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Common Ground | 1994-10-20 | 1MB | 13,476 lines

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Barry Krusch
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INTERNET PRESS
,Electronic Copyright
 1994 by Barry Krusch
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Cadded, substituted, rearranged, omitted or otherwise altered, other
Ethan for exclusively personal use) and (that no hard copies are made,
Gother than for exclusively personal use, or to give to a friend, or for
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ANOTE TO USER: The purpose of retaining copyright is to insure the
g,textual integrity of the following document.
    LAST UPDA
TED:
October 20, 1994
h6The latest version of this document may be obtained at
ftp.netcom.com, /pub/krusch
Times
Garamond Narrow
BOOK REVIEW FROM
AMENDING AMERICA
 (Times Books: 1993)
2by Richard Bernstein (with Jerome Agel) pp. 237-8:
Garamond
In 1992 as this book was nearing completion, Barry Krusch
UEpublished what may well be the most thoughtful and thorough reframing
>of the Constitution yet attempted. His study, THE 21ST CENTURY
8CONSTITUTION: A NEW AMERICA FOR A NEW MILLENNIUM, is the
Cfirst proposed rewriting of the Constitution to take account of the
?twentieth-century revolutions in information and communications
Itechnologies; it is also noteworthy for its intellectual grounding in the
=American Revolution's series of experiments in government.
9Krusch, a 34-year-old computer consultant living in New Y
    ork City,
U>began his labors in 1987, prompted by the commemoration of the
IConstitution's bicentennial. Struck by the contrast between the political
=creativity of the Revolutionary generation and the increasing
@ineffectiveness of their modern counterparts, Krusch pursued two
Bcomplementary lines of research. He steeped himself in the primary
Gsources produced by the framing and ratification of the Constitution in
D1787-1788, and he traced the divergences between the Constitution as
<written and the Constitution as administered (the
Empirical
>Constitution
). In 1990, Krusch opened a file on rewriting the
DConstitution on GENIE, a national computer bulletin board. He posted
Cdraft revisions of selected constitutional provisions and solicited
Ecomments from other users of GENIE, using the accumulating drafts and
Ecomments as the raw material for his first comprehensive presentation
8of a clause-by-clause revision of the Constitution.
BFour major themes shape Krusch's proposals. First, emphasizing the
UIvital role that access to information must play in democratic governance,
Che proposes that modern information and communications technologies
<be the core of a new constitutional framework. Technological
Lconstitutionalism of this type, he maintains, could make it possible for all
GAmericans to take part in government. Second, he seeks to close the gap
Hbetween the written Constitution and the Empirical Constitution, so that
Ddivergences between theory and practice in constitutional government
Gno longer would sap the legitimacy of the constitutional system. Third,
GKrusch urges the reworking of constitutional doctrines of separation of
Epowers and checks and balances, and the recasting of key institutions
>such as the Senate, to improve government's responsiveness and
Gefficiency while incorporating added protections for individual rights.
FFourth, Krusch stresses the dangers to democracy posed by professional
Times
Garamond
+U3Cpoliticians and the major political parties and the need to restore
8ordinary citizens as the true sources of sovereign power
. His proposals
UBtherefore would, for example, exclude members of the major parties
Dfrom holding federal legislative, executive, or judicial posts.
BKrusch's plan of revision differs in several notable ways from all
UHprevious attempts to rewrite the Constitution. His plan is distinct from
Nthe parliamentary tradition (though it shares that tradition's dissatisfaction
Fwith separation of powers) and from Tugwell's executive-centered model
A(though, like Tugwell, Krusch seeks to bridge the gap between the
?theoretical and actual operation of American government). While
Eretaining the structure and much of the original language of the 1787
EConstitution, Krusch hopes to construct a form of government in which
Eordinary citizens retain and exercise power to set national goals and
Eobjectives and to monitor effectively the doings of their elected and
Cappointed officials. Finally, thanks to his familiarity with modern
?computer technology, Krusch has helped to advance the theory of
Delectronic governance beyond the model of the
electronic town hall
Lfamiliar to most Americans from the tantalizing 1992 Presidential initiative
of H. Ross Perot.
Times
Garamond Narrow
NOTE TO INTERNET EDITION
p3This document consists of Chapters Two and Three of
The 21st Century Constitution.
"The Introduction and Chapter One,
Why We Need a New Constitution,
are in a separate document at
ftp.netcom.com
/pub/krusch
b:The following Chapters assume that you have read the first
5Chapter, and that you are familiar with the terms and
-arguments introduced in that Chapter, such as
'delegation, the Empirical Constitution,
the Separation of Powers
, and so forth.
&I would highly recommend that you read
Why We Need a New Constitution
m7before reading the following, since many of the changes
V>introduced to the Constitution will make sense only if one has
5a familiarity with the issues raised in that Chapter.
Barry Krusch
Times
Times
+k9    Chapter T
)`.wo
The 21st Century Constitution
*!+In THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION, language
which
originally appeared
)u*in the 1787 Constitution as amended by the
g Bill of Rights, is indicated in
plain-face
type as follows:
Garamond
!The Congress of the United States
g*In THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION, language
removed from
g:the 1787 Constitution as amended by the Bill of Rights, is
indicated in
strike-thru
type as follows:
# The Congress of the United States
g4In THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION, language which has
been
added to
)8/the 1787 Constitution as amended by the Bill of
g>Rights, either by Constitutional Amendment subsequent to 1791,
&by the Supreme Court, or by the Author
, is indicated in
)]    bold-face
type as follows:
!The Congress of the United States
Example
1787 CONSTITUTION
:All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
$Congress of the United States . . .
REVISION
All legislative Powers
 herein
granted
herein
shall be vested
g)in a Congress of the United States . . .
THE 21ST CENTURY CONSTITUTION
7All legislative  Powers  as  granted  herein  shall  be
0vested in a Congress of the United States . . .
Times

Garamond
e the People
of the United States,
m9in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice,
<insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence,
promote the general W
#elfare, and secure the Blessings of
m?Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish
3this Constitution for the United States of America.

?e the People.
  Simple words. Elegant words. And what important
UHwords they have proven to be. In just eleven letters the basic political
Hphilosophy of our country is summarized; a political philosophy that, in
1776, rocked the world.
CThe importance of retaining a Preamble that so elegantly states the
U6purposes of Government (while articulating the People
s critical right of self-
U%determination) in a Constitution for
$century is, or ought to be, obvious.
U>Nonetheless, some have maintained that the
Preamble
 which,
incidentally
)=A, is not labeled as a
Preamble
 in the Constitution
 should not
UHbe considered as part of the Constitution, and thus
has no importance.
KThis rather curious belief was not held by the Framers of our Constitution,
Owho recognized its critical importance in getting the Constitution ratified, in
'declaring the Objectives of Government,
$and even in its role as a substitute
UGfor the Bill of Rights, which was not present in the 1787 Constitution.
6Hamilton proclaimed the importance of the Preamble in
Federalist 84
.  In
that essay
)5<, he stated his belief that a Bill of Rights was unnecessary
    , because
UEall the rights of the People of the United States were granted in the
    Preamble!
EHere, in strictness, the people surrender nothing, and as they retain
Aevery thing, they have no need of particular reservation.
WE THE
BPEOPLE of the United States, to secure the blessings of liberty to
ourselves and our posterity
, do
ordain
    establish
this constitution
gBfor the United States of America.
 Here is a better recognition of
=popular rights than volumes of those aphorisms which make the
Iprincipal figure in several of our state bills of rights, and which would
Csound much better in a treatise of ethics than in a constitution of
government.
And James W
)R4ilson, a delegate from Pennsylvania, declared in the
U<Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention on December 11, 1787 that:
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+g1G[T]his system is not a compact or contract; the system itself tells you
Hwhat it is; it is an ordinance and establishment of the people . . . the
Bforce of the introduction to the work, must by this time have been
Dfelt. It is not an unmeaning flourish. The expressions declare, in a
practical manner
)W9, the principle of this constitution.  It is ordained and
g,established by the people themselves . . . .
gFBut what
principle
 is declared by the Preamble?  In interpreting the
UGPreamble, it is important to note that certain words were not used: for
&example, the introductory words are
e the People,
 not
e the
People
of the States
  Our Framers rejected an initial draft of the Preamble which
read as follows:
;e the People of the States of New-Hampshire, Massachusetts,
g;Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-Y
New Jersey
)B%, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, V
irginia, North-
g=Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare and
Destablish the following Constitution for the Government of Ourselves
and our Posterity
Hith their rejection of this initial draft, the Framers declared that the
Constitution was a
National
)5-Constitution, ordained by the People, and not
UHthe product of the State Legislatures.  Note also the replacement of the
words
the following
Constitution
 for
Constitution,
 which clearly
UNindicates that the Preamble is no mere preface to the Constitution, but rather
an intrinsic part of it.
HAn equally important clue to the meaning of the Preamble is found in the
use of the word
(ordain and establish,
 and not
UJJefferson stated in a letter to Madison written on September 6, 1789,
Bsociety can make a perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law
. The earth
U)belongs always to the living generation.
In this regard, note that the
UHConstitution is written in the first person (
WE the People,
 not merely
The People
), and that
e the People
qualified with
of 1787,
U#but
of the United States,
 giving
spatial
    political
location precedence
over
temporal
)4Alocation.  In light of the foregoing, we can see clearly that the
UOConstitution is written in the first person and the present tense, and that its
'authors are THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED ST
gDThis insight, that people have an inalienable right to establish the
U,Government under which they live (no matter
what
century), and which is
UNtoday part and parcel of the American political fabric, was not a new insight;
rather
E, it was a view directly sprung from those revolutionary times.  Many
UGpolitical writers, including Locke, Montesquieu, and Thomas Gordon, had
Iavowed their belief in the supremacy of the People, a view best stated by
James Burgh in his
Political Disquisitions,
written in 1774, two years
Times
before the American Revolution:
All lawful authority
)u-, legislative, and executive, originates from
gBthe people.  Power in the people is like light in the sun, native,
7original, inherent and unlimited by any thing human. In
Agovernors, it may be compared to the reflected light of the moon;
Cfor it is only borrowed, delegated, and limited by the intention of
>the people, whose it is, and to whom governors are to consider
Bthemselves as responsible, while the people are answerable only to
BGod, themselves being the losers, if they pursue a false scheme of
politics. . . .
'As the people are the fountain of power
, so are they the object of
government, in such manner
*, that where the people are safe, the ends
gAof government are answered, and where the people are sufferers by
Ftheir governors, those governors have failed of the main design of the
Einstitution, and it is of no importance what other ends they may have
Fanswered . . . happy is that people, who have originally so principled
Htheir constitution, that they themselves can without violence to it, lay
hold of its power
)[6, wield it as they please, and turn it, when necessary
g.against those to whom it was entrusted . . . .
g9This Principle was affirmed by George Mason, one of the V
irginia
UHdelegates to the Federal Convention, who insisted, in his Remarks to the
FFairfax Independent Company in 1775, that a Government must constantly
Mbe evaluated with reference to the Principles under which it was established:
no institution can be long preserved, but by frequent recurrence to those
%maxims on which it was formed. . . .
"Mason went on to state the primary
U-maxims underlying a Government of the People:
De came equals into this world, and equals shall we go out of it. All
g6men are by nature born equally free and independent. T
o protect the
gIweaker from the injuries and insults of the stronger were societies first
?formed; when men entered into compacts to give up some of their
Enatural rights, that by union and mutual assistance they might secure
?the rest; but they gave up no more than the nature of the thing
required. Every society
), all government, and every kind of civil
gEcompact therefore, is or ought to be, calculated for the general good
and safety of the community
.  Every power
, every authority vested in
gHparticular men is, or ought to be, ultimately directed to this sole end;
<and whenever any power or authority whatever extends further
, or is
gIof longer duration than is in its nature necessary for these purposes, it
7may be called government, but it is in fact oppression.
In this view
, people were not only the
raison detre
of Government (i.e.,
Times
+U1:the sole reason for the existence of Government), but the
checks
UKGovernment.  The politicians elected by the People could not be relied upon
Ito secure the Government, and to constantly evaluate it with reference to
Hthose Principles under which it was instituted.  According to Jefferson,
[e]very government degenerates when trusted to the rulers of the people
Galone.  The people themselves are its only safe depositories. . . . The
Hinfluence over government must be shared among all the people.  If every
Kindividual which composes their mass participates of the ultimate authority
the government will be safe.
#Under this fundamental proposition,
UHexpressed by Thomas Gordon in 1721, it was impossible to assert that the
opinion of the
representatives
)V-of the People was superior to the judgment of
the People
themselves
g<Every Ploughman knows a good Government from a bad one, from
Cthe Effects of it: he knows whether the Fruits of his Labour be his
Bown, and whether he enjoy them in Peace and Security: And if he do
Enot know the Principles of Government, it is for want of Thinking and
Enquiry
)*=, for they lie open to common Sense: but People are generally
gDtaught not to think of them at all, or to think wrong of them. . . .
?[O]ur whole worldly Happiness and Misery (abating for Accidents
g8and Diseases) are owing to the Order or Mismanagement of
<Government; and he who says that private Men have no Concern
Cwith Government, does wisely and modestly tell us, that Men have no
BConcern in that which concerns them most; it is saying that People
Aought not to concern themselves whether they be naked or clothed,
Efed or starved, deceived or instructed, and whether they be protected
<or destroyed: What Nonsense and Servitude in a free and wise
Nation!
gJThe veracity of these Principles hardly in dispute to the Americans of the
Ds, it was inevitable that they would be contained in the charters of
U5American Government.  Indeed, on June 12, 1776, the V
irginia Declaration of
UMRights (drafted by Mason) codified these political maxims for the first time.
&In that document, the then-colony of V
(irginia proclaimed that
. . . all power
UMis vested in, and consequently derived from, the People . . . magistrates are
@their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them,
and set forth
U"the First Principle of Government:
AGovernment is, or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit,
<protection, and security of the people, nation, or community
gCall the various modes and forms of Government that is best which is
@capable of producing the greatest degree of happiness and safety
, and
gEis most effectually secured against the danger of mal-administration;
 and that,
)D1whenever any Government shall be found inadequate
Times
+g1?or contrary to these purposes, a majority of the community hath
?an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right, to reform,
alter
7, or abolish it, in such manner as shall be judged most
conducive to the publick weal.
Three weeks later
)h/, this conviction was re-asserted in the second
U>paragraph of the primary American document, the Declaration of
LIndependence, which proclaimed its validity to the world on July 4, 1776, in
words dear to all Americans:
@e hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created
g:equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
>unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
?pursuit of Happiness.  That to secure these rights, Governments
9are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from
7the consent of the governed.  That whenever any Form of
@Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of
:the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new
8Government, laying its foundation on such principles and
>organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most
,likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
Having secured America
 s independence after winning the
Revolutionary W
)    4, the States which comprised America began to codify
UEthese precepts in their own constitutions, including one of the chief
Hinspirations for our own Constitution, the Massachusetts Constitution of
J1780.  The Massachusetts document codified the Legislative, Executive, and
JJudicial powers, and declared that they be forever separated, the Preamble
Jheld that
[t]he end of the institution, maintenance and administration of
Ogovernment, is to secure the existence of the body-politic . . . and to furnish
Ithe individuals who compose it, with the power of enjoying, in safety and
tranquillity
)9E, their natural rights, and the blessings of life; And whenever these
UDgreat objects are not obtained, the people have a right to alter the
;government, and to take measures necessary for their safety
, prosperity and
happiness.
<Articles Five and Seven of the Massachusetts Constitution of
UJ1780 further held that the power given to these separate departments was a
8grant of authority which could be retracted at any time:
>All power residing originally in the people, and being derived
>from them, the several magistrates and officers of government,
vested with authority
)y., whether legislative, executive, or judicial,
gBare their substitutes and agents, and are at all times accountable
to them. . . .
Times
+t15Government is instituted for the common good; for the
protection, safety
)a1, prosperity and happiness of the people; and not
for the profit, honor
)p,, or private interest of any one man, family
g?class of men; Therefore the people alone have an incontestible,
Cunalienable, and indefeasible right to institute government, and to
?reform alter or totally change the same, when their protection,
safety
) &, prosperity and happiness require it.
gCThese beliefs were not lost on the Framers, who modeled the Federal
UEConstitution in large part on the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780.
Indeed, in their view
)o8, the approval of the People via the act of Ratification
UGwas essential to good Government.  A Government formed in any other way
Lwas inherently defective, as proven by the history of all world Governments,
Iand even by our own Articles of Confederation.  This tenet was recognized
by Hamilton in
Federalist
It has not a little contributed to the
ULinfirmities of the existing federal system, that it never had a ratification
by the people
)N?. . . . The possibility of a question of this nature proves the
UJnecessity of laying the foundations of our national government deeper than
+in the mere sanction of delegated authority
The fabric of American
U=empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE
@PEOPLE.  The streams of national power ought to flow immediately
=from that pure, original fountain of all legitimate authority
Note: consent of the
People
, not consent of the
States
, which were not
UKsuperior to the People. Consent of the People was required, since under the
Koriginal Articles of Confederation, all thirteen States had to ratify a new
LConstitution
 a stricture which, if obeyed, would practically guarantee the
Dpreservation of the Articles.  Strictly speaking, the Framers at the
.Convention were proposing a document that was
unconstitutional.
But in
U0the view of Madison, this was not only necessary
, but an ethical obligation,
ULin light of the overriding concern of the well-being of the People, who were
Iliving under a defective Constitution that promised to live in perpetuity
unless action was taken:
D[I]f they [the Framers at the Convention] had exceeded their powers,
?they were not only warranted, but required, as the confidential
servants of their country
), by the circumstances in which they were
gDplaced, to exercise the liberty which they assumed; and that finally
g=they had violated both their powers and their obligations, in
Gproposing a Constitution, this ought nevertheless to be embraced, if it
Dbe calculated to accomplish the views and happiness of the people of
America.
gHOf course, the People were the
fountains of authority
 underlying their
UEConstitution, and securing their well-being was the primary object of
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Government.  But, unfortunately
&, though republican constitutions were
ordained and established
 by the People, they were and are not
)administered by the People, but by their
representatives
. This was
U problematic: as Madison said in
Federalist 63
The people can never
UIwilfully betray their own interests; but they may possibly be betrayed by
 [their] representatives . . . .
+This had long been identified as a problem.
UKJohn Trenchard, writing in 1721, maintained that
the great Point of Nicety
Jand Care in forming [a] Constitution,
 was that
the Persons entrusted and
Grepresenting, [should] either never have any Interest detached from the
EPersons entrusting and represented, or never the Means to pursue it.
U-Mason noted in 1775 that wise Principles were
W    necessary
for the formation
U"of a worthy Constitution, but not
sufficient
, since all Governments were
administered by
*, who, as Madison stated, were no
angels
g@Upon these natural just and simple positions were civil laws and
Cobligations framed, and from this source do even the most arbitrary
Dand despotic powers this day upon earth derive their origin. Strange
=indeed that such superstructures should be raised upon such a
foundation! But
)[1when we reflect upon the insidious arts of wicked
g:and designing men, the various and plausible pretences for
#continuing and increasing authority
, the incautious nature of the
-, and the inordinate lust of power in the few
, we shall no
g9longer be surprised that free-born man hath been enslaved
, and
gDthat those very means which were contrived for his preservation have
been perverted to his ruin; or
", to borrow a metaphor from Holy W
g-that the kid hath been seethed in his mother
s milk.
gEThat this problem needed to be solved was reiterated over and over by
UHour Framers, who knew that the measure of the strength of a constitution
Kwas the extent to which it was enable to prevent the inevitable attempts to
corrupt it.  In
Federalist 62
, Madison held that
[i]t is a misfortune
UHincident to republican government . . . that those who administer it may
Gforget their obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to
their important trust.
,This reflected his views of an earlier essay
U8which he stated that
Men of . . . sinister designs, may
, by intrigue, by
UNcorruption, or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the
interests, of the people.
2But, as Hamilton wrote, it was naive to think that
UDthis corruption or encroaching despotism would be sudden or obvious.
IThough many saw the use of military force as the engine of constitutional
<destruction, Hamilton knew that appropriators of the People
s political
power were far more cunning:
DIs this the way in which usurpers stride to dominion over a numerous
Band enlightened nation?  Do they begin by exciting the detestation
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+g1?of the very instruments of their intended usurpations?  Do they
>usually commence their career by wanton and disgustful acts of
power
)!:, calculated to answer no end, but to draw upon themselves
g@universal hatred and execration?  If we were even to suppose the
Anational rulers actuated by the most ungovernable ambition, it is
>impossible to believe that they would employ such preposterous
"means to accomplish their designs.
gGOne way to measure the extent of this subtle encroachment on the rights
UJof the People by the
usurpers
 is to measure the extent to which the laws
passed do not reflect the W
+ill of the People.  According to Hamilton,
[i]t is
UInot . . . to be supposed that the constitution could intend to enable the
2representatives of the people to substitute their
to that of their
constituents.
;But, as we saw in Chapter One, history repeated itself, and
the will of the People
s representatives
substituted for the W
ill of the
UHPeople, the existence of the Constitution notwithstanding. The asymmetry
Kof this reality in the Constitutional scheme of things was noted by Senator
Paul W
)'Eellstone (D-MI), in a magnificent and chilling speech on the floor of
the Senate on May 21, 1991:
When I came to W
)x(ashington, D.C. as a candidate I met the
gCgatekeepers. Those who very early on decide whether or not you as a
'candidate will be able to get the money
. These are the people with the
g:purse strings. These are the people who have the big money
t=They are not your next-door neighbors. Who is kidding whom? W
g&know where the money comes from. . . .
EThere is a deep sense of skepticism about politics and politicians in
our country
)?=, and the people feel that this Capitol, that the U.S. Senate
gBand the U.S. House of Representatives, does not belong to them; it
!belongs to people with big bucks.
ALet me repeat that. Let us be honest about it. If we want to talk
g@about low levels of participation and we want to talk about what
Fpeople are saying back in cafes and at the grassroots, we can say that
Epeople do not believe any longer that this Capitol, the Senate or the
DHouse, belongs to them. They think it belongs to the people with the
=big bucks. They do not think that we any longer have a system
Bwhere each person counts as one, and no more than one. They do not
9think that democracy is really functioning in our country
. And that is
gDnot just a perception. I have heard that word over and over again in
Athe debates. It is not just people. They are right and that is a
reality
. . . .
g    Senator W
)8@ellstone was not alone in his fervent criticism of a system gone
UHradically wrong.  His views were seconded by Senator David Boren (D-OK),
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+U1Hwho demanded a return to the Principles on which this country was based,
Jand action on those Principles by the people paid a salary to uphold those
.Principles, and who, indeed, were sworn under
to uphold those
Principles:
FCan we really honestly sit here and say it is a good thing that it now
Bcosts an average of $4 million to run for reelection to the United
FStates Senate; that it is a good thing, and all the time and attention
Fthat it takes to raise that kind of money is being spent by Members of
@Congress instead of doing our duty to solve the problems of this
FNation? . . . As long as elections are decided on the basis of who can
raise the most money
)r/, it will always favor incumbents, so we do not
g*have any competition in American politics.
@As long as that goes on we are going to have a deeper and deeper
gCdisillusionment of our own people, especially with more and more of
@that money coming from special interests that have no connection
@with the home States of those involved. How long are we going to
wait, Mr
),=. President? Are we just going to talk about it? Are we going
gAto get up on the floor of the Senate and wave our arms, and pound
Gthe desk, and talk about it over and over in sound bites on the nightly
5news, or are we going to do something about it? . . .
9e are the trustees of the political process. The American
gCpeople have sent us here. And . . . this should be their chamber of
?Government. This should be their Capitol building.  This should
Bbe their Congress, not the Congress that gives access to those who
:contribute more and more of the money to finance political
1campaigns.  It ought to belong to every American.
5Every American counts and every American should count
gCequally in the political process, including those who cannot afford
?to make large political contributions. That is what this is all
    about, Mr
):9. President.  It is about a struggle for the soul of this
democracy itself . . . .
Unfortunately
)J;, this struggle was conducted not by the People, but by the
UFrepresentatives of the People, the politicians of Congress. As Senator
Gellstone revealed,
The people outside of the Senate and the House, the
people who live in the country
+, want the change, but they do not have the
power
)!E.  And too many people, I am afraid, in the U.S. Senate
 or at least
U@some Senators
 have the power but they do not want the change.
gDIndeed, this proved to be the case. Notwithstanding the overwhelming
ULpublic opinion in favor of this most important proposal, and notwithstanding
Kthe corrupting and debilitating effect on our political process without its
Himplementation, no Congressional Public Financing Bill was passed by the
IUnited States Congress in 1900, 1910, 1920, 1930, 1940, 1950, 1960, 1970,
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+U151980, 1990, or any year before, in-between, or since!
JIn the 17th and 18th centuries, the political writers of the time knew how
UOto evaluate and handle betrayals of this nature, which strike at the heart of a
4supposedly
democratic
 process.  As Locke stated,
[I]f a long train of
U?Abuses, Prevarications, and Artifices, all tending the same way
, make
UIthe design visible to the People, and they cannot but feel, what they lie
under
) E, and see, whither are they going;
tis not be be wonder
d, that they
UEshould then rouze themselves, and endeavour to put the rule into such
Dhands, which may secure to them the ends for which Government was at
first erected. . . .
3And Hamilton realized that the People would have no
U@choice but to regain the form of Government they were promised:
If the
UIrepresentatives of the people betray their constituents, there is then no
Hresource left but in the exertion of that original right of self-defence
?which is paramount to all positive forms of government . . . .
gFThe form of
self-defence,
 of course, was to change the nature of the
UIpolitical system, to prevent this and similar occurrences from happening.
KThis philosophy was the
safety-valve
 which secured the First Principle of
 Government.  Indeed, Madison in
Federalist 51
referred to the power of the
U!People as the
primary controul.
(The fact that the representatives of the
UKPeople, or the system under which they performed their duties, could not be
Jrelied upon to achieve the ends of Government, meant that the power of the
People
>to be resorted to.  The fact that the People would alter their
U5system was no betrayal of the system; to the contrary
, it was evidence that
UBthe system, which was to serve the People, had itself betrayed its
Jfundamental precepts.  As Locke wrote in his Second Treatise, holding that
Gthe People had to support a defective Government was a notion 180
 from
the truth:
6[T]hey have a very wrong Notion of Government, who say
, that the
People have
)F!incroach'd upon the Prerogative,
[of the Government],
gEwhen they have got any part of it to be defined by positive Laws. For
Din so doing, they have not pulled from the Prince any thing, that of
Dright belong
d to him, but only declared, that that Power which they
Lindefinitely left in his, or his Ancestors, hands, to be exercised for their
?good, was not a thing, which they intended him, when he used it
otherwise.
+the end of government being the good of the
g    Community
)@8, whatsoever alterations are made in it, tending to that
end, cannot be an
incroachment
upon any body: since no body in
gAgovernment can have a right tending to any other end. . . . Those
<who say otherwise, speak as if the Prince had a distinct and
0separate Interest from the good of the Community
, and was not
g>made for it, the Root and Source, from which spring almost all
?those Evils, and Disorders, which happen in Kingly Governments.
AAnd indeed if that be so, the People under his Government are not
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+g1Aa Society of Rational Creatures entred into a Community for their
6mutual good; they are not such as have set Rulers over
Athemselves, to guard, and promote that good; but are to be looked
=on as an Herd of inferiour Creatures, under the Dominion of a
Master
)'8, who keeps them, and works them for his own Pleasure or
Profit.
))<If men were so void of Reason, and brutish, as to enter into
Society upon such T
erms,
Prerogative
might indeed be, what some
gAMen would have it, an Arbitrary Power to do things hurtful to the
People.
gEThe Framers, who were fighting a defective Government, had to address
UDthe erroneous major premise that the People were bound to support an
Hobsolescent and/or poorly conceived political structure. In December 11,
11787, at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, W
ilson questioned any
UInotion that Governments were superior to the People they were supposed to
    serve:
)7@e hear it every time the gentlemen are up,
Shall we violate the
UMconfederation, which directs every alteration that is thought necessary to be
0established by the State legislatures only?
, those gentlemen must ascend
UNto a higher source; the people fetter themselves by no contract. If your State
Hlegislatures have cramped themselves by compact, it was done without the
<authority of the people, who alone possess the supreme power
U2Hamilton, questioning the Principle of the People
s Supremacy was
unthinkable:
. . . I trust the friends of the proposed Constitution will
UGnever concur with its enemies in questioning that fundamental principle
Gof republican government, which admits the right of the people to alter
>or abolish the established Constitution, whenever they find it
*inconsistent with their happiness . . . .
g0Thus the view expressed in our Preamble, that
e the People . . . do
UBordain and establish
 constitutions. In the Pennsylvania Ratifying
Convention, W
)S;ilson indicated that the essential function of the Preamble
U3was to anchor down this central truth for all time:
D[T]he leading principle in the politics, and that which pervades the
)American [state] constitutions, is, that
the supreme power resides in
g"the people.  This Constitution, Mr
 . President, opens with a solemn
g1and practical recognition of that principle:
e, the people of
g:the United States,
 in order to form a more perfect union,
Cestablish justice, &c. do ordain and establish the Constitution for
@the United States of America.
  It is announced in their name
Breceives its political existence from their authority: they ordain
;and establish. What is the necessary consequence? Those who
#ordain and establish have the power
, if they think proper
g?repeal and annul. . . . the people have a right to do what they
Bplease with regard to the government. . . . the fee-simple remains
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+g1Ain the people at large, and by this Constitution they do not part
Ewith it. . . . in a government like the proposed one, there can be no
#necessity for a bill of rights, for
#, on my principle, the people never
part with their power
. . . .
That the supreme power
$, therefore, should be vested in the
gApeople, is in my judgment the great panacea of human politics. It
>is a power paramount to every constitution, inalienable in its
Anature, and indefinite in its extent . . . if there are errors in
=government, the people have the right not only to correct and
?amend them, but likewise totally to change and reject its form;
Aand under the operation of that right, the citizens of the United
=States can never be wretched beyond reprieve, unless they are
wanting to themselves.
8ith this dictum in mind, let us revise the Constitution.
    Helvetica
    Article 1
The Legislative Power
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Article I, Section 1
Garamond
All legislative Powers
 herein
granted
herein
shall be
m>vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist
(of a Senate and House of Representatives
, and the People of
the United States

