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- Date: Thu, 19 Mar 1992 15:00:07 EST
- From: "The Moderator Kenneth R. van Wyk" <krvw@CERT.SEI.CMU.EDU>
- Subject: VIRUS-L Digest V5 #70
- Comments: To: VIRUS-L@ibm1.cc.lehigh.edu
-
- VIRUS-L Digest Thursday, 19 Mar 1992 Volume 5 : Issue 70
-
- Today's Topics:
-
- VIRUS-L/comp.virus FAQ, 19 March 1992
-
- VIRUS-L is a moderated, digested mail forum for discussing computer
- virus issues; comp.virus is a non-digested Usenet counterpart.
- Discussions are not limited to any one hardware/software platform -
- diversity is welcomed. Contributions should be relevant, concise,
- polite, etc. (The complete set of posting guidelines is available by
- FTP on cert.sei.cmu.edu or upon request.) Please sign submissions
- with your real name. Send contributions to VIRUS-L@IBM1.CC.LEHIGH.EDU
- (that's equivalent to VIRUS-L at LEHIIBM1 for you BITNET folks).
- Information on accessing anti-virus, documentation, and back-issue
- archives is distributed periodically on the list. Administrative mail
- (comments, suggestions, and so forth) should be sent to me at:
- krvw@CERT.SEI.CMU.EDU.
-
- Ken van Wyk
-
- ----------------------------------------------------------------------
-
- Date: Thu, 19 Mar 92 14:07:05 -0500
- From: Kenneth R. van Wyk <krvw@cert.sei.cmu.edu>
- Subject: VIRUS-L/comp.virus FAQ, 19 March 1992
-
- Frequently Asked Questions on VIRUS-L/comp.virus
- Last Updated: 19 March 1992, 2:00 PM EST
-
- ====================
- = Preface Section: =
- ====================
-
- This document is intended to answer the most Frequently Asked
- Questions (FAQs) about computer viruses. As you can see, there are
- many of them! If you are desperately seeking help after recently
- discovering what appears to be a virus on your computer, consider
- skimming through sections A and B to learn the essential jargon, then
- concentrate on section C.
-
- If you may have found a new virus, or are not quite sure if some file
- or boot sector is infected, it is important to understand the protocol
- for raising such questions, e.g. to avoid asking questions that can be
- answered in this document, and to avoid sending "live" viruses except
- to someone who is responsible (and even then in a safe form!).
-
- Above all, remember the time to really worry about viruses is BEFORE
- your computer gets one!
-
- The FAQ is a dynamic document, which changes as people's questions
- change. Contributions are gratefully accepted -- please e-mail them
- to me at krvw@cert.sei.cmu.edu. The most recent copy of this FAQ will
- always be available on the VIRUS-L/comp.virus archives, including the
- anonymous FTP on cert.sei.cmu.edu (192.88.209.5) in the file:
- pub/virus-l/FAQ.virus-l
-
- Ken van Wyk, moderator VIRUS-L/comp.virus
-
- Primary contributors (in alphabetical order):
- Mark Aitchison <phys169@csc.canterbury.ac.nz>
- Vaughan Bell <vaughan@computing-department.poly-south-west.ac.uk>
- Matt Bishop <matt.bishop@dartmouth.edu>
- Vesselin Bontchev <bontchev@fbihh.informatik.uni-hamburg.de>
- Olivier M.J. Crepin-Leblond <umeeb37@vaxa.cc.ic.ac.uk>
- David Chess <chess@watson.ibm.com>
- John-David Childs <con_jdc@lewis.umt.edu>
- Nick FitzGerald <cctr132@csc.canterbury.ac.nz>
- Claude Bersano-Hayes <hayes@urvax.urich.edu>
- John Kida <jhk@washington.ssds.COM>
- A. Padgett Peterson <padgett%tccslr.dnet@mmc.com>
- Rob Slade <rslade@sfu.ca>
- Gene Spafford <spaf@cs.purdue.edu>
- Otto Stolz <rzotto@nyx.uni-konstanz.de>
-
- ====================
-
- Questions answered in this document
-
- Section A: Sources of Information and Anti-viral Software
- (Where can I find HELP..!)
-
- A1) What is VIRUS-L/comp.virus?
- A2) What is the difference between VIRUS-L and comp.virus?
- A3) How do I get onto VIRUS-L/comp.virus?
- A4) What are the guidelines for VIRUS-L?
- A5) How can I get back-issues of VIRUS-L?
- A6) What is VALERT-L?
- A7) What are the known viruses, their names, major symptoms and
- possible cures?
- A8) Where can I get the latest free/shareware anti-virus programs?
- A9) Where can I get more information on viruses, etc for my report?
-
-
- Section B: Definitions
- (What is ...?)
-
- B1) What are computer viruses (and why should I worry about them) ?
- B2) What is a trojan horse?
- B3) What are "stealth" viruses (and what is special about them) ?
- B4) What are "polymorphic" viruses (and what is special about them) ?
- B5) What are "armored" viruses?
- B6) What different types of PC viruses are there?
- B7) Miscellaneous Abbreviations and jargon
-
-
- Section C: Virus Detection
- (Is my computer infected? What do I do?)
-
- C1) What are the symptoms and indications of a virus infection?
- C2) What steps should be taken in diagnosing and identifying viruses?
- C3) What does the <insert name here> virus do?
- C4) What are "false positive" (Type I) and "false negative" (Type II)
- errors ?
- C5) Could an anti-viral program be infected?
- C6) Where can I get a virus scanner for my Unix system?
- C7) Why does an antiviral scanner reports an infection only sometimes?
- C8) Am I infected with the Stoned virus ?
- C9) I think I have detected a new virus; what do I do?
-
-
- Section D: Protection Plans
- (What should I do to prepare against viruses?)
-
- D1) What is the best protection policy for my computer?
- D2) Is it possible to protect a computer system with only software?
- D3) What can be done with hardware protection?
- D4) Will setting MSDOS files' attributes to READ ONLY protect them from
- viruses?
- D5) Will password protection systems protect my files from viruses?
- D6) Will the protection systems in DR-DOS work against viruses?
- D7) Will a write-protect tab on a floppy disk prevent a virus from
- infecting it?
- D8) What is the best way to remove the virus?
- D9) What other ways can I stop viruses before they enter my computer?
-
-
- Section E: Facts and Fibs about computer viruses
- (Can a virus...?)
-
- E1) Can "boot sector" viruses like Stoned infect non-bootable floppy disks?
- E2) Can a virus hide in a PC's battery-backed CMOS memory?
- E3) Can viruses infect data files?
- E4) Can viruses spread from one type of computer to another?
