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Common Ground | 1994-10-26 | 244KB | 1,428 lines

Delphian
The Role of Frame
Analysis in Enhancing
the Transfer of
*)    Knowledge
Minstrel
Barry Krusch
UltraShadow
Internet Press
CasqueOpenFace
*( Knowledge at the blink of an eye
Bookman
Electronic Copyright
Times
1994 by Barry Krusch
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INOTE TO USER: The purpose of retaining copyright is to insure the textual
$integrity of the following document.
Avant Garde
LAST UPDATED: October 26, 1994
7The latest version of this document may be obtained at
ftp.netcom.com
/pub/krusch
Times
lGDoes previous experience transfer to new situations, and if so, in what
H0circumstances? To educators, this phenomenon of
transfer
 is key. Without transfer,
HQone has educated or been educated only in the rather limited domain of that which
Lhas immediately occurred in the classroom: a contrived situation that seldom
Joccurs twice. As transfer increases, so does the value of education. In an
FInformation Age, where the amount of knowledge that can be known grows
Jexponentially (and with it the amount of knowledge that has to be taught),
Kincreasing the efficiency of education is an issue of paramount importance.
EConcern with this issue is not new, however.  Prior to experiments by
HPThorndike and Woodworth in the early part of this century, a theory known as the
doctrine of formal discipline
/ was widely accepted. According to this theory,
general
)+G principles of formal reasoning could be taught implicitly by selecting
HSmaterial for learning which subjected the mind to these principles.  Latin and Math
Pwere widely considered to be useful in this regard.  Students would take courses
Onot for content, but because they
exercised the mind.
 These habits would then
transfer
),M at a later time to other disciplines, such as science. The clear implication
HTof this hypothesis that transfer was readily obtainable was that education should be
global
)$3 to achieve maximum efficiency.  (Detterman, 1993).
GBut this optimistic theory was challenged by Thorndike and Woodworth in
HA1901. The psychologists trained subjects to estimate the area of
rectangles
H%Subsequent tests involving different
polygons
)3( (triangles and circles) revealed errors
HW90% as large as the errors before training.  On this task, it appeared that transfer of
the general skill of
estimating the area of polygons
 was very difficult to obtain.
HEAfter analyzing their results, Thorndike and Woodworth concluded that
Nimprovements in a single mental function rarely brought about an equal improve
ment in another function.
3Surprisingly, Thorndike and Woodworth reached this
general
 conclusion
H5even though 1) the nature of the task given was very
specific
  [estimating the area
HQof geometrical shapes], and 2) subjects required between 1,000 and 2,000 practice
Jtrials to achieve improvement on rectangle area estimation [introducing a
fatigue
HOsource of error].  Still, many subsequent studies seemed to confirm Thorndike's
Jfindings. According to Detterman (1993), since the Thorndike and Woodworth
Nexperiment there have been hundreds of experiments reaffirming the same point.
'Transfer is very difficult to obtain. (
    See also
)5 Singley and Anderson (1989), who
reached a similar conclusion).
But even though the theory of
general
)+( transfer was discredited, the notion of
H    transfer
in any form
)H5 was not, not even by Thorndike, who introduced as an
H3alternative to the theory of formal discipline the
theory of identical elements.
Times
H9According to this theory, transfer would occur only when
specific
 component skills
in the
target
  area (
to be
)%3learned) were isomorphic with those present in the
that which was
)ZAlearned).   Learning Latin would perhaps not help a student learn
HOChemistry, but it might help her learn Spanish (a language with elements common
Wto Latin):
[o]ne mental function or activity improves others . . . because it contains
elements [in] common
)~> to them . . . [K]nowledge of Latin gives increased ability to
HPlearn French because many of the facts learned in the one case are needed in the
other.
 (Thorndike, 1906,
pp. 243, emphasis supplied).
lAHowever,
elements in common
 is a vague expression. As Gick and
HIHolyoak (1987) perceptively noted, an
escape clause
 was implicit in the
Klinguistic formulation of this hypothesis, since
common
 elements could be
/construed in a general way to include not only
perceptual features
)q     but also
H$categories, procedures, principles,
and even
 emotional attitudes
; in other words,
HQcommonality existed at not just the level of immediate sensation, but at a deeper
Slevel, that of cognitive processing (where the meaning perceived is in large part a
function of the
processing
)=( through which the meaning was derived).
 Commonality
HRcould exist at low, middle, and high levels, depths as well as surfaces, depending
7on the minds and approaches of the student and teacher.
QThis was a different angle: identity does not exist in and of itself, but only as
a function of the
frame
)!9 of reference through which the information is perceived.
HQThe
common element
 restriction fails because, at some level of abstraction, and
"through some frame of perception,
everything
 has
)     something
 in common with
HIevery other thing.  For example, learning Math and Latin share the common
Melement of
having to study.
  Biology and Chemistry share the common element
scientific method.
  And so forth.  From this angle, the view was completely
Ndifferent, and from this perspective, many psychologists saw the potential for
Qtransfer where others saw none.  Thus, Cormier and Hagman (1987, at p. xi), after
Qciting several reviews of the topic, stated that "[t]ransfer of learning . . . is
Spervasive in everyday life, in the developing child and in the adult." According to
Othese authors, the magnitude and generality of the effects produced by previous
Glearning upon performance in new learning tasks suggested that transfer
Jphenomena should assume a critical importance in psychology. The theory of
transfer had come full circle.