GNotwithstanding the retention of a Senate and House of Representatives,
UJthe requirement of Bicameral passage of legislation as it exists under the
G1787 Constitution has been done away with, with the addition of the new
Oprocedure for the passage of Bills in Section Eight of this Article.  While the
MSenate retains in part its power to vote on legislation, its primary function
under THE 21ST CENTUR
"Y CONSTITUTION is Oversight of the
Government.
!As we saw in the previous chapter
%, Congress is unable to to pass every
UClaw and regulation that must be passed in modern industrial society
Consequently
)J%, they have had to delegate authority
.  Indeed, Delegation is
UKinevitable.  The answer is not to prevent all Delegations, but to alter the
F(existing) system of Checks and Balances that makes Delegation unwise.
GThe newly drafted Article One, Section Nine legitimizes the practice of
DDelegation (
as granted herein
), since new Checks and Balances have
Nbeen
instituted; in addition, Section One declares that the People, the source
of all power
)E:, have retained certain Legislative powers (one of the new
UIchecks on Delegation).   Because a key aspect of the new system of Checks
and Balances is the Senate
)        exclusive
Oversight function, the Senate
delegate its powers.
gEThe Legislative powers the People reserve for themselves (the
direct
U9democracy
 provisions) are enumerated in Section Fifteen.

Article I, Section 2, Clause 1
m9The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members
chosen every
 second
)    'ear by the People of the several States
m>, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications
9requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the
Garamond
State Legislature
%The term of the Representative may be
m6extended by the People to two years, as provided under
 Section Fifteen of this Article.
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[I]n last year
)M4s reconciliation bill, the consummation of months of
gBbudget negotiations, Congress departed from habit and authorized a
Gcomparatively huge, $1 trillion-plus increase in the limit, from $3.123
Gtrillion to $4.145 trillion.  Lawmakers thought that would be plenty to
carry things well into 1993,
safely past the 1992 elections.
Congressional Quarterly
gC[M]embers of national legislatures should be held accountable.  The
Dnational legislature ought to be reviewed regularly by the citizenry
gBLegislators should feel anxious about their reelection chances and
Cshould feel insecure about possibly deteriorating home-base support
from their constituents. . . .
DIf the voters find their representatives lacking, they can
turn the
gErascals out.
  If the national legislature fails to act or makes poor
Fpolicy choices, or if the electorate perceives that members are acting
Funethically by placing self-interest above the general public welfare,
Athen the public should use the ballot box to elect wiser and more
honest representatives. . . .
The Constitution Under Pressure
gKInherent in our political system is the idea that
the People are supreme.
UKBecause they are supreme, they decide who will represent them, in a process
Eanalogous to that of corporation stockholders choosing their board of
:directors.   Since the People are supreme, the concept of
voting
necessarily
UDfollows when the political power of the People is delegated to their
Frepresentatives.  Inherent in the concept of voting, of course, is the
length
of the term
);B.  Note that the vote would be worthless if the length of the term
U    were, say
)1C, twelve years.  Such a term length, would, indeed, defeat the very
UMpurpose of voting.  In that span of time, an incompetent representative could
$do irreparable damage to the country
%, and s/he would also be empowered to
ignore the W
)G@ill of the people s/he supposedly represents.  All other factors
UObeing equal, the shorter the term, the greater the probability that the will of
Lthe voters will be considered, and the greater the check on the authority to
$whom the power has been delegated.
"The worth of the vote is inversely
U&proportional to the length of the term
 the longer the term, the
U*vote is worth;  the shorter the term, the
the vote is worth.  This is why
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+U1Mmany stockholders, eminently interested in preserving their investment, elect
their boards of directors for
Annual T
gIThe concept of voting includes not only the idea of voting in, but voting
J, for reasons of retribution.  Long terms make this exceedingly difficult,
due to the
recency effect
)K2; people tend to remember what the politician most
UMrecently did (voted for new jobs in the District), versus what the politician
@did at the beginning of the term (voted for a higher salary).  W
ith longer
ULterms, the framing of reality through political advertisements has a greater
Minfluence on the voters than reality itself.  And, if the term is too long, a
politician can say
, with some authority
)q#,
m different now
 that was the
UGold me.
  The combination of forgetting the old and remembering the new
Kworks to the advantage of strategic politicians, and to the disadvantage of
Evoters held captive by the biological limitation of short-term memory
Foting has many purposes, including the opportunity to inject new ideas
U;into Government.  But the fundamental reason for voting is
accountability
ULAs a Senate Select Committee stated in 1826,
This return to the people, and
(accountability to them, constitutes the
responsibility
of the Representative,
UBand affords the only check and control over his conduct, which the
constituent can possess.
o secure this responsibility
annual elections
were the norm in the 18th
Century
)+H.  In fact, at the time of the formation of our Constitution, only South
UGCarolina had elections every two years.  The other States had elections
annually
)-B, and two States, Connecticut and Rhode Island, even had elections
U"for State office every six months!
&This was a reflection of an old maxim,
UHunfortunately since forgotten, that
where annual elections end, tyranny
2begins,
 which Madison quoted at the beginning of
Federalist 53.
George
Mason, the author of the V
1irginia Declaration of Rights (from which much of
UNour Bill of Rights was derived),  stated in his remarks on annual elections to
,the Fairfax Independent Company in 1775 that
E[T]o restore mankind to its native rights hath been the study of some
2of the best men that this world ever produced; and
the most effectual
g9means that human wisdom that ever been able to devise, is
.frequently appealing to the body of the people
, to those constituent
g@members from whom authority originated, for their approbation or
dissent.
)/:Whenever this is neglected or evaded, or the free voice of
gEthe People is suppressed or corrupted . . . inevitable destruction to
the state follows. . . .
*North America is the only great nursery of
gGfreemen now left upon the face of the earth.  Let us cherish the sacred
Edeposit.  Let us strive to merit this greatest encomium that ever was
bestowed upon any country
&.  In all our associations; in all our
agreements
)A3let us never lose sight of this fundamental maxim
g<that all power was originally lodged in, and consequently is
derived from, the people. W
&e should wear it as a breastplate, and
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buckle it on as our armour
'. . . . The proposed interval of a year
g@will defeat undue influence or cabals; and the capacity of being
>rechosen afterwards, opens a door to the return of officers of
7approved merit, and will always be a means of excluding
unworthy men . . . .
gHBenjamin Rush, writing in 1777, foresaw the end of annual elections, and
UNrealized that their demise was the demise of justice:
[T]he rich have always
Cbeen an over-match for the poor in all contests for power . . . The
Lconsequence of a majority of rich men getting into the legislature is plain.
HTheir wealth will administer fuel to the love of arbitrary power that is
;common to all men. . . . Farewell now to annual elections!
John Adams,
UFwho later became the Second President of the United States, was amazed
Jthat people throughout history would surrender their liberties to powerful
HGovernment officials who would not always represent the interests of the
general population:
CIs it not amazing, that nations should have thus tamely surrendered
Fthemselves, like so many flocks of sheep, into the hands of shepherds,
Dwhose great solicitude to devour the lambs, the wool, and the flesh,
Escarcely leave them time to provide water or pasture for the animals,
Eor even shelter against the weather and the wolves? . . . Is is often
Isaid, too, that farmers, merchants, and mechanics, are too inattentive to
Fpublic affairs, and too patient under oppression.  This is undoubtedly
@true, and will forever be so; and, what is worse, the most sober
gHindustrious, and peaceable of them, will forever be the least attentive,
;and the least disposed to exert themselves in hazardous and
$disagreeable efforts of resistance.
The only practicable method,
gEtherefore, of giving to farmers, &c. the equal right of citizens, and
,their proper weight and influence in society
, is by elections,
frequently repeated . . . .]
gGFor Adams, and for many other writers, the rights of the common people,
UGwho work long and difficult hours, and who consequently do not have the
Etime or energy to devote to an understanding of day-to-day Government
Joperations, were not secure without free and frequent elections.  As Mercy
arren wrote in 1788,
CAll writers on government agree, and the feelings of the human mind
Fwitness the truth of these political axioms, that man is born free and
<possessed of certain unalienable rights
 that government is
%instituted for the protection, safety
", and happiness of the people, and
not for the profit, honour
(, or private interest of any man, family
class of men
 That
)v-the origin of all power is in the people, and
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@they have an incontestible right to check the creatures of their
own creation . . . .
.Annual election is the basis of responsibility
 Man is not
gCimmediately corrupted, but power without limitation, or amenability
g+may endanger the brightest virtue
 whereas
a frequent return to
g@the bar of their Constituents is the strongest check against the
Acorruptions to which men are liable, either from the intrigues of
>others of more subtle genius, or the propensities of their own
hearts . . . .
gDThese insights were not lost on the Framers of our Constitution.  As
Hamilton observed in
Federalist 21
Where the whole power of the
ULgovernment is in the hands of the people, there is the less pretence for the
Kuse of violent remedies in partial or occasional distempers of the State.
UFnatural cure for an ill-administration, in a popular or representative
"constitution, is a change of men.
"Madison well understood that paper
UHsecurities such as an ostensible Checks and Balances System were useless
9without first securing the Principle of Accountability:
=The means relied on in this form of government for preventing
>their degeneracy are numerous and various.  The most effectual
Gone is . . . a limitation of the term of appointments, as will maintain
Ha proper responsibility to the people. . . . [S]ecurities . . . would be
J. . . very insufficient without the restraint of frequent elections. . . .
Cthe House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the
Cmembers an habitual recollection of their dependence on the people.
=Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by the mode of
7their elevation can be effaced by the exercise of power
, they will
g<be compelled to anticipate the moment when their power is to
:cease, when their exercise of it is to be reviewed . . . .
gEFor Hamilton, the power of the People over Government was
essential
U+for maintaining the rights of the People:
[T]he whole power of the
UGproposed government is to be in the hands of the representatives of the
Mpeople.  This is the essential, and, after all, the only efficacious security
Hfor the rights and privileges of the people which is attainable in civil
society
=o Hamilton, frequent elections would help prevent corruption,
due to
the slender interest a man is apt to take in a short-lived advantage,
UPand the little inducement it affords him to expose himself, on account of it, to
*any considerable inconvenience or hazard.
Since
it [was] not . . . to be
UJsupposed, that the constitution could intend to enable the representatives
"of the people to substitute their
to that of their constituents
UIfrequent elections were necessary to insure not only that rights would be
Gsecured, and not only that Government would remain corruption-free, but
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+U10that the representatives of the People actually
represented
the People, and
voted the collective W
)x9ill of the People as the National Interest required.  The
UMfinal rationale for frequency of elections was to furnish a security that the
Constitution would be
obeyed
.  As Madison wrote in
Federalist 63
UMhouse of representatives, with the people on their side, will at all times be
Jable to bring back the Constitution to its primitive form and principles.
gGWhen the Constitution was drafted, the Framers were well aware that the
UHPeople were fond of annual elections.  Edmund Randolph, the Governor and
one of the Delegates from V
+irginia (who gave the opening speech at the
UCConvention), noted on June 21 that
The people were attached to the
Nfrequency of elections.  All the Constitutions of the States except that of S.
,Carolina, had established annual elections,
and Nathaniel Gorham, a
ULdelegate from Massachusetts, stated that
[t]he great bulwark of our liberty
&is the frequency of elections . . . .
)For these reasons, several of the Framers
argued for the Annual T
!erm at the Federal Convention.  W
ilson said he was
for making the 1st branch an effectual representation of the people at large,
M[and] preferred an annual election of it.  This frequency was most familiar &
pleasing to the people.
.Oliver Ellsworth, a delegate from Connecticut,
argued for the Annual T
2erm and against a motion that had been made to set
UJthe term for Representative at three years.  Ellsworth said that
even one
Fyear was preferable to two years,
 and that
[t]he people were fond of
Dfrequent elections and might be safely indulged in one branch of the
legislature.
Ellsworth moved for one year
, and was seconded by Caleb
U9Strong, another delegate from Massachusetts.  And finally
, Roger Sherman,
UAanother delegate from Connecticut, stated that
I am for one year
. Our
UEpeople are accustomed to annual elections.  Should the members have a
Jlonger duration of service, and remain at the seat of the government, they
Nmay forget their constituents, and perhaps imbibe the interest of the state in
which they reside . . . .
However
)0G, it is an unfortunate political reality that term lengths, like taxes,
UDcreep ever upward.  On June 21, the Federal Convention voted for the
Abiennial term.  The primary reason for not going to one year was
expense
UFStrong stated in the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention on January 15,
H1788, in response to an inquiry of why two years was substituted for one
it was . . . urged by the Southern States, which are not so populous as
UBthe Eastern, that the expense of more frequent elections would be
great. . . .
g:There were other reasons for the rejection of the Annual T
erm, stated by
Madison in
Federalist 37
, and
as follows:
<There would not be enough time to investigate the returns of
elections.
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[S]purious elections cannot be investigated and annulled in time for
Ethe decision to have its due effect.  If a return can be obtained, no
3matter by what unlawful means, the irregular member
, who takes his
gEseat of course, is sure of holding it a sufficient time to answer his
Fpurposes. . . . so great a portion of a year would unavoidably elapse,
Ebefore an illegitimate member could be dispossessed of his seat, that
Athe prospect of such an event would be little check to unfair and
#illicit means of obtaining a seat.
:The distance Representatives would have to travel was too
far for Annual T
erms.
The distance which many of the representatives will be obliged to
Etravel, and the arrangements rendered necessary by that circumstance,
Fmight be much more serious objections with fit men to this service, if
limited to a single year
)u!, than if extended to two years.
0Annual elections would lead to frequent turnover
, and a
g"resulting frequent change of laws.
A frequent change of men will result from a frequent return of
Celectors, and a frequent change of measures, from a frequent change
of men . . . .
2Senior members would set
snares
 for new members.
A few of the members, as happens in all such assemblies, will possess
Csuperior talents; will, by frequent re-elections, become members of
Elong standing; will be thoroughly masters of the public business, and
Cperhaps not unwilling to avail themselves of those advantages.  The
Cgreater the proportion of new members, and the less the information
Fof the bulk of the members, the more apt will they be to fall into the
"snares that may be laid for them.
=Knowledge for the job is important, and the one-year term was
g3insufficient for acquiring the necessary knowledge.
No man can be a competent legislator who does not add to an
:upright intention and a sound judgment a certain degree of
Gknowledge of the subjects on which he is to legislate. . . . The period
Hof service, ought, therefore, in all such cases, to bear some proportion
Eto the extent of practical knowledge requisite to the due performance
of the service.
Times
>The powers of Government were to be limited, so terms could be
longer
It is a received and well-founded maxim, that where no other
Dcircumstances affect the case, the greater the power is, the shorter
)ought to be its duration; and, conversely
, the smaller the power
, the
g,more safely may its duration be protracted.
=Constitutional safeguards existed that made the biennial term
less dangerous.
[T]he limited powers of the Congress, and the control of the State
Jlegislatures, justify less frequent elections than the public safety might
otherwise require . . . .
When Madison
)X$s reasons for rejecting the Annual T
erm are analyzed in
U&light of 20th and 21st Century reality
(, they are found wanting.  The First and
UBSecond reasons are obviously obsolete. And, while the aberrational
Acoincidence of Reapportionment, a Recession, and a Check-Bouncing
LScandal in 1992 will in all probability reduce the Incumbent return ratio to
Lits lowest percentage in over twenty years, the historical fact remains that
93 percent
)>?of Incumbent Representatives were, on average, re-elected every
UGterm in the 1964 to 1988 time period
 thus, the Third reason no longer
obtains.
@The Fourth reason is not really an argument against the one-year
UMterm, but against an effect that would be present with terms of any length if
Nthere were no limitations set forth in the Constitution on the number of terms
7that could be served by Representatives and Senators.
%Thus, we are left with the reason of
expense
cited by Caleb Strong (this
UJ18th Century concern has a contemporary spin: the advent of television has
Fmade political campaigning more expensive, and more frequent elections
Nwould, if left unregulated, lead to greater campaign costs), and reasons Five,
0Six, and Seven.  Reason Five, and the reason of
expense
, was reiterated (and
UGsupplemented) by Henry Hazlitt in his argument for a four-year term for
Representatives in
A New Constitution Now
A four-year term would give
UHcongressmen more time to learn their job and to acquaint themselves with
Bissues. They would have to devote less time and expense to getting
themselves reelected.
2For Hazlitt, the need for a proper education was a
UEcompelling reason for longer terms, along with an additional reason
Ipoliticians were devoting more and more time to getting re-elected; thus,
Hthe shorter the term, the more campaigning for office, and the less time
>the politician could devote to fulfilling his or her duties.
o the latter
reason of
waste of time
)S&of the Legislator in attempting to a)
    privately
finance
and b)
campaign
)<,for his or her election (and Reasons Six and
UJSeven) may be added an additional reason, not noted by Hazlitt or Madison:
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+U1Dthat a short term length would potentially make Representatives more
Osusceptible to local interests, such as jobs for defense plants, etc.  An undue
Lattention to the concerns of local interests would lead to violations of the
National Interest.
FThe net result of this analysis is six plausible arguments against the
Annual T
erm:
$Annual elections are more expensive.
.The limited powers of Government make Annual T
unnecessary
'Constitutional safeguards make Annual T
erms unnecessary
@There is a greater susceptibility to local interests with Annual
erms.
3More frequent privately-financed elections (and the
g8concomitant need to devote more time to fund-raising and
Ccampaigning) means less time spent on the job by elected officials.
7The need for additional legislative knowledge makes the
longer term necessary
gHWhile these arguments are plausible, they are found wanting under closer
scrutiny
.   The First argument,
expense
)+(, is spurious.  When people refer to the
UBexpense of elections, they are generally referring to the cost of
publicizing
UHelections (with private expenditures for political advertisements).  But
Celections can, should, and will be financed publicly under THE 21ST
CENTUR
)2*Y CONSTITUTION (see Article One, Section T
en, Clause Five), and
UEexpenditures and the length of campaigns will be drastically limited,
Gresulting in savings that will more than pay for the minimal additional
expense of
holding
)05elections (setting up voting booths, etc.) every year
UJinstead of every other year (although all States have off-year elections).
More importantly
)^9, when we factor in the savings that will accrue from the
UMavoidance of financial disasters like the National Debt, the Savings and Loan
1scandal, $700 screws, the B-2 program, and Star W
ars, to name but a few of
UJthe literally hundreds of examples of wasteful Government expenditures our
Mcurrent political system cranks out on a yearly basis, the additional cost of
Lannual elections, if present at all, will turn out to be one of the greatest
investments in American History
gEWhen we examine the next two arguments in light of our recent history
we find compelling reasons
the Annual T
erm.  Why?  Because the nature
UIof Government has radically changed.  Recall that Madison stated that the
Times
+U1CGovernment was one of
limited powers.
 Madison made that statement
before John Marshall
s decision in
McCulloch
)        Maryland
in 1819
UGdecision Madison and many others argued fervently against, as we saw in
the earlier chapter
)j1. In that decision, John Marshall argued that the
Necessary and Proper
 Clause in Article One, Section Eight, was a license
Hto the Government to go beyond the strictly enumerated powers in Section
BEight, and to make additional laws that were
necessary and proper
Marshall stated,
C[W]e think the sound construction of the Constitution must allow to
Jthe national legislature that discretion . . . which will enable that body
Hto perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial
to the people.
)M8Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of
g@the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are
Bplainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist
Cwith the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are Constitutional.
gEThus, the Constitution was radically transformed.  The powers were no
ULlonger limited to those explicitly stated in Article One, Section Eight, but
Iwere expanded to any powers consistent with
the letter and spirit of the
DConstitution.
  Over time, the Federal Government gradually began to
Lacquire more and more powers, and not only by escalation.  Ratified in 1913,
Bthe Sixteenth Amendment eliminated the concept of apportionment in
Ltaxation, the constitutional safeguard against higher taxes, and the Federal
EGovernment could boldly tax what no Government had taxed before.  The
-Seventeenth Amendment, ratified the same year
, eliminated the constitutional
UJsafeguard of control by the State Legislatures mentioned by Madison in his
JSeventh Reason.  Recall again that statement:
[T]he limited powers of the
JCongress, and the control of the State legislatures, justify less frequent
Nelection than the public safety might otherwise require . . . .
  According to
    Madison,
>the powers of Congress were not limited (and they were greatly
broadened by the
)h    McCulloch
)B*decision and the addition of the Sixteenth
Amendment), and
7the State Legislatures would lose control of the Senate
U.(as they did with the Seventeenth Amendment),
the public safety
could
require
)//more frequent elections.  Thus, two of Madison
s most
compelling reasons
against
Annual T
)3#erms become, in light of subsequent
U<historical developments, two of the most compelling reasons
Annual
Germs.  Government now has vast new powers, and, as Madison stated,
U>greater the power is, the shorter ought to be its duration.
;Some have argued that a shorter term might lead to an undue
UQsusceptibility to local interests.  Indeed it might, but there are better ways to
Nsolve that problem constitutionally than by increasing the length of the term.
Apart from its inherent danger
,, the longer term has shown itself to a very
UGpoor check against the influence of local interests, as revealed by our
Times
+U1Iexperience with Senators, who serve for six-year terms.  As Glenn Pascall
noted in his book
The T
rillion Dollar Budget,
g>If the services don
t get what they want from the Secretary of
?Defense, they can turn to Congress, pointing out to members the
Hbenefits for their districts if projects appear in the budget.  Congress
Eoften responds.  Senator Barry Goldwater has said,
I don
t care what
3the piece of equipment is, or how bad it is, if it
s done in his state, the
gCSenator has to get up and scream for it.
. . . Examples abound, but
<perhaps none is more striking that that of Senator Cranston
    s support
for the B-1B bomber
)x,, whose prime contractor is California-based
Rockwell International.
An article in
)E    The New Y
ork T
imes
%on September 6, 1991 vividly revealed
UHthe inadequacy of the six-year term as a solution for the local interest
Hproblem. Titled
Senator Who Brings Home the Bacon,
 the article read as
follows:
?wo years after Senator Robert C. Byrd was named chairman of the
g@Senate Appropriations Committee, he declared that he intended to
!become a
billion-dollar industry
  What he planned to do, he
gAexplained in June 1990, was use his new power to funnel a billion
Edollars
 worth of Federal projects and agencies into his impoverished
state.
I hope to become W
est V
irginia
s billion-dollar industry
g@Senator told a crowd in Clarksburg.
I expect during my term to
%bring at least a billion dollars to W
est V
irginia in projects that I put
into the bill.
. . .
7In less than three years as appropriations chairman, Mr
. Byrd has
g<steered more than $750 million worth of Federal projects and
2agencies and more than 3,000 Federal jobs out of W
ashington and
g>toward his constituents.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation
s new
gA$185 million fingerprint center will soon be built in Clarksburg,
=bringing in 2,600 new jobs.  His latest target is the Central
Intelligence Agency
)m+.  He wants to shift 3,000 of its jobs to W
irginia. . . . Mr
)I7. Byrd, who is 73 years old, is demonstrating anew that
gBhe can play the Congressional power game as well as anyone around,
Despecially when it comes to
pork barrel
 politics.
This nation is
9made up of local interests,
 he is fond of saying. . . .
=[N]o one else can claim to have attracted $140 million in new
gAhighway projects this year
 a third of the new highway money put
%up by Congress for the entire country
What helps W
est V
irginia
g1helps the nation,
 the Senator often says. . . .
Byrd has shown himself to be one of the great masters at making
gEthe appropriations process work for himself and for others by trading
Times
favors and building loyalty
 said Joseph White, a scholar at the
g<Brookings Institution who is writing a book on Congressional
appropriations.
)a3ou don
t necessarily make great history doing this,
but it
) %s an inescapable part of the system.
g    Obviously
)6@, the six-year term does not prevent an undue attention to local
U+interests.  The six-year term does, however
", supply the danger of long terms,
UDwithout providing its supposed benefits. The local-interest problem,
however
).<, is a serious one, and must be dealt with.  THE 21ST CENTUR
UCCONSTITUTION contains structural solutions for the problem of local
Minterests unduly influencing National Representatives in Sections Three, Six,
!Seven, and Eight of Article One.
HThe final two arguments against one-year terms are that politicians will
UMalways be
running for office,
 and that politicians need more time to
learn
0on the job.
  These final two arguments, however
, are not compelling
UGreasons against one-year terms.  If politicians are always
running for
Noffice,
 that is only because there is a constitutional structure that permits
Kthem to do so, a problem that can be easily solved constitutionally without
Hresorting to the dubious remedy of long terms, which have not solved the
Jproblem of
too much time running for office.
  In fact, the length of the
terms has indirectly
increased
)='the time politicians spend
running for
UFoffice,
 by preventing the legitimate cure for the problem of too much
running for office,
 legislation providing for
Public Financing
(i.e., long
UEterms have allowed Senators to ignore the wishes of 80 percent of the
=People, who would like to see Public Financing); consequently
, Senators and
ULRepresentatives spend much of their time fund-raising
 in fact, the average
Senator must raise $
10,000
dollars a
week
to run for re-election, and
UFindirectly runs for office on a weekly basis by
dialing for dollars.
UGSenator Kerry of Massachusetts stated on the floor of the Senate on May
    22, 1991,
>The growing fundraising burden is something we have all talked
Babout.  I was just sitting here a moment ago making a list from my
own memory
)F7.  I could not remember all of them but here is where I
g5raised money in 1990, the Senator from Massachusetts.
8I went to California a number of times.  I went to New Y
g%Connecticut, Rhode Island, New Jersey
, Ohio, Illinois, Georgia,
Louisiana, Florida, T
exas, W
)+%ashington, Colorado, Nevada, Alabama,
g?Missouri, New Hampshire, North Carolina
and I am sure there are
@some I have left out.  What is a U.S. Senator from Massachusetts
Cdoing having to go to all those States?  How many weekends did that
<take away from my being in Massachusetts?  How many weekends
Aand how many days did that take away from my ability to meet with
Ethe best minds in this country on health care, on education, on ocean
Times
policy
) >, on environment, on the issues we ought to be voting on here?
g<Instead I was chasing dollars, living some night in a motel.
gGBut the collective power Incumbent Senators with six-year terms have to
UIprevent the passage of Public Financing legislation ultimately keeps even
ARepresentatives beholden to the money chase, since the passage of
$legislation requires the consent of
both
 houses. As one ex-Representative
UJstated,
I heard of some guys who call their closest supporters, their key
contributors, on Christmas Day
ou never know when to stop.
gDThe final argument, the
need for knowledge
 is valid, but it too is
ULhardly a persuasive one against one-year terms.  After a year in office, any
Ecompetent Representative should have
learned the ropes,
 and so this
/argument could only be valid for the first year
.  If people felt this argument
UIwas legitimate, they could re-elect their congressman because s/he hadn
2time to
learn the job.
  More disturbing, however
, is that this argument
UGjustifies a status quo where people who
t know what they
re doing
Gare running for office.  This would provide a powerful disincentive for
Jpeople to remove Incumbents, and would partially account for the fact that
HIncumbents are so difficult to unseat.  Why do we have people who
/know what they
re doing
 running for office?  T
o some individuals, the first
UMyear of the Representative is lost due to the need to
learn on the job,
Kthe second year is lost because the Representative is
running for office.
MBy this analysis, the first term of a freshman congressman, under our system,
Cis a complete waste of time!  It would be far better to have either
experienced or
trained
),/people seeking election
 people who don
t need
UFto
learn on the job,
 because they
ve learned what they need to learn
before
)'Gtaking office.  If indeed a lack of knowledge is a problem (and it is),
U1then the far better solution for this problem is
preliminary training for
politicians
);=, not a longer term.  This problem is dealt with in Section T
en of
this Article.
$When people contemplate the Annual T
erm, they frequently create an
U"inaccurate mental model of reality
&.  They assume that a
revolving door
ULeffect will take place, and that Representatives will serve for one year and
    no longer
)4A.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  Extensive experience
UGwith the House of Representatives and the two-year term shows that just
)the opposite is the case; year after year
, the People re-elect their
Representatives.  W
ith the one-year term, however
, the People will not have
UIto remember as long, and as much.  A power greater in the threat than the
Kexecution, the Congress will be more directly controlled by the People, and
*new benefits will accrue as the effect of
learned helplessness
becomes less
UFpronounced.  As Hazlitt wrote, in favor of staggered annual elections,
Annual elections would keep both Congress and the President in constant
@touch with and more responsive to public opinion.  It would keep
constantly alive the people
3s interest in the policies of their government.  It
Times
+U2?would give them a sense of constant control of these policies.
    A benefit
UCrealized by corporations would be realized by Government.
[W]e sit
&everybody down in the dark once a year
 said Dan Burke (the CEO of
UHCapital Cities/ABC),
and show them what they said they were going to do
Gfor the year and what they actually did.  Then we look at what they say
re going to do next year
s sort of compelling to know that a year
U4from now you
re going to be back in that same slot.
gFWhere something as important as term lengths are concerned, there will
UCalways be disputes as to the proper terms.  Knowing what the proper
lengths are is not easy
)w3, and depends on many variables.  As Madison stated
Federalist 52
)I;,
Frequent elections are unquestionably the only policy by
U@which this dependence and sympathy can be effectually secured.
But what
UBparticular degree of frequency may be absolutely necessary for the
Fpurpose, does not appear to be susceptible of any precise calculation,
Band must depend on a variety of circumstances with which it may be
connected.
=Because the proper term length is uncertain, and, indeed, may
U)require change over time, THE 21ST CENTUR
Y CONSTITUTION gives the
U;People the power to change the term lengths of Senators and
BRepresentatives without requiring a Constitutional Amendment.  The
Bprocedure for this is provided in Section Fifteen of this Article.