- E5) Can mainframe computers be susceptible to computer viruses?
- E6) Some people say that disinfecting viruses is a bad idea. Is that true?
- E7) Can I avoid viruses by avoiding shareware/free software/games?
- E8) Can MS-DOS Viruses run on Non-DOS machines (e.g., Mac, Amiga)?
-
-
- Section F: Miscellaneous Questions
- (I was just wondering...)
-
- F1) How many different types of viruses are there?
- F2) How do viruses spread so quickly?
- F3) What is the plural of "virus"? "Viruses" or "viri" or "virii" or...
- F4) When reporting a virus infection (and looking for assistance), what
- information should be included?
- F5) How often should we upgrade our anti-virus tools to minimize
- software and labor costs and maximize our protection?
-
-
- Section G: Specific Virus and Anti-viral software Questions...
-
- G1) I was infected by the Jerusalem virus and disinfected the infected
- files with my favorite anti-virus program. However, Wordperfect and
- some other programs still refuse to work. Why?
- G2) I was told that the Stoned virus displays the text "Your PC is now
- Stoned" at boot time. I have been infected by this virus several
- times, but have never seen the message. Why?
-
-
- ================================================================
- = Section A. Sources of Information and Anti-viral Software. =
- ================================================================
-
- A1) What is VIRUS-L/comp.virus?
-
- It is a discussion forum with a focus on computer virus issues. More
- specifically, VIRUS-L is an electronic mailing list and comp.virus is
- a USENET newsgroup. Both groups are moderated; all submissions are
- sent to the moderator for possible inclusion in the group. For more
- information, including a copy of the posting guidelines, see the file
- virus-l.README, available by anonymous FTP on cert.sei.cmu.edu in the
- pub/virus-l directory. (FTP is the Internet File Transfer Protocol,
- and is described in more detail in the monthly VIRUS-L/comp.virus
- archive postings - see below.)
-
- Note that there have been, from time to time, other USENET
- cross-postings of VIRUS-L, including the bit.listserv.virus-l. These
- groups are generally set up by individual site maintainers and are not
- as globally accessible as VIRUS-L and comp.virus.
-
-
- A2) What is the difference between VIRUS-L and comp.virus?
-
- As mentioned above, VIRUS-L is a mailing list and comp.virus is a
- newsgroup. In addition, VIRUS-L is distributed in digest format (with
- multiple e-mail postings in one large digest) and comp.virus is
- distributed as individual news postings. However, the content of the
- two groups is identical.
-
-
- A3) How do I get onto VIRUS-L/comp.virus?
-
- Send e-mail to LISTSERV@IBM1.CC.LEHIGH.EDU (or LISTSERV@LEHIIBM1 for
- you Bitnetters) stating: "SUB VIRUS-L your-name". To "subscribe" to
- comp.virus, simply use your favorite USENET news reader to read the
- group (assuming that your site receives USENET news).
-
-
- A4) What are the guidelines for VIRUS-L?
-
- The list of posting guidelines is available by anonymous FTP on
- cert.sei.cmu.edu. See the file pub/virus-l/virus-l.README for the
- most recent copy. In general, however, the moderator requires that
- discussions are polite and non-commercial. (Objective postings of
- product availability, product reviews, etc., is fine, but commercial
- advertising is not.) Also, requests for viruses (binary or
- disassembly) are not allowed. Technical discussions are encouraged,
- however, within reason.
-
-
- A5) How can I get back-issues of VIRUS-L?
-
- VIRUS-L/comp.virus includes a series of archive sites that carry all
- the back issues of VIRUS-L, as well as public anti-virus software (for
- various computers) and documents. The list of archive sites is
- updated monthly and distributed to the group; it includes a complete
- listing of the sites, what they carry, access instructions, as well as
- information on how to access FTP sites by e-mail. The anonymous FTP
- archive at cert.sei.cmu.edu carries all of the VIRUS-L back issues, as
- does the LISTSERV at LEHIIBM1 (on BITNET). See the file
- pub/virus-l/README for more information on the cert.sei.cmu.edu
- archive site.
-
-
- A6) What is VALERT-L?
-
- VALERT-L is a sister group to VIRUS-L, but is intended for virus
- alerts and warnings only -- NO DISCUSSIONS. There is no direct USENET
- counterpart to VALERT-L; it is a mailing list only. All VALERT-L
- postings are re-distributed to VIRUS-L/comp.virus later. This group
- is also moderated, but on a much higher priority than VIRUS-L. The
- group is monitored during business hours (East Coast, U.S.A.,
- GMT-5/GMT-4); high priority off-hour postings can be made by
- submitting to the group and then telephoning the CERT/CC hotline at +1
- 412 268 7090 -- leave instructions to call Ken van Wyk.
-
- Subscriptions to VALERT-L are handled identically to VIRUS-L --
- contact the LISTSERV.
-
-
- A7) What are the known viruses, their names, major symptoms and
- possible cures?
-
- There are several major sources of information about viruses.
- Probably the biggest one is Patricia Hoffman's hypertext VSUM. It
- describes only MS-DOS viruses, but almost all of them. Unfortunately,
- it tends to be too verbose and is regarded by many in the field as
- being inaccurate, so we do not advise people to rely on it. It can be
- downloaded from most major archive sites -except- SIMTEL20.
-
- The second one is the Computer Virus Catalog, published by the Virus
- Test Center in Hamburg. It contains a highly technical description of
- computer viruses for several platforms: MS-DOS, Mac, Amiga, Atari ST,
- Unix. Unfortunately, the MS-DOS section is somewhat incomplete. The
- CVC is available for anonymous ftp from ftp.informatik.uni-hamburg.de
- (IP=134.100.4.42), directory pub/virus/texts/catalog.
-
- A third source of information is the monthly Virus Bulletin. It
- regularly publishes very detailed technical information about viruses.
- Unfortunately it is -very- expensive (the subscription is about $350
- per year; US subscriptions can be obtained by calling 203-431-8720).
-
- A fourth good source of information on MS-DOS viruses is the "Computer
- Viruses" report of the National Computer Security Association. This
- is updated regularly, and is fairly complete. Copies cost
- approximately $75, and can be ordered by calling +1 202-244-7875.
-
- Another source of information is the documentation of Dr. Solomon's
- Anti-Virus ToolKit. It is more complete than the CVC list, just as
- accurate (if not more), but lists only MS-DOS viruses. However, it is
- not available electronically; you must buy his anti-virus package and
- the virus information is part of the documentation.
-
- Yet another source of information is "Virus News International",
- published by S & S International. And, while not entirely
- virus-related, "Computers & Security" provides information on many
- aspects of computer security, including viruses.
