to empirical evidence, by
appealing to empirical evidence, is merely arguing in a circle.
The critic of empirical rationalism could at this point dismiss it
as being irrational.  But suppose that he is charitable and
accepts the empirical rationalist's "justification" of empirical
rationalism (perhaps on the ground that there is empirical
evidence that persons who practice empirical rationalism tend to
live longer because, for example, they tend to cross the street
against the light less often than persons who do not practice
empirical rationalism).  Since we grant that a position is
rationally acceptable if, and only if, it is rationally
justifiable, the critic can go on to demand the rational
justification of the "justification" just given.  Again, the only
option open to the empirical rationalist is to justify the
previous justification by appeal to empirical evidence.  And
again, the malicious critic can demand (on pain of its being
admitted that there is none) the rational justification of the
previous justification of the first justification, and so on, _ad
infinitum_.  It is clear, then, that the classical rationalist
principle "Accept all, and only, those positions that can be
rationally justified" cannot be extended to that fundamental
rationalist principle itself.  The result is that if we identify
the practice of rationality with the practice of rational
justification, then rationalists cannot consistently claim to be
rationalists "all the way down," because the fundamental
principles of their rational practice cannot themselves be
"justified" without resort to circular reasoning or entrapment in
infinite regress.  If the practice of rationality is identical
with the practice of justification, then the scope of rational
practice is severely limited.
          According to Bartley, the failure of justificationist
rationalists to justify their own practice of rationality has led
to a crisis of integrity for rationalists in general.  Moreover,
the failure of justificationist rationalists to justify their own
rationalist practice has provided a powerful and insidious weapon
for irrationalists to use against rationalists.  This "weapon" is
in fact a very good argument, which is precisely why it is so
powerful and insidious when used against rationalists.  Bartley
calls this anti-rationalist argument-weapon the _tu quoque_, and
it goes like this:  Since rational practice cannot itself be
rationally justified, so-called rationalists cannot criticize and
reject any other practice, including the practice of
irrationalism, on the grounds that those rival practices are
unjustified and so irrational.  The failure of rationalists to
justify their own practice of rationality means that the playing
field has been totally leveled in the contest between rational
practice, irrational practice, and any form of nonrational
practice whatsoever.  The choice of one of these kinds of practice
must in fact be based upon something other than rational
justification (whim, pleasure, taste, existential anguish, and
faith are some of the more common substitutes for rational
justification in choosing one practice over another) and the
robust irrationalist is much more self-critical and honest--much
more rational--in his recognition of this fact than is the self-
righteous, self-deceiving rationalist.  So the _tu quoque_
argument against rational practice consists simply in the
irrationalist's replying "You too!" to the rationalist, every time
that the rationalist challenges the irrationalist's irrationalism
on the grounds that it is unjustified.  The best that we can do,
given the failure of rationalists to justify their own
rationality, is to commit ourselves (through whim, faith, or
whatever) to our practices, including the practice of rationality.
Hence "the retreat to commitment" of Bartley's title.
          It would be a mistake for us to think, as skeptics and
rationalists, that the crisis of rationalist integrity described
by Bartley is of academic interest only.  Bartley focuses upon the
moral, cultural, and practical consequences of the failure of
rationalists to justify their own rational practice.  In his book,
Bartley analyzes the specific consequences of that failure for
contemporary Protestant theology and religious life, but he
carefully points out that his focus on Protestantism is for
illustrative purposes only.  Protestant theology's gradual
movement away from rationalism and into fideism happens to provide
a particularly vivid illustration of the consequences of the
rationalists' failure to justify their own practice, but those
consequences are by no means limited to Protestant thought.  The
main consequence for our culture as a whole is that the _tu
quoque_ argument against rationalism has put down deep and
extensive roots.  (A bit of anecdotal evidence for this claim:  I
have myself encountered the _tu quoque_ four times over the past
two years, twice in conversation and twice in print.)  The
specific consequence of that failure for contemporary skeptics
should be clear:  If the _tu quoque_ argument against rational
practice is valid and sound, it follows that the choice between,
for example, the practice of skepticism and the practice of
occultism can never be made rationally.  Another important
consequence of the cultural spread of the _tu quoque_ is that
argument itself is severely devalued.  Arguments are no longer
taken seriously as arguments, but are used instead (if they are
used at all and not abandoned in favor of the use of brute
physical force) for such purposes as the spread of propaganda and
the evocation of emotion.  Under the reign of the _tu quoque_
argument against rational practice, we may take or leave argument
in precisely the same way that we may take or leave a given flavor
of soda pop.