Article I, Section 2, Clause 2
Garamond
Every
person shall be
eligible to the office of
Representative who shall
 not
have attained to the Age of
twenty-five Y
ears, and been seven Y
ears a Citizen of the
United States,  and who shall
 not
 when elected
upon and
m(subsequent to taking the oath of office,
be an Inhabitant
of that State in which he
or she
shall be chosen
, a graduate
m6of the Federal Academy, and without formal affiliation
8with any political party; but no person shall serve more
$than eight years as Representative.

!.This Clause, as rewritten, achieves nine ends:
Establishes qualifications
for Representatives.
Establishes
0as a qualification, and provides a minimum of 25
years.
Times
Establishes
citizenship
)>*as a qualification, and provides a minimum
g'citizenship requirement of seven years.
Establishes
inhabitancy
)F)as a qualification, and provides that the
g.Representative be an inhabitant of his or her
State
(not his or her
District
))3) upon and subsequent to taking the oath of office.
In establishing qualifications,
removes power from the States
g0establish more or less stringent qualifications.
 Acknowledges and formalizes the
increasing role of women
Government.
Establishes
education
)?&as a qualification, and provides as an
g7educational minimum graduation from the Federal Academy
&Prohibits political party affiliation
while serving as a
Representative.
Introduces the concept of
erm Limitations
for the Legislative
Branch.
FWhich qualifications for office will be implemented is one of the most
ULimportant issues confronting those drafting a New Constitution.  In addition
Hto acknowledging the increasing role of women in future Governments, THE
21ST CENTUR
)W1Y CONSTITUTION adds three absolutely critical new
UKqualifications for office
 the requirement for Federal Academy graduation,
Kthe prohibition against political party membership, and a limitation on the
5number of terms a person may serve as Representative.
The Federal Academy
INot all of the poor legislation or absence of adequate legislation in our
UMpolitical system can be ascribed to our Bicameral System as it is checked and
'balanced by the Executive and Judiciary
.  Many of our problems can be
traced to the fact that
/our Legislators have simply not been adequately
U    trained.
)5=If we only elected freshmen to Congress, we would be flown to
UFnew destinations by pilots who had never been in a cockpit.  Naturally
, this
UJprovides a powerful disincentive to toss out Incumbents, and has helped to
maintain the status quo.  Y
1et even Incumbents are frequently poorly trained,
UNand, in the scramble of everyday legislative life, lack the time to attain the
Lprofessional education necessary for the competent execution of their tasks.
#This is not a new problem.   Noah W
ebster wrote in 1788 that
Times
+g1?There are some acts of the American legislatures which astonish
>men of information; and blunders in legislation are frequently
:ascribed to bad intentions.  But if we examine the men who
=compose these legislatures, we shall find that wrong measures
>generally proceed from ignorance either in the men themselves,
Aor in their constituents.  They often mistake their own interest,
8because they do not foresee the remote consequences of a
measure.
gBMadison recognized this problem, and saw that its solution must be
U!constitutional
 as he stated in
Federalist 57
The aim of every political
UKConstitution is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess
Emost wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common good of
the society . . . .
According to Madison,
gCA good government implies two things; first, fidelity to the object
=of government, which is the happiness of the people; secondly
gAknowledge of the means by which that object can be best attained.
<Some governments are deficient in both these qualities: most
Egovernments are deficient in the first.  I scruple not to assert that
Bin American governments, too little attention has been paid to the
last.
gCFor example, one of the many areas where knowledge was required was
commerce
: as Madison wrote,
A proper regulation of commerce requires
much information . . . .
1But Legislators must vote on many Bills, not just
UHcommerce Bills, and not just on those issues upon which they have formed
7expertise (generally from serving on a committee).  In
Federalist
U?Madison took cognizance of the need for additional knowledge:
No man
UFcan be a competent legislator who does not add to an upright intention
Fand a sound judgment, a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on
which he is to legislate.
g0If this was true for the 18th Century Legislator
, then the 21st Century
URLegislator has a far more difficult task.  Even at the State level, the issues are
?complicated. Miewald (1984) observed with reference to Nebraska
legislators that
B[L]egislators today are expected to form an intelligent opinion on
?groundwater control . . . the educational needs of the mentally
Gretarded, abortion, [and] minority rights . . . Even a secluded scholar
?would be exhausted by the very range of questions now demanding
a legislative answer
)m1, and [legislators] are far from seclusion, since
gEcitizens are more vocal than ever in demanding to be heard on issues
Times
+g1Dor to complain about the action of government . . . [t]he demands of
/the job are too much for any single individual.
gFThe truth of this cannot be disputed at the State level; how much more
UOtrue it is at the Federal level, which entails an intimate familiarity with far
Jmore complex and far-reaching substantive issues, such as the environment,
(defense, taxation, antitrust, patent law
), agriculture, economics, transportation,
UItrade, animal research, international issues, insurance, crime, labor and
management, energy
, the Judiciary
, social security
, community and regional
UIdevelopment, computers, education, telecommunications, finance, and civil
rights, to name a few
.  Let
)"/s examine some of these topics in depth, to see
just how complicated they are.
"ake, for example, the area of the
environment
.  Just a few of the many
UHissues in that field which may appear in future legislation on which the
2Representative must vote are air and water quality
, waste disposal, noise
ULpollution, radiation, hazardous substances (toxic materials, food additives,
Kand pesticides), land use planning, Federal land management, coastal areas,
Jcommunity development, historic resources, weather modification, watershed
Lprotection, fish and wildlife resources, and natural resources conservation.
JAnd these are just broad categories.  Some of the more specific areas that
Jmay be affected by legislation are oil, gas, and sulphur operations on the
Lcontinental shelf; visibility and other effects of air pollution on National
HParks and historic sites; control of wind erosion at surface coal mines;
Dairborne hazards in the workplace; fuel venting and exhaust emission
Lrequirements for turbine-engine powered airplanes; air quality conformity of
Ftransit projects; toxic emissions for consumer products; discharges of
Mdredged or fill materials into the waters of the United States; contamination
Kof shellfish with toxics; water pollution from ships; effluent limitations;
Osludge application on cropland; the proper criteria for classification of solid
Nwaste disposal facilities; transportation of hazardous materials; easements or
Apermits for transmission line rights-of-way across the National W
ildlife
UJRefuge; and underground storage fields leaching into various aquifers, for
Mstarters. And of course, the Representative needs to have a basic familiarity
Cwith the Environmental alphabet, including CERCLA, RCRA, SARA, POTW
U    TSCA, HMT
A, FIFRA, NEP
)N!A, NAAQS, PSD, SPDES, and the FDF
The area of
defense
))8, of course, is one filled with a veritable minefield of
UJforeign concepts.  The Representative must have a working familiarity with
Gvarious issues including, but not limited to, long-range bomber forces,
+Multiple Independently targetable Reentry V
ehicle (MIR
V) warheads,
U-carrier-based nuclear capable aircraft, ICBM
s, SLBM
s, ALCM
s, BLU
s, CBU
).:s, deliverable strategic warheads, SRAM missiles, mortars,
UHhowitzers, grenades, mines, and various other
antipersonnel
 weapons, a
)list which only scratches the surface of
procurement
, and omits strategy
history
)$I, international relations, and the economics of military investment, etc.
Times
FThe issue of procurement alone is extremely critical in a Nation which
U>sees an enormous percentage of its budget expended on military
GAppropriations.  Suppose the issue is Fragmentation Bombs.  Which bombs
Bshould be procured?  The M83 4-lb Fragmentation Bomb, or the M28A2
H100-lb Fragmentation Bomb?  Or will it be the MS9A1 500-lb Fragmentation
Cluster
)%6, or the AN-M81 260-lb Fragmentation Bomb?  And there
s always
UCthe AN-M262A2 500-lb. Fragmentation Cluster and the AN-M41A1 20-lb.
Fragmentation Cluster
)w2.  Of course, we haven
t even begun to discuss the
U,MK 44 MOD O 550-lb. Lazy Dog Missile Cluster
, the BLU-26/B Sadeye 1-
UGlb Fragmentation Bomb, the BLU-66/B Pineapple 1-lb. Fragmentation Bomb,
Ethe MK 118 2-lb Antitank Fragmentation Bomb, nor the CBU-59/B 750-lb.
!AM Cluster Bomb Unit.  It really
"tough to decide!  How about one of
U"each?  Or will it be five of each?
(How about tanks and armored vehicles?  W
ell, there
s the M-48 Patton II,
and the M-41 W
alker Bulldog.  There
)u#s also the M-26 Pershing, the M-3A1
U?Stuart/M-5A1, the M-4 Sherman, the XM-1 Abrams, and the M-113A1
Armored Personnel Carrier
,,  not to mention the M-59 Armored Personnel
Carrier
)#9, the M-75,  the M-114 Command and Reconnaissance Carrier
, the M-
U 2 IFV/M-3 CFV Bradley Fighting V
#ehicle, and the M-2A1 Armored Half-
U+Track/M16.  So many tanks
 so little time!
Then there
)B6s the combat aircraft. Do we order 10 of the Fairchild
UHRepublic A-101A Thunderbolt II and 15 of the General Dynamics F-16, or 5
*of the Grumman A-6E Intruder Attack Bomber
, and 30 of the Grumman F-
14A T
)!Aomcat Fighter Interceptor?  How about one of the B-2, and none of
UHthe above?  Or will it be 50 of the McDonnell-Douglas F-15 Eagle Fighter
Interceptor
):=, and 20 of the Rockwell International B-1B strategic bomber?
UJAnd don
t forget the combat support and special mission aircraft, like the
Boeing E-3A A
3ACS, or the Grumman E-2C Hawkeye, the Lockheed P-3C
Orion, or the Fairchild T
-46A Trainer
)F#, nor various aircraft modification
UIprograms such as the Boeing B-2-52G/H Stratofortress long-range strategic
Fbomber avionics modernization program, the Boeing B-52G Stratofortress
Emodifications to carry the ALCM, the Grumman/General Dynamics EF-111A
Ielectronic counter measures aircraft conversion program, and the Lockheed
NC-141A Starlifter fuselage stretch and aerial refueling modification to the C-
.141B standard.  And what about helicopters?  W
ell, there
s . . . forget it
re running out of space!
CKnowledge of all these is important, and a lack of knowledge can be
very costly
);%, in an area where knowledge is power
, and power translates into
UHexpenditures for Pentagon
wish lists.
  As General David Jones said, if
you don
t have the knowledge of all the war plans, the fundamentals of
Fstrategy and weapons and so forth, the services can just chew you up.
UGPaul Feldman of the Center for Naval Analysis echoed this concern:
Gpros can always beat down critiques by non-specialists.  They just keep
Times
+U2%tossing technical objections at you.
And what about the issue of
taxation
?  According to Hamilton,
gBThere is no part of the administration of government that requires
@extensive information and a thorough knowledge of the principles
Bof political economy so much as the business of taxation.  The man
Dwho understands those principles best will be least likely to resort
Ato oppressive expedients, or to sacrifice any particular class of
'citizens to the procurement of revenue.
>s unlikely that even Hamilton could legislate competently in a
U,conceptual world of
 transactions, ADR
bunched income,
ordinary income,
gross income,
net income,
one-way street
Gprovisions, corporate spin-offs, deductions, Subchapter S corporations,
contemplation of death
 rules,
phantom stock
 bonuses, depletion
Iallowances,  excess foreign tax credits, gift taxation, dividend credits,
transfer
 payments,
intangible drilling expenses,
minimum
 taxes,
Fdomestic international states corporations, tax-free bonds,
sick pay
Mexclusions, depreciation, capital gains, stock options,
perks,
double-dip
@tax advantages, tax subsidies, and unearned income, without some
?knowledge of what these terms meant and their impact on society
And what about
)a    antitrust
$ithout background knowledge of price
UKfixing, division of markets, group boycotts and concerted refusals to deal,
Kjoint ventures by competitors,
self-regulation
 by trade associations, the
@legal definitions of
agreement,
combination,
 and
conspiracy
 resale
UDprice maintenance by sellers,
requirements
 contracts, customer and
Iterritorial restrictions,
tying
 arrangements, horizontal, vertical, and
Hconglomerate mergers, the economic analysis of price discrimination, the
Avarious exemptions from antitrust laws, the Sherman, Clayton, and
GRobinson-Patman Acts, the
rule of reason
 test, conscious parallelism,
>interlocking directorates,
consignment
 arrangements, product
substitutability
)N5, the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index, minimal unintegrated
capacity
),A, cost differentials, cross-elasticity of demand, opportunity and
U<variable costs,
average revenue
 curves, cartels, monopsony
, bilateral
monopoly
)5<,
kinked
 demand curves, and marginal revenue products, the
U2passage of legislation would be difficult, if not
impossible
.  The same is true
patent
;.  Could anyone legislate in that area without knowledge of
UJissues and concepts such as mechanical, process, combination, improvement,
*and design patents, compositions of matter
, improvements,
first
U!inventorship,
 diligence, novelty
&, anticipation,
continuation-in-part
U?applications, copending applications, the Milburn rule, utility
ULnonobviousness, genus-species,  design-design, and design-utility cases, the
?Muncie Gear doctrine, abandonment, secrecy orders, examination,
Dcodependency requirements, Rule 131 Affidavits, revival of abandoned
Times
+U1Oapplications, enlarging claims, the doctrine of intervening rights, standing to
sue, assignee
)JBs rights against third parties, royalties, divisional assignments,
UIsublicensing, the doctrine of equivalents, and contributory infringement?
And these are just
) .of the issues on which our Legislators will be
U.called upon to pass laws.  But it is not only
issues
regarding which our
UDFederal officials need to have background knowledge.  They also need
Ntraining in decisionmaking and cost-benefit analysis, how to write legislation
Fwithout
loopholes
 which is not vague and/or overbroad, the long-term
Mimpact of legislation, and a basic grounding in critical areas, including but
.not limited to economics, civil liberties, law
#, social problems and their causes,
U&and American and International History
&.  There also needs to be training for
U+specialized positions under THE 21ST CENTUR
Y CONSTITUTION, such as
UJthe Legislative Review Board (e.g., how to evaluate and give Timetables to
    Bills).
AIt is preposterous to assume that in a world where the objects of
UIlegislation have multiplied beyond all comprehension, a world where there
Mare so many
rippling effects
 of legislation, that Legislators can have time
learn on the job
 all that they need to know
e are paying, and will
continue to pay
)U=, a very heavy price for this ignorance.  Madison referred to
as a
defect
)q-want of due acquaintance with the objects and
principles of legislation.
As he stated,
It is
not possible
)E5that an assembly of men called for the most part from
gHpursuits of a private nature, continued in appointment for a short time,
@and led by no permanent motive to devote the intervals of public
Eoccupation to a study of the laws, the affairs, and the comprehensive
interests of their country
, should,
if left wholly to themselves
, escape
gIa variety of important errors in the exercise of their legislative trust.
B. . . [N]o small share of the present embarrassments of America is
Ato be charged on the blunders of our governments; and . . . these
?have proceeded from the heads rather than the hearts of most of
the authors of them.
g@A Constitution should take, as Jay wrote, the
utmost care
 that
U/Legislators be people of
talents and integrity
Thus, THE 21ST
CENTUR
)2AY CONSTITUTION requires that all elected Federal Officials (other
than the President and V
-ice President, who are not empowered to draft
U0legislation) be graduates of the Federal Academy
, where they will be
UHformally trained.  The Federal Academy is further discussed in Section T
,ohibition Against Political Party Membership
g6One of the most significant changes in THE 21ST CENTUR
UICONSTITUTION is the prohibition against formal political party membership
Times
+U1"for our highest Federal officials.
DThe two-party system which has evolved in America has proven to be a
UKdismal failure.  Both parties
 the
low-taxing
 Republicans and the
free-
&spending
 Democrats
 have given us a
$4,000,000,000,000
National
UIDebt, a debt which siphons money away from the poor and middle-classes in
(interest payments to the upper class.  Y
et year after year
, the people of
U>classes vote in the parties that gave us this National Debt.
    This is a
U%structural effect of the Constitution
(.   In a letter to Roger Sherman written
U9in July of 1789, John Adams predicted the inevitable:
e shall very soon
UOhave parties formed . . . these parties will study with all their arts, perhaps
Kwith intrigue, perhaps with corruption, at every election to increase their
)own friends and diminish their opposers.
As we shall soon see, once in,
UEthe parties consolidated their power and precluded meaningful choice.
HIt didn
t take long after the Ratification of the Constitution, as Adams
UDpredicted, for the debilitating effects of party dominance to reveal
Ithemselves.  In one of the most prescient statements in political history
President George W
)j7ashington warned us in 1796 of the
baneful effects
UJpolitical parties in his famous Farewell Address, a warning which has gone
unheeded to this day:
;However combinations or associations . . . may now and then
>answer popular ends, they are likely in the course of time and
@things to become potent engines by which cunning, ambitious, and
<unprincipled men will be enabled to subvert the power of the
<people, and to usurp for themselves the reins of government,
@destroying afterwards the very engines which have lifted them to
unjust dominion. . . .
<I have already intimated to you the danger of parties in the
g;State, with particular reference to the founding of them on
5geographical discriminations.  Let me now take a more
comprehensive view
)s(, and warn you in the most solemn manner
g<against the baneful effects of the spirit of party generally
    . . . .
t?[T]he common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party are
g?sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wise People to
discourage and restrain it.
AIt serves always to distract the public councils and enfeeble the
gBpublic administration.  It agitates the community with ill-founded
>jealousies and false alarms; kindles the animosity of one part
against another . . . .
=There is an opinion that parties in free countries are useful
g>checks upon the administration of the government, and serve to
 keep alive the spirit of liberty
 .  This within certain limits is
g7probably true; and in governments of a monarchical cast
6patriotism may look with indulgence, if not with favor
, upon the
Times
spirit of party
)Y(.  But in those of the popular character
gAgovernments purely elective, it is a spirit not to be encouraged.
ith this statement, W
)l0ashington was echoing the remarks of the authors
The Federalist
;who despised political parties.  As Hamilton had written in
Federalist 1
. . . nothing could be more ill-judged than that intolerant
UAspirit which has, at all times, characterized political parties.
UJHamilton, party membership led to a fundamental Government  irrationality:
Fo judge from the conduct of . . . opposite parties, we shall be led to
UEconclude that they will mutually hope to evince the justness of their
Iopinions, and to increase the number of their converts by the loudness of
;their declamations and the bitterness of their invectives.
At a certain
UBpoint, party division in the Legislature would lead to injustice:
. . . on
UBaccount of the natural propensity of [legislative] bodies to party
Mdivisions, there will be . . . reason to fear that the pestilential breath of
@faction may poison the fountains of justice.  The habit of being
Fcontinually marshalled on opposite sides will be too apt to stifle the
voice both of law and of equity
&Critical decisions such as Impeachment
would
be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties than
U2by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.
,o Jay and Madison, the two other authors of
The Federalist
, there were
U8other problems with political parties.  According to Jay
, the existence of
UMpolitical parties would lead to bizarre results such as Presidents elected by
Gonly 27 percent of the voting age population (e.g., George Bush in 1988
 . . . the activity of party zeal, taking advantage of the supineness, the
Fignorance, and the hopes and fears of the unwary and interested, often
Iplaces men in office by the votes of a small proportion of the electors.
, like Hamilton, recognized a
    Prisoner
)1    s Dilemma
effect
to which
UOpolitical parties were liable:
. . . the prospect of present loss or advantage
Gmay often tempt the governing party . . . to swerve from good faith and
justice . . . .
8This fundamental tilt towards irrationality was noted by
ULMadison in his discussion of the Pennsylvania Council of Censors:
. . . it
4was split into two fixed and violent parties. . . .
passion
, not
reason
, must
U$have presided over their decisions.
"The most sinister outcome of party
U:control was that the People would be subject to Minority T
    yranny:
Men of
UIfactious tempers . . . may by intrigue, by corruption, or by other means,
Jfirst obtain the suffrages, and then betray the interests, of the people.
gAAt the Federal Convention, Mason noted that
. . . those who have
UJpower in their hands will not give it up while they can retain it.  On the
Dcontrary we know they will always when they can rather increase it.
U6Power corrupts, and absolute power corrupts absolutely
.  But there was a
UJnecessary lack of corrupting political party membership at the Convention.
Cithout this absence, we might still be living under the Articles of
Times
+U1JConfederation.  As Madison wrote,
. . . the Convention must have enjoyed,
,in a very singular degree, an exemption from
the pestilential influence of
UIparty animosities; the diseases most incident to deliberative bodies, and
*most apt to contaminate their proceedings.
Hamilton thought that the
UKfact that Representatives were elected uniformly would help to prevent this
Qdisease:
It is more than possible that this uniformity may be found . . . to be
H. . . a security against the perpetuation of the same spirit in the body
, and
$a cure for the diseases of faction.
!If this disease was not cured, it
could prove to be fatal:
. . . the diseases of faction . . . have proved fatal
U>to other popular governments . . . alarming symptoms have been
betrayed by our own.
Unfortunately
)J6, uniformity in the time of elections for the House of
UHRepresentatives proved to be a very inadequate cure for this potentially
@fatal disease. And, as historical developments have subsequently
Kdemonstrated, the structure of the Constitution led inexorably to the worst
Inightmares of the Framers.  Whicker (1987) reported that the effects were
Bdiscovered not long after the Constitution was ratified, and the T
welfth
U1Amendment was added to compensate for the effect:
FThe rising strength of political parties and the political maneuvering
9surrounding the election of 1800 triggered the process of
-Constitutional change which resulted in the T
welfth Amendment.
gEThe framers of the Constitution had . . . assumed that control of the
@federal government would be entrusted to nonpartisan elites.  No
Gmention of political parties was made in the Constitution itself and no
Crecognition of political parties was given in voting procedures for
president and vice-president.
But the
).    structure
of the Constitution, perversely
, had
insured
)-    the reign
UFof the debilitating political parties.   According to Domhoff (1983),
=wo fundamental features of American government lead to a two-
gJparty system.  The first is the election of a president, and the second is
Gthe election of senators and representatives from states and districts.
BThe fact that only one person can win the presidency or be elected
Dfrom a given state or district, which seems trivial and is taken for
@granted by most Americans, creates a series of
winner-take-all
Jelections in which a vote for a third candidate of the right or left is in
effect support for the voter
&s least-favored candidate on the other
gHside of the political spectrum.  Because a vote for a third candidate is
a vote for
your worst enemy
 the most sensible strategy for those
gGwho want to avoid this fate is to form the largest possible preelection
Fcoalition, even if numerous policy preferences must be abandoned . . .
EThe inevitable result is two coalitional parties that attempt to blur
Times
+g2;their differences in order to win the voters in the middle.
gGIn addition,
. . . the electoral college, along with the single-member
UEdistrict method of electing members of Congress, promotes a two-party
Nsystem to the detriment of smaller third parties.  Under the unit rule winner-
Ftake-all system, third parties have virtually no chance of securing an
electoral college victory
winner-take-all
 systems, there is a built-in
UJbias against third parties.  As Justice Stewart noted in a footnote to his
dissent in
illiams
Rhodes
, 393 U.S. 23 (1968),
gCAssume a State in which a dissident faction of one of the two major
9parties
 party A
 becomes dissatisfied with that party
s nominees
gAand sets itself up as a
third party
 party C
 putting forward
Kcandidates more to its liking. . . . A situation is possible in which party
8s candidates poll, for example, 46% of the vote, party A
candidates 44%, and party C
s candidates 10%.  Party B
s candidates
g7would in such a situation be elected by plurality vote.
gLBecause of this effect, voters tend to vote for one of the two main parties,
since a vote for the
most-preferred
)T'candidate may result in the election of
least-preferred
)V6candidate!  Assume a three-party Presidential election
U?consisting of Republicans, Democrats, and conservative-oriented
JLibertarians.  Assume that 55 percent of the People support the Republican
Jcandidate, but that 15 percent of this support is
soft.
  This 15 percent
prefers the
Libertarian
candidate.  If, however
, the entire 15 percent defect,
UKthe Republican will get 40 percent of the vote, the Libertarian will get 15
#percent, and the Democrat will get
percent
of the vote.  Thus, by
UFdefecting, Republicans sacrifice a won election and gain nothing, and,