KOnce the dust created by term-mongering (
general
 vs.
specific
 transfer,
 vs.
 transfer, etc.) settles, it is clear that
 transfer must take place
H    at least
F time.  Take the words on this page as an example: even if we were all
trained to read
Courier
)Z*in the mono-spaced Courier font, like this
, it is
HMreasonable to expect from everyday experience that when we are presented with
Times
material
Garamond Narrow
3in the proportional-spaced Garamond font, like this
we can still
HNcomprehend the text.  We can even read text presented in other styles, such as
italic
, or
shadow
4This means that the learning and recognition of text
H@elements such as lettershapes does not take place merely at the
local
     level of
lettershape-as
-(FONT:
Times
)$    )-(SIZE:
14 point
)-(STYLE:
Plain
), but, more
importantly, at the
global
 level of
lettershape,
a more
)*    schematic
 level which can be
HPexemplified by any example which follows the form.  This ability to see patterns
T(via the perception of similarities through the filters of differences) allows us to
Rmake sense of the world, and explains why certain experiences in our lives quickly
Pgrow familiar. To use a mundane example, we learn where to shop for food, how to
Vget to the store, and how to pay for the groceries, and don
t worry that the available
Tparking spaces have changed each trip, nor that new items are on the shelf, nor that
Hfamiliar cashiers greet us at the check-out counter. The accumulation of
knowledge acquired from
, shopping experiences is transferred without
HFdifficulty to present shopping experiences (Gick and Holyoak, 1987), a
phenomenon which cuts across
experience
 in general.
lGIndeed, observation of the world around us shows us that the ability to
HOrecognize patterns and form generalizations leads to a
practice makes perfect
Ophenomenon: because of this phenomenon, pilots are trained on flight simulators
L(Rose, Evans & Wheaton, 1987), soldiers fight in war games, actors rehearse,
Mprospective surgeons experiment on cadavers, architects work from models, pro
Jfootball teams draft from colleges, prospective employees are filtered for
Jconsideration based on their prior experience, and college courses require
Xprerequisites.  In fact, one entire educational domain,  law school, has as its explicit
Taim not to
teach the law,
 but teach the student how to
find the law,
  an ability
Tderived from past experiences.  Transfer exists, so much so that when it exceeds its
)legitimate boundaries, we refer to it as
negative
 transfer, the well-known
psychological phenomenon of
overgeneralization:
the young boy who calls every
HRadult
daddy
; the young girl who is given
night,
light,
 and
right
 to spell,
Uand then spells
hight
; or the nationalist who believes that all Japanese people are
ruthless.
In point of fact, there
/ to be some degree of transfer, if only because
HNrecognizable and predictable patterns exist in the scientific and mathematical
Rdomains of reality.  A ball released from the hand will fall to the ground whether
Mone is in Paris or Rome, and a one in a million chance is
not a good chance
Uwhether one is afraid of being hit by lightning or anxious to win the lottery.  2 + 2
U= 4 whether the quantity is apples or dollars, and being an historian as opposed to a
Times
HNbiologist does not shield one from the difficulty of formulating well-reasoned
hypotheses.
KThe scientific and mathematical disciplines frequently show us that reality
HQhas a structure which, skeleton-like, is then filled out by particular phenomena.
SWhen we recognize the similarities which cut across differing surfaces (i.e. seeing
Sthe phenomenon of gravity in a dropping ball or orbiting planet), we can be said to
have seen the
deep structure
)Q9 of reality, a concept that over the years has cut across
 sciences like physics and into
softer
 sciences such as the field of
Epsycholinguistics, where it was made famous by linguist Noam Chomsky.
CChomsky
s theory held that, like physical laws, all languages have
 structures,
H9which are instantiated through transformation rules into
surface
 structures.  As the
HKdropping ball reveals gravity, so does the sentence reveal grammatical deep
Mstructure.  For example, the deep structure
John hit ball
 converted by the
passive
HQtransformation results in the surface structure
The ball was hit by John,
 while
conversion by the
active
)!9 transformation will produce
John hit the ball.
 (Mayer,
HN1992). As Chomskian psycholinguists noted, transformation rules should be seen
    universal
, transcending all cultures.
l9Thus, the rationale for the existence of transfer at the
physical
 and
linguistic
H3levels. But transfer needs to be understood at the
psychological
)M     level of
information processing
9, because any transfer of knowledge will occur only after
HRthe processing of information has taken place.  Along with the critical concept of
Ndeep structure popularized by Chomsky are at least three other key concepts in
Qunderstanding how people think from the (respective) fields of cognitive science,
+artificial intelligence, and cryptography:
schemas
frames
, and
encoding
l.Schemas, Frames, and the Encoding of Knowledge
*"KTransfer is not the only issue in educational psychology which rests on the
HMpremise that reality has a deep structure. In fact, a more well-known area of
educational psychology,
schema
)*4 theory, is also predicated on the existence of this
H6concept.  (Reed, 1993, at p. 42) described a schema as
+$"E[A] cluster of knowledge representing a particular generic procedure,
Eobject, percept, event, sequence of events, or social situation. This
cluster provides a skeleton
    structure
 for a concept that can be
instantiated
:filled out, with the detailed properties of the particular
instance being repre
)s.sented. For example, a schema for the American
l;Psychological Association annual meetings would contain the
Times
lJstandard properties of a scientific conference such as its location, date,
Eattenders, session types, and the length of presentations. . . . (1st
emphasis supplied)
*"DSchemas select and organize incoming information into an integrated,
HMmeaningful framework. People change new information to fit existing concepts,
Oand in the process, knowledge becomes more coherent to the individual.   Schema
5theory explains an important aspect of thinking: its
organization
lKThat schemas are used to organize thinking is not mysterious.  Consider the
HNworld, and its multifaceted, vast store of information contained in libraries,
Iorganized with schematic classification schemes such as the Dewey Decimal
Nsystem. Now imagine the Library of Congress and its millions of books, journal
Narticles, and newspapers, etc., and simultaneously imagine that its cataloging
Usystem is not only entirely destroyed, but that, in addition, all the books within it
Lare randomly reshelved.  Now how does one find the information one requires?