          Bartley's solution to the "dilemma of ultimate commitment"
posed by the failure of justificationist rationalism is simple and
profound.  Bartley shows that rationalists have been skewered on
the dilemma precisely and only because they have mistakenly
assumed that criticism, for example the criticism of a practice,
is identical to the justification1 of that practice.  It is
crucially important to realize and appreciate just how mistaken
that assumption is.  In fact, there is nothing in logic that shows
criticism and justification to be the same kind of thing.  The
rationalist's propensity to make that identification, and to cling
to it so tenaciously, can be explained by closely examining the
history of rational practice itself.  For one thing, our ideas
about what it is to practice rationality have largely or wholly
sprung from our Western philosophical tradition, and, as Bartley
points out, that tradition has developed in tandem with
Christianity which, in its orthodox forms, is fundamentally
concerned with the justification of its beliefs.  (Think of the
genre of Christian literature known as "apologetics.")  Thus, when
rationalists have rebelled against (i.e., criticized) various
forms of religious authority, they have felt compelled to
demonstrate that rebellion (criticism) will not lead to social
anarchy by showing that the rebellion (criticism) is itself
grounded upon (justified by) some form of rational authority.
But, as we have seen, at the end of the justificationist road lies
the _tu quoque_ argument against rationalist practice itself.
          Bartley shows that, contrary to the standard assumptions of
Western rationalists, the practice of criticism can be completely
decoupled from the practice of justification.  He offers the
following as the core proposition of rational practice:  "_Nothing
gets justified; everything gets criticized_" (p. 112; emphasis
Bartley's), and the very first thing that goes unjustified but
gets severely criticized is this core proposition of rational
practice itself.  An immediate consequence, therefore, is that the
_tu quoque_ argument against rational practice is defanged:  One
can be a rationalist "all the way down" as long as one holds all
of one's beliefs and actions open to potential (and optimally
continual) criticism and potential refutation including, most
importantly, one's fundamental principle of rational practice
itself, which is just the proposition that one ought to hold all
of one's beliefs open to potential (and optimally continual)
criticism and potential refutation.  The _tu quoque_ argument is
valid but not sound, because its fundamental premise is false.
Rational practice is not identical with the practice of
justification, but it is identical with the practice of criticism.
Bartley calls his theory of rational practice "pancritical
rationalism" because of the comprehensive logical scope that the
practice of criticism has.  There are no logical barriers to the
practice of criticism, and therefore there are no logical barriers
to the practice of rationality.  In fact, we become involved in
another kind of "infinite regress" if we practice pancritical
rationalism:  the practice of criticism can be carried on _ad
infinitum_.  And it ought to be, if we aspire to practice
rationality with regard to everything, including our rational
practice itself.
          An important consequence of the decoupling of criticism from
justification is that the onus is now on the irrationalists and
nonrationalists to practice "pancriticism" themselves, if they
expect to maintain intellectual parity with rationalists.  As
Bartley puts this point:
                    Whereas many...have argued that we may decide as we
                    please, freely and irrationally, between two
                    unjustifiable theories, I suggest that we can decide
                    freely and irrationally, as a matter of taste, only
                    between two theories against which there exist no
                    criticisms one is unable to defeat.  This reduces the
                    area of whim considerably...Moreover, once the retreat
                    to commitment involved in the justificational framework
                    is no longer necessary, then it is also no longer
                    possible to avoid facing these criticisms by citing the
                    _tu quoque_.  (p. 136)
          The identification of rational practice with the practice of
criticism, with the recognition that the scope of criticism is
logically unlimited, has sweeping moral implications.  One of
these implications is that we ought to practice radical humility
with regard to our own beliefs and actions.  We ought to be always
willing to "turn the other cheek" to and "go the second mile" with
the critics of our own beliefs and actions (p. 163).  Bartley's
theory of pancritical rationalism implies an "ethic of argument"
that invokes the moral sentiment of
                    ..._respect_ for people...one owes respect to all--at
                    least until they very definitely show themselves
                    unworthy of it.  One of the most important ways of
                    indicating prima facie respect for a person is to
                    attempt to take his views seriously.  This would be
                    impossible if rationality were so limited that critical
                    argument was impossible.  (p. 165; emphasis Bartley's).2

Notes
1. More precisely, within the justificationist framework, the
criticism of theories, ways of life, etc. is the attempt to
disjustify them by showing that, for example, there is no
empirical evidence for them.  Throughout this review, the concept
of "justification" should be taken to imply the concept of
"disjustification" as well.