adding injury to injury
)y5, assure the ascendancy of the party they despise the
UOmost!   Because of this structural effect, third-parties are virtually ignored.
g7Domhoff acknowledged that this effect was an unintended
consequence:
?Although the system of presidential elections and single-member
Ccongressional districts generates the strong tendency toward a two-
>party system, it was not designed with this fact in mind.  The
AFounding Fathers wished to create a system of checks and balances
1that would keep power within bounds . . . However
, the creation of a
gAtwo-party system was not among their plans.  Indeed, the Founding
=Fathers disliked the idea of parties, which they condemned as
factions
 that were highly divisive.  Parties were a major unintended
*consequence of their deliberations . . . .
gJAs it happened, a circularity effect developed.  Once in, the parties were
U6able to secure campaign contributions from the wealthy
.  According to
Times
+U1FWhicker (1987),
U.S. parties are heavily dependent upon contributions
from wealthy members . . . .
*As Senator Bill Bradley (D-NJ) reported on
UKthe floor of the Senate on May 21, 1991, out of 240 million Americans, only
H179,000 people (less than one-tenth of one percent) donated over $200 to
IFederal candidates, and fewer than 9000 individuals contributed more than
/$95 million to the 1990 congressional campaign.
ith financial backing of
UAthis nature, the parties have been able to sustain their hegemony
UEhegemony which has lasted over 130 years.  Their mere presence on the
Jpolitical scene for that length of time has legitimized their existence, a
1legitimacy reinforced by the media and education:
AThe portrayal of elections by the media, education systems and by
@parents as contests between Democrats and Republicans reinforces
the voter
):%s perception of the two-party norm. V
oter access to
gFinformation about third parties may be limited and voters may find the
Hprocess of acquiring information costly . . . Since third parties rarely
Gget more than five percent of the total vote in presidential elections,
<they usually do not qualify for public financing in the next
presidential race.
g>Matters have gotten so out of hand that the taxpayers are even
financing the
conventions
)I,of the dominant political parties, which are
UMnothing more or less than a week of prime-time commercials for these parties,
Hbroadcast over
public
 airwaves.  Senator John Kerry (D-MA) revealed on
Dthe floor of the Senate on May 22, 1991 that
[e]ach of the parties
Hconventions is financed by taxpayers.  The Republican Party has accepted
D$32.2 million in public money for its conventions since 1976
 $32.2
    million.
?Since there were four Republican conventions in that time span,
this advertising
given
)"-to the political parties cost the taxpayers $
    8 million
for each convention!
g*It is hardly surprising that once in power
, the parties pass legislation
consolidating their power
0, to the detriment of third parties.  As Supreme
U0Court Justice Rhenquist noted in his dissent in
Buckley
, 424 U.S. 1
U<(1976) with reference to the Federal Election Campaign Act ,
gCCongress in this legislation . . . has enshrined the Republican and
?Democratic parties in a permanently preferred position, and has
@established requirements for funding minor party and independent
Icandidates to which the two major parties are not subject . . . I find it
%impossible to subscribe to the Court
!s reasoning that because no third
g=party has posed a credible threat to the two major parties in
APresidential elections since 1860, Congress may by law attempt to
,assure that this pattern will endure forever
Times
In power
)38, the parties prevent measures that threaten their power
U<matter how worthy the proposal.  According to Cronin (1989),
?One reason the national initiative and referendum failed to win
Jwidespread support . . . is that . . . [t]he established national parties,
Bthe Republicans and Democrats . . . opposed the idea of a national
Finitiative and referendum, viewing it not only as unnecessary but also
Eas a threat to traditional representative principles and to their own
,role as policy agenda-setting organizations.
Fet another consequence of party domination is that the balances of the
UNConstitution are altered by this dominance.  Political parties can prevent the
8obvious Constitutional necessity of veto overrides.  As
|    The New Y
ork T
reported,
>Thomas Mann, director of Governmental Studies at the Brookings
DInstitution, observed that the Democrats may
probably be better off
3not overriding.
  In defeat, they can claim that Mr
. Bush prevented a
g&problem from being solved.  In victory
, the public gets to judge
g4whether their solution has actually solved anything.
Sometimes the worst thing you can do is get your bill passed,
Mann said.
gLParty membership also alters the voting pattern of Legislators:
It is well
UHknown that many legislators vote a relatively straight party line or are
Csometimes unduly influenced by their peers or senior members.  Some
Dlegislators are compelled by binding party caucus procedures to vote
contrary to their consciences.
*The existence of parties also prevents the
UJpassage of legislation, creating even more inefficiency in the Legislative
IBranch than was intended by the Framers
 contributing to the transfer of
JLegislative power to an unelected Administrative Branch.  And, the passage
Mof legislation is impeded as endless irrelevancies are introduced into public
debate.  As the
4reported,
. . . badly outnumbered House Republicans
UHuse meaningless roll-calls as their stock in trade to get the Democrats
$attention and slow down the majority
  Regarding debate on a Civil Rights
Bill in 1991, the
2noted that
[h]ardly anybody took the floor to say
UAwhat the problem was and why one approach was better than another
Instead the other side
)v&s motives were almost the only issue.
gFAnother critical effect of party domination is control over the public
U=political agenda, and a consequential lack of Accountability:
8Critics have often described the two major parties as
weedledee
and T
)":weedledum
 to emphasize the centralist, middle-of-the-road
Times
+g1Gpositions they take on most issues.  The voter is provided with limited
Achoices when the two viable candidates take similar and sometimes
Balmost identical positions. . . . the lack of cohesion within U.S.
Fpolitical parties contributes to an absence of party discipline and to
Ifailure to deliver the promised platforms.  Party platforms are often ten
?to fifteen times the length of the Declaration of Independence.
?Frequently they are not read, and they are often ignored by the
congressional party
)i5. . . . [this] diminishes accountability to the voter
gFsince any individual politician may not be able to deliver on campaign
promises to approve, modify
-, or cut programs.  Even if elected officials
g@attempt to their campaign promises, they may be blocked by other
politicians in their own party
', as well as by members of the opposing
party
gKThe issues seen as significant by the political parties are not necessarily
UFthose favored by a Majority of Americans, and this is reflected by the
membership
 of the people in the parties.  The combined results of eleven
Epolls taken in 1991 revealed that 31 percent of Americans referred to
Fthemselves as
Republicans,
 34 percent called themselves
Democrats,
Aand 29 percent said they were
Independents.
  6 percent answered
t know
<There are two interesting points about this poll.  The first
UIis that 34 percent of Americans refer to themselves as
Democrats.
  Many
;of these people call themselves
Democrats
 because if they
, they
UNwould lose their right to vote in one of the primary elections!  This trick of
Kthe political parties gets people to form the conception
I am a Democrat,
Jeven though that person has never contributed a dime to the Democrats, nor
?has read their campaign platforms.  Thus, people are forced to
identify
psychologically
)_9with the political parties to retain their right to vote.
Ultimately
, Americans may see attacks on
parties
, who do not represent their
U#long-term interests, as attacks on
themselves
gAThe second interesting aspect of this poll is that even though a
    plurality
U>of those polled (35 percent) do not identify with either party
, this 35 percent
UMis virtually unrepresented in Congress.  In the 102d Congress, 100 percent of
Nthe Senate was affiliated with the two major parties,  and 99.8 percent of the
DHouse of the Representatives was affiliated with these parties. What
Chappened to the representation of the 35 percent of those people, a
    plurality
)0=, who were (and are) not affiliated with either party?  Their
UMrepresentation was obliterated by the
winner-take-all
 effect (leaving aside
Mthe regulatory barriers to third party competition passed into legislation by
Jthe major parties).  The existence of this plurality indicates significant
Mdissatisfaction with the views of the parties (and doesn
t even factor in the
Mnumber of people who have not bothered to register to vote at all).  In fact,
Ithere is dissatisfaction even among people who claim to identify with the
parties.  As the
0reported, a black Democrat, Gloria Hackman, said
Times
re doing terrible jobs, Democrats and Republicans.
 A white
MRepublican, Joseph Carp, said
Neither party looks after my interests.  They
'just don
t get anything accomplished.
gKOne of the sources of this dissatisfaction may be that, as with any cartel,
U    there is
)/    collusion
instead of
competition
)A , and this collusion may lead to
U6effects such as personality voting and/or voter apathy
, to mention only the
U@most minor problems. Domhoff (1983) catalogued the techniques of
collusion:
B[T]here is evidence that the parties sometimes collude rather than
Bcompete . . . collusion between the two parties often makes better
Gsense for them than competition if they are interested in rewards other
'than winning, as indeed they often are:
>The parties may find many ways of restricting competition with
<each other: bipartisanship, promotion of mutually acceptable
<ideologies, marginal changes in the previous administration
tBpolicies, and recruitment of those who are not antagonistic to the
other party
)?2.  Even the belief in the impossibility of certain
tBplatforms being able to win the election may be a form of implicit
@collusion if there is more fiction than substance to the belief.
Thus the parties compete more
the voters than
voters or
with each other
tC[T]here is no a priori theoretical reason to believe that political
gEparties and their candidates will reflect out of necessity the policy
Fpreferences of the majority of the voters.  Candidates and parties are
/relatively free to say one thing and do another
. . . .
t9It even may be that a two-party system discourages policy
gCdiscussion, political education, and an attempt to satisfy majority
Hpreference . . . The need for a majority vote where the stakes are high,
such as the presidency
)z-, may lead to campaigns in which there are no
issues but personality
&, even when voters are extremely issue
conscious. . . .
C[T]here is evidence that a two-party system discourages voting, for
gAthose in a minority of even 49 percent receive nothing for their
efforts . . . .
g<Collusion leads to the development of a
cult of personality
 where
U#people become the focus instead of
issues
 and the only people upon
U7whom the public spotlight shines are those financed by
special interests
gAIn a system where policy preferences become blurred, the emphasis
:on the images of individual candidates becomes very great.
Times
+g1CIndividual personalities become more important than the policies of
Hthe parties. . . . the same people who direct corporations and take part
Gin policy groups play a central role in the careers of most politicians
<who advance beyond the local level in states of any size and
consequence.
gDPerhaps the worst effect of collusion (leaving aside the effects of
rolling
)&9, to be discussed in a later section), is that it aborts
ex post facto
UBcriticism in scandals where both parties were involved (virtually
    of them),
UOresulting in losses of billions, even trillions, to the taxpayers:
In 1987 and
1988, hundreds of S & L
's across the country began losing money
. . . . As
the situation worsened, W
/ashington pretended there was nothing wrong.  A
UMbipartisan conspiracy of silence kept the scandal off the front pages and out
of the presidential race.
gMAnother familiar and socially debilitating effect of political parties is the
phenomenon of
)Y    patronage
)9/, which the Supreme Court defined as
the right
U<to select key personnel and to reward the party
faithful.
This concept
U)of patronage is the very antithesis of a
merit system
, as Hamilton observed in
1788:
?[I]n every exercise of the power of appointing to offices by an
@assembly of men, we must expect to see a full display of all the
Eprivate and party likings and dislikes, partialities and antipathies,
@attachments and animosities, which are felt by those who compose
the assembly
)I0.  The choice which may at any time happen to be
gBmade under such circumstances, will of course be the result either
/of a victory gained by one party over the other
    , or of a
gDcompromise between the parties.  In either case, the intrinsic merit
Cof the candidate will be too often out of sight.  In the first, the
Aqualifications best adapted to uniting the suffrages of the party
g?will be more considered than those which fit the person for the
Astation.  In the last, the coalition will commonly turn upon some
Ainterested equivalent
Give us the man we wish for this office,
/and you shall have the one you wish for that.
This will be the
gCusual condition of the bargain.  And it will rarely happen that the
<advancement of the public service will be the primary object
3either of party victories or of party negotiations.
Federalist 77
)N1, Hamilton indicated that patronage might lead to
U    oligarchy
, or rule by the
gAEvery mere council of appointment, however constituted, will be a
Aconclave, in which cabal and intrigue will have their full scope.
Their number
)Q/, without an unwarrantable increase of expense,
Times
+g1=cannot be large enough to preclude a facility of combination.
;And as each member will have his friends and connections to
provide for
)E1, the desire of mutual gratification will beget a
g=scandalous bartering of votes and bargaining for places.  The
@private attachments of one man might easily be satisfied; but to
Csatisfy the private attachments of a dozen, or of twenty men, would
;occasion a monopoly of all the principal employments of the
@government in a few families, and would lead more directly to an
:aristocracy or an oligarchy than any measure that could be
contrived.
gDHamilton was not alone in noting this effect.  Supreme Court Justice
Joseph Story
)E    , in his
)& Commentaries on the Constitution
, observed the effect
U%of parties on political appointments:
F[I]n a public body appointments will be materially influenced by party
?attachments and dislikes . . . and will be generally founded in
Bcompromises, having little to do with the merit of candidates, and
Fmuch to do with the selfish interests of individuals and cabals.  They
:will be too much governed by local, or sectional, or party
arrangements.
gABut, the structure of the Constitution insured that parties would
U-continue, and therefore that the practice of
    patronage
would continue.  As
Justice Powell observed in
Branti
Finkel
, 445 U.S. 507 (1980),
gBPatronage is a long-accepted practice . . . Patronage appointments
Fhelp build stable political parties by offering rewards to persons who
Dassume the tasks necessary to the continued functioning of political
Forganizations.
As all parties are concerned with power they naturally
Aoperate by placing members and supporters into positions of power
N. . .
 . . . The use of patronage to fill . . . positions builds party loyalty
N. . . The failure to sustain party discipline, at least at the national level,
Ihas been traced to the inability of successful political parties to offer
Dpatronage positions to their members or to the supporters of elected
officials.
gCOver the course of time, patronage became the
way of the world
UGthe United States, and blurred the Separation of Powers by transferring
power to the Executive Branch:
@While the Constitution forbids congressmen to hold other federal
>jobs, it doesn
t forbid appointment of his friends, family and
supporters.  W
)M;ith the emergence of political parties in the first decade
Times
+g@=of government under the Constitution, party loyalists started
demanding federal jobs. . . .
BFranklin Roosevelt . . . made effective use of his patronage power
g7His patronage chief, Postmaster General James A. Farley
, asked
gApatronage seekers such questions as
What was your pre-convention
>position on the Roosevelt candidacy?
 and
How did you vote on
Dthe economy bill?
  If a member was asked to vote for a presidential
Gmeasure against local pressures, the matter was put
on the frank basis
of quid pro quo.
gCIt goes without saying that patronage (and the party system fueling
UFpatronage) leads inevitably to the most egregious forms of corruption.
Consider this report from
    The New Y
ork T
on September 11, 1991:
g    In theory
)46, voters are supposed to choose the successor to Louis
g>Laurino, who stepped down last month from the powerful post of
?Queens County Surrogate.  But with millions of dollars of court
Cpatronage at stake, the Queens Democratic organization isn
t taking
any chances.
DPresiding over the probating of wills and estates, the Surrogate has
gDthe power to award lucrative fees to lawyers acting as conservators,
guardians and trustees.  Mr
$. Laurino, not known for his ethical
sensitivity
)57, made his resignation effective Aug. 3
 just past the
g+deadline for filing petitions for tomorrow
s primary election.
In cases where it
)_0s too late to choose nominees through primaries,
gAparty leaders select the candidates.  As a result, the Democratic
?nominee for Surrogate in this overwhelmingly Democratic borough
Awill be chosen not by voters but by Representative Thomas Manton,
the Queens Democratic leader
%.  His choice may not even face token
g.Republican opposition in the general election.
:. Laurino became Surrogate by a similar act of timing that
gDavoided any primary challenge 20 years ago.  But that hardly excuses
Bthis farce of democracy
 a farce that ought to give pause to even
#the most ardent supporters of New Y
s system of judicial
elections.
gFIn absolutely essential reading for students of the American political
system, George W
ashington Plunkitt in
Plunkitt of T
ammany Hall
UFdozens of examples of the myriad ways in which political corruption is
6manifested by the existence of parties in our society:
There
)"?s an honest graft, and I
m an example of how it works.  I might
g@sum up the whole thing by sayin
I seen my opportunities and I
Times
took
+Just let me explain by examples.  My party
s in power in the city
and it
)$5s goin
 to undertake a lot of public improvements.  W
ell, I
tipped off, say
)M7, that they
re going to lay out a new park at a certain
place.
DI see my opportunity and I take it.  I go to that place and I buy up
gGall the land I can in the neighborhood.  Then the board of this or that
@makes its plan public, and there is a rush to get my land, which
#nobody cared particular for before.
t it perfectly honest to charge a good price and make a profit
g5on my investment and foresight?  Of course, it is.  W
ell, that
s honest
graft.
gLAs Plunkitt noted,
. . . parties can
t hold together if their workers don
U&get the offices when they win . . . .
#Under the party system, workers who
U7receive jobs have to
pony up
 in support of the party:
>Even candidates for the Supreme Court have to fall in line.  A
Supreme Court Judge in New Y
ork County gets $17,500 a year
, and
?s expected, when nominated, to help along the good cause with a
s salary
)'5.  Why not?  He has fourteen years on the bench ahead
gAof him, and ten thousand other lawyers would be willin
 to put up
&twice as much to be in his shoes.  Now
, I ain
t sayin
 that we sell
nominations.  That
s a different thing altogether
    .  There
s no auction
gBand no regular biddin
.  The man is picked out and somehow he gets
to understand what
)o/s expected of him in the way of a contribution,
g>and he ponies up
 all from gratitude to the organization that
honored him, see?
=Let me tell you an instance that shows the difference between
gEsellin
 nominations and arrangin
 them in the way I described.  A few
Dyears ago a Republican district leader controlled the nomination for
FCongress in his Congressional district.  Four men wanted it.  At first
#the leader asked for bids privately
#, but decided at last that the best
gBthing to do was to get the four men together in the back room of a
Ccertain saloon and have an open auction.  When he had his men lined
up, he got on a chair
)p1, told about the value of the goods for sale, and
gGasked for bids in regular auctioneer style.  The highest bidder got the
nomination for $5000.  Now
), that wasn
t right at all.  These things
g+ought to be always fixed up nice and quiet.
gJAt the lower levels of political life, and perhaps beyond, these practices
continue.  As W
)W8aldman (1990) reported with regards to the Nassau County
(New Y
))Dork) Republican political machine,
the party raised funds through a
one-percent
 system, in which county employees gave one percent of their
Times
salaries to the GOP . . . .
gKThe final, and perhaps worst effect of the party system is that it destroys
UIthe concept of Separation of Powers, a Principle which, as implemented in
"the Constitution, made Government
unworkable
, as we saw in the earlier
Chapter
)*;. A truly divided Government could not govern; consequently
, the
UMparties filled in a gap existing under the present Constitution, and fostered
7cooperation between the Branches
 in so doing, however
, obliterating a
U@fundamental constitutional Principle.  As Justice Powell noted,
AAlthough the Executive and Legislative Branches of Government are
-independent as a matter of Constitutional law
, effective government is
g@impossible unless the two Branches cooperate to make and enforce
/laws.  Over the decades of our national history
, political parties have
gAfurthered
 if not assured
 a measure of cooperation between the
#Executive and Legislative Branches.
The Framers, however
)z,, did not intend for there to be any
common
UBinterest
 between the Branches.  In fact, as Hamilton asserted in
Federalist
F,  the system of Checks and Balances was designed under the assumption
U(that there would be no such common bond:
CThe House of Representatives being to be elected immediately by the
Gpeople, the Senate by the State legislatures, the President by electors
5chosen for that purpose by the people, there would be
little
g!probability of a common interest
"to cement these different branches
g7in a predilection for any particular class of electors.
g#The answer to this problem is clear
.  As Madison observed in
Federalist
, because
causes
)'7of faction cannot be removed . . . relief is only to be
U'sought in the means of controlling its
effects
  Since political parties will be
U:formed under any Constitution which recognizes the People
s right to
UHassociate, the only way to insure that political parties do not dominate
?Government and obliterate the new system of Checks and Balances
instituted in THE 21ST CENTUR
!Y CONSTITUTION is to mandate that
UFelected officials may not belong to any political party while they are
holding office
)N=.  The Supreme Court recognized the logic of this position in
upholding the Hatch Act:
DIt seems fundamental . . . that employees in the Executive Branch of
@the Government, or those working for any of its agencies, should
Badminister the law in accordance with the will of Congress, rather
Bthan in accordance with their own or the will of a political party
g@They are expected to enforce the law and execute the programs of
Fthe Government without bias or favoritism for or against any political
Times
+g1Hparty or group or the members thereof . . . it is essential that federal
Lemployees . . . not take formal positions in political parties . . . and not
Irun for office on partisan political tickets.  Forbidding activities like
?these will reduce the hazards to fair and effective government.
gDAs the Court noted,
Neither the right to associate nor the right to
U8participate in political activities is absolute . . . .
The right of politicians to
UKbelong to political parties has been conclusively demonstrated to interfere
Fwith the right of Americans to an efficient and fair Government.  When
Drights clash, the common good must take precedence, in line with the
Lstricture of the Preamble that the primary role of Government is to
promote
general
elfare.
 As Madison wrote,
[n]o axiom is more clearly
established in law
)d7, or in reason, than that wherever the end is required,
U!the means are authorized . . . .
%If an individual who seeks to run for
UKoffice values his or her right to belong to a political party more than the
Ccommon good, that person is free to join a political party; however
, s/he will
UMnot be allowed to serve as an elected Federal official.  Senator Joseph Biden
K(D-DE), in speaking on the issue of Public Financing, spoke of the need for
3dramatic reform
 mild reform was no reform at all:
A[W]e should stop kidding the American People and answer two basic
@questions: Do we want to both in fact and in appearance free any
Fcandidate . . . from the appearance of being beholden to anyone? . . .
FThere was an English writer and cleric, I believe, in the 17th century
g?who said,
Moderate reform is like moderate justice or moderate
chastity
  There ain
t no such thing.  Either reform the system or be
quiet.
erm Limitations
gDAs a final check on the powers of Incumbents to secure an invincible
UKpolitical base by using the political power they have consolidated over the
3years to pander to local interests, THE 21ST CENTUR
Y CONSTITUTION
introduces the concept of
erm Limitation
to the Federal Legislative
UMBranch.  Certain politicians and establishment organizations have referred to
Ferm Limitations as
undemocratic.
  But, from a long-term perspective,
U%nothing can be more democratic than T
 erm Limitations.  Incumbents use
UMtheir political power to secure private contributions, and use these funds to
?stay in office.  Challengers are handicapped, and, consequently
, the People
have no substantive choice.  W
*ithout substantive choice, there can be no
U+such thing as a democratic election.  The T
 erm Limitation requirement, like
UQthe other qualifications for office, has as its final goal the attainment of more
Lchoice for the People, and, in addition, is institutional insurance that new
Jideas will be presented in Congress over the decades.  According to Cronin
Times
+U1I(1989),
. . . the advantages of incumbency may thwart an infusion of new
blood and fresh ideas.
The T
) (erm Limitation provision is the ultimate
UGinsurance that the Government will not be run by public officials whose
@primary goal is to secure a power base built up over many years.
7And, in light of the earlier remarks by Senator Byrd, W
est V
irginia
s self-
U#proclaimed
billion-dollar industry
erm Limitations may be
    essential
the survival of the country