-
- The best source of information available on Apple Macintosh viruses is
- the on-line documentation provided with the freeware Disinfectant
- program by John Norstad. This is available at most Mac archive sites.
-
-
- A8) Where can I get the latest free/shareware anti-virus programs?
-
- The VIRUS-L/comp.virus archive sites carry publicly distributable
- anti-virus software products. See a recent listing of the archive
- sites (or ask the moderator for a recent listing) for more information
- on these sites.
-
- If you need an MS-DOS anti-virus program urgently, chances are that
- you can find it via anonymous FTP on WSMR-SIMTEL20.ARMY.MIL
- (192.88.110.20), in the directory PD1:<MSDOS.TROJAN-PRO>. (Note that
- the SIMTEL20 archives are also mirrored at many other anonymous FTP
- sites, including oak.oakland.edu (141.210.10.117) and
- wuarchive.wustl.edu (128.252.135.4).
-
- Likewise, Macintosh anti-virus programs can be found on SIMTEL20 in
- the PD3:<MACINTOSH.VIRUS> directory.
-
-
- A9) Where can I get more information on viruses, etc for my report?
-
- There are three excellent books on computer viruses available that
- should cover most of the introductory and technical questions you
- might have:
-
- * "Computers Under Attack: Intruders, Worms and Viruses," edited by
- Peter J. Denning, ACM Press/Addison-Wesley, 1990. This is a book of
- collected readings that discuss computer viruses, computer worms,
- break-ins, legal and social aspects, and many other items related to
- computer security and malicious software. A very solid, readable
- collection that doesn't require a highly-technical background.
-
- * "Rogue Programs: Viruses, Worms and Trojan Horses," edited by
- Lance J. Hoffman, Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1990. This is a book of
- collected readings describing in detail how viruses work, where they
- come from, what they do, etc. It also has material on worms, trojan
- horse programs, and other malicious software programs. This book
- focuses more on mechanism and relatively less on social aspects than
- does the Denning book; however, there is an excellent piece by Anne
- Branscomb that covers the legal aspects.
-
- * "A Pathology of Computer Viruses," by David Ferbrache,
- Springer-Verlag, 1992. This is a recent, in-depth book on the
- history, operation, and effects of computer viruses. It is one of the
- most complete books on the subject, with an extensive history section,
- a section on Macintosh viruses, networks worms, and Unix viruses (if
- they were to exist).
-
- A somewhat dated, but still useful, high-level description of viruses,
- suitable for a complete novice without extensive computer background
- is in "Computer Viruses: Dealing with Electronic Vandalism and
- Programmed Threats," by Eugene H. Spafford, Kathleen A. Heaphy, and
- David J. Ferbrache, ADAPSO (Arlington VA), 1989. ADAPSO is a
- computer industry service organization, and not a publisher, so the
- book cannot be found in bookstores; copies can be obtained directly
- from ADAPSO @ +1 703-522-5055). There is a discount for ADAPSO
- members, educators, and law enforcement personnel. Many people have
- indicated they find this a very understandable reference; portions of
- it have been reprinted many other places, including Denning &
- Hoffman's books (above).
-
-
- ======================================================
- = Section B. Definitions and General Information =
- ======================================================
-
- B1) What are computer viruses (and why should I worry about them) ?
-
- The term "computer virus" tends to be used to cover many sorts of computer
- programs that hide their true (malicious) function and try to spread onto as
- many computers as possible. While the definitions of the various types of
- computer virus (and other malicious software) in this document are certainly
- useful, it can still be worth keeping something a "fuzzy" definition of
- "computer virus", since pre-conceived notions as to what a virus is, and what
- it exactly does, can lead to a false sense of security.
-
- These software "pranks" are very serious; they are spreading faster than they
- are being stopped, and even the least harmful of viruses can have serious
- consequences. For example, a virus that stops your computer and displays a
- message, in the context of a hospital life-support computer, could be fatal.
- Even those who created the viruses could not stop them if they wanted to; it
- requires a concerted effort from computer users to be "virus-aware", rather
- than the ignorance and ambivalence that have allowed them to grow to such a
- problem.
-
-
- B2) What is a trojan horse?
-
- It is a program that does something the programmer intended, but that
- the user would not approve of if he knew about it. Thus, a virus is a
- particular case of a Trojan horse, which is able to spread to other
- programs (i.e., it turns them into trojans, too).
-
-
- B3) What are "stealth" viruses (and what is special about them) ?
-
- Every virus makes changes to executable code; hence every virus can be
- detected by checking all executable code in a system for discrepancies
- between presumed and actual contents. A stealth virus camouflages the
- changes it has made from detection by other programs, usually by
- monitoring the system functions used by programs to read files or
- physical blocks from storage media, and forging the results of such
- system functions suitably. However, in order to practise "stealth,"
- the virus must be resident in memory. In every "stealth" virus seen
- so far, this residence is detectable, often easily.
-
- Example: One of the oldest MS-DOS Viruses, Brain, a boot sector
- infector, monitors physical disk-I/O and re-directs any attempt to
- read a Brain-infected boot sector to the disk area where the original
- boot sector is stored.
-
- Countermeasures: To gain unadulterated access to storage media, a
- "clean" system is needed so that no virus is present to interfere with
- its operation. Thus, the system should be built from a trusted,
- clean master copy before any virus-checking is attempted; this is "The
- Golden Rule of the Trade." With MS-DOS, (1) boot from original DOS
- diskettes (i.e. DOS Startup/Program diskettes from a major vendor that
- have been write-protected since their creation), (2) use only tools
- from original diskettes until virus-checking has completed.
-
-
- B4) What are polymorphic viruses (and what is special about them) ?
-
- In order to eradicate a virus infection, all instances of this
- particular virus in various places (program files, boot records, etc.)
- have to be found and identified. A program to accomplish this task is
- called a Virus Scanner.
-
- A polymorphic virus tries to escape virus scanners by producing varied
- (yet fully operational) copies of itself.
-
- One method to evade signature-driven virus scanners is self-encryption
- with a variable key; however these viruses (e.g. Cascade) are not
- termed "polymorphic," as their decryption code is always the same and
- thus can be used as a virus signature even by the simplest, signature-
- driven virus scanners.
-
- One method for a polymorphic virus is choosing amongst a variety of
- different encryption schemes requiring different decryption routines:
- only one of these routines would be plainly visible in any instance of
- the virus (e.g. the Whale virus). A signature-driven virus scanner
- would have to exploit several signatures (one for each possible
- encryption method) to reliably identify a virus of this kind.