2.  My immediate inspiration for the writing of this review stems
from two comments made by Jim Lippard.  The first comment was made
at a meeting of the Phoenix Skeptics during which Jim was
describing his exchanges with a group of Australian skeptics
following his criticism of their handling of a debate with
creationist Duane Gish.  Jim stated (and I paraphrase, but this
paraphrase captures the core of his comment) that everything is
open to criticism, most especially one's own views.  It struck me
as amazing and important that this idea would have to be
explicitly stated during the course of a discussion between
skeptics, and that the critical spirit Jim espoused seemed to play
no part in the Australians' response to his criticisms.  Bartley's
theory of pancritical rationalism provides us with a powerful
argument in support of Jim's dictum, and the Australians'
dogmatism provides us with an example of why Bartley's assertion
that "There is nothing intrinsically rational about any particular
position or context--including that particular context known as
'rationalism' or the 'rationalist identity' or 'the rationalist
tradition'" (p. 171) is true:  simply substitute "skepticism,"
"the skeptical identity," and "the skeptical tradition" into
Bartley's sentence.
          The second comment by Jim that inspired this review appears
in his note to Jeff Jacobsen's article "Science and Dianetics"
(_AS_, July/August 1992).  In that note, Jim observes that, in
reference to Karl Popper's attempt to find a line of demarcation
between science and pseudoscience based upon the notion of
falsifiability, "it is the opinion of many philosophers that there
is no principled way of distinguishing science from pseudoscience,
or even from nonscience."  It is important to note that Bartley
claims that his theory of pancritical rationalism is a
generalization of Popper's approach to the problem of criticism
and justification (p. xiii), but that Bartley can be counted among
the philosophers who have questioned the importance of trying to
demarcate between science and pseudoscience.  He argues that "the
fundamental problem of modern philosophy...is the problem of
defeating the _tu quoque_ by showing that it is possible to choose
in a nonarbitrary way among competing, mutually exclusive
theories, and--more broadly speaking--among competing 'ways of
life'" (p. 83).  Thus, the fundamental problem here is not that of
distinguishing between science and pseudoscience, but of finding a
principled way of distinguishing between competing and
incompatible theories and ways of life.  If Bartley's theory of
rational practice is correct, there is a principled way of making
that distinction.

Camille Paglia:  Astrologer
"I'm an astrologer--people don't mention this!  I mean, everyone's
attacked me for everything else.  I mean, I'm an astrologer--it's
right in my book.  I _endorse_ astrology.  I believe in astrology.
Will someone attack me for that?  No!"  --Camille Paglia, "The
M.I.T. Lecture: Crisis in the American Universities," in her _Sex,
Art, and American Culture_ (1992, Vintage), pp. 253-254.

Skeptical News
Eldon Byrd's libel lawsuit against James Randi and CSICOP is
scheduled to go to trial on May 24.  Uri Geller's lawsuits are
still pending.
          Mike Stackpole and Ted Karren were guests on the Phoenix
local cable TV show "Arizona Now and Then" on February 1 to
discuss predictions by psychics and the Phoenix Skeptics.  (Our
predictions were published in the last _AS_.)
          Phoenix Skeptic Jeff Jacobsen attended the recent convention
of the Cult Awareness Network and reports that Scientology members
were there distributing anti-CAN literature, picketing the hotel,
and occasionally representing themselves as CAN members in dealing
with the hotel.  Jeff also reports that someone set off the hotel
fire alarm in the middle of a speech by ASU psychologist Robert
Cialdini, the author of the excellent book, _Influence_.  In
related news, CAN has been fighting off numerous lawsuits filed by
Scientologists.