Article I, Section 2, Clause 3
Garamond
Representatives
 and direct taxes
shall be apportioned
by the
m1Senate within equivalent and contiguous Districts
:among the several States which may be included within this
<Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be
determined by
)Y"enumeration in a National Census.
 adding
m:to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound
to Service for a Term of Y
ears, and excluding Indians not
m*taxed, three-fifths of all other Persons.
The actual
m!Enumeration shall be made within
 three
five
ears after
m3first Meeting of the Congress of the United States,
#Ratification of this Constitution,
and within every
subsequent Term of
five or
ten Y
ears, in such Manner as
 they
m    shall by
shall
)#&direct.  The number of Representatives
shall
 exceed
less than
one for every
 thirty
three
hundred and fifty
    thousand
Citizens
and the initial
m1number of Representatives shall be one thousand.
 , but
0ach State shall have at least one Representative
and  until
m:such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire
=shall be entitled to chuse three; Massachusetts, eight, Rhode
<Island and Providence Plantations one; Connecticut five; New
)    <ork six; New Jersey four; Pennsylvania, eight; Delaware one;
m?Maryland six; Virginia ten; North Carolina five; South Carolina
five; and Georgia three.

CThis Clause contained the infamous
three-fifths
 compromise, which
UImandated that African-American slaves be counted as three-fifths a person
Gfor the purposes of apportioning Representatives and direct taxes. This
Gcompromise was made necessary by the conflicting interests of the North
Jand South: the North, recognizing that slaves in the South were treated as
Times
+U1Kproperty and had no rights,  didn
t want the South to increase its power by
Hgetting additional Representatives in Congress by being allowed to count
Islaves as
persons
: the Northern view was that Slaves shouldn
t count as
Jpeople at all!  The South, on the other hand, which in other respects gave
Mslaves no legal rights, wanted to increase its influence, and have the slaves
Fcounted as what they actually were, people, solely for the purposes of
9allocating representation.  One of the ironies of history
et the taint of that
U$astonishing compromise remains today
(, in language which is still part of our
ritten Constitution.
Quite properly
, THE 21ST CENTUR
Y CONSTITUTION
U(will strike out this offensive language.
KThe representation in the House under this Clause is proportional; that is,
UIeach State is allocated a number of Representatives (as controlled by the
!Senate, to prevent the effect of
gerrymandering
, where House Incumbents
ULattempt to have Districts re-drawn to secure their re-election) based on its
Lpercentage of the population of the United States, assuring that the concept
one person, one vote
 is maintained in at least one Branch of
Government.
THE 21ST CENTUR
)z&Y CONSTITUTION increases the number of
UCRepresentatives to 1000, since the workload of Congress has greatly
(expanded.  According to Whicker (1987),
@The expansion of the work load of Congress, especially in recent
Edecades, has further undermined the accountability of representatives
9to citizens.  The work of Congress has grown dramatically
    , but the
gCnumber of representatives elected to do the work has not. . . . The
?number of constituents served by each member has also increased
;with national population growth, increasing the demands for
constituent service.
gHThe new provisions also insure that the Representative/Constituent ratio
UHwill never drop below one Representative for every 350,000 Constituents:
"In order to enhance accountability
, increased numbers of
g?representatives would prevent distance between constituents and
>important decision-makers.  In an extreme scenario, without an
Bincrease in the number of representatives, national policies would
@most likely be established more frequently by anonymous staffers
>who never appear on the ballot.  A concomitant increase in the
<number of representatives would prevent this undercutting of
Ddemocratic principles.  Lines of accountability would be shorter and
more obvious.
g$Under this Clause of THE 21ST CENTUR
Y CONSTITUTION, the
ULRepresentative/Constituent ratio is permanently established, and not subject
Times
+U1!to the will of elected officials.

Article I, Section 2, Clause 4
Garamond
m4Every Representative shall appoint an Alternate, who
5shall serve for a single one-year term.  Every person
6shall be eligible to the office of Alternate who shall
6have attained to the age of twenty-one years, and been
3seven years a Citizen of the United States, and who
1shall, upon and subsequent to being appointed, be
4either in attendance at or a graduate of the Federal
0Academy, and without formal affiliation with any
;political party.  The Alternate shall serve in the District
5of the Representative as the intermediary between the
8Constituents of the District and the Representative, and
9shall have responsibility over services for Constituents.
2The Alternate shall refer Constituent requests for
5particular Legislation to the appropriate Legislative
3Committee.  If no Legislative Committee exists, the
4Alternate shall refer the Constituent to the Federal
8Committee.  No Alternate shall be eligible to the office
5of Representative until one year has elapsed from the
3end of his or her term, subject to the exception of
    vacancy.
);0When vacancies happen in the Representation from
any State,
)=. the Executive Authority thereof shall issue W
rites
of Election to fill such V
acancies.
the age requirement for
m5Representative shall, if necessary, be suspended, and
6the Alternate shall assume the vacancy.  The Alternate
"shall be eligible for re-election.

@acancies may happen from various causes; resignation, disability
, death,
UHor expulsion.  The power to provide for vacancies is an obvious one, and
Gthis Clause formerly assigned the power to the Governors of the States.
DUnspecified in the Clause of the 1787 Constitution are the necessary
Jtemporal parameters regarding the issuance of
writs of election
 will a
Bvacancy be filled if there are only six months left in the term? T
en? T
welve?
U    Generally
)2@, Governors did not call elections unless the unexpired term was
UKover twelve months, due to the expense of a special election.  Consequently
UMunder this Clause, a District could conceivably be without representation for
Times
as long as one year
gKThe addition of the Alternate supersedes this passage.  In this regard, the
UFAlternate functions for the Representative in the same manner as the V
UAPresident functions for the President
 vacancies will be filled
immediately
However
)0B, the Alternate has additional obligations: the responsibility for
UCconstituent services, while serving as the intermediary between the
Dconstituents of the District and the Representative, who is based in
Kashington, D.C.  Thus, constituents will have direct contact with a Federal
official.  Additionally
)p:, it gives the Alternate, who will either be a graduate of
UKthe Federal Academy or a third-year student, and who will in all likelihood
Kbe a future candidate for Representative, the opportunity to see first-hand
Bthe impact of Federal policies on the lives of everyday people.  W
ith this
opportunity
)?B, the future candidate is out of the world of abstractions and raw
UIdata and in the world of living, breathing human beings.  Along with this
Ivaluable
reality check,
 the Alternate is exposed to the concerns of the
Dpeople who live in the District, the people s/he will one day serve.
FBecause the Alternate will be performing constituent services (freeing
UFthe Representative from this time-consuming and potentially corrupting
Ktask), the Alternate will become well-known in the District, and be able to
Ibuild a
political base
 from which to run for office.  Thus, a potential
Danimosity may arise between the Representative and the Alternate.  T
UNameliorate this potentially unhealthy situation, the Alternate is limited to a
Isingle one-year term (this also allows for more nominees to be exposed to
Mthe problems of the District).  As an additional precaution, the Alternate is
Hnot allowed to run for election until one year after his or her term has
Eexpired, putting temporal distance between the services performed for
constituents and the Alternate
s views on National Policy
.  Thus, the
UQAlternate is more likely to be elected for his or her views, and not for services
:rendered to certain influential residents of the District.
HIn addition to performing constituent services, the Alternate will refer
UGconstituents who are either concerned with social problems, or who have
Nproposals for future legislation, to the Legislative Committees set up for the
Hpurpose.  For example, a constituent concerned with the literacy problem
Awill be referred to the Committee on the Monthly Book Program for
JElementary School Children, or any one of the other Committees established
Qto deal with the problem.  If the constituent is not satisfied with any or all of
Jthese existing approaches, the constituent is invited to submit his or her
Kproposal for legislation dealing with the problem to the Federal Committee,
Lwhich is responsible for the establishment of new Committees, subject to the
Krules established in Section Fifteen of this Article.  Under these Clauses,
Eevery taxpaying Citizen has the same freedom and authority granted to
today
)#Fs lobbyists and special interests: the opportunity to place a proposal
on the Public Agenda.
Times

Article I, Section 2, Clause 5
Garamond
m#The House of Representatives shall
 chuse
choose
their
Speaker and other Officers
# ; and shall have the sole Power of
Impeachment.
)X)and the Nominees for Senatorial elections
m4under the guidelines enumerated in
 A-100, provided
8that there shall be not less than three and no more than
2six Nominees for each seat in the Senate, and that
.Nominations for the office of Senator shall be
7representative of the population to the greatest extent
7possible with regard to sex, race, national origin, and
1other factors the Congress shall designate as the
National Interest requires.

JUnder the current system, nominations for key political offices are in the
hands of a) the
media
)!4, who decide to recognize candidate A over candidate
ULB, and give that particular candidate air time, and thus brand him or her as
legitimate,
 and b)
political parties
)Z$.  In essence, approval by the media
UMand the parties is necessary to attain office: without this approval, private
and P
HAC financing is virtually impossible to obtain, and a political campaign
ULcannot be conducted.  The net consequence of this unholy alliance is that if
Kthe media and the two political parties do not discuss the issues which are
Nmost critical for the long-term interests of the American people, or recognize
Ithe candidates who discuss these issues, an essential political power has
?been impermissibly granted to private
 not public
 concerns.
FThis Clause pulls the nominating process out of the hands of the media
UL(which collectively receives hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue from
Ipolitical advertisements, and which is thus more likely to legitimize the
Kcandidates who attract the most financing), and puts the nominating process
exclusively in the hands of
elected
),$officials who are not allowed formal
UEparty membership, who owe no allegiance to private concerns, who must
Mmake their nominations from the pool of the best and brightest individuals in
?the country (trained for their positions at one of the Country
s finest
ULacademic institutions), and who may be removed from office if the quality of
Ithe nominees does not reflect the wishes of the People.  In addition, the
EClause helps to insure diversity and representation in Government, by
Jproviding that nominations be representative of the population with regard
)to the designated factors.  In his essay
 Thoughts on American Government,
Times
+U1CJohn Adams had written that a representative assembly
should be in
Kminiature an exact portrait of the people at large.  It should think, feel,
reason, and act like them.
'On June 6 at the Federal Convention,  W
ilson
U9said that
[t]he Govt. ought to possess not only 1st the
force
)     but 2ndly
. the
or sense
of the people at large.
)z$The Legislature ought to be the most
U%exact transcript of the whole Society
In light of this consideration,
Hamilton stated in
Federalist
that
It is said to be necessary
*, that all classes of citizens should have
g3some of their own number in the representative body
, in order that
g=their feelings and interests may be the better understood and
Jattended to. . . . But . . . [t]he idea of an actual representation of all
3classes of the people . . . is altogether visionary
.  Unless it were
expressly provided
)n/in the Constitution . . . the thing would never
take place in practice.
aking Hamilton
s advice, THE 21ST CENTUR
Y CONSTITUTION
expressly provides
)h;for an increase in the probability of equal representation,
U:a hallmark of every Government that wishes to call itself
democratic
The Constitutional Supplement
<The Constitutional Supplement (
A-100
 means Constitutional
UGSupplement Section A-100) is one of the most important new additions to
Fthe Constitution.  Under the concept of the Constitutional Supplement,
Qcertain critical provisions, such as the guidelines discussed in this Clause, are
Keasier to amend than other provisions of the Constitution.  There are three
JSections of the Constitutional Supplement: those in Section A are the most
Mdifficult to amend, and require the consent of a Majority of the People
Hprovisions in Section C are the easiest to amend, and do not require the
Kconsent of the People.   The Constitutional Supplement is discussed further
in Article Seven.
GInterestingly enough, an ersatz Constitutional Supplement exists today:
U;the decisions of the Supreme Court.  One of our Government
dirty little
UDsecrets
 is that there are two Constitutions in America today: the W
ritten
UEConstitution (the one we all studied in 8th grade), and the Empirical
.Constitution discussed in the previous chapter
They are not the same.
example, under the W
)ritten Constitution, Congress shall pass
U#abridging the Freedom of Speech.  Y
$et under the Empirical Constitution,
UBCongress is empowered to pass laws abridging the Freedom of Speech
5whenever it feels such laws are
necessary and proper
  For details, see the
U.Hatch Political Activity Act (5 U.S.C.A. 7324
et seq
.) and the
U,Communications Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C.A. 151
et seq
.).  There are hundreds
UDof examples of other Constitutional rewrites, too many to list here.
Times
+U1$Interested readers should consult Dr
. Ladanyi
s book,
The 1987
Constitution
)L9(the First Amendment, which typically occupies 4 lines of
written text, occupies
pages of his book!).
Under THE 21ST CENTUR
(Y CONSTITUTION, the power to rewrite the
UHConstitution by historical practice (i.e., if the Government ignores the
IConstitution long enough, historical practice becomes law) is terminated.
Unquestionably
)T5, a Constitution must evolve with the times, but this
evolution
 must itself occur
constitutionally
. The concept of the
UEConstitutional Supplement is that the provision supplemented needs to
6change with the times; but the change must occur on a
formal
, and not
, basis.

Article I, Section 3, Clause 1
Garamond
m8The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each State,
 chosen by the Legislature
elected
by the People
thereof, for
 six
ears; and each Senator
shall have one V
ote.
The term of the Senator may be
m1extended to four years, as provided under Section
Fifteen of this Article.

The Senate
)E.s role is vastly changed under THE 21ST CENTUR
U3CONSTITUTION.  Because it has been given more power
, the length of the
U>term for each Senator must be reduced to reflect the new power
.  This term
UMlength is initially set at two years, but may be changed to four years by the
+People as provided under Section Fifteen.

Article I, Section 3, Clause 2
m;Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of
?the first  Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be
Ainto three Classes.  The Seats of the Senators of the first Class
2shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Y
, of the
m.second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Y
    , and the
second Y
., of the second Class at the Expiration of the
fourth Y
7, and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth
0, so that one third may be chosen every second Y
ear; and
8acancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the
Garamond
+m3>Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive  thereof
9may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of
-the Legislature, which shall then fill such V
    acancies.
m2When vacancies happen in the representation of any
4State in the Senate, the age requirement for Senator
4shall, if necessary, be suspended, and the Executive
:Authority of such State shall appoint an Alternate to fill
such vacancies
)f'from one of the Federal Districts.  The
m-Alternate shall be eligible for re-election.
Times

HThe deletion of the Second Clause from Article One, Section Three of the
UM1787 Constitution eliminates the concept of staggered terms for Senators.  If
Lthe People find that the Senate has gone beyond its Constitutional powers, a
GMajority of the Senate (or the entire Senate) may be removed in any one
Helection. The Governor of each State still has the power to make vacancy
Happointments, but the Governor must make his or her choice from the pool
/of Alternates serving in the Federal Districts.

Article I, Section 3, Clause 3
Every
Person shall be
eligible to the office of
Senator who shall
 not
have attained to the Age of
 thirty
twenty-five
ears, and been
 nine
seven
ears a Citizen of
m the United States, and who shall
 not
 when elected
m+and subsequent to taking the oath of office
, be an
m%Inhabitant of that State for which he
or she
shall be chosen
m3graduate of the Federal Academy, and without formal
9affiliation with any political party; but no person shall
&serve more than eight years as Senator

HThese are essentially the same qualifications for office as required for
U9Representatives, and are instituted for the same reasons.