-
- A more sophisticated polymorphic virus (e.g. V2P6) will vary the
- sequence of instructions in its copies, by interspersing it with
- "noise" instructions (e.g. a No Operation instruction, or an
- instruction to load a currently unused register with an arbitrary
- value), by interchanging mutually independent instructions, or even by
- using various instruction sequences with identical net effects (e.g.
- Subtract A from A, and Move 0 to A). A simple-minded, signature-based
- virus scanner would not be able to reliably identify this sort of
- virus; rather, a sophisticated "scanning engine" has to be constructed
- after thorough research into the particular virus.
-
- The advent of polymorphic viruses has rendered virus-scanning an ever
- more difficult and expensive endeavor; adding more and more search
- strings to simple scanners will not adequately deal with these
- viruses.
-
-
- B5) What are "armored" viruses?
-
- Armored viruses use special tricks to make the tracing, disassembling
- and understanding of their code more difficult. A good example is the
- Whale virus.
-
-
- B6) What different types of PC viruses are there?
-
- Generally, there are two main classes of viruses: the first describes
- file infectors which attach themselves to individual programs that
- are easily copied/transferred between computers. These attack .COM
- and .EXE programs though some will infect other classes of program
- capable of execution (e.g. .DB* and .WK* files). Still others can
- infect any program for which execution is requested such as .SYS,
- .OVL, .PRG, & .MNU programs. Generally though, all file infector
- viruses will infect either .COM or .EXE programs or both. Common
- examples are Jerusalem, Sunday, Vienna, 4096, or Whale.
-
- The second category is System Infectors: those viruses which infect
- executable code found in specific locations either on a disk or in
- memory. On DOS systems, for example, most of these viruses infect the
- Master Boot Record on fixed disks, the DOS Boot Record on both fixed
- and floppy disks, or the system files (IO.SYS or MSDOS.SYS). Examples
- include Brain, Stoned, Empire, Azusa, & Michelangelo.
-
- Finally, a few viruses are able to infect both (the Tequila
- virus is one example).
-
-
- B7) Miscellaneous Jargon and Abbreviations...
-
- BSI = Boot Sector Infector: the most common PC viruses belong to this
- family, which take over control when the computer attempts to boot.
-
- DOS = Diskette Operating System: We use DOS to mean MS-DOS, PC-DOS, or
- DR-DOS even though there are operating systems called DOS on unrelated
- hardware.
-
- MBR = Master Boot Record: the first sector on a PC hard disk, that
- usually contains the partition table (but may simply contain a DOS
- boot sector).
-
- RAM = Random Access Memory: the place programs are loaded into to
- execute; the significance for viruses is that, to be active, they must
- grab some of this for themselves. However, some virus scanners may
- declare a virus is active simply when it is found in RAM - even though
- it might be in a disk's buffer area of RAM rather than truly being
- executed.
-
- TOM = Top Of Memory: (this is particularly significant in PC's) The
- amount of RAM is recorded in the computer; viruses or other software)
- may try to tell the software that follows there is less memory than
- there really is, so the virus can hide there.
-
- TSR = Terminate but Stay Resident: these are PC programs that stay in
- memory while you continue to use the computer for other programs; they
- include pop-up utilities, network software, and (unfortunately) some
- viruses. These can often be seen using utilities such as MEM and PMAP
- and INFOPLUS.
-
-
- =================================
- = Section C. Virus Detection =
- =================================
-
- C1) What are the symptoms and indications of a virus infection?
-
- There are all kinds of symptoms which virus authors have written into
- their programs, such as messages, music and graphical displays. These
- "payloads" may include deleting files, or other destruction. Viruses
- try to do a lot of spreading before they deliver their payload, but
- there can be symptoms of virus infection before this, and it is
- important to use this opportunity to spot and eradicate the virus
- before any destruction.
-
- The main indications are changes to file sizes and contents, changing
- of interrupt vectors (on a PC), and the unaccounted use of RAM (but,
- of course, viruses try to hid such effects). On a PC it can be very
- worthwhile looking at the amount of RAM known to the CHKDSK program,
- which should be 655360 bytes (or at least a multiple of 16384 bytes);
- and boot sector infections are often easily identified to the trained
- eye (or heuristic checkers such as CHECKOUT). These symptoms, along
- with longer disk activity and strange behavior from the hardware, can
- also be caused by genuine software, or by harmless "prank" programs,
- or by hardware faults, unfortunately.
-
- The only foolproof way to determine that a virus is present is for an
- expert to analyze the assembly code contained in all programs and
- system areas, but this is usually impracticable. Virus scanners go
- some way towards that by looking in that code for known viruses; some
- will even try to use artificial intelligence means to spot viral
- activity, but this is usually only reliable for boot sectors. It is
- wise to arm yourself with the latest anti-viral software, but also to
- pay close attention to your system... look particularly for any change
- in the memory map or configuration as soon as you start the computer.
- For users of MS-DOS 5.0, the MEM program with the /C switch is very
- handy for this. If you have DRDOS, use MEM with the /A switch; if you
- have an earlier version use CHKDSK or the commonly-available PMAP or
- MAPMEM utilities. You don't have to know what all the numbers mean,
- only that they change.
-
-
- C2) What steps should be taken in diagnosing and identifying viruses?
-
- Most of the time, a virus scanner program will take care of that for
- you. Running it often and on new disks will help identify problems
- early! If you run into one that the scanner doesn't identify, or
- doesn't properly clean up for you, first verify that the version that
- you are using is the most recent, and then get in touch with one of
- the reputable antivirus researchers and send a copy of the infected
- file to them, after they ask you to send it. See also question C9.
-
-
- C3) What does the <insert name here> virus do?
-
- If an anti-virus program has detected a virus on your computer, don't
- rush to post a question to this list asking what it does. First, it
- might be a false positive alert (especially if the virus is found only
- in one file), and second, some viruses are extremely common, so the
- question "What does the Stoned virus do?" or "What does the Jerusalem
- virus do?" is asked here repeatedly. While this list is monitored by
- several anti-virus experts, they get tired of perpetually answering
- the same questions over and over again. In any case, if you really
- *need* to know what a particular virus does (as opposed to knowing
- enough to get rid of it), you will need a longer treatise than could
- reasonably be given to you.
-
- For example, the Stoned virus replaces the disk's boot sector with its
- own, relocating the original to a sector on the disk that may (or may
- not) occur in an unused portion of the root directory of a DOS
- diskette; when active, it sits in an area a few kilobytes below the
- top of memory. All this description could apply to a number of common
- viruses; but the important points of where the original boot sector
- goes - and what effect that has on networking software, non-DOS
- partitions, and so on are all major questions in themselves.