          Jim Lippard's "Report on the 1992 CSICOP Conference" is being
reprinted by _BASIS_, the Bay Area Skeptics' newsletter, and (in
small pieces) by _The Skeptic_, the newsletter of the North Texas
Skeptics.  One comment prompted by this summary is that the Robert
Young explanation of the Kecksburg UFO (being the Lake Erie
meteor) is contradicted by satellite data, according to skeptic
James Oberg, who has speculated that it may have been a Russian
satellite reentry.  (Oberg emphasizes, however, that it is more
likely that nothing at all landed at Kecksburg.)  Young's _SI_
article (Spring 1991) has also been criticized for overlooking the
content of Stan Gordon's investigation of the Kecksburg incident,
while making indirect reference to it on p. 284 of his article.
(Gordon is founder of the Pennsylvania Association for the Study
of the Unexplained and Pennsylvania MUFON director.)
          National Capitol Area Skeptic and National Institute of
Standards and Technology research chemist Michael Epstein now has
a regular column in the _Journal of Scientific Exploration_.  The
column, titled "The Skeptical Perspective," has so far run for two
issues.  The first, in vol. 6, no. 3 (1992), reported on local
skeptical group activities and skeptical computer bulletin boards.
The second reported on appearances of the Virgin Mary and two
works by CSICOP Fellows which Epstein characterized as "rather
disturbing verbiage"--Henri Broch's _Skeptical Inquirer_ comment
on the liquefying blood of St. Januarius, which used unverified
anecdotal evidence to discredit a claim, and Susan Blackmore's
book _Beyond the Body_, which discusses the use of the drug
ketamine to produce OBEs without mentioning the rather serious
warnings which accompany that drug's description in the
_Physicians Desk Reference_.  A future column by Epstein will
include some comments on skeptical computer forums by Jim Lippard.
(The _JSE_ is available for $30/year for the first year, $40/year
for each year thereafter from _JSE_, ERL 306, Stanford University,
Stanford, CA 94305-4055.)
          Suitbert Ertel and Arno Mueller have analyzed the data from
the French skeptics' "Mars effect" replication study, and conclude
that it shows the correlation between the position of Mars at time
of birth and sports ability predicted by the late Michel
Gauquelin.  (See "Editorial Note Regarding the 'Mars Effect,'"
_AS_, May/June 1992, pp. 6-7.)  Claude Benski of the French CFEPP
and Jan Willem Nienhuys of the Dutch Stichting Skepsis are
expected to produce their own analysis of the data in the near
future; this analysis is expected to be negative.  (This
replication study was agreed to by CFEPP and Michel Gauquelin in
the French science magazine _Science et Vie_ way back in October
1982, and the data had been collected by June 1990.  It was
because of the long delay that Ertel and Mueller obtained the data
from CFEPP and did their own analysis.  The "Mars effect" has been
studied by the Belgian Comite Para (in the late 1960's), CSICOP
(in the late 1970's), the French CFEPP (1980's to present), and
the Dutch Stichting Skepsis (1990's).  Of these groups, the Comite
Para, CSICOP, and CFEPP did their own replications.  The Belgians
replicated the effect while CSICOP did not--but Ertel's reanalysis
of CSICOP's data, published in the Winter 1992 _Skeptical
Inquirer_, casts some doubt on that, and Ertel is continuing to
examine some puzzles in the CSICOP data.  The explanation offered
by the Comite Para for their replication was falsified by an
experiment proposed by CSICOP Fellow Marvin Zelen conducted by
Gauquelin, by other analysis by Gauquelin, by analysis by ex-
CSICOP Executive Council member Dennis Rawlins, and by unpublished
work by the Comite Para itself.  The Dutch skeptics have suggested
various explanations in terms of selection bias, but a full
explanation of the "Mars effect" anomaly is still awaited.)
          The February 1993 _Spy_ magazine (p. 19) reported on apparent
vital mythical numbers (see Max Singer, "The Vitality of Mythical
Numbers," _AS_, March/April 1992) from the Centers for Disease
Control.  _Spy_ pointed out that news reports from October 1, 1985
to present have given the number of HIV infections in the United
States as one million--despite claiming (_New York Times_, October
1, 1985) that "the total may be climbing by 1,000 to 2,000 per
day."  While this number was definitely mythical in 1985, it may
not in fact be mythical today.  _Spy_'s article may be misleading
because newspapers tend to report the highest number in a range of
possibilities and neglect to give any information about confidence
limits.  Further, the accuracy of projections has improved over
the last eight years--the initial projections were a bit high.