MThe chaff has hidden the wheat.  While in reality the information may be only
Ftwenty yards away, it is, functionally speaking, unavailable. The same
Gphenomenon obtains in the filing systems of our minds, which ordered by
8schematic structures, enable semantic perception itself.
JSchema theory now plays a prominent role in the field of education, second
HGperhaps only to behaviorism as a structuring paradigm upon which entire
Mapproaches of education (e.g.. whole language) have been built.  For example,
teachers schooled in the
whole language
)Y+ approach understand that a student will be
HPable to fill in (instantiate) the blanks in the words contained in the following
Lsentences due to the student
s preexisting schemas which are keyed in by the
Cknown words in the sentence, and the sentences which surround them:
+$")Ed took his daugh____ to the super_____ .
 He bou___ her some foo_ to ea_ .
CThey ate hamb____s and fr___ fr___ , with bak___ bea__ on the side.
*"I Schema theorists maintain that whether or not we understand something is
HPin large part due to our existing background knowledge; that for which we have a
Pschema (cooking), we understand.  That for which we do not (nuclear physics), we
Tdo not.  For this reason, transfer is more likely when we learn material in a domain
Rwith which we are already familiar, base learning being rooted in prior knowledge.
CSchema theory is closely related to a second information processing
HKconstruct which has an impact on the issue of transfer, the concept of the
frame
Times
IBateson, 1972: Goffman, 1974; Minsky, 1975), a cognitive filtering system
HSthat can key in items of a text or a situation as meaning
 while simultaneously
+excluding other interpretations. There are
interpretive
 frames (the way we see
things [decoding]), and
exemplifying
)S!frames (the way we present things
[encoding]).
<language is embedded within exemplifying frames; to take the
HJmost obvious example, the words that appear on this page have been encoded
Iwithin the frame of ENGLISH, and within that frame, the frame of ACADEMIC
EWRITING (as opposed to ROMANCE NOVEL, WESTERN, etc., all genres which
Vcall up different styles of writing, vocabularies, situations, etc.). Frames transform
Oschemas, accounting for the diversity of information we both send and receive
both intended and unintended!
NSince they are closely related from a cognitive standpoint, distinguishing the
concept of
schema
from that of the
frame
)'$is difficult. One of the differences
HKbetween the concepts of schema and frame is that schemas may be seen as non
H1interactive, but frames constantly interact, via
modularity
 and
layering
HSsituation can be seen not only with reference to discrete, multi-dimensional frames
T(modularity), but also through these differing frames simultaneously (layering): for
Sexample, the letters on this page may be seen as being produced by the intersection
    of three
modular
 key values (
, and
STYLE
layered
 one on the
other, to wit:
Helvetica Black
IDENTITY ALONG DIFFERENT
FRAMING DIMENSIONS
MODULARITY
LAYERING
       FRAME
    (COURIER)
FRAME
         (9 PT)
FRAME
STYLE
(SHADOW)
FRAME
FRAME
STYLE
Courier
Hello
Hello
Hello
Hello
l(The distinction between the concepts of
schema
 frame
 can be made
HWclearer from an analysis of an individual letter character.  Note that the first letter
Pin each example in the above table (
) has a deep structure (schema) which can
Ebe filled out (instantiated) along many different dimensions (frame).
  So, an
V[NOTE: those familiar with object-oriented computer programming will see the following
Hcdescription of a schematic deep structure to be identical to what they have previously known as an
    algorithm
Times
deep structure of
)k>two parallel vertical lines of equivalent length X intersected
H7midway by a perpendicular, horizontal line of length X*
    , [where
is a value
typically between .33 and .85]
6, produces something that looks a lot like an
, but
HSthe
 only gets to us after it has passed through many different stylistic frames
Q(such as FONT, SIZE, STYLE, etc.), as the preceding table clearly shows.  But the
Pdistinction between schemas and frames is not hard and fast, since the schematic
*structures we perceive through frames are
themselves
 created by the frames we use
H/when we decode reality, thus affecting what we
perceive
 as the deep structure, and
HDthus potentially producing pseudo-deep structures: for example, too
specific
H+frame decoding the letter
 produces the
rigid
! structure
two parallel one-inch
HNlines intersected midway by a 1/4 inch perpendicular line 1/2 inch up from the
Pbase
 from a particular example of an
 which possesses these properties (thus
Lexcluding legitimate
s which do not fit this rigid description), and too
shallow
H frame decoding
 produces the
floppy
)/    structure
two lines and a third,
HOformulation which calls up many
non-H
 geometrical forms).  The only structure
worthy of being called the
& structure is that which captures the
essence
 of that
HNwhich cuts across all instantiated forms, the structure which accounts for all
Olegitimate
s, and excludes all those which are not
 Needless to say, the
Mcreation of a deep structure is made far more probable when we see through a
decoding frame
lGAs we see through frames, so do we communicate with them. Understanding
HHthe significance of these interpretive, decoding frames is essential for
Funderstanding how human beings see the world. It is also essential for
Kunderstanding why communication breakdowns are so pervasive. We see what we
@send as A, while the person who gets what we send sees it as B.
Merely
HGestablishing a similar type of encoding does not insure communication.
Frequently
HKmiscommunication results when different keys are used in the production and
Sreception of information, a fact vividly displayed with analogies from the field of
Ncryptography. Just agreeing on a
dot and dash
 system of communication is not
Penough; our maps of what the dots and dashes refer to have to correspond, and we
Phave to insure this correspondence before we communicate.  When calibration does
Mnot proceed communication, we can not be assured that we are referring to the
same reality.
AThis can be illustrated by the following example. Suppose you are
H0confronted with the following string of letters:
Times
lPAt first glance, you may see this particular string of letters as
nonsense,
HQfunction of your use of an interpretive LITERAL frame to decode this string.  But
Psuppose you are subsequently told that this string is a
coded message
 and that
?you are to use one of the following keys to decode the message:
Helvetica Black
STRING
KEY A
KEY B
lMNow you see that to properly interpret this
meaningless
 string, you need to
HCshift from a LITERAL interpretive frame to an interpretive frame of
KCRYPTOGRAPHY, the critical change (because the key for unlocking meaning is
Qprovided). Once this major frame shift is made, the only question that remains is
which
)!I key to apply.  We note that the application of Key A gives us
HNKey B gives us
  Here we can see vividly that sometimes meaning does not
0reside in the reality itself, but rather in the
 used to encode and decode the
HRreality!  (To take another example, attorneys, applying their own, private, frame,
#will have seen the initials to the
merican
ssociation
). The
 reality can
HBproduce several widely differing meanings with differing keys, or
frames,
))     as shown
by the following examples:
O    DECODINGS
REALITY
 (Input)
OBJECTIVE Reading
    (frame of
observable phenomena)
SUBJECTIVE Reading
    (frame of
internal reaction )
She is wearing a watch.
She is wearing jewelry.
She is wearing a status symbol.
A car has been behind you for
five minutes.
The car is behind me.
The car is following me.
A woman smiles at a man.
She smiled at me.
She is available.
U The price of Apple stock is $37.
The price of Apple is $37.
Apple went up $4 today.
Lakers: 110
Clippers: 90
The Lakers won.
Magic won in his coaching
debut.
lKHere we see how different frames of mind produce different interpretations.
HKIn a social setting, the problem of frame conflicts becomes acute. Note how
Rdiffering frames can produce differing messages in the minds of listeners, and how
&communication can silently break down:
Times
Helvetica Black
MESSAGE
INTENDED
BY MR. Y
ENCODING
FRAME BY MR. Y
MESSAGE
SENT TO MR.
X  BY MR. Y
AFTER
ENCODING
DECODING
FRAME USED
    BY MR.  X
    INCORRECT
MESSAGE
RECEIVED BY
MR. X AS A
    RESULT OF
IMPROPER
DECODING
FRAME
Jim wants LSD.
SLANG
Get Jim some
Vitamin A.
LITERAL
Jim wants Vitamin
A.  I
ll pick some up
at the supermarket.
The lab results
show I have no
trace of cancer.
MEDICAL
The results were
negative, Mr. X
SOCIO
LINGUISTIC
I have cancer.
I will give him
what he is owed.
PROMISE
I will give you
what you deserve.
THREAT
He is going to do
something bad to me.
ll play a joke.
APRIL FOOL
re fired.
LITERAL
m fired.
s not going to
    work here
    anymore.
LITERAL
re fired.
HUMOR
s just kidding.
Inconsistent ideas
clash in
subconscious.
METAPHORICAL
Colorless green
ideas sleep
furiously.
LITERAL
s nonsense.
I escorted her
home.
COLLOQUIAL
I saw her home.
LITERAL
He saw her house.
I hated the movie.
)Z    SARCASTIC
Best movie I
ever seen .
LITERAL
He loved it.
The girl is not
beautiful.
    SARCASTIC
s a beauty.
METAPHORICAL
His car is a beauty.
There is a deep
meaning contained
in this title,
probably having to
do with the Latin
root
) and
the Irish term
. (a
what you get at the
 of your life).
LITERARY
    CRITICISM
Finnegans Wake
is an interesting
title.
GRAMMATICAL
s interesting
because someone
considered a great
writer left off the
possessive
apostrophe.
Times
lIAs the preceding table shows, the same language can produce two different
HImeanings depending on which of many possible decoding processes are used.
ONote that one can correctly decipher a message only when applying the same code
Oboth ways.  Vocal string
elp-hay ee-may
  sends
help me!
 to the person who
Qspeaks Pig Latin,
blah-blah-blah
 to the person who does not.  Tone string
HNdot-dot/dash-dash-dash/dot-dot-dot
 sends
 to the person who speaks Morse
Qcode, meaningless tones to the person who does not. And a raised dot string sends
Hey there!
 to A, a speaker of Braille; B, not a speaker of Braille, comprehends
Praised dots on a page.  Frame analysis reveals that we are in distinct cognitive
Jvirtual worlds without even realizing it [since the processes which affect
Mcomprehension are invisible, and are only made visible when we act on what we
Rthink], and most of the time we are tragically unaware that the person across from
Nus that we are speaking to may be misunderstanding much of what we are talking
about!
AThe above analysis focuses on what is perhaps the key problem for
H>communicators (and thus educators); communication/learning is
encoded
 with
frames,
communicated
 with frames, and
comprehended
 with frames, and not only
HPsingle frames, but sub-frames and sub-sub frames as well, all layered one on the
other. Hidden
references
 and allusions, differing
modes
 of speaking such as literal,
HNmetaphorical, hyperbolic, humorous, ironic, academic, and sarcastic, differing
words
 such as slang, differing
     meanings
 for words, vague terms due to
abstraction
schemas
)/* necessary for comprehension, the role of
context
, and perhaps most
importantly,
 and
surface
))4 structures, all play a mutually interactive role in
HQenhancing and interfering with comprehension, and thus can have a profound effect
Pon the subsequent transfer (or lack thereof) of that which has (or has not) been
learned.
KThe great power of frames leads to many different comprehension results, by
effecting how we
perceive
 reality,
categorize
reality, and
)G    evaluate
reality.  The
HPoutputs in our mind of
 and
different
 and
alien
familiar
 all take
Pplace within the context of how we take in information, a fact which has obvious
Kimplications for the theory of
common elements
 in transfer.  For example,
consider the items
Dolly Parton
Mozart
, and
    Babe Ruth
viewed through the
H    frame of
Times
Dolly Parton
Mozart
)f    Babe Ruth
FEMALE
lCWithin this frame we see Mozart and Babe Ruth as
 (male), and
HVDolly Parton as
different
 (a female is not a male).   In this situation, within this
Lframe, Mozart and Babe Ruth are in the
majority.
  But Dolly is only in the
minority
 because we have chosen to view reality through that framework.  Note
(the re-ordering when we view through an
OCCUPATIONAL
 frame:
Dolly Parton
Mozart
)q    Babe Ruth
MUSICIAN
ATHLETE
lFNow Dolly is in
the majority.
 Are we to conclude from the above that
HTMozart is always fated to be in the majority?  No, since a third result obtains when
the items are viewed through a
NATIONALIST
 framework:
Dolly Parton
Mozart
)v    Babe Ruth
AMERICAN
AUSTRIAN
lIHere we can see vividly that what counts as
common
 is a function of the
HPencoding and decoding framing processes used.  The question that remains is, how
Ncan these processes be used to facilitate transfer based on a theory of common
Kelements?  The answer is to utilize framing techniques to pitch educational
Iconcepts at the level that gives the greatest degree of transfer: at the
 level.
Times
l5The Impact of Frame Analysis on the Issue of Transfer
*"JUsage of frame techniques in education is not new: teachers, perhaps since
HTthe beginning of civilization, have intuitively used framing techniques for years as
Sa way of achieving educational objectives.  Often changing the frame of a situation
Tis just what it takes to do X, whether X is getting a class to be silent, work on an
Massignment, or become motivated.  For example, Teacher A cannot get her first
Rgrade children to be silent, until she plays
Simon Says
 with the children: it is
    only when
 Simon Says
)D<
be quiet
 that the children comply.  Teacher B knows that
HRher junior high school students hate math, so she sets up a mock stock market game
Rplayed with pseudo-dollars; the concepts are paired with money, which the kids are
Rinterested in, and they cooperate.  Teacher C knows that chess is seen as a
Ogame in certain subcultures, so when he teaches it he makes sure to use phrases
Srooted in violence (a concept seen in the subculture as
), to wit,
get him!
capture him!
t let him run away!
, etc. Teacher D forms part of his class
Pinto
teams
 and sets up a
competition
 where there are
winners
 and
losers.
RIn fact, even when the teacher makes no explicit effort to use framing techniques,
Tframing is nonetheless part and parcel of the daily rituals in educational life; the
school itself activates the
THIS IS SCHOOL
frame by displaying flags in
HIclassrooms, hanging blackboards on walls, ringing bells every 45 minutes,
Tarranging desks in rows, and by implementing all the other signifiers of the typical
educational environment.
FA less obvious use of framing, however, is the enhancement of positive
HUtransfer.  In this regard, the primary use of framing is to get educators to focus in
    terms of
, as opposed to
surface
)*., structures.  Since transfer occurs only when
HUthere are
common elements
 in place, it is the role of the teacher to make sure that
Ma) the deep structure of a conceptual subsystem is the target lesson (because
Tsignificant commonality is at the deep level, not the surface level) and that b) the
Pstudent is given enough disparate examples to create a deep concept.  To take an
Jelementary example of this approach, a teacher should teach the concept of
alliteration
)?E using not only examples from poetry (as is typically done), but also
HTfrom prose, fiction, and drama.  After this initial presentation within the frame of
ENGLISH
)@G, the teacher leaves this primary frame, and gives examples from other,
H!widely disparate frames, such as
MUSIC
 (aural),
 (visual), and
HISTORY
(social). So, in
MUSIC
alliteration
 might be
)8%the repetition of a two-note sequence
H at the beginning of every phrase
; in
alliteration
 might be
the initial
H*presentation of image A from shot to shot
((e.g., beginning every shot with a close
up of the star);  in
HISTORY
alliteration
 might be
the framing of every different
Times
H%year by beginning with a single event
(, such as the dropping of a Big Apple in
HMTimes Square.  The teacher finds these examples, and then teaches them to the
Tstudents.  Taught from so many widely differing areas, the student begins to see the
deep structure
 of the concept of
alliteration
, which is
 [string1]
 [string2]
H    [string3]
)3O.  In this situation, positive transfer (the ability to discern an alliterative
situation in
# domain) is made far more probable.
lEThe use of many examples from a variety of different domains has been
HDreferred to by Butterfield, Slocum, and Nelson (1993) as the use of
generative
frames
Hpitching the level of learning at the conceptual level. According to the
HTauthors, all deep conceptual learning is generative because it allows the learner to
4correctly classify examples never seen before, from
simple
  (e.g., a person seeing a
H6new tree could nevertheless identify it as a tree) to
complex
 (e.g. the generative
HLframe "when you know what to do with one example of a concept, you can do it
Lwith other examples" can be applied by a person to many different examples).
6Properly used, examples can exemplify deep structures.
GAs Haring (1985) found, the teaching of even simple concepts requires a
HRminimum of several examples, and thus it is not surprising that studies attempting
Rto promote the use of generative frames by providing only a single example usually
Nfail (e.g., Gick & Holyoak, 1980; Reed, Ernst, & Banerji, 1974) since a single
Qexample can be seen in terms of any one of hundreds of concepts (e.g.,
Mozart
<MAN, MUSICIAN, DEAD, AUSTRIAN, DIED YOUNG, SUBJECT OF MOVIE,
PMARRIED, etc.), thus providing no basis for learning a single frame/concept, nor
Gany basis for generalization with reference to aspect X.  Studies that
     included
HKmore than one example have found the use of learned frames on new analogous
Minstances (e.g., Butterfield & Nelson, 1991; Gick & Holyoak, 1983).  In fact,
Igeneralization by intersection (finding common components) is a technique
Tfrequently used in artificial intelligence programs that learn (Winston, 1975). Once
a concept has been ac
)~<quired, transfer results simply from applying the concept to
H<new cases, from whatever domain, that exemplify the concept.
=These insights  have important implications not only for the
enhancement of
positive transfer
, but also the
prevention of negative transfer
. The
H    STRUCTURE
)V< frame helps combat a latent defect of the mind, which is an
HAoverreliance on surface data to key in problem-solving processes.
LAs Keane (1988) noted, superficially-similar situations tend to be retrieved
H2rather than deep structures because more vivid sur
f!face features frequently activate
irrelevant
)73 analogues, and in so doing block the retrieval of
relevant
 analogues such
HUas deep structures.  Consider how this cognitive defect can effect student resolution
?of the following three example problems (Reed, 1993, at p. 62):
Times
l<Joe had three marbles.  Then Tom gave him five more marbles.
#How many marbles does Joe have now?
*"7Joe has three marbles.  Tom has five marbles.  How many
marbles do they have together?
*";Joe has three marbles.  Tom has five more marbles than Joe.
How many marbles does Tom have?
*"    Here the
similar surfaces
)`, of these three situations (three sentences,
marbles,
how many . . . have
) can interfere with the perception
that these are three
)r    different
)/5 kinds of problems which require three very different
processes for their solution:
Helvetica Black
"    PROCEDURE
EFFECT ON A
)h    EFFECT ON
QUANTITY
ADD TO
add x to A
)l    A changes
 new quantity
TOGETHER
add A and B to get
does not
 change
new quantity
RELATE
relate A to B to
discover B
    does not
change
 new quantity
lMA student untrained at the deep level would perhaps, after having learned the
process for the
add to
)$0  problem, erroneously apply that process to an
add together
HSproblem because the surface features of the problem were identical (a sterling case
Rof negative transfer).  Training in the deep structure is necessary to prevent the
Kstudent from inappropriately generalizing or failing to generalize, getting
Vfrustrated, and perhaps even erroneously concluding that he or she is
stupid.
  It is
Halso essential for teaching perhaps the most important cognitive skill:
critical
thinking
Times
l?Transfer, Frame Analysis, and the Teaching of Critical Thinking
*"KFraming education at the deep level can not only enhance positive transfer,
HPand help to combat negative transfer, but the basic approach guarantees that the
student will be put into a
critical thinking
)^  mode, as opposed to the current
HIdeclarative knowledge mode, which is focused on the memorization of facts
Odivorced from their contexts.  It could even be plausibly argued that without a
radical re-framing of
education within domains
education across domains
, much
H>of the applicability of critical thinking (its application to
 domain) will be lost.
HMTo see the notion of domain specificity, note that the previously referred-to
7Joe/Tom math problems are typically discussed within a
frame:
ADD TO
TOGETHER
RELATE
lLThus, if the student is in math class, and is given the Joe/Tom problems, at
HOleast one of the above procedures will occur to the student (
Okay, I
m in math
7class now.  Solving these problems will involve either
add to, add together,
relate,
 and not
)54 make past tense, interpret metaphorical as literal,
 etc.
). The
H4surface features of math problems typically call up
frames, but critical
HQthinking transfer will only be taught when these features call up problem-solving
    HEURISTIC
 frames
).4 created by an education system which has previously
HQsubcategorized declarative knowledge under procedural (as opposed to the reverse,
the status quo), as follows:
Times
ENGLISH
eJWpeJWp
ENGLISH
ENGLISH
CHUNK
WORK BACKWARDS
ELIMINATE
IRRELEVANCIES
PROBLEM-SOLVING (HEURISTICS)
lEWhen declarative knowledge is subsumed under the rubric of procedural
H:knowledge, problem-solving (heuristic) techniques will be
taught
across
declarative knowledge domains
, such as
 and
ENGLISH
.   Unfortunately,
HQcurrent education parcels out the day in terms of declarative knowledge units (
Qnoun is a person, place or thing
Albany is the capital of New York
) typically
Massociated with their subject fields, thus permanently anchoring knowledge in
Qterms of local solutions (problem-solving modes confined to the specific field of
Qinquiry), and reducing the probability of positive transfer. Unfortunately, local
'framing teaches local processes: thus,
addition
 is a process
 to be applied in
, and
make past tense
 is a process
 to be applied in
ENGLISH
.  Since
make past tense
)YC may not properly be applied to numbers, which exist in ideological
and not temporal spheres, the
ENGLISH
 algorithm
make past tense
 is domain
HMspecific and non-transferable, and the teaching of a number of these kinds of
Salgorithms can lead a student (and teacher) to the conclusion that
transfer is not
Times
H+possible.
 Yet heuristic processes such as
eliminate irrelevancies
 do not labor
H*under this handicap. For example, one can
eliminate irrelevant data
 in paragraphs
ENGLISH
), and one can
eliminate irrelevant data
 in word problems (
Eliminate irrelevancies
+ is a global skill that, when practiced in
, will
H1enhance the ability to solve the same problem in
ENGLISH
. Consider the
Socks
H    Problem
(Sternberg, 1987 at p. 207):
l>Suppose you have brown socks and blue socks in a drawer, mixed
>in a ratio of 4 to 5.  What is the maximum number of socks you
@have to take out of the drawer to be assured of having a pair of
socks of the same color?
*"HThose able to solve this problem know that the 4-to-5 ratio given in the
problem is
irrelevant.
Solving this problem in
 by finding an irrelevancy
H9will strengthen the ability to solve the same problem in
ENGLISH
 (finding an
HOirrelevancy), because the concept has been strengthened by yet another example.
DSeeing irrelevance at the deep level will strengthen the concept of
irrelevance
, and
HRthus aid in the solution of those other problems in life whose resolution requires
 finding the signal in the noise.
Similarly,
working backwards
)o/ is a valuable problem-solving skill.  Seeing a
HIsituation in terms of BEGINNING and ENDING by starting from a known helps
Vthe student find the syntax of a situation (which aids in the situation
s resolution).
),3, for example, the solution of the addition problem
equals
lHrequires a reversal of typical math syntax, since one must work from the
only
known
)$F, which is that the M in
money
 must be the number
 (since
HQthe only possible answer); thus, the problem has to be worked from left-to-right,
    backwards
)=D, as opposed to the typical right-to-left syntax schema called up in
solving math problems. (
5 Bartlett, 1958). When this process is also taught in
ENGLISH
)@> (e.g., one can make writing easier by using the heuristic of
working
H    backwards
)=C by figuring out the end of a story first and then figuring out the
HVcharacters, plot  and setting required to get to the ending), the student has begun to
0see the abstract, deep side of backwards motion.
Times
Chunk
)%B is another useful heuristic that easily transfers across domains.
HFDifferent ways of chunking produce different outputs: for example, in
ENGLISH
HNthe output can be
 and
different
 (which affects the way we categorize,
&organize, think, and write), while in
),  the output can be two different
arithmetic results. Thus in
ENGLISH
chunk
)"! will allow us to see that
Dolly
HMParton
 and
Mozart
 are similar to each other and different from
Babe Ruth
1only with reference to a certain category frame (
OCCUPATION
), while in
 we find that we only get
 from
)#    4 * 3 + 2
 when we chunk as
(3 + 2)
and not
(4 + 3)
which
    produces
(.  Different chunking leads to different
outputs, in
 and
ENGLISH
lJBut the above heuristics are only a small set of the hundreds of essential
HUproblem-solving skills people need to resolve difficult situations.  The following is
Fbrief list of heuristics that can cut across widely different domains:
WORK BACKWARDS
CHUNK
)u    ELIMINATE
IRRELEVANCIES
DELETE
COMBINE
)u    DECREMENT
FIND EXAMPLES
FOCUS
GO BACK
SCHEMATIZE
DEFINE TERMS
GATHER
SCAFFOLD
PRIORITIZE
OVERSAMPLE
REDUCE TEMPO
)u    INCREMENT
MODULARIZE
MEASURE PROGRESS
INCREASE SORT
BINARY SEARCH
FIND AN ANALOGOUS
SOLVED PROBLEM
ISOLATE
PARAMETERS
FIND THE SYNTAX OF
THE SITUATION
SEEK  EFFICIENCY
COUNTERFACTUALS
    SHIFT THE
REFERENCE FRAME
MAKE VARIABLES
SOLVE A SIMPLER
PROBLEM
Times
lKEducation organized in terms of global heuristic skills can transfer across
HNwhat are on the surface very dissimilar declarative knowledge domains, because
Nidentity will exist in the deep structure of the frames used to transmit these
heuristic skills.
IIf a school is organized in terms of heuristics, courses will change from
HMthose conveying declarative knowledge to those involving knowledge of problem
H4solving processes.  Here is a sample course content:
Critical Thinking
Heuristics
English
Science
General Semantics
Frame Analysis
Interpretation
Subroutinization of Thought
Chess
Programming
Scientific Method
Statistics
Hypothesis testing
lLA student graduated from this school, a school which has radically re-framed
HSthe educational day so as to greatly increase the probability of positive transfer,
Owould be a student who would see every problematic situation as one which could
.be dealt with by applying the proper approach.
NThe ability to see in terms of deep structures,  an artifact of an educational
HTapproach rooted in deep-structure analysis, will enable the student to be the master
Qof his or her own perception.  No longer the captive of whatever local frames are
?called up by surface features, the student will be able to get
     kinds of
HLinformation from the same text (seeing all the inherent possibilities), and
 kind
HLof information from many different texts (seeing the forest, not the trees).
LEducation will be efficient because each problem-solving situation will be a
Prehearsal for the next problem-solving situation. The liberation from old tricks
Otaught by old dogs within old frames will help all of us trying to cope with an
+endlessly morphing, Third Millennium world.
Times
REFERENCES
BARTLETT, F.C.  (1958).
    Thinking.
 London: Allen & Unwin.
BATESON, G. (1972).
Steps to an Ecology of Mind.
(   New York, NY: Ballantine Books, 1972.
HTBUTTERFIELD, E.C. & DICKERSON, D.J. (1991).  Promoting Postive Transfer of Different
Types.
Cognition and Instruction, 8
    , 69-102.
HOBUTTERFIELD, E.C., SLOCUM, T.A. & NELSON, G.D. (1993). Cognitive and Behavioral
VAnalyses of Teaching and Transfer: Are They Different? In Sternberg, R.J. & Detterman,
D.K. (Eds.),
)@=Transfer on Trial: Intelligence, Cognition, and Instruction
(pp. 192-257).
l#Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corp.
HRCORMIER, S.M. & HAGMAN, J.D. (1987). Introduction. In Cormier, S.M. & Hagman, J.D.
(Eds.),
)$>Transfer of Learning: Contemporary Research and Applications
(pp. 1-8).  New
York, NY: Academic Press.
HVDETTERMAN, D.K. (1993). The Case for the Prosecution: Transfer as an Epiphenomenon. In
*Sternberg, R.J. & Detterman, D.K. (Eds.),
/Transfer on Trial: Intelligence, Cognition, and
Instruction
);0(pp. 1-24).  Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corp.
H?GICK, M.L. & HOLYOAK, K.J. (1980). Analogical Problem Solving.
Cognitive Psychology,
306-355.
HMGICK, M.L. & HOLYOAK, K.J. (1983). Schema Induction and Analogical Transfer.
    Cognitive
Psychology, 15,
1-38.
HPGICK, M.L. & HOLYOAK, K.J. (1987). The Cognitive Basis of Knowledge Transfer. In
%Cormier, S.M. & Hagman, J.D. (Eds.),
+Transfer of Learning: Contemporary Research
and Applications
)X*(pp. 9-46).  New York, NY: Academic Press.
GOFFMAN, E. (1974).
)x:Frame Analysis: An Essay on the Organization of Experience
 .  New
York, NY: Harper and Row.
HQHARING, T.G. (1985) Teaching Between-Class Generalization of Toy Play Behavior to
Handicapped Children.
)r,Journal of Applied Behavioral Analysis, 18,
127-139.
KEANE, M.T. (1988).
Analogical Problem Solving
$. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons.
MAYER, R.E (1992).
)q$Thinking, Problem Solving, Cognition
. (2d Ed.). New York, NY: W.H.
Freeman & Co.
HSMINSKY, M. (1975). A Framework for Representing Knowledge. In Winston, P.H. (Ed.),
Psychology of Computer Vision
.  New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
HZREED, S.K. (1993). A Schema-Based Theory of Transfer. In Sternberg, R.J. & Detterman, D.K.
(Eds.),
)#=Transfer on Trial: Intelligence, Cognition, and Instruction
(pp. 1-24).  Norwood,
NJ: Ablex Publishing Corp.
HUREED, S.K., ERNST, G.W. & BANERJI, R. (1974). The Role of Analogy in Transfer Between
Similar Problem States.
Cognitive Psychology, 6,
436-450.
Times
HQROSE, A., EVANS, R. & WHEATON, G. (1993). Methodological Approaches for Simulator
5Evaluations. In Cormier, S.M. & Hagman, J.D. (Eds.),
Transfer of Learning:
l(Contemporary Research and Applications
*(pp. 9-46).  New York, NY: Academic Press.
H(SINGLEY, M.K. & ANDERSON, J.R. (1989).
The Transfer of Cognitive Skill
, Cambridge,
MA.: Harvard University Press.
HYSTERNBERG, R.J. (1987). Teaching Intelligence: The Application of Cognitive Psychology to
Qthe Improvement of Intellectual Skills. In Sternberg, R.J. & Baron, J.B. (Eds.),
Teaching
l&Thinking Skills: Theory and Practice
.(pp. 182-218).  New York, NY: W.H. Freeman and
Company.
HMTHORNDIKE, E.L. & WOODWORTH, R.S.  (1901) The Influence of Improvement in One
8Mental Function Upon the Efficiency of Other Functions.
Psychological Review, 8
, 247
THORNDIKE, E.L. (1906)
Principles of Teaching
)m!. New York, NY: Lemke & Buechner.
HVWINSTON, P.H. (1975). Learning Structural Descriptions from Examples. In Winston, P.H.
(Ed.),
"The Psychology of Computer Vision
.  New York, NY: McGraw-Hill.
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WORK BACKWARDS
CHUNK
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DELETE
COMBINE
DECREM
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