-
- Therefore, it is better if you first try to answer your question
- yourself. There are several sources of information about the known
- computer viruses, so please consult one of them before requesting
- information publicly. Chances are that your virus is rather well known
- and that it is already described in detail in at least one of these
- sources. (See the answers to questions A7 and A9, for instance.)
-
-
- C4) What are "false positive" (Type I) and "false negative"
- (Type II) errors?
-
- Most virus scanners do not identify viruses exactly. What they do is
- to use a characteristic sequence of bytes from the virus code, called
- "scan string" and to scan the files for this string. While the authors
- of most scanners do their best to select good scan strings, it is
- possible that the same string happens to be present in a benign
- program. If a non-virus program is flagged as a virus by the scanner,
- this is called a "false positive" error.
-
- On the other hand, a virus scanner searches only for known viruses.
- Most probably it will miss a completely new or a heavily modified
- virus. If the scanner does not detect a program, which in fact
- contains a virus, this is called a "false negative" error.
-
- Obviously the false negative errors are more dangerous than the false
- positive ones. Therefore, producers of virus scanners usually attempt
- to minimize both kinds of errors, but they are more concerned with the
- false negative ones.
-
- One other serious problem could occur: A "positive" that is
- misdiagnosed. E.g., a scanner that detects the Empire virus in a boot
- record but reports it as the Stoned. In the case of a boot sector
- infector, use of a Stoned specific "cure" to recover from the Empire
- could result in an unreadable disk or loss of extended partitions.
- Similarly, sometimes "generic" recovery can result in unusable files.
- "Second generation" products store information about "clean" programs
- to allow verification of recovery processes.
-
-
- C5) Could an anti-viral program itself be infected?
-
- Yes, so it is important to obtain this software from good sources, and
- to only trust results after running scanners from a "clean" system.
- But there are situations where one scanner appears to be infected when
- it isn't.
-
- Most antiviral programs try very hard to identify only viral
- infections, but sometimes they give false alarms. If two different
- antiviral programs are both of the "scanner" type, they will contain
- "signature strings" to identify viral infections. If the strings are
- not "encrypted", then they will be identified as a virus by another
- scanner type program. Also, if the scanner does not remove the
- strings from memory after they are run, then another scanner may
- detect the virus string "in memory".
-
- Note that a recent example of this type of false alarm regards F-PROT
- "detecting" viruses in two Central Point Anti-Virus (CPAV) files.
-
- Some "change detection" type antiviral programs add a bit of code or
- data to a program when "protecting" it. This might be detected by
- another "change detector" as a change to a program, and therefore
- suspicious.
-
- It is good practice to use more than one antiviral program. Do be
- aware, however, that antiviral programs, by their nature, may confuse
- each other.
-
-
- C6) Where can I get a virus scanner for my Unix system?
-
- Basically, you shouldn't bother scanning for Unix viruses at this
- point in time. Although it is possible to write Unix-based viruses,
- we have yet to see any instance of a non-experimental virus in that
- environment. Someone with sufficient knowledge and access to write an
- effective virus would be more likely to conduct other activities than
- virus-writing. Furthermore, the typical form of software sharing in
- an Unix environment would not support virus spread.
-
- This answer is not meant to imply that viruses are impossible, or that
- there aren't security problems in a typical Unix environment -- there
- are. However, true viruses are highly unlikely and should be found
- quite readily with normal Unix file integrity procedures. For more
- information on Unix security, see the book "Practical Unix Security"
- by Garfinkel and Spafford, O'Reilly & Associates, 1991 (it can be
- ordered via e-mail from nuts@ora.com).
-
- However, there are special cases for which scanning Unix systems for
- non-Unix viruses does make sense. For example, a Unix system which is
- acting as a file server (e.g., PC-NFS) for PC systems is quite capable
- of containing PC file infecting viruses that are a danger to PC clients.
- Note that, in this example, the UNIX system would be scanned for PC
- viruses, not UNIX viruses.
-
- Another example is in the case of a 386/486 PC system running Unix,
- since this system is still vulnerable to infection by BIOS infectors
- such as Stoned and Michelangelo, which are operating system
- independent. (Note that an infection on such a Unix PC system would
- probably result in disabling the Unix disk partition(s) from booting.)
-
- In addition, a file integrity checker (to detect unauthorized changes
- in executable files) on Unix systems is a very good idea. (One free
- program which can do this test, as well as other tests, is the COPS
- package, available by anonymous FTP on cert.sei.cmu.edu.) Unauthorized
- file changes on Unix systems are very common, although they usually
- are not due to virus activity.
-
-
- C7) Why does my anti-viral scanner report an infection only sometimes?
-
- There are circumstances where part of a virus exists in RAM without
- being active; if your scanner reports a virus in memory only sometimes
- it could be due to the operating system buffering disk reads, keeping
- disk contents that include a virus in memory (harmlessly) - in which
- case it should also find it on disk, or after running another scanner
- there may be scan strings left (again harmlessly) in memory.
-
-
- C8) Is my disk infected with the Stoned virus ?
-
- Of course the answer to this, and many similar questions, is to obtain
- a good virus detector. However, the Stoned virus is one that occurs
- often and you may spend a lot of time going through disks looking for
- it. Also, there are several versions of this virus (and similar ones)
- that may just possibly escape detection by conventional scanners.
-
- Since it is so easy to detect "by hand", it is worth using the CHKDSK
- method (mentioned in C2) to make sure it isn't in memory, then looking
- at the first 11 bytes in diskettes using your favorite hex disk
- editor; what you should look for is the third byte should be "90" hex
- for a good diskette, and "00" for an infected diskette (anything else
- may or may not imply an infection). There are even better methods of
- determining the presence of such a virus, e.g. contained in the
- freeware CHECKOUT program and the shareware SCANBOOT program, but this
- is good enough for a quick check. The advantage of the system is that
- it can be a lot faster than running some scanners over the disk, if
- there are many to check. There are disadvantages - the main one being
- that a few "good" diskettes, such as "immunized" ones, may show up as
- having a virus - in which case you refer them to a better scan before
- disinfecting them.
-
- A more time-efficient method is to load the SCANBOOT TSR and let it
- check diskettes automatically as you access them in the normal way
- (e.g. when listing their files).
-
-
- C9) I think I have detected a new virus; what do I do?
-
- Whenever there is doubt over a virus, you should obtain the latest
- versions of several (not just one) major virus scanner. If you use
- F-PROT, which has several methods of scanning, try each method in
- turn. The "heuristic" methods in one of these scan methods, and in
- several other programs (CHECKOUT and SCANBOOT, for example), can
- report a disk or file as being possibly infected, when it is, in fact
- perfectly safe (odd, perhaps, but not infected). If no
- string-matching scan finds a virus, but a heuristic program does (or
- there are other reasons to suspect the file, e.g. change in size of
- files) then it is possible that you have found a new virus, although
- the chances are probably greater that it is an odd-but-okay disk or
- file. Start by looking in recent VIRUS-L postings about "known" false
- positives, then contact the author of the anti-virus software that
- reports it as virus-like. Read the section explaining what to do if
- you think you have found a new virus, and consider using the BOOTID or
- CHECKOUT programs to calculate the "hashcode" of the diskette, in the
- case of boot sector infectors.