For instance, in 1986 the Public Health Service's AIDS experts
projected a cumulative total of 270,000 AIDS cases (as opposed to
HIV infections) by the end of 1991, with 179,000 deaths (according
to Randy Shilts, _And the Band Played On_, 1987, St. Martin's, p.
586).  The total number of AIDS cases in the United States
reported to the CDC by the end of 1991 was 199,516, with 133,233
deaths (_HIV/AIDS Surveillance_, January 1992).  The most recently
reported U.S. figures, for the end of 1992, are 244,939 cases of
AIDS and 171,890 deaths (_HIV/AIDS Surveillance_, January 1993).
          This will be the last issue of _AS_ edited by Jim Lippard.  A
new editor is still being sought.  Any volunteers?

Upcoming Meetings
The Phoenix Skeptics will meet at the Jerry's Restaurant on
Rural/Scottsdale Road between McKellips and the river bottom, with
lunch at 12:30 on the first Saturday of each month except where it
conflicts with a holiday.

Books of Note
(Books listed here may still be reviewed in depth in future issues
of _AS_.  Submissions of reviews of these books are, in fact,
encouraged.)
Richard Broughton, _Parapsychology: The Controversial Science_,
          1991, N.Y.: Ballantine, 408pp.  Probably the best popular
          overview of the evidence for psi to date.  Highly recommended
          for skeptics, but be warned that Broughton frequently
          overlooks skeptical criticisms of the evidence he presents
          (e.g., the Summer 1989 _Skeptical Inquirer_ criticism of
          Zhang Baosheng).  He also uncritically cites Ron McRae's
          _Mind Wars_, overlooking Philip Klass's Spring 1984 _SI_
          critique.  (McRae has since confessed to making up much of
          his research for columnist Jack Anderson and making up many
          of his stories, in the June 1992 issue of _Spy_ magazine--see
          "Articles of Note," _AS_, May/June 1992.)  Especially
          recommended:  the account of the late Charles Honorton's
          ganzfeld research on pp. 99-114 and the description of the
          debate between Honorton and CSICOP Executive Council member
          Ray Hyman on pp. 285-288.
John Crewdson, _By Silence Betrayed: Sexual Abuse of Children in
          America_, 1988, N.Y.: Harper & Row, 267pp.  A detailed but
          relatively unsensational account of the extent and nature of
          child sexual abuse in the United States.  Crewdson, a
          Pulitzer prizewinning journalist for the _Chicago Tribune_
          who broke the story of Robert Gallo's nondiscovery of the HIV
          virus, unfortunately fails to take seriously the possibility
          of suggested false memories, leading to his endorsement of
          even some rather unbelievable Satanic ritual abuse claims.
          On the other hand, he does present some evidence of child
          abuse in cases such as the McMartin Preschool case and the
          Jordan, Minnesota case which should be taken into
          consideration by those who think that the Satanism elements
          are sufficient to refute the molestation charges.
Marcel C. LaFollette, _Stealing Into Print: Fraud, Plagiarism, and
          Misconduct in Scientific Publishing_, 1992, Berkeley:
          University of California Press, 293pp.  Another new book on
          scientific fraud (see last _AS_'s review of Robert Bell's
          _Impure Science_); this one focuses on publication issues
          such as plagiarism, questions of authorship, the review
          process, etc.  One major flaw is that the LaFollette fails to
          take her own advice on page 105:  "unresolved issues, like
          varying interpretations of data, should be described
          explicitly in print."  She heavily criticizes the late Cyril
          Burt for fraud in his twin studies (on pp. 54, 57, 125-126,
          and 152, among other places), but fails to note recent
          reevaluations of the case which put Burt in a much more
          favorable light and his critics in a worse light (e.g.,
          Ronald Fletcher, _Science, Ideology, and the Media: The Cyril
          Burt Scandal_, 1991, New Brunswick: Transaction; Robert B.
          Joynson, _The Burt Affair_, 1989, London: Routledge).  The
          charge that Burt invented research assistants, for example
          (which LaFollette repeats on p. 152 and in a footnote on p.
          228), appears to be completely unfounded (see especially
          Fletcher's book).  LaFollette also brings up charges that
          _Archaeopteryx_ fossils are forgeries, without mentioning the
          nature of the charges (that feathers were stamped on the
          fossils; alleged by astronomer Fred Hoyle and mathematician
          Chandra Wickramasinghe in a photography journal).  While she
          does cite a rebuttal to Hoyle and Wickramasinghe's charges
          (A. Charig et al., "_Archaeopteryx_ Is Not a Forgery,"
          _Science_ 232(May 2, 1986):622-626), she doesn't mention the
          most recently discovered specimen, which also has feather
          impressions (P. Wellnhofer, "A New Specimen of
          _Archaeopteryx_," _Science_ 240(June 24, 1988):1790-1792).

Articles of Note
"Biospherians to have oxygen pumped in again," _Arizona Daily
          Star_ (Wednesday, January 13, 1993):1A.  Reports on the
          planned January 13 introduction of enough pure oxygen to
          bring the oxygen level down to the equivalent of a 6,400-foot
          elevation from its 13,400-foot elevation equivalent.
Sharon Begley with Mary Heger, "New Cracks in the Glass House: The
          Science Advisers Resign from Biosphere 2," _Newsweek_
          121(March 1, 1993):67.  The entire science advisory committee
          resigned, citing as one reason fear of damage to their
          reputations for being connected with the project.
Raymond Bonner, "Crying Wolf Over Elephants: How the International
          Wildlife Community Got Stampeded Into Banning Ivory," _The
          New York Times Magazine_ (February 7, 1993):16-19,30,52-53.
          Reports on some negative consequences of the ivory ban for
          elephants and misinformation promulgated by groups such as
          the the African Wildlife Foundation and the World Wildlife
          Fund.  While elephant populations have been declining in
          Kenya and Tanzania, the populations in many areas of those
          countries are still too great--resulting in elephants
          destroying the habitat of other animals such as impala,
          giraffes, bush babies, and monkeys.  In other countries such
          as Botswana, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, elephant populations
          have been increasing and are almost double what they were ten
          years ago.  (See also Julian Simon, "Truth Almost Extinct in
          Tales of Imperiled Species," _AS_, March/April 1992.)
          Letters of reply from Paul Schindler of the African Wildlife
          Foundation and Russell Train and Kathryn Fuller of the World
          Wildlife Fund appear in _The New York Times Magazine_
          (February 28, 1993):10,12.  A few more letters appear in the
          March 7, 1993 issue, p. 12.
Bruce Johnston, "Vatican Sets Evangelical Sights on Outer Space,"
          London _Daily Telegraph_ (October 28, 1992):15.  Discusses
          the Vatican's new telescope, a joint project with the
          University of Arizona on Mt. Graham near Tucson.  Fr. George
          Coyne, head of the Vatican Observatory (who splits his time
          between Rome and the University of Arizona), is quoted saying
          that if extraterrestrial life is found, "the Church would be
          obliged to address the question of whether extraterrestrials
          might be brought within the fold and baptised."  Coyne is
          also quoted in the article as saying that extraterrestrials
          would have to be asked "Have you ever experienced something
          similar to Adam and Eve, in other words original sin?" and
          "Do you people also know a Jesus who has redeemed you?"
Jenny Randles, "Keep Watching The Skies!" _Fortean Times_
          #65(October/November 1992):24-26.  Gives some good advice on
          identifying common UFOs--lenticular cloud formations,
          meteors, various photographic errors--with ten example
          photographs.
Bob Rickard, "Ghostwatch: Whatever Possessed Parkinson?" _Fortean
          Times_ #67(February/March 1993):38-42.  Looks at reactions to
          BBC TV's "Ghostwatch" media hoax, a 90-minute fictional
          investigation of "the most haunted house in Britain" which
          ended with the demonic possession of Michael Parkinson, a
          popular talk show host.  (The show also featured a phony live
          satellite link-up to "Dr. Sylvester" in New York, portraying
          a skeptic.)  The BBC received over 20,000 calls asking if the
          show was for real, and was apparently responsible for the
          suicide of 18-year-old Martin Denham three days later.  Among
          those commenting negatively on the BBC's hoax (p. 42) is
          CSICOP Executive Council member Susan Blackmore.
Andy Roberts, "Curiouser and Curiouser," _Fortean Times_
          #67(February/March 1993):53.  A report on the Linda
          Napolitano UFO case which, while it doesn't mention the
          Butler, Stefula, and Hansen report (see article in this
          _AS_), states that "I think this is going to be _the_ case on
          which abductions as alien events stand or fall.  If (and in
          my opinion when) it all falls down, the nonsense that aliens
          are abducting human beings can be laid to rest and we can
          sort out just what _is_ behind these experiences."
Carl Sagan, "What's Really Going On?" _Parade_ (March 7, 1993):4-
          7.  CSICOP Fellow Sagan discusses UFO abductions.
Kathleen Sharp, "The New Hidden Persuaders," _Self_ (March
          1993):174-175, 194-195.  Reports on studies of subliminal
          tapes for behavior modification--they don't work.  Quotes
          _Skeptical Inquirer_ (Spring 1992) author Anthony Pratkanis
          and CSICOP Executive Council member Susan Blackmore.
Brian Siano, "All the Babies You Can Eat," _The Humanist_ 53(2,
          March/April 1993):40-41.  _The Humanist_'s "Skeptical Eye"
          columnist responds to the unsubstantiated stories of ritual
          human sacrifice told by the pseudonymous "Elizabeth Rose" in
          a recent issue of _Ms._ magazine.
Paul Sieveking, "Fear and Loathing in France," _Fortean Times_
          #67(February/March 1993):48.  Describes a child murder
          hysteria (there is no evidence of any killings) in Calais,
          France from late last year, which nearly led to a lynching of
          a 19-year-old former drug addict.  It started with a city
          surveyor taking photographs outside a school in an area of
          Calais with an over 50% unemployment rate.  A child reported
          to his parents that a man was taking photographs outside the
          school, which led to rumors of children being found with
          their throats slit, being burned alive, etc.
Peter Smith, "Childhood Terrors" (letter), _Fortean Times_
          #67(February/March 1993):65.  Reports that a four-year-old
          son of a friend regained consciousness while undergoing a
          tonsillectomy and now has trouble sleeping--he will wake and
          claim that he is being chased by ghosts.  The letter writer
          postulates that this phenomenon--waking during surgery,
          surrounded by masked beings--may be responsible for the
          imagery reported by UFO abductees and ritual abuse survivors.
          _FT_ editor Bob Rickard replies that a biography of Bram
          Stoker by Daniel Farson reports that such a childhood
          experience inspired the writing of the novel _Dracula_.
"Real Incest and Real Survivors: Readers Respond," _New York Times
          Book Review_ (February 14, 1993):3,27.  Critical and
          supportive letters in response to Carol Tavris' "Beware the
          Incest-Survivor Machine" (January 3; listed in the last _AS_)
          from Judith Lewis Herman, Frances Lear, Ellen Bass and Laura
          Davis, E. Sue Blume, and others.  Carol Tavris replies on
          page 27.

The Arizona Skeptic is the official publication of the Phoenix
Skeptics and the Tucson Skeptical Society (TUSKS).  The Phoenix
Skeptics is a non-profit scientific and educational organization
with the following goals:  1. to subject claims of the paranormal,
occult, and fringe sciences to the test of science, logic, and
common sense; 2. to act as clearinghouse for factual and
scientific information about the paranormal; and 3. to promote
critical thinking and the scientific method.  The contents of The
Arizona Skeptic are copyright (c) 1993 by the Phoenix Skeptics
unless otherwise noted.  Material in this publication with Phoenix
Skeptics copyright may be reprinted provided that The Arizona
Skeptic and the author are provided copies of the publication in
which their work is reprinted.  Address all correspondence to the
Phoenix Skeptics, P.O. Box 62792, Phoenix, AZ 85082-2792 or
electronically to REVENANT on GEnie.  All manuscripts become the
property of the Phoenix Skeptics, which retains the right to edit
them.  Subscription rate is $12.50 per year.  Editor:  Jim
Lippard.  Production:  Ted Karren.