)!Article I, Section 3, Clauses 4-5
Garamond
+m3=The Vice President of the United States shall be President of
the Senate, but shall have no V
ote, unless they be equally
divided.
The Senate shall
 chuse
choose
their other Officers, and also
m>a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President,
or when he
or she
)/)shall exercise the Office of President of
the United States.
Times

8The Fourth and Fifth Clauses preserve the power of the V
ice President to
ULbreak tie votes in the Senate, and the power of the Senate to choose its own
    Officers.

Article I, Section 3, Clause 6
Subclauses 1-3
m-The Senate shall have the exclusive power and
3obligation to oversee the operations of Government,
4and insure compliance with this Constitution; and to
5Appoint an Auditor to serve for four years or until a
4successor has been appointed.  Each year the Auditor
-shall conduct a thorough audit of all Federal
4Government accounts and operations, and shall submit
3these audit reports to the Senate, which shall make
-these reports available to the public; and to
Publish
     regular
Quarterly
Statement and Account
of all
public money
)Z(Receipts and Expenditures by the Federal
Government
)U' shall be published from time to time.
, and
m/Quarterly reports of Congressional progress and
Government functions; and to

-HThe First Subclause of the Sixth Clause introduces the first fundamental
UAstructural differences between the 1787 Constitution and THE 21ST
CENTUR
)23Y CONSTITUTION. Under this Subclause the Senate has
U    exclusive
Legislative powers
obligations.
Thus, the New Constitution
mandates
)8Fthat certain critical laws be passed.  If the laws are not passed, the
Times
+U1JPeople know who are responsible, and may vote out the lawbreakers at their
2discretion (if they haven
t been impeached first).
EThe Second and Third Subclauses insure that the People, who pay taxes
UHto support the Government, know where their money is going and how it is
Jspent. (The Third Subclause was formerly Section Nine of Article One).  If
money is being spent unwisely
!, or is otherwise unaccounted for
, the People
UIwill be informed, and thus be able to take action to correct the problem.

Article I, Section 3, Clause 6
Subclauses 4-5
Garamond
m0Establish a Federal Committee, consisting of one
7Senator from each State, which shall create and disband
2the Legislative Committees described under Section
Fifteen of this Article; and to
2Administer and Regulate the National Database, the
4National Poll, the National Objectives, the National
5Initiative, the National Referendum, and the National
Recall; and to

!=These Subclauses establish the power of the Senate to provide
UDregulations for the
direct democracy
 provisions in THE 21ST CENTUR
UECONSTITUTION.  The Federal Committee has Oversight of the Legislative
KCommittees, groups of Citizens who propose, research, and draft legislation
'(discussed further in Section Fifteen).

Article I, Section 3, Clause 6
Subclauses 6-8
m3Nominate candidates for the Office of President and
6Vice President and the House of Representatives, under
7the procedures outlined in
 A-105, provided that there
1shall be not less than three and no more than six
&Nominees for each seat in the House of
7Representatives, and not less than ten and no more than
6twenty Nominees each for President and Vice President;
Garamond
+m3/and provided that one-half the Nominees for the
4Presidency and Vice Presidency shall be graduates of
1the Federal Academy, and that Nominations for all
8offices shall be representative of the population to the
2greatest extent possible with regard to sex, race,
5national origin, and other factors the Congress shall
3designate as the National Interest requires; and to
0Supervise and provide guidelines for the Federal
2Elections Commission, to be enumerated in
 C-100,
0which is authorized to and shall enact electoral
8Legislation securing the Objectives set forth in Section
Ten of this Article; and to
5Compile, prior to Elections, a Performance Rating for
5each Representative determined by dividing the sum of
6the Evaluations of votes cast by the Representative by
/the number of votes cast by the Representative,
7provided that a Representative is given Zero points for
 votes; a Performance Rating comprised of the
5average of the Evaluations of
 votes cast by the
5Representative; and a Performance Rating comprised of
5the sum of the Evaluations of
 votes cast by the
4Representative.  The Senate shall publish the voting
,record of each Representative and his or her
1Performance Ratings on the National Database, and
.shall utilize these Performance Ratings in any
4subsequent Legislation to which they may apply;  and
Times

EThe Sixth Subclause provides for nominations of important officers of
UGGovernment by elected officials, and for the same reasons given earlier
.  The
ULnomination process insures that half the nominees for President be graduates
of the Federal Academy
), even though there is no Federal Academy
UFgraduation requirement for that office.  Nominations for the office of
IPresident must be representative of the population to the greatest extent
    possible.
DThe Seventh Subclause allocates to the Senate the exclusive power of
UHsupervision over the Federal Elections Commission, which is charged with
.the responsibility of insuring fair elections.
,The Eighth Subclause gives the voters three
    objective
appraisals of the
ULperformance of their Representative.  Under Section Six of this Article, the
Times
+U1Mprimary Legislative responsibility of Representatives is to vote for Bills in
Lthe National Interest.  How is this to be determined?  Section Seven of this
JArticle establishes a Legislative Review Board, which provides Evaluations
Ifor Bills based on the extent to which they serve the National Interest
and provides those Evaluations
before
the Representatives vote on the
U=Bills.  A Bill given an Evaluation of 85 would be much better
, from this
U3standpoint, than a Bill with an Evaluation of 10.
BAs an example, assume that the Representative has cast 4 votes, as
follows:
ote by Representative
Evaluation of Bill
Net Points
ote 1
ote 2
ote 3
Against
ote 4
Against
g\
otal Points for Representative
The first time s/he voted
(a Bill with an Evaluation of 40, and was
given
"points; the second time s/he voted
a Bill with an Evaluation of
- 30, and was given
6points (i.e., 30 points was subtracted from his or her
U"total); the third time s/he voted
against
)-$a Bill with an Evaluation of 60, and
was given
;points (no points are given or subtracted for
 votes
U5see Subclause Eight); and the fourth time s/he voted
against
a Bill with an
U"Evaluation of - 15, and was given
    points.
g?When his or her four votes are totaled, the Representative has
points.
U>Under the First Performance Rating, this number is divided by
(the number
UBof votes cast).  Thus, this Rating of the Representative would be
.  Not
UHvery good, considering that under this Constitution a Zero Rating may be
*considered evidence of unconstitutionality
!.  When it comes time to face the
UKvoters, the Representative will have to explain why this Performance Rating
    is so low
)-4.  His or her opponent may also have some questions.
gBThe Representative did not have to have such a low Rating, however
UGHad the Representative wanted to improve his or her Performance Rating,
s/he would have voted
)the Bills with positive Evaluations, and
against
U0the Bills with negative Evaluations, as follows:
ote by Representative
Evaluation of Bill
Net Points
ote 1
ote 2
Against
ote 3
ote 4
Against
g^
otal Points for Representative
Times
Had s/he voted in this manner
$, s/he would have received points as
U    follows:
, and
.  The total would have been
, and the First
U#Performance Rating would have been
, a Rating
)6    ten times
better than the
one s/he actually received!
?Thus, the Representative has a very powerful incentive to vote
Bills
in the National Interest, and
against
).#Bills which are not in the National
UCInterest.  The First Performance Rating alone greatly increases the
6probability that the Representative will consider the
National
Interest when
voting, and not
local
)!6interests, which lead to high deficits, poorly drafted
UElegislation, and undesirable social consequences that result from the
Amisallocation of funds.  Because the Senate has the power to rank
ARepresentatives by their Performance Ratings, Representatives who
consistently
)E>disregard the Evaluations of the Legislative Review Board will
ULfind themselves at the
bottom of the class
: not only embarrassing, and not
Lonly penalizable by the Senate, but also a potentially fatal obstacle to re-
election hopes.
IUnder this Subclause, the Representative retains his or her power to vote
UGto keep a military base in his or her District, even though the base is
unnecessary
)A=, or to vote for a weapons program that provides jobs for the
UHLockheed workers in his or her District, even though the weapons program
is obsolete.  However
)q9, the Representative must pay a price for the exercise of
this power
)7D.  In voting to keep his or her constituents happy from the point of
ULview of their short-term self-interest, the Representative makes it less and
Oless probable that s/he will be re-elected, instituting a necessary balance our
Ncurrent Constitution does not provide.  It goes without saying that it will be
Kthe rare Representative who will vote for a Bill with a negative Evaluation
that
does not
)7(benefit his or her constituents directly
.  The Performance
UJRating System thus insures that Representatives who vote for Bills against
-the National Interest will be in the minority
 , and that such legislation will
U$either not be, or rarely be, passed.
DThe next two Performance Ratings are designed to prevent
strategic
UGvoting by Representatives to achieve high Evaluations without regard to
Htheir own personal political convictions and/or the convictions of their
Mconstituents.  If only the First Performance Rating were used, it is possible
8(however unlikely) that a Representative would vote for
every
Bill with a
U%Rating higher than Zero, and against
every
Bill with an Evaluation of Zero
UM(or less than Zero).  The Representative (voting strategically) would do this
Dto prevent Zero points (or less) from being averaged into his or her
HPerformance Rating. Thus, a Representative would vote for a Bill with an
HEvaluation of 5, because to vote against the Bill would mean having Zero
?points averaged into his or her Rating. This would obviously be
Lcounterproductive; in this case, the Representative would be penalized for a
$potential exercise of good judgment.
Times
+g1DThe Second Performance Rating provides a different criterion for the
UFevaluation of performance.  Under the Second Performance Rating,
Lvotes are not considered.  So, were a Representative to vote for a Bill with
Kan Evaluation of 5, and had his or her other two positive votes been 20 and
G50, the Representative would lower his or her Second Performance Rating
Cfrom 35 to 25.  Thus, the Second Performance Rating discourages the
:Representative from voting for Bills with low Evaluations.
BAnother potential (though equally improbable) strategy would be to
UIvote for a Bill with an Evaluation of 100, and then refuse to vote on any
'other legislation.  Under this strategy
", a Representative would achieve a
UIRating of 100 on his or her First and Second Performance Rating, but only
/because no other votes had been averaged in!  T
o prevent this final form of
UMstrategic voting, the Third Performance Rating is simply the sum total of all
Mthe votes by the Representatives.  Thus, a vote total of 100 in a Legislative
Aworld where the vote totals are in the tens of thousands would be
.potentially disastrous for the Representative.
CThe three Ratings together are greater than the sum of their parts.
ULImagine five Representatives A, B, C, D, and E, and their voting records, as
%follows (
 signifies a
 vote):
ote 1
ote 2
no vote
ote 3
no vote
ote 4
no vote
ote 5
ote 6
ote 7
ote 8
ote 9
ote 10
g)Their Performance Ratings are as follows:
Performance Rating 1
Performance Rating 2
Performance Rating 3
When
;the Performance Ratings are taken into account, we see that
UBRepresentative B may marginally be considered the finest, from the
Mstandpoint of votes for the National Interest.  B was at the top of Rating 3,
Times
+U1Hand second in Ratings 1 and 2.  The worst  Representative was
nightmare
CRepresentative
 E, who was last in all the Ratings.  The job of the
Representative is to vote
,Bills in the National Interest, and by every
U'measurement E was derelict in that duty
!.  A Representative who is at the
bottom of
)9    all three
)28Performance Ratings will have a lot of explaining to do,
U&and may even be liable to Impeachment.
Aith three Ratings, each voter can decide for him or herself which
ULranking is the most important, in those situations where a Representative is
>in the highest percentile on one Rating, the middle on another
    , and the
ULlowest on a third.  At the same time, Representatives who are highest on all
Kthree will be seen as objectively good Representatives, and Representatives
Hwho are lowest on all three will be seen as what they are
 objectively
Representatives.

Article I, Section 3, Clause 6
Subclauses 9-12
Garamond
m7Enact conflict-of-interest and ethics Legislation which
0shall apply to all elected and appointed Federal
9officials or staff members in the Legislative, Executive,
5and Judicial Branches of Government. The conflict-of-
9interest and ethics Legislation shall include, but not be
-limited to, requirements for mandatory annual
8disclosure by public officials of economic interests and
6sources of income, and shall be designated in
 C-105;
and to
5Regulate or forbid all lobbying other than impersonal
,contact through the presentation of letters,
6memoranda, studies, or other written or electronically
transmitted materials; and to
* 0Pass regulations against vote-trading and caucus
,membership by Representatives, Senators, and
Delegates; and to
7Conduct investigations into the misconduct or potential
)misconduct of any Representative, Senator
, Alternate,
m5Delegate, President, or Officer of Government; and to

Times
+gBGAnother factor leading to outrageously high deficits and poorly drafted
legislation is
institutionalized corruption
, otherwise known as the
private
U    financing
)8Cof elections.  Under this system of quasi-bribery which our current
UKConstitution obviously lacks the power to prevent, the National Association
Hof Auto Dealers can give $5,000 for the re-election of Representative X,
Iwho just happens to head the committee which has jurisdiction over
lemon
 legislation.  As Chairman of that committee, this Representative could
Iconceivably work to make sure that the Bill is not
reported out,
 (which
Gmeans that it would not be voted upon).  Thus, hundreds of thousands of
Gpurchasers of automobiles would have to endure needless frustration and
Lwholly unjust and potentially debilitating repair bills, and all because one
ARepresentative wanted to place a half-page ad in the local paper!
gIThe four Subclauses of this Section are the first part of the solution to
UHthis problem.  Under these Subclauses, conflicts-of-interest will not be
Etolerated (and receiving private funds from a concern while voting on
Mlegislation affecting that concern is an inherent conflict-of interest).  The
ESenate has the power to prevent personal lobbying, which can include,
:among other things,
wining and dining
 Federal officials.
5The Eleventh Subclause declares that the practice of
logrolling
ULtrading votes, is an unconstitutional practice.
Logrolling
 is a political
?phenomenon wherein Representative X votes for Representative Y
s pork-
U$barrel project, or Representative Y
,s special-interest legislation, if Y will do
UIthe same for X.  As a consequence it will frequently happen that two laws
favored by a
Majority
)55of the People are rejected in favor of two Bills that
favor a
)*    Minority
)4:of the People.  Consider the following report of a swap of
corn for porn
 from
)t    The New Y
ork T
imes:
gDA provision to prohibit government financing of
patently offensive
Esexual exhibits was removed from an Appropriations bill, as part of a
deal with W
)C7estern senators to preserve low grazing fees on Federal
g$land in 16 states.  Representative W
illiam Dannemeyer (R-CA) called
g%the deal a
swap of corn for porn.
Grazing fees can buy anything,
 complained Representative Mike
Synar
?, Democrat of Oklahoma, the author of a provision passed by the
g<House that would have increased the charges by more than 400
percent.
This year the Senate traded anti-pornography language for no
gFincrease,
 he said.
Last year it was the Outer Continental Shelf oil
Eand gas program.  Maybe I should put grazing fees on the defense bill
and eliminate the B-2 bomber
gHThe worst aspect of
logrolling
 is that it is the engine behind deficit
UKspending, since the only incentive a Representative from Kansas has to vote
Times
+U1:for a pork-barrel project favoring a Representative from W
isconsin is that the
favor
 will be returned.  This results in a reversal of Bernard Mandeville
UJdoctrine (rationalizing laissez-faire economics) of
Private vices, Public
Mbenefits
 logrolling insures that America will have private benefits at the
>cost of public vices (like deficit spending).  Needless to say
, this
phenomenon must be
stopped
)++.  The Performance Rating System makes this
U>practice improbable, and Subclause Eleven makes this practice
illegal
.  If a
UORepresentative even attempts to
logroll,
  his or her job will be on the line.
ASince caucus membership can exacerbate the
logrolling
 effect by
Hunifying Representatives along the lines of special interests, it too is
forbidden.
The T
)!<welfth Subclause grants to the Senate the necessary power to
ULconduct investigations into all such infractions (or potential infractions).

Article I, Section 3, Clause 6
Subclauses 13-14
Garamond
m5Establish Timetables to be applied by the Legislative
3Review Board, provided that no Timetable other than
7an indefinite Timetable be shorter than thirty days nor
6longer than one hundred and eighty days, that there be
9not less than four categories of Timetables, and that all
(Bills must be voted upon by the House of
5Representatives prior to expiration of the Timetable;
.Assign penalties for those members of Congress
4responsible when Legislative Review Board Timetables
5are not met, and penalties for those officials of the
6Executive Branch responsible in the event laws are not
executed by that Branch; and to

FThe Senate has extensive regulatory powers over the Legislative Review
UJBoard, and the Thirteenth Subclause regulates the power of the Legislative
@Review Board to put Timetables on legislation. Under the current
MConstitution, good legislation can, and does,
die in committee
: that is, it
Jnever gets reported out to the floor of the House, where it would be voted
upon.  T
)-4o take one of thousands of examples (as reported in
Congress and
the Nation
g;Legislation (HR2382) sponsored by 232 members of the House,
Times
+g1>never got out of the House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on
>elecommunications in 1984 because some members demanded public
g?interest guidelines for programming that the industry would not
Eaccept.  After nearly a year of on-and-off negotiations, subcommittee
Bmembers gave up their efforts to reach agreement on a deregulation
bill.
gJFrom a Judicial standpoint, this is akin to unjustly empowering a court to
U0hear certain cases to the exclusion of others. Y
et this is the current
U/Legislative System
 a system which is, however
, changed under the
UKTimetable concept.  Under this concept,  the Legislative Review Board gives
Peach Bill a time frame.  At the expiration of the time frame (for example, three
'months) the Bill must be voted upon.  W
!ith Timetables in place, the vast
UKmajority of Bills will be voted upon, preserving the right of all Americans
G(and the issues with which they are concerned) to have their day in the
Legislative court.
<The Timetable concept also solves the problem of undue delay
    .  One of
UPthe tactics of Congress is to delay voting on important Bills until the
heat is
Ioff.
 For example, after a particularly horrific case of police brutality
Hreported in the media, a Representative might introduce a Bill providing
Mfunding for some form of solution for the problem.  Because the allocation of
!funds is a zero-sum game, however
&, and because money for project A (the
UEprogram regulating police brutality) is less money for project B, the
supporters of project B will
oppose
)+%spending for project A, no matter how
UJworthwhile the project.  The Representatives and Senators, funded by these
"special interests, act accordingly
..  A simple tactic is to wait until the People
cool off,
 and simply refuse to act on the Bill
 in this case, an obviously
intolerable situation.
#Because there may be times, however
 , when the temporary passions of
UJthe People do not conform to the National Interest, the Legislative Review
LBoard can give a Timetable of 180 days to legislation, providing a six-month
cooling-off
 period for those cases where a cooling-off period is desirable.
AThe Legislative Review Board is also empowered to give indefinite
LTimetables to one-fifth the legislation it considers.  If a Bill is given an
indefinite Timetable, it may
1, at the discretion of the committee to which the
UMBill has been assigned,
die in committee.
  Generally Bills given indefinite
ITimetables for this reason will also be given low Evaluations, making the
1passage of such legislation even more improbable.

Article I, Section 3, Clause 6
Subclause 15
Garamond
+m<+Provide penalties for those Delegates whose
2Evaluations are discrepant with the average of the
4Evaluations given by the other Delegates on the same
5Legislation, provided that the minimal discrepancy is
8not less than twenty-five points, and that discrepancies
1by two hundred points and over must be considered
2impeachable offenses, if and only if the aforesaid
7discrepancies occur as a specified percentage deviation
5within any group of one hundred contiguous votes, and
4that the unacceptable deviation is not less than ten
1percent and no greater than fifty percent for any
penalty; and to
Times

>The Fifteenth Subclause insures that individual members of the
UJLegislative Review Board (called
Delegates
) cannot disrupt the integrity
Kof the Bill Evaluation process.  Under the procedure as outlined in Section
LSeven, the Evaluation is derived from the individual votes of Delegates, who
Eare authorized to give a Rating of anywhere from 100 to - 1000 to any
#individual piece of legislation.  T
*o insure that no one Delegate can skew the
UBEvaluation dramatically upward or downward, the highest and lowest
@Ratings of Legislative Review Board members are discarded. As an
Iadditional precaution, Subclause Fifteen authorizes the Senate to provide
+penalties for those Delegates whose voting
habitually
deviates from the
norm.
@s how it works.  Under this Subclause, the Senate can penalize a
UMDelegate only when both of two factors are present: first, the discrepancy of
#an individual vote by the Delegate
be more than
points away from
UHthe average of the votes cast by the other members.  Thus, if Delegate X
&votes to give a Bill an Evaluation of
#, and the average vote of the other
members is
, the vote is only
!points away from the average, and
therefore does not and
cannot
)*-count against the Delegate.  If, on the other
U?hand, the Delegate has voted to give the Bill an Evaluation of
the vote is
-points away from the average, and the Senate
provide a penalty
average vote
 = the average of the vote by the other Delegates):
Delegate V
verage V
Prohibited Discrepancy?
No (under 25 points)
Possibly (over 25 points)
g0But the extent of discrepancy is only one factor
.  The Senate can
UHpenalize the Delegate only when the second factor is also met
 that the
Times
+U1%Delegate has voted against the grain
too many times
.  Under this Subclause,
UHdiscrepancy is expressed as a percentage, and ten percent is the minimum
/percentage required for penalizable discrepancy
.  So, if a Delegate has voted
U0100 times, then the Delegate must be discrepant
by over 25 points at least
U    ten times
for any penalty to be levied.
"If the Delegate has voted over 100
UMtimes (e.g., 350 times), the Delegate must be discrepant ten times or over in
@contiguous grouping of 100 votes for a penalty to be levied: for
ULexample, the Delegate may not be sufficiently discrepant in votes 126 to 225
O(eight prohibited discrepancies), but might be sufficiently discrepant in votes
-166 to 265 (twelve prohibited discrepancies).
FAssume that the following are the results of the first four votes in a
UILegislative session by a discrepant Delegate and the other Members of the
Legislative Review Board:
Delegate V
verage V
Prohibited Discrepancy?
ote 1
Possibly (over 25 points)
ote 2
- 100
No (less than 25 points)
ote 3
- 200
es (over 200 points)
ote 4
No (less than 25 points)
gAIn this example, the individual voting of the wayward Delegate is
UJdiscrepant with the average vote of the other Delegates by greater than 25
Lpoints two of four times.  The Delegate has been (possibly) discrepant fifty
Hpercent of the time (depending on the regulations passed by the Senate),
Jand even discrepant by over 200 points one time, but since only four votes
Mhave been taken into account, no penalty can be levied.  So, until eight more
Bvotes have taken place, the Delegate cannot possibly be penalized.
FThe Fifteenth Subclause also states that discrepancies over 200 points
9be considered impeachable offenses if they occur between
fifty
Lpercent of the time (not more, not less),  So, if any Delegate is discrepant
by 200 points or over
at least ten
but not greater than fifty
times in any
U0grouping of 100 contiguous votes, that Delegate
be impeached under
UJthis Constitution (and discrepancies less than 200 points and greater than
25 points
1be declared impeachable offenses by the Senate).
gJThus, the Fifteenth Subclause gives the Senate a great deal of flexibility
UEin insuring that Delegates cannot impose their own personal political
Gphilosophies on the Nation as a whole, while preventing the Senate from
5granting the Legislative Review Board too much leeway
, or from unduly
UMrestricting the disparity of opinions of Delegates, a disparity essential for
(preserving the integrity of the process.
Times

Article I, Section 3, Clause 6
Subclauses 16-17
Garamond
m8Provide Appropriations for the faithful execution of the
above provisions; and to
4Designate the regulations affecting the above powers
6and any other powers granted exclusively to the Senate
3under this Constitution in
 C-100 through
 C-199.
7Legislation to be designated in
 C-100 through
 C-199
7shall be signed into law by the President within thirty
9days after passage by a full Majority vote of the Senate.

FThe Sixteenth Subclause, in adherence to the Accountability Principle,
UIgives the power to the Senate to provide the funds necessary for insuring
Jthat the provisions of this Section are given effect.  Because neither the
CPresident nor the House of Representatives are entitled to veto the
Hprovisions passed by the Senate, the Senate has total responsibility for
@Oversight of Government, without the danger that the Branches of
BGovernment they are overseeing can prevent investigations into and
Nregulations of their conduct. The Senate itself is responsible to the ultimate
authority: the People.

Article I, Section 3, Clause 7
m%The Senate shall have the sole Power
of Impeachment and
the trial of
 to try
)0(all Impeachments.  When sitting for that
m/Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation.
     When the
m@President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall
preside
&No Person shall be charged without the
m2Concurrence of a Majority of the Members present,
m;no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two
 thirds of the Members present.
The Vice President
shall be
m&removed from Office on Impeachment for
, and Conviction of,
Treason, Bribery, or other
 high Crimes and Misdemeanors
m3significant violations of the law, as enumerated in
 B-105.  Representatives and Senators may be removed
Garamond
+m38for the foregoing reasons, for violation of conflict-of-
9interest and ethics Legislation passed by the Senate, for
<failure to fulfill their responsibilities as defined in this
5Constitution, and for failure to report violations by
-other elected or appointed Officials of their
1Constitutional responsibilities. Delegates may be
7removed for the foregoing reasons, and for violation of
2Legislative Review Board Regulations passed by the
;Senate.  All civil Officers of the United States, including
7the Judiciary, may be removed for good cause.  Inferior
6Officers, as defined and regulated in
 B-100, may be
2removed by the Senate from office by full Majority
vote, without Impeachment.
Judgment in Cases of
m9Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from
<Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of
honor
)#8, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party
m5convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to
=Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.
7The right to trial by jury shall not extend to cases of
Impeachment.
Times

CThe Seventh Clause consolidates the Impeachment powers provided for
UJin our Constitution, which currently does not allow for the Impeachment of
+Representatives and Senators.  Consequently
, Senators like the
Keating
 who helped to create financial debacles like the Savings and Loan
Ascandal which will end up costing the taxpayers $500 billion, are
reprimanded
)K1(if they are punished at all) for what should be
impeachable
ULoffenses.  As James Iredell stated in debate at the North Carolina Ratifying
DConvention on July 24, 1788,
A man in public office who knows that
Nthere is no tribunal to punish him, may be ready to deviate from his duty; but
Mif he knows there is a tribunal for that purpose, although he may be a man of
Dno principle, the very terror of punishment will perhaps deter him.
gGConsistent with its exclusive power of Oversight, the Senate is charged
with this responsibility
)y3.  Under the Seventh Clause the Senate can not only
UGremove Officers of Government by the formal process of Impeachment, but
Bcan also remove
inferior Officers
 by full Majority vote, without
FImpeachment, allocating the Senate a larger measure of control over an
unelected bureaucracy
gEThis Clause also mandates that impeachable offenses be defined in the
UFConstitutional Supplement. The current Constitution allows Impeachment
Ffor
high Crimes and Misdemeanors,
 too vague a formulation for such a
Times
serious matter
)H?.  If a Judge commits a crime, and the Congress doesn
t want to
U)impeach, it need only say that the crime
was not
 crime.  Or
, if a
UDJudge commits a minor crime, and Congress wants to impeach, Congress
#need only say that the minor crime
 crime.  W
e can do better
gFOne notable change in the new Impeachment Clause is that the President
UMof the United States is no longer impeachable (though s/he is still removable
3from office by reason of incapacity
 see Article T
wo, Section One, Clauses
UEThree through Nine).  The power to remove the President of the United
MStates directly has been given to the People of the United States, in Section
8Fifteen of this Article, for the reasons outlined there.

Article I, Section 4, Clause 1
Garamond
m5The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for
?Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State
<by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time
'by Law make or alter such Regulations,
 except as to the Places
of chusing Senators.
"provided that no Law or Regulation
m5may be passed which violates any rights granted under
6this Constitution.  The Primary Election shall be held
6the Saturday and Sunday Next after the first Monday in
    September
)E(. The General Election shall be held the
m2Saturday and Sunday Next after the first Monday in
November

FThe New Constitution preserves the power of the States and Congress to
UKregulate elections, as long as no rights granted under the Constitution are
Hviolated.  For example, a State cannot pass a law requiring passage of a
&literacy test for the right to vote.
DThe First Clause also formally establishes the days when the Federal
UKPrimary and General Elections will be held.  Elections are held on weekends
Hin several countries in Europe, a practice which thus allows the average
Gworking person to more easily vote, a practice which thus increases the
Jprobability of voter participation,  and a practice which is thus mandated
under THE 21ST CENTUR
&Y CONSTITUTION.  Since Saturdays are a
UDreligious holiday for many Americans, Elections will also be held on
Sundays.
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Article I, Section 4, Clause 2
Garamond
m4The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Y
, and
such meeting shall
)y# be on the first Monday in December
m+begin at noon on the third day of January.
 unless they
m&shall by Law appoint a different Day.
The terms of Senators
and Representatives
    shall end
at noon on the third day
of January.

4This Clause formally incorporates a portion of the T
wentieth Amendment
into the New Constitution.

Article I, Section 5, Clause 1
The Senate
 Each House
)R$shall be the Judge of the Elections,
Returns and Qualifications of
     its own
Members
m    Congress.
)I*The Senate is not empowered to exclude any
m4person, duly elected by his or her Constituents, who
/meets all the requirements for Office expressly
prescribed under Sections T
wo and Three of this Article.
, and
Majority of each
House of Congress
shall constitute
m9a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn
4from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the
,Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner
, and under
such Penalties as
 each House
the Senate
may provide.

IThe First Clause in this Section gives the Senate the sole power to judge
UFthe elections, returns, and qualifications of the members of Congress,
8consistent with its general Oversight function.  However
, the Senate is not
UDempowered to exclude anyone from office who meets the Constitutional
requirements.
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Article I, Section 5, Clause 2
Garamond
m6Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings,
+punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour
, and, with the
m)Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member
m3The Federal Academy shall propose the Rules for the
2Proceedings of Congress, which shall be valid upon
8ratification by a full Majority of the Senate, and which
7shall be designated in
 C-110.  The procedure by which
0the Federal Academy promulgates and proposes the
7Rules shall be established by a Majority of the Senate,
#and shall be set forth in
 C-110.

EThe House and Senate Rules are extremely important
 the Rules can be
UJused to speed or slow down the passage of legislation; to make the passage
pork barrel
 legislation more or less inevitable; to increase the chances
of Incumbent
)LAs re-election, and so forth.  In fact, they are so important that
UIthey will become a part of the Constitution proper (in the Constitutional
FSupplement).  Letting either House of Congress propose their own Rules
/has been shown to be an exceedingly poor policy
, the most obvious
example being the Senate
s power to
filibuster
)6 (i.e., stall for time by talking
U    endlessly
)0D, or until
cloture
 is invoked).  Another congressional disaster is
Committee System
)l"as it is presently constituted.  W
oodrow W
ilson
U;attacked the Committee System in 1886 in his classic text,
Congressional
Government,
)H*and Alexander Hehmeyer stated in 1943 that
gBNo part of our governmental machinery is in greater need of reform
Dthan the Congressional committee system as it now functions.  In the
Afirst place, there are far too many standing committees . . . The
>chairmen of these committees, who dominate them, receive their
Eposition because of the rule that the chairmanship automatically goes
4to the senior committee member of the majority party
.  In the Senate
g=this has been the case without exception since 1846. Thus, in
Apractice, the committee chairmen are drawn exclusively from those
Bmembers coming from safe districts or States who are also adept at
Gkeeping their home political fences mended. . . . Senators from pivotal
CStates and Representatives from districts where the vote is usually
Cclose hardly ever reach the coveted and important chairmanship, for
+they rarely acquire the necessary seniority
.  Ability
, capacity or
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+g1Fpolitical stature go for naught.  Congress is probably alone among all
7private or governmental bodies charged with any kind of
>responsibility which lets leadership depend exclusively on the
accident of tenure.
gBThe Committee System as it is presently constituted exacerbates an
U3already parochial orientation in Congress, and the
Seniority System
created
UDby the Rules of Congress contributes to Parochialism, as well as the
0Incumbency Effect.  According to Whicker (1987),
=Several factors have exacerbated the parochial orientation of
CCongress, including the internal congressional committee structure,
@the maintenance of the seniority system and the power of special
Jinterest groups in the national political process. . . . In the mid-1980s,
:the House had twenty-two standing committees and about 135
Csubcommittees, while the Senate had sixteen standing committees and
about ninety subcommittees.  T
ypically
, members attempt to secure
g;positions on committees of the greatest importance to their
?constituents, making committees a vehicle for the expression of
9particularized rather than generalized or national views.
8Congressional subcommittees and committees join with the
Cbureaucratic agencies they authorize, oversee and fund.  Along with
Ethe clients of the bureaucracies and congressionally funded programs,
;they form the classic
iron triangle
 of special interests.
:The seniority system in Congress (the means used to select
gDcommittee and subcommittee chairs) contributes to the particularized
;and parochial rather than national and generalized views of
4Congress. Through the seniority system, members from
@noncompetitive and relatively homogenous districts rise to power
Dwithin Congress.  Not only do the district characteristics of senior
Amembers often distinguish them from members from more competitive
Idistricts, but the seniority system itself diminishes leadership turnover
g<assuring the long-term and meaningful representation of some
4parochial interests at the expense of others. . . .
>The speed with which legislation is passed, or more accurately
, the
gElack of speed, is a major problem with congressional performance.  In
Haddition to the difficulty of obtaining rapid agreement in a pluralistic
Cenvironment, structurally rooted phenomena have also contributed to
Ddelays in legislative outcomes.  Internal specialization within each
?house of Congress has led to a lengthy sequential process, with
Chearings, investigations and debates occurring at the subcommittee,
Fcommittee and full house levels.  In the House of Representatives, the
<House Rules Committee which functions as a traffic regulator
Dthrough which all committee-originated legislation must pass, serves
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+g1?as an additional level between full committee hearings and full
6debates. Spending measures must sometimes pass through
@authorizing subcommittees and committees as well as a network of
Aappropriations subcommittees and committees in each house. . . .
>Another problem with the implementation of citizen preferences
g@under the current congressional system is the internal committee
Bspecialization within Congress.  Not only does such specialization
Jlengthen the time frame for legislation, but it also serves to effectively
Ddisenfranchise most constituents from legislation initiation in most
Cpolicy areas.  Even constituents who are fortunate enough to have a
Bcongressional representative whose policy positions are similar to
@their own preferences on a particular issue are not guaranteed a
>meaningful legislative expression of those preferences. . . .
CMembers of Congress are primarily limited to effectively initiating
g@legislation in the policy areas covered by the subcommittees and
Ccommittees on which they serve.  Recognizing this political reality
g9most members of Congress strive to acquire memberships on
Gcommittees dealing with legislation of particular salience to their own
Hconstituencies.  The consequence of this functional specialization . . .
Fis that constituents cannot effectively initiate new policies in issue
Aareas where their own legislative representative has no committee
&membership and therefore little clout.
CWhile the internally specialized committee structure is the primary
g=culprit in the inability of Congress to meet the criterion of
Fapproximating citizen preferences, the seniority system contributes to
the flaw
)*?.  Under the seniority system, the most important and desirable
g?committee assignments have traditionally been acquired by older
?congressional members from noncompetitive districts whose views
>are frequently out of step with national sentiment and trends.
gJNote that the Seniority System is a self-sustaining system.  Such a system
UFwould not only be proposed and supported by the most senior members of
GCongress, but once enacted it would be difficult, if not impossible, to
change.
FUnder this Clause, the Federal Academy proposes the Rules of Congress,
UCunder regulations written by the Senate. This provides an excellent
Eopportunity for students of the Federal Academy to receive first-hand
Fexperience with the composition of legislation, frees the Senators and
MRepresentatives from the task, and greatly increases the probability that the
ERules will not be to the exclusive benefit of any particular class of
HLegislators, such as senior members, and members of States who represent
Lpowerful special interests.  The Senate approves the Rules, again consistent
Kwith its Oversight function, retaining a measure of control by the Citizens
)over the creation of Congressional Rules.
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)!Article I, Section 5, Clauses 3-4
Garamond
<Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from
=time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in
)their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Y
eas and Nays of the
m<Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire
:of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.
3erbatim Report of the Proceedings of Congress shall
m/be printed in the Congressional Record and made
4available on the National Database on a daily basis,
5subject to the exceptions enumerated in
 A-110.  The
6votes of both Houses, and the names of those voting or
1abstaining, shall be recorded on all Legislation,
(Nominations, Orders, and Resolutions.  V
oice votes are
prohibited.
=Neither House, during the session of Congress, shall, without
the Consent of the other
#, adjourn for more than three days,
m>nor to any other place than that in which the two Houses shall
be sitting.

KOne of the
tricks of the trade
 in Congress is avoiding roll call votes on
U0important legislation.  As Whicker (1987) wrote,
DMany voters are not aware of the most visible acts
 roll call votes
 or of how their own representatives perform on recorded votes.
9Nor are members of Congress supportive of the standard of
accountability
o avoid accountability
, members often exploit the
g@decentralized nature of the institution, acting incongruently by
Edenouncing a bill in committee and later supporting it in a roll call
vote. . . .
g7This Clause subdues the Congressional tendency to avoid
U!Accountability by insisting that
every
vote be recorded.
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Article I, Section 6, Clause 1
Garamond
Representatives,
Senators
 and Representatives
Alternates, and Delegates
 shall receive a Compensation for
m=their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the
>Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except
(Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace
those violations
m%of the law as provided for in
 B-105
be privileged from
m6Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their
9respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the
>same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall
& not be questioned in any other Place
be immune from
m+criminal or civil prosecution or litigation

IThis Clause states that our most important Officers of Government will be
UOpaid for their services.  It further states that these Officers may be arrested
Jonly for committing certain offenses (which are more specific than
breach
of the peace
).  T
)`9o prevent a
chilling effect
 on their speech in Congress
UKthrough litigation from private or State interests, they are given immunity
Ffrom prosecution or other forms of litigation for anything they say in
GCongress.  Because
any other place
 may be construed to be a newspaper
(or other media, this Clause is stricken.

Article I, Section 6, Clause 2
Representative,
Senator
 or Representative
Alternate,
nor Delegate
shall, during
their term
 the Time for which
he was elected
be appointed to any
 civil Office
position
m*under the Authority of the United States,
with the exception
m!of those enumerated in
 B-110,
 which shall have been
m2created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been
encreased during such time
until the expiration of the
m6Presidential term in which such person shall have been
designated to serve
#;  and no Person holding any Office
m:under the United States, shall be a Member of either House
during his
or her
Continuance in Office.

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Do prevent an unhealthy intermixture of the Legislative and Executive
UMpowers, the additional language does not allow our highest officials to serve
Ias Officers of Government in any other capacity unless 1) exceptions have
Fbeen enumerated in Constitutional Supplement Section B-110, AND 2) the
President
)5,s term has expired.  So, if Ms. X, a Senator
, Representative,
UNDelegate, or Alternate, is appointed by the President to serve as Secretary of
DTreasury in the year 2018, Ms. X cannot serve until 2020, when a new
0President will be elected.  Thus, the Executive
s power to influence the
U(Legislative Branch is greatly curtailed.

)!Article I, Section 6, Clauses 3-4
Garamond
)The primary Legislative Responsibility of
7Representatives and Senators shall be to vote for those
4Bills in the National Interest, as determined by the
3Evaluations of the Legislative Review Board, and to
7propose or pass all Legislation necessary or proper for
8carrying into execution the Objectives set forth in this
6Constitution; and their secondary responsibility shall
7be to vote for those Bills which reflect the particular
1concerns of the District or State they represent.
A Representative, Senator
, or Delegate who has
m8personal or private interests, as defined in
 C-115, in
9any proposed or pending Bill, shall disclose this fact to
2the Speaker of the House or President Pro Tempore,
7and shall not vote on that Bill; and shall abide by all
9conflict-of-interest and ethics Legislation passed by the
Senate, under penalty of law.

ARepresentative Richard Gephardt, the House Majority Leader of the
UK102d Congress, stated that
[w]e were elected to do what we think is in the
2highest and best interests of the country . . . .
Indeed.  However
, under
UMthe 1787 Constitution, there is no such job requirement set forth in writing,
Jnor any means of enforcing any such job requirement.  Thus,  Senator Byrd
remark that he would become W
est V
irginia
billion-dollar industry
  If all
UJRepresentatives and Senators made similar remarks, and voted along similar
Plines, the country would sink (and is, in fact, sinking) under the weight of its
Jdeficit spending, as each Representative and Senator strives to
bring the
Times
+U1Ipork home,
 without levying taxes to pay for this spending.  Consequently
over a quarter of a
trillion
)*3dollars is paid by taxpayers every year on interest
on the National Debt.
2By the year 2000, if current trends continue, well
over
@of our individual income tax dollars will go towards the payment
of this interest.
-The Third Clause makes language such as Byrd
s a highly
suspect activity
, and voting like Byrd
)w$s a potentially impeachable offense.
gFThe Fourth Clause of this Section is a conflict-of-interest provision,
UGwhich prohibits Representatives, Senators, and Delegates from voting on
BBills in which they have
personal or private
 economic interests.

)!Article I, Section 7, Clauses 1-4
Garamond
1The Legislative Review Board shall be composed of
7nine Delegates chosen by a full Majority of the Senate.
3The Legislative Review Board must be representative
6of the population to the greatest extent possible with
6regard to sex, race, national origin, and geographical
dispersion.
7Each Delegate shall serve for a single three-year term,
9and shall receive for his or her services a Compensation,
1the value of which shall neither be increased nor
9diminished during his or her continuance in office, other
7than for violations of regulations passed by the Senate
5under Section Three, Clause Six, Subclause Fifteen of
this Article.
5Immediately after the Delegates shall be assembled in
6consequence after the first appointment, they shall be
7divided into three classes.  The Seats of the Delegates
8of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of
the first Y
*, of the second Class at the Expiration of
the second Y
*, and of the third Class at the Expiration
of the third Y
', so that one third may be chosen every
ear; and if V
)a"acancies happen by Resignation, or
m(otherwise, the Senate may make temporary
4Appointments until the next Meeting of the Congress,
when they shall fill such V
acancies.
m8Every person shall be eligible to the office of Delegate
3who shall have attained to the Age of twenty-five Y
ears,
and been seven Y
)o(ears a Citizen of the United States, and
Garamond
+m34who shall, upon and subsequent to taking the oath of
1office, be a graduate of the Federal Academy, and
4without formal affiliation with any political party.
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;One of the most important additions made by THE 21ST CENTUR
UCCONSTITUTION is the Legislative Review Board, which, along with the
Federal Academy
)_7, prevents undue influence by local interests, and thus
makes the critical Annual T
!erm for Representatives possible.
As mentioned earlier
)l6, no Bill will be passed without a prior Evaluation by
ULthe Legislative Review Board, and an assignment of a Timetable to that Bill.
FClauses One through Four indicate the makeup of the Legislative Review
#Board.  They will be appointed for
single
three year terms, making them
UKaccountable to National, and not local, interests.  The short term prevents
/any one Delegate from dominating via Incumbency
, and the one-third
UCrotation in membership allows the Senate to maintain balance on the
#Legislative Review Board every year
!.  Fixed compensation prevents an
U?undue control of the Delegates by salary hikes or cuts; however
, the Senate
UKis empowered to fine Delegates on an individual basis if they violate their
Emandated duty to obey Senatorial (and Constitutional) regulations.  T
U?prevent undue attachment to any particular demographic category
, the
UHcomposition of the Legislative Review Board must be as representative of
Mthe population as possible.  Thus, if 51 percent of the population are women,
Jthen one year there will be five female delegates and four male delegates,
Land the next year four female and five male delegates, to approximate the 50
Dpercent representation as much as possible over time. Since African-
HAmericans make up 14 percent of the population, and one-ninth is roughly
Nequivalent to 11 percent, there will be at least one African-American delegate
every year
gCThe Third Clause mandates staggered terms.  Because there are Fifty
UFStates, each year the new Delegates will be from States which were not
represented the previous year
/, and each Delegate will represent a particular
U=region of the country (e.g., the Southwest, Northeast, etc.).
EBecause the Legislative Review Board plays a critical role in the New
UEGovernment, and because there are many issues that must be understood
Kbefore a person will be qualified to serve on the Legislative Review Board,
4Federal Academy graduation is required of Delegates.
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)!Article I, Section 7, Clauses 5-7
Garamond
6The Legislative Review Board shall provide a Timetable
8for the consideration and passage of each Bill under the
7regulations set forth in
 C-120, provided that no more
1than one-fifth of the Bills submitted be given an
indefinite Timetable; and
6Evaluate the quality of a Bill regarding the extent to
/which it serves the National Interest by either
5implementing the goals in the Preamble or the Will of
/the People of the United States, or both, while
8preserving those individual liberties enumerated in this
6Constitution, by providing a numerical Rating for each
8Bill under the guidelines set forth in
 C-125, with one
4hundred being the highest possible Rating, and minus
3one thousand being the lowest possible Rating.  All
/Ratings between minus one hundred and minus one
+thousand are to be reserved for objectively
/unconstitutional Bills, or Bills excessively or
7completely detrimental to the National Interest.  Every
6Delegate must vote greater than twenty-five on any law
7required by this Constitution, and greater than Zero on
-any Bill which serves to implement a National
6Objective.   No Delegate can give a Rating higher than
1Zero to any Bill that, in his or her judgment, is
7unconstitutional.  The highest and lowest Ratings given
5by the Delegates shall be eliminated, and the average
-Rating of the seven remaining Delegates shall
constitute the Evaluation.
-Every Delegate shall abide by the regulations
0restricting their behavior set forth in
 C-130.

EThe Fifth Clause mandates that every Bill be given a Timetable.  This
UGreduces the power of committees in Congress to
bottle up
 legislation,
Fwhich makes vote-trading a more probable occurrence (i.e., X agrees to
Qreport or not report out a Bill from his or her committee if Y will reciprocate).
MThe ability of committees to abort the consideration of necessary legislation
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+U1Iviolates the Accountability Principle, and gives a great deal of power to
Jspecial interests (violating the Fourteenth Amendment requirement that the
IPeople receive the equal protection of the laws).  Under Section Three of
Jthis Article, there must be at least four categories of Timetables, and no
BTimetable can be shorter than 30 days or longer than 180 days.  An
Pindefinite Timetable is also permitted.  Longer or indefinite Timetables will be
Jgiven for more complicated legislation, and/or legislation the Legislative
$Review Board views as undesirable.
CThe Sixth Clause is without question one of the five most important
Clauses in THE 21ST CENTUR
Y CONSTITUTION. This Clause
UKaccomplishes many goals, and it is important to analyze them in some depth.
@Because Representatives come from Districts of less than 350,000
U1people, and because they are elected for Annual T
erms, there is a danger of
UHan undue attachment to local interests: for example, people may vote for
Ktheir Representative because s/he has voted to keep an unnecessary military
Jbase in the District.  What is the check against this sort of voting?  The
KEvaluation of the Legislative Review Board.  The mandate of the Legislative
HReview Board is to give high Evaluations to Bills which either serve the
$National Interest, or implement the
National
ill of the People.  At the same
UJtime, the Legislative Review Board must give low Evaluations to Bills that
Qunconstitutionally infringe on individual liberties.  Thus, there is a protection
Pfor individual rights, while at the same time there is a proper attention to the
Hill of the People of the United States.  Because the Evaluation is given
before
)&Fthe Bill is considered by the House of Representatives, the passage of
UEunconstitutional legislation will be made extremely difficult, if not
Mimpossible. Under the current system, unconstitutional laws are passed, and a
Lperson can fight the law in court only if wealthy enough to afford the legal
0fees (and if the person can cross the Judiciary
s jurisdictional thresholds
UJ[such as
non-frivolity
]).  If one is not wealthy enough to mount a legal
"battle of this nature, and if one
.s cause does not fit into the political agenda
UIor limited budget of the ACLU and similar organizations, that person must
obey an unconstitutional law
,.  The Evaluation requirement prohibits this
U&unjust and unconstitutional situation.
HAn Evaluation is derived from the individual votes of Delegates.  Assume
the following votes on a Bill:
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Delegate
)H Rating Given to Bill by Delegate
gBUnder the procedure outlined in Clause Six, the highest and lowest
UORatings are discarded.  In this case, the high vote (Delegate 3) is 98, and the
Flow vote (Delegate 4) is -30.  These votes are not used, and the seven
)remaining votes are totaled.  The sum is
.  This result is divided by
seven
U and the resulting Evaluation is
&.  What does this mean?  It means that
UJunder Section Eight of Article One, the Bill must not only pass the House,
<but also the Senate.  If the Senate also approves, the Bill
must
be signed into
UFlaw by the President.  The collective determination of the Legislative
LReview Board is that though this Bill is too important to risk a veto by the
9President, it nonetheless warrants review by the Senate.
EThus, the first important role of the Evaluation is to streamline the
ULpassage of worthy and important Bills, while placing constitutional barriers
2to Bills of questionable necessity or desirability
.  Bills with Evaluations over
UG50 that are passed by a Quorum Majority of the House of Representatives
must
Ibe signed into law by the President.  Bills with Evaluations less than 25
UJhave to pass not only the House of Representatives and the Senate, but can
Meven be vetoed by the President.  In addition, Bills with Evaluations of less
Kthan Zero that happen to pass the constitutional barriers do not have to be
6enforced by either the Executive or Judicial Branches.
?The second role of the Evaluation is to provide a basis for the
U>Performance Ratings of Representatives. Imagine that you are a
Representative.  Here
)x9s a Bill that will bring jobs to your District, but which
U;has an Evaluation of -50.  How will you vote?  If you vote
UFlegislation, fifty points will be subtracted from your total, and your
'Performance Ratings will be lowered.  Y
ou know that few
, if any other
ULRepresentatives have any reason to vote for the Bill, since vote-trading has
Fbeen prohibited, and there is no party membership creating a collegial
Katmosphere encouraging such vote-trading.  In addition, the Third Clause of
9this Section has made voting for the National Interest a
job requirement
UHOther Representatives are constitutionally required to vote against this
Jlegislation, and will undoubtedly do so, given that they can improve their
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+U1/Ratings by fulfilling their constitutional duty
ou also know that even if
UNpassed by the House, the Bill will have to pass the Senate, and is even liable
Jto veto by the President.  Furthermore, if you vote for the Bill, you know
Hyour opponent in the next election will point out that you have violated
Jyour responsibility by voting for legislation which is not in the National
CInterest. All the above will be taken into account by all the other
KRepresentatives, and you realize that if you vote for the Bill, there is an
?excellent chance that, if all vote, the vote will be 1 in favor
, 999 against.  Y
U2will look extremely foolish, and even unpatriotic.
How would
vote?
g>Because the Legislative Review Board has a great deal of power
, this
UGpower must be checked.  The Discrepancy requirement of Section Three is
Ione check, and the other is provided by the Seventh Clause. The Senate is
;empowered to author regulations governing Delegate behavior
, and
U'empowered to enforce those regulations.
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)!Article I, Section 8, Clauses 1-4
Garamond
All Bills
 for raising Revenue
other than those originating
in Legislative Committees
and in the National Initiative
m/shall originate in the House of Representatives
 but the Senate
m7may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills
6and no law shall be enacted except by Bill, subject to
2the exceptions enumerated under this Constitution.
.Nominations by the House of Representatives or
1Senate for any Office, Orders or Resolutions, and
1regulations promulgated by agencies created under
6Congressional authority shall not be considered Bills.
7The subject of every Bill shall be clearly expressed in
6its title.  Each Bill shall have an enacting Clause as
3follows:
Be it enacted by the People of the United
3States of America.
 No Bill embracing more than one
5subject shall be passed, except Appropriations Bills.
5Bills originating in the House of Representatives and
-Legislative Committees shall be submitted for
3Evaluation to the Legislative Review Board prior to
.consideration by the House of Representatives.
6Whenever a law or section of law or the Constitutional
1Supplement is amended, it shall be re-enacted and
2republished on the National Database, and in bound
6form or as a pocket part, with the amended or repealed
9laws annexed in an Appendix.  Every Bill shall be plainly
3worded, shall be published with its Evaluation, and
6shall set forth hypothetical examples for illustrative
9purposes in all cases other than those designated in
.115. The Timetables for consideration of Bills
3established by the Legislative Review Board must be
3faithfully observed by the House of Representatives
2unless the Senate, in extraordinary circumstances,
9grants an exemption by a full two-thirds Majority.  Bills
2which shall have passed the National Initiative or
,which are to be enumerated in Constitutional
7Supplement Sections A and B, and Sections C-100 to 200,
5are to be given Evaluations by the Legislative Review
4Board, but otherwise shall be signed into law by the
6President within thirty days if passed under the Rules
5as provided in this Constitution, and are exempt from
Garamond
the following requirements:
.Every Bill which receives an Evaluation by the
5Legislative Review Board which is greater than fifty,
(and which shall have passed the House of
0Representatives, shall be signed into law by the
2President within thirty days after passage by that
House.
.Every Bill which receives an Evaluation by the
7Legislative Review Board which is greater than or equal
9to twenty-five and less than or equal to fifty, and which
5shall have passed the House of Representatives, shall
3be presented to the Senate within ten days, and the
;Senate shall consider it within thirty days.  If the Senate
7shall pass the Bill, it shall be signed into law by the
1President within thirty days after passage by the
Senate.
Every Bill
)N#which receives an Evaluation by the
m3Legislative Review Board which is less than twenty-
five, and
)S$which shall have passed the House of
m7Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become
a Law,
m:be presented to the President of the United States; If he
or she
approve he
or she
shall sign it, but if not he
or she
shall
return it, with his
or her
Objections to
 that House in which it
shall have originated
the House of Representatives
, who
m9shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and
proceed to reconsider it
within ten days
. If after such
m<Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass
@the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the
other house
Senate
, by which it shall likewise be
m=reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of the Senate, it
shall become a Law.
 But in all such Cases the V
otes of both
m:Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names
?of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered
+on the Journal of each House respectively.
If any Bill shall not
m5be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays
4excepted) after it shall have been presented to him
or her
, the
m-Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he
or she
had signed
7 , unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its
m,Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law
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Times
+g@EAnother of the most important new provisions is the re-writing of the
UHprocedure by which proposed legislation becomes actual legislation.  The
QFirst Clause of this Section establishes the ground rules:  all laws originate in
Fthe House of Representatives or Legislative Committees (or through the
QNational Initiative process), not with the Senate or the President.  If a Bill is
Kto be considered, one of the members of the House or one of the Legislative
?Committees must propose it, or it must make its way through the
"aforementioned Initiative Process.
DThis Clause also eliminates the concept of
Riders,
 the practice of
UKattaching one completely different and unpopular Bill to a popular Bill, in
@the hopes that it will be passed. The Rider concept violates the
KAccountability Principle, since a Representative can always argue to his or
her constituents,
5to vote for that unpopular Bill
; in addition, Riders
UHwould wreak havoc on the new system of Evaluations for Bills.  Laws will
Ibe published with their Evaluations, so that Judges will know whether the
Dlaw is enforceable or not.  Laws must be plainly worded (for obvious
Freasons), must be published on the National Database, and must contain
Fhypothetical examples to anchor the meaning of the legislation to some
Iexternal referent.  For example, if the law states
Arson is the crime of
Mburning materials within the confines of an edifice,
 a hypothetical might be
F. X pours gasoline inside a house and lights a match.  The house burns
U,for one minute, and the fire is put out.  Mr
. X is guilty of Arson,
UElights a cigarette inside a building. A is not guilty of Arson.
 This
Grequirement increases the probability that vague laws, constitutionally
prohibited, will not be passed.
EThis Clause also allows the Senate to grant exceptions to Timetables,
UHsince there may be occasions when the House is unable, for one reason or
another
)(I, to vote on the legislation within the stated time period.  In addition,
UGit states that provisions to be enumerated in specified Sections of the
AConstitutional Supplement are exempt from the requirements in the
following three Clauses.  W
-ithout this exemption, the concept of varying
UDamendability as instituted in the Constitutional Supplement would be
negated.
BThe Second through Fourth Clauses establish the parameters for the
UILegislative Review Board.  Bills with Evaluations higher than 50 need not
@be approved by the Senate or the President to be passed into law
Consequently
)J:, the Bill must truly be necessary or desirable and in the
UJNational Interest to get such a high Evaluation.  If Delegates have qualms
Iabout the legislation, they can give the Bill a Rating between 25 and 50,
Mwhich means that Senate approval is also required.  If Delegates have serious
Ldoubts about the legislation, they can give it a Rating of less than 25, and
the President
)M&s approval will then also be necessary
.  The Delegates, as
UIprovided under Section Seven of this Article, may give a Rating as low as
Times
+U1+- 1000 to the absolutely worst legislation.
IIf the President vetoes a piece of legislation, it goes back to the House
UNand Senate, where, if it is re-passed by a two-thirds Majority of both Houses,
it will become law
.  This isn
t very likely
)}!.   In 203 years of our Republic,
U4there have been 2497 vetoes, and only 100 overrides.
Thus, in the history
of our country
)N=, only 4 percent of vetoes have been overridden. (This effect
UHhas been remarkably consistent over time.  For example, in the period of
)1801 to 1901, .04004577 of the President
 s vetoes were overridden, and in
U4the period of 1901-1991, .04009870 of the President
s vetoes were
U+overridden, a difference of only .00005293!
s difficult to imagine more
U0compelling evidence of an institutional effect.)

Article I, Section 8, Clause 5
Garamond
Every Order
, Resolution, or V
ote to which the Concurrence of
m8the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary
;(except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to
=the President of the United States; and before the Same shall
>take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by
<him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House
:of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations
!prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
6All constitutional Orders and Resolutions by the House
4of Representatives shall become law upon approval by
a full Majority of the Senate.
If disapproved by the
m4Senate, the House of Representatives shall style the
5Resolution as a Bill and submit it to the Legislative
5Review Board.  If the Senate approves the Resolution,
+the President
s signature is not required.

?This Clause allows the Senate to prevent the House from passing
UGlegislation by styling the legislation as an
Order
Resolution
Ievade the above requirements (consistent with the existing Constitutional
provisions).
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Article I, Section 9, Clause 1
Garamond
m0The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes,
Duties, Imposts, and Excises,
provided that
all Duties,
m:Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States,
)*-and to lay and collect Taxes on incomes, from
m.whatever source derived, without apportionment
3among the several States, and without regard to any
census or enumeration,
provided that
personal income
m6taxes are levied on not less than three-fourths of the
6Citizens with the highest net income; that the rate of
8the highest tax bracket shall be no more than twice that
6of the lowest tax bracket; and that the lowest bracket
7shall be no lower than one-tenth of net income, and the
7highest bracket shall be no higher than one-half of net
income; and
)U+to pay the Debts and Provide for the common
Defence
Defense
and general W
elfare of the United States;

EThis Section was formerly Section Eight of the 1787 Constitution, and
UKlists the powers of Congress.  The First Clause of this Section establishes
FCongress
 power to tax and spend, with more severe limitations on this
Ipower than currently exist.  For example, the Clause allowing Congress to
Dborrow money on the credit of the United States has been extensively
Nmodified (see the next Clause) to greatly increase the probability that future
revenue will come from
taxes
)     (and not
)3    borrowing
).  W
ith this modification,
the Annual T
)GAerm for Representatives insures that a free-spending (i.e., free-
taxing
)#.) Congress will not meet with public approval.
gIThe Clause also links Americans together on the issue of taxation.  If an
U1income tax is to be levied, it must be levied on
at least
three-fourths of the
UMpopulation.  In addition, the highest tax bracket cannot be higher than fifty
Kpercent, which guarantees that as long as the Constitution is in place, the
Federal Government can
never
take more than half a person
s income in
UMtaxes.  In addition, the lowest tax bracket must be at least half that of the
Lhighest.  So, for example, if the highest tax bracket is thirty percent, the
lowest bracket must be
at least
).*fifteen percent (and can be higher).  This
UIClause, by linking the fate of Americans on the issue of taxation, and by
(radically decreasing the power to borrow
, thus provides a
structural
U=limitation on spending by foreclosing the source of revenue.
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Ho insure that a substantial percentage of revenue is derived within this
UIlimitation, and not from other sources, the one-tenth minimum requirement
has been instituted.

)!Article I, Section 9, Clauses 2-4
Garamond
3To borrow Money on the credit of the United States
solely
m4upon the assent of two-thirds of the members of both
2Houses of Congress, and a two-thirds Majority of V
oters
m$in the General or a Special Election
m8To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
.several States, and with the Indian Tribes;
;To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform
9Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States;

!EThe power to borrow money is the power to sink the United States into
UAan ever greater debt, a debt upon which interest must be paid.  Y
et the 1787
UHConstitution contained a general and virtually unlimited power to borrow
money
)#E, the only check being a requirement that direct taxes be apportioned
UFamong the States
 a check that, in 1913, was removed by the Sixteenth
KAmendment.  This virtually unlimited power to borrow was criticized in 1788
by Robert Y
ates, one of the New Y
)y(ork delegates to the Federal Convention,
U$in a prediction of uncanny accuracy:
EThe power to borrow money is general and unlimited . . . . Under this
    authority
)0:, the Congress may mortgage any or all the revenues of the
g7union, as a fund to loan money upon, and it is probably
, in this way
gDthey may borrow of foreign nations, a principal sum, the interest of
9which will be equal to the annual revenues of the country
By this
gBmeans, they may create a national debt, so large, as to exceed the
Bability of the country ever to sink.  I can scarcely contemplate a
.greater calamity that could befal this country
, than to be loaded
g7with a debt exceeding their ability ever to discharge.
If this be a
just remark,
)E3it is unwise and improvident to vest in the general
g7government a power to borrow at discretion, without any
limitation or restriction.
AIt may possibly happen that the safety and welfare of the country
gAmay require, that money be borrowed, and it is proper when such a
Times
+g1Bnecessity arises that the power should be exercised by the general
Bgovernment.
 But it certainly ought never to be exercised, but on
;the most urgent occasions, and then we should not borrow of
0foreigners if we could possibly avoid it. . . .
it would certainly have
g;been a wise provision in this constitution, to have made it
9necessary that two-thirds of the members should assent to
borrowing money
 when the necessity was indispensable, this
gCassent would always be given, and in no other cause ought it to be.
4ates
 suggested amendment was also proposed by New Y
ork and
Rhode Island
6, but was not sent by Congress to the other States for
ratification
 and, as Y
1ates correctly forecast, America began to amass a
UJhuge National Debt, a debt that in the latter half of this century reached
8colossal proportions
 so large, in fact, that in 1988,
percent of each
person
)(Cs individual income taxes went not to health care, not to education
U:not to the arts, and not to research and development, but
interest
: or rather
ULto individuals and institutional investors predominantly located in America,
1but over time more likely to be located overseas.
And how is this interest
UMto be paid?  In one of two ways: either through taxes or through inflation, a
hidden
)+?tax, and a tax which hurts poor people and middle-income people
disproportionately
)a;.   The power to lavish money on local interests by locally
U3elected officials, coupled with the power to borrow
, is a structural formula for
disaster
)'C.  Establishing in the Constitution that if you spend, you must tax
UG(with a moderate safety-valve for the rare circumstances when borrowing
Gmay be necessary that are significant enough to build both a two-thirds
MCongressional and National coalition), and that no less than three-fourths of
Jthe Americans must pay this tax, is the best way to insure that Government
Gspending is kept to a minimum, and that such spending only goes for the
most worthy proposals.  It
s one thing to support
Star W
 knowing that
U4you won
t have to pay for it this year in taxes; it
s another to know that you
have to pay for it this year
).   Under the new system, the $640 dollar
U"toilet seat will become a dinosaur
"ill the People continue to support
U)unnecessary animal research knowing that
    this year
they will have to foot
UGthe bill, and that there is no need whatsoever for this spending?  This
scenario is highly unlikely
2.  On the other hand, legitimate expenditures such
UGas spending for education or necessary research and development will be
Pseen in a different light.  Every dollar spent will be evaluated in light of its
necessity and desirability
3.  But the days of outrageous waste and pork barrel
UAspending, and spending on the unnecessary pet programs of special
6interests, will be gone for good under THE 21ST CENTUR
CONSTITUTION.
>Due to the structural limitation on spending through what will
UGfunctionally amount to a prohibition on borrowing, we will cut interest
    payments
entirely
)05out of the budget, thus freeing more than 250 billion
Times
+U1Adollars a year in 1991 dollars for worthy Government programs and
$operations, or a reduction in taxes.
BThe Third and Fourth Clauses are unchanged, and continue Congress
UJpower to regulate commerce (i.e., environmental legislation, food and drug
:laws, etc.), and to regulate Naturalization and Bankruptcy

)!Article I, Section 9, Clauses 5-6
Garamond
 coin Money,
)^ issue Currency in Paper or Coins
through electronic means,
    regulate
 the V
alue thereof,
m#domestic purchasing power thereof,
 and of foreign Coin,
m/set the rates of exchange of foreign currency,
and fix the
Standard of W
eights and Measures;
m>To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities
Sand current Coin of the United States;

@The Fifth Clause acknowledges and certifies our present monetary
UGsystem, and allows for the creation of a checkless and cashless society
UFsystem which is technologically possible, and which is being partially
Mimplemented in certain areas of the United States.  Of course, counterfeiting
remains illegal.

Article I, Section 9, Clause 7
To establish
and maintain a
 Offices and post Roads;
m3Service, whether conventional, electronic, or both,
7which is authorized to promulgate all those regulations
%consonant with its authority; however
, no Postal
m3Service Regulation may violate rights granted under
7this Constitution, including those rights designated in
 A-115.

<Under the Seventh Clause, Congress is empowered to create an
UDElectronic Post Office.  Under this system, each person will have an
Melectronic address, and mail will be sent over telephone wires, thus reducing
Jthe hazards to the environment through the use of fossil fuels to transmit
Jhard-copy mail (a/k/a
snail mail
), and the paper on which hard-copy mail
Times
+U1Gis printed. Under the new system, letters will be transmitted instantly
ULFurthermore, one letter may be sent to thousands of people.  For example, an
Oorganization of coin collectors could mail its newsletter to all of its members
Jin one instant, and at a fraction of the cost of current postal rates.  Or
UDstereo manufacturer could send materials to all people who requested
4information on the topic the week before.  Obviously
, there must be certain
UGrestrictions on this right, and the People of the United States must be
Lconsulted and will be consulted when such restrictions are to be made (since
Jthe restrictions are to be enumerated in Constitutional Supplement Section
NA).  For example, there may be restrictions on electronic
junk mail
 (e.g., a
Kparticular business may be entitled to send a generalized mailing only once
Jper year to a designated number of people, and subsequent mailings only to
6those persons who have requested additional mailings).
EThis Clause alone will greatly increase the flow of information in an
Information Society
)l5, by radically reducing the cost of transmitting that
UFinformation, and will reduce the hazards to the environment which come
Gfrom transporting information by truck or plane, when a telephone wire,
Nfiber-optic cable or satellite can do the job far more quickly and efficiently
UOAt the same time, the quality and integrity of the information transmitted will
Kbe maintained by reasonable regulations against the transmission of certain
:kinds of information (see Section Eleven of this Article).

Article I, Section 9, Clause 8
Garamond
m6To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Time
to Authors and Inventors
exclusive
those
Right
to their respective W
ritings and
Discoveries
designated in
 B-120
Notwithstanding
m7provisions in
 B-120, those authors and publishers who
3request copyright protection from the United States
5Government, shall, as a condition for the granting of
4copyright protection, consent to the distribution of
6their non-fiction material on the National Database as
8described under Section Eleven of this Article, provided
1that reasonable compensation is made therefore as
mandated in
 C-135;

DThe Eighth Clause re-establishes the right of copyright, patent, and
UHtrademark, but with a twist: publishers who request copyright protection
Ifrom the Government must simultaneously grant the Government the right to
Times
+U1Hpost their non-fiction publications on the National Database, a National
Hsource of information.  These publishers and authors must be compensated
Hwhen Citizens
download
 the information (i.e., transmit the information
from the Government
){1s mainframe computers into the computers in their
U8home), as provided under Section Eleven of this Article.

)!Article I, Section 9, Clauses 9-1
Garamond
m,To implement Transportation, Energy, Health,
4Education, and Arts and Sciences policies, and other
"policies in the National Interest;
To regulate
)O/the right of the People to keep and bear arms;
m>To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;

GThe Ninth Clause re-establishes Congress
 current power to set National
U#Policies in important areas.  The T
'enth Clause is a revision of the Second
UKAmendment, and indicates that the right of the People to keep and bear arms
Iis a right that can be regulated by Congress.   For example, Congress can
Ideclare that no convicted felons are allowed to own weapons after serving
Ntheir prison terms, or that there must be a waiting-period before purchasing a
Chandgun, or that the possession of certain weapons, such as AK-47s,
4bazookas, or hand grenades, may be outlawed entirely
.  The Eleventh Clause
UJmaintains the Congressional power to create various courts, such as Courts
of Appeal, District Courts, W
orkman
),"s Compensation courts, and various
bodies of arbitration.

Article I, Section 9
Clauses 12-13
m;To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the
6high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of Nations;
To declare W
%pursuant to the guidelines in
 A-120
m%grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal
, and make Rules
m!concerning Captures on Land and W
, which shall be
designated in
 A-125;
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FUnder the Thirteenth Clause, Congress can declare war only under a set
U+of circumstances approved by the People.  T
 aken in conjunction with Article
wo, Section T
)P4wo, Clause One, the power of the President to commit
UMAmerican troops to military action is greatly curtailed, and the existence of
debacles like V
)N'ietnam is thus made much less probable.

Article I, Section 9, Clause 14
Garamond
To raise and support
 Armies
an Army, Navy, and Air
Force
)$8, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for
a longer Term than
 two Y
ears;
the number of years
m8indicated in
 A-130, and no military expenditures shall
3exceed one-twentieth of the Gross National Product,
0subject to the exceptions enumerated in
 A-135;

GThe Fourteenth Clause insures that the People of the United States will
UJbe able to control the military through Appropriations.  Currently weapons
Asystems are funded far in excess of the two years mandated by the
LConstitution, which takes control away from the Constitution and gives it to
the military; because Congress
must
&disobey the Constitution, the military
UGcan draw up its own
wish lists,
 and the constitutional guidelines are
Iforgotten.  The Fourteenth Clause also limits military expenditures to no
Lmore than five percent of the Gross National Product, unless the People have
1approved exceptions (such as the inception of war
, etc.).

Article I, Section 9
Clauses 15-18
m To provide and maintain a Navy;
;To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land
and naval Forces;
?To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of
6the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
ATo provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia,
Garamond
+m39and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in
9the Service of the United States, reserving to the States
6respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the
=Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline
prescribed by Congress;
* 9To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever
, over
m9such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by
=Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress,
;become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and
;to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the
?Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall
:be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Y
ards,
and other needful Buildings;
 And
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BThese Clauses extend the power of Congress to provide for military
UJexpenditures and author regulations, and provide for a seat of Government.

Article I, Section 9
Clauses 19-20
m7To delegate its authority to legislate to the Executive
6Branch under the guidelines enumerated in
 B-125, and
to utilize the Legislative V
eto, in whatever form, when
m"the National Interest so requires;
7To delegate its authority to legislate to the People in
the National Initiative; and

'In an extensive and complicated society
", it is and will be impossible for
Congress
)7@to pass each and every necessary law and regulation.  Go to your
U#local library and read through the
Code of Federal Regulations
    , and ask
UIyourself how a 1000 person Congress could ever have the time or expertise
Ito pass the volume of legislation found in eight library-shelves worth of
5books.  The fact of the matter is that Congress will
have the expertise,
U4nor the time to pass such regulations.  Consequently
, some Legislative
UApower will have to be delegated to agencies such as the Federal A
viation
UAAdministration, the Food and Drug Administration, and the Federal
Times
+U1ECommunications Commission, etc.  Because of this Necessity Principle,
Congress has
unconstitutionally
)m%delegated their exclusive Legislative
UEpower (granted in Article One, Section One of the 1787 Constitution),
without
)0?the alteration of the system of Checks and Balances required to
UKlend legitimacy to this ratification. The Nineteenth Clause legitimizes the
HDelegation Doctrine, since new Checks and Balances have been placed into
THE 21ST CENTUR
)n!Y CONSTITUTION, and reverses the
Chadha
decision
U:by the Supreme Court, which held that while Congress could
Nunconstitutionally delegate authority to legislate to the Executive Branch, it
?could not retain some measure of control over these agencies by
5empowering itself to veto regulations passed by them.
The Nineteenth
UJClause gives a greater measure of control over an unelected bureaucracy to
the People.
The T
?wentieth Clause gives Congress the power to allow the People to
UEvote directly on certain critical issues, as provided under Section T
en of this
Article.

Article I, Section 9, Clause 21
Garamond
To make all
Constitutional
Laws which shall be necessary
0proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
m?Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the
8Government of the United States, or in any Department or
Officer thereof
)[(, and for securing the Objectives in the
m5Preamble, the National Objectives specified in
 C-1,
.and any rights granted under this Constitution

In the decision of
McCulloch
Maryland
, 4 L. Ed. 579 (1819), Chief
UIJustice John Marshall greatly expanded the power of Congress to legislate
Fthrough his interpretation of the
Necessary and Proper
 Clause.  This
&Clause formalizes that interpretation.
HThe National Objectives are further discussed in Section Fifteen of