-
-
- ===================================
- = Section D. Protection plans =
- ===================================
-
- D1) What is the best protection policy for my computer?
-
- There is no "best" anti-virus program. In fact, there is no program
- that can magically protect you against all viruses. But you can design
- a whole anti-virus protection strategy and build multiple layers of
- defense. There are three main kinds of anti-virus detectors, plus
- several other means of protection (such as hardware write-protect
- methods).
-
- 1) Monitoring programs; these look for viral activity when it happens,
- such as attempts to write to another executable, reformat the disk,
- etc, etc. Examples: FluShot+ (PC), and GateKeeper (Macintosh).
-
- 2) Scanners. Most look for known virus strings (byte sequences known
- to occur in certain viruses, but hopefully not in good software), but
- some use AI or heuristic techniques to recognize viral code. They may
- also include virus removers. Examples: Dr Solomon's Anti-Virus Toolkit,
- FRISK's F-Prot, McAfee's VIRUSCAN (all PC), Disinfectant (Macintosh).
-
- 3) Integrity (change-of-state) checkers. These take a "snapshot" of code,
- and periodically compare code with the original and (what is supposed
- to be) uninfected snapshot. Examples: V-Analyst (commercial, BRM
- Technologies, Israel) and Integrity Master (shareware), both for the PC.
-
- Plus, there are mixtures and variations on these approaches, such as
- resident scanners (e.g. VShield, VIRSTOP) and heuristic search
- versions (e.g. SCANBOOT). Of course, only a few examples of each type
- were given. All of them can find their place in the protection
- against the computer viruses, but you should appreciate the
- limitations of each method, along with system-supplied security
- measures that may or may not be helpful in defeating viruses. Ideally,
- you would arrange a combination of methods that cover the loopholes
- between them.
-
- A typical PC installation might include a protection system on the
- hard disk's MBR to protect against viruses at load time (ideally this
- would be hardware or in BIOS, but software methods such as DiskSecure
- and PanSoft's Immunise are pretty good). This would be followed by
- resident virus detectors loaded as part of the machine's startup
- (config.sys or autoexec.bat), such as FluShot+ and/or VirStop together
- with ScanBoot. A scanner such as F-Prot or McAfee's scan should be
- put into autoexec.bat to look for viruses as you start up, but this
- may be a problem if you have a large disk to check (or don't reboot
- often enough). Most importantly, new files should be scanned as they
- arrive on the system. If your system has DR-DOS installed, you should
- use the password command to write-protect all system executables and
- utilities. If you have Stacker or SuperStore, you can get some
- improved security from these compressed drives, but also a risk that
- those viruses stupid enough to directly write to the disk could do
- much more damage than normal; using a software write-protect system
- (such as provided with Disk Manager or Norton Utilities) may help, but
- the best solution (if possible) is to put all executables on a disk of
- their own, protected by a hardware read-only system that sounds an
- alarm if a write is attempted.
-
- If you do use a resident BSI detector or a scan-while-you-copy
- detector, it is important to trace back any infected diskette to its
- source; the reason why viruses survive so well is that usually you
- cannot do this, because the infection is found long after the
- infecting diskette has been forgotten with most people's lax scanning
- policies.
-
- Organizations should devise and implement a careful policy, that may
- include a system of vetting new software brought into the building and
- free virus detectors for home machines of employees/students/etc who
- take work home with them.
-
-
- D2) Is it possible to protect a computer system with only software?
-
- Not perfectly, however, software defenses can significantly reduce
- your risk of being affected by viruses WHEN APPLIED APPROPRIATELY.
- All virus defense systems are tools - each with their own capabilities
- and limitations. Learn how your system works and be sure to work
- within its limitations.
-
- From a software standpoint, a very high level of protection/detection
- can be achieved with only software, using a layered approach.
-
- 1) ROM Bios - password (access control) and selection of boot
- disk. (some may consider this hardware)
-
- 2) Boot sectors - integrity management and change detection
-
- 3) OS programs - integrity management of existing programs,
- scanning of unknown programs. Requirement of authentication
- values for any new or transmitted software.
-
- 4) Locks that prevent writing to a fixed or floppy disk.
-
- As each layer is added, invasion without detection becomes more
- difficult. However complete protection against any possible attack
- cannot be provided without dedicating the computer to pre-existing or
- unique tasks. The international standardization of the world on the
- IBM PC architecture is both its greatest asset and its greatest
- vulnerability.
-
-
- D3) What can be done with hardware protection?
-
- Hardware protection can accomplish various things, including: write
- protection for hard disk drives, memory protection, monitoring and
- trapping unauthorized system calls, etc. Again, no tool is foolproof.
-
- The popular idea of write-protection (see D6) may stop viruses
- spreading to the disk that is protected, but doesn't, in itself,
- prevent a virus from running.
-
-
- D4) Will setting DOS file attributes to READ ONLY protect them from viruses?
-
- No. While the Read Only attribute will protect your files from a few
- viruses, most simply override it, and infect normally. So, while
- setting executable files to Read Only is not a bad idea, it is
- certainly not a thorough protection against viruses!
-
-
- D5) Will password/access control systems protect my files from viruses?
-
- Some will, some won't. Many file access control systems for PCs will
- do a great deal to guard against existing PC viruses. A good
- operating system (not wishing to start a "Unix vs MSDOS" war!)
- combined with use of memory management hardware is best. But they are
- not foolproof.
-
- The important thing is that they be properly installed and
- administered. (There's a recurring theme here...)
-
-
- D6) Will the protection systems in DR-DOS 5 or 6 work against viruses ?
-
- Partially. Neither the password file/directory protection available
- from DRDOS version 5 onwards, nor the secure disk partitions
- introduced in DRDOS 6 are intended to combat viruses, but they do to
- some extent. If you have DRDOS, it is very wise to password-protect
- your files (to stop accidental damage too), but don't depend on it as
- the only means of defense.
-
- The use of the password command (e.g. PASSWORD/W:MINE *.EXE *.COM)
- will stop more viruses than the plain DOS attribute facility, but that
- isn't saying much! The combination of the password system plus a disk
- compression system may be more secure (because to bypass the password
- system they must access the disk directly, but under SuperStore or
- Stacker the physical disk is meaningless to the virus). There may be
- some viruses which, rather than invisibly infecting files on
- compressed disks in fact very visibly corrupt the disk.
-
- The "secure disk partitions" system introduced with DRDOS 6 may be of
- some help against a few viruses that look for DOS partitions on a
- disk. The main use is in stopping people fiddling with (and
- infecting) your hard disk while you are away.
-
-
- D7) Will a write-protect tab on a floppy disk stop viruses ?
-
- In general, yes. The write-protection on IBM PC (and compatible) and
- Macintosh floppy disk drives is implemented in hardware, not software,
- so viruses cannot infect a diskette with a properly-functioning
- write-protection mechanism is functioning properly.
-
- But remember:
-
- (a) A computer may have a faulty write-protect system (this happens!)
- - you can test it by trying to copy a file to the diskette.
- (b) Someone may have removed the tab for a while, allowing a virus on.
- (c) The files may have been infected before the disk was protected.
- Even some diskettes "straight from the factory" have been known to be
- infected in the production processes.
-
- So, it is worthwhile to scan even write-protected disks for viruses.
-
-
- D8) What is the best way to remove the virus so that downtime is short
- and losses are low?
-
- Do the minimum that you must to restore the system to a normal state,
- starting with booting the system from a clean diskette. It is very
- unlikely you need to "low level reformat" the hard disk!
-
- If a disinfecting program will remove the virus, do that. If not, and
- the virus is a program (or file) infector, remove the infected file
- and reinstall the software from the original (write-protected) disks.
- If the virus is a boot sector infector, you can continue using the
- computer with relative safety if you boot it from a clean system
- diskette, but it is wise to go through all your diskettes removing
- infection, since sooner or later you may be careless and leave a
- diskette in the machine when it reboots. Boot sector infectors on PC's
- can be cured by a two-step approach of replacing the MBR then using
- the SYS command.
-
-
- =======================================================
- = Section E. Facts and Fibs about computer viruses =
- =======================================================
-
- E1) Can "boot sector" viruses like Stoned infect non-bootable floppy disks?
-
- Any diskette that has been properly formatted contains an executable
- program in the boot sector. If the diskette is not "bootable," all
- that boot sector does is print a message like "Non-system disk or disk
- error; replace and strike any key when ready" but it's still
- executable and still vulnerable to infection. If you accidentally
- turn your machine on with a "non-bootable" diskette in the drive, and
- see that message, it means that any boot virus that may have been on
- that diskette *has* run, and has had the chance to infect your hard
- drive, or whatever. So when thinking about viruses, the word
- "bootable" (or "non-bootable") is really misleading. All formatted
- diskettes are capable of carrying a virus.
-
-
- E2) Can a virus hide in a PC's battery-backed CMOS memory?
-
- No. The CMOS RAM in which system information is stored and backed up
- by batteries is ported, not addressable. That is, in order to get
- anything out, you use I/O commands. So anything stored there is not
- directly sitting in memory. Nothing in a normal machine loads the
- data from there and executes it, so a virus that "hid" in the CMOS RAM
- would still have to infect an executable object of some kind, in order
- to load and execute whatever it had written to CMOS. A malicious
- virus can of course *alter* values in the CMOS as part of its payload,
- but it can't spread through, or "hide" itself in, the CMOS.
-
-
- E3) Can a virus infect data files?
-
- Several viruses (Frodo, Cinderella) contain bugs, which make them
- infect non-executable programs. However, in order to spread, the virus
- must be executed. Therefore, the "infected" non-executable files
- cannot be sources of infection.
-
- However, note that it is not always possible to make a distinct
- difference between executable and non-executable files. One man's code
- is another man's data and vice versa. Several files that are not
- directly executable contain code or data, which is at some time
- executed or interpreted.
-
- Some examples from the IBM PC world are .OBJ files, libraries, device
- drivers, source files for any compiler or interpreter, macro files
- for some packages like MS Word and Lotus 1-2-3, and many others.
- Currently there are viruses that infect boot sectors, master boot
- sectors, COM files, EXE files, BAT files, and device drivers, although
- any of the objects mentioned above can theoretically be used as an
- infection carrier. PostScript files can also be used to carry a virus,
- although no currently known virus does that.
-
-
- E4) Can viruses spread from one type of computer to another? (e.g.,
- Amiga to PC), even if they can both read the same format disks,
- like the Atari ST reading MS-DOS format disks.
-
- The simple answer is that no currently known viruses can do that.
- Although the disk formats may be the same, the different machines
- interpret the code differently. For example, the Stoned virus cannot
- infect an ST as the ST cannot execute the virus code in the
- bootsector. The Stoned virus contains instructions for the 80x86
- family of CPU's that the 680x0-family CPU (Atari ST) can't understand
- or execute.
-
- The more general answer is that such viruses are possible, but
- unlikely. Such a virus would be quite a bit larger than current
- viruses and might well be easier to find. Additionally, the low
- incidence of cross-machine sharing of software means that any such
- virus would be unlikely to spread -- it would be a poor environment
- for virus growth.
-
-
- E5) Can mainframe computers be susceptible to computer viruses?
-
- Yes. Numerous experiments have shown that computer viruses spread
- very quickly and effectively on mainframe systems. However, to our
- knowledge, no non-research computer virus has been seen on mainframe
- systems. (The Internet worm of November 1988 was not a computer virus
- by most definitions, although it definitely had some virus-like
- characteristics.)
-
- Computer viruses are actually a special case of something else called
- "malicious logic", and other forms of malicious logic -- notably
- Trojan horses -- are far quicker, more effective, and harder to detect
- than computer viruses. Hence those tend to be used to attack
- mainframe systems, rather than computer viruses.
-
- For further information on malicious programs on multi-user systems,
- see Matt Bishop's paper, "An Overview of Malicious Logic in a Research
- Environment". The paper is available via anonymous FTP on
- Dartmouth.edu (129.170.16.4) as "pub/security/mallogic.ps".
-
-
- E6) Some people say that disinfecting viruses is a bad idea. Is that true?
-
- Disinfecting a virus is completely "safe" only if the disinfecting
- process restores the non-infected state of the object completely. That
- is, not only the virus must be removed from the file, but the original
- length of the file must be restored exactly, as well as its time and
- date of last modification, all fields in the header, etc. Sometimes,
- it is necessary to to be sure that the file is placed on the same
- clusters of the disk that it occupied prior to infection. If this is
- not done, then a program, which uses some kind of self-checking or
- copy protection may stop functioning properly, if at all.
-
- None of the currently available disinfecting programs do all this. For
- instance, because of the bugs that exist in many viruses, some of the
- information of the original file is destroyed and cannot be recovered.
- Other times, it is even impossible to detect that this information has
- been destroyed and to warn the user. Furthermore, some viruses
- corrupt information very slightly and in a random way (Nomenklatura,
- Phoenix), so that it is even not possible to tell which files have
- been corrupted.
-
- Therefore, it is always better to determine the infected objects, and
- to destroy them by replacing them with clean backups. You should try
- to disinfect files only if they contain some valuable data that
- cannot be restored from backups or compiled from their original
- source.
-
-
- E7) Can I avoid viruses by avoiding shareware/free software/games?
-
- No. There are many documented instances in which commercial "shrink
- wrap" software was inadvertently distributed containing viruses.
- Avoiding shareware, freeware, games, etc., only isolates you from a
- vast collection of software (some of it very good, some of it very
- bad, most of it somewhere in between...).
-
- The important thing is not to avoid a certain type of software, but to
- be cautious of ANY AND ALL newly acquired software. Simply scanning
- all new software media for known viruses would be rather effective at
- preventing virus infections, especially when combined with some other
- prevention/detection strategy such as integrity management of
- programs.
-
-
- E8) Can MS-DOS Viruses run on Non-DOS machines (e.g., Mac, Amiga)?
-
- In general, no. However, on machines running DOS emulators (either
- hardware or software based), DOS viruses - just like any DOS program -
- may function. These viruses would be subject to the file access
- controls of the host operating system. An example is when running a
- DOS emulator such as VP/ix under a 386 UNIX environment, DOS
- programs are not permitted access to files which the host UNIX system
- does not allow them to. Thus, it is important to administer these
- systems carefully.
-
-
- =========================================
- = Section F. Miscellaneous Questions =
- =========================================
-
- F1) How many different types of viruses are there?
-
- It is not possible to give an exact number because new viruses are
- being created literally every day. Furthermore, the different
- anti-virus researchers use different criteria to decide whether two
- viruses are different or one and the same. Some count two viruses as
- two different ones if they differ by at least one bit in their
- non-variable code. Others group the viruses in families and do not
- count the closely related variants in one family as different viruses.
-
- As of March 1992, there were about 1,200 different IBM PC viruses,
- about 150 Amiga viruses, about 30 Macintosh viruses, several Atari ST
- viruses and a few Apple II viruses.
-
-
- F2) How do viruses spread so quickly?
-
- This is a very complex issue. Most viruses don't spread very quickly.
- Those that do spread widely are able to do so for a variety of
- reasons. A large target population (i.e., millions of compatible
- computers) helps... A large virus population helps... Vendors whose
- quality assurance mechanisms rely on, for example, outdated scanners
- help... Users who gratuitously insert new software into their systems
- without making any attempt to test for viruses help... All of these
- things are factors.
-
-
- F3) What is the plural of "virus"? "Viruses" or "viri" or "virii" or...
-
- The correct English plural of "virus" is "viruses." The Latin word is
- a mass noun (like "air"), and there is no correct Latin plural.
- Please use "viruses," and if people use other forms, please don't use
- VIRUS-L/comp.virus to correct them.
-
-
- F4) When reporting a virus infection (and looking for assistance), what
- information should be included?
-
- People frequently post messages to VIRUS-L/comp.virus requesting
- assistance on a suspected virus problem. Quite often, the information
- supplied is not sufficient for the various experts on the list to be
- able to help out. Also note that any such assistance from members of
- the list is provided on a volunteer basis; be grateful for any help
- received. Try to provide the following information in your requests
- for assistance:
- - The name of the virus (if known);
- - The name of the program that detected it;
- - The version of the program that detected it;
- - Any other anti-virus software that you are running and
- whether it has been able to detect the virus or not, and if yes, by
- what name did it call it;
- - Your software and hardware configuration (computer type,
- kinds of disk(ette) drives, amount of memory and configuration
- (extended/expanded/conventional), TSR programs and device drivers
- used, OS version, etc.)
-
-
- F5) How often should we upgrade our anti-virus tools to minimize
- software and labor costs and maximize our protection?
-
- This is a difficult question to answer. Antiviral software is a kind
- of insurance, and those type of calculations are difficult.
-
- There are two things to watch out for here: the general "style" of the
- software, and the signatures which scanners use to identify viruses.
- Scanners should be updated more frequently than other software, and it
- is probably a good idea to have a new set of signatures at least every
- two to three months.
-
- Some antiviral software looks for changes to programs or specific
- types of viral "activity," and these programs generally claim to be
- good for "all current and future viral programs." However, even these
- programs cannot guarantee to protect against all future viruses, and
- should probably be upgraded once per year.
-
- Of course, not every anti-virus product is effective against all (or
- any!) viruses, even if upgraded regularly. Thus, do *not* depend on
- the fact that you have upgraded your product recently as a guarantee
- that your system is free of viruses!
-
- =====================================================================
- = Section G. Specific Virus and Anti-viral software Questions... =
- =====================================================================
-
-
- G1) I was infected by the Jerusalem virus and disinfected the infected
- files with my favorite anti-virus program. However, Wordperfect and
- some other programs still refuse to work. Why?
-
- The Jerusalem virus and Wordperfect program combination is an example
- of a virus and program that cannot be completely disinfected by an
- anti-virus tool. In some cases such as this one, the virus will
- destroy file header information by overwriting it. The only solution
- is to re-install the programs from clean (non-infected) backups or
- distribution media. (See question C4.)
-
-
- G2) I was told that the Stoned virus displays the text "Your PC is now
- Stoned" at boot time. I have been infected by this virus several
- times, but have never seen the message. Why?
-
- The "original" Stoned message was ".Your PC is now Stoned!", where the
- "." represents the "bell" character (ASCII 7 or "PC speaker beep").
- The message is displayed with a probability of 1 in 8 only when a PC is
- booted from an infected diskette -- when booting from an infected hard
- disk Stoned never displays this message.
-
- Recently, versions of Stoned with -no message whatsover- or only the
- leading bell character have become very common. These versions of
- Stoned are likely to go unnoticed by all but the most observant, even
- when regularly booting from infected diskettes.
-
- Contrary to the information in Patricia Hoffman's VSUM and derivative
- works (apparently including the Central Point Anti-Virus ad's in
- PC-Magazine, et al.), the Stoned virus -does NOT- display the message
- "LEGALISE MARIJUANA", although such a string is quite clearly visible
- in the boot sectors of diskettes infected with the "original" version
- of Stoned in "standard" PC's.
-
- ====================
- [End of VIRUS-L/comp.virus FAQ]
-
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-
- End of VIRUS-L Digest [Volume 5 Issue 70]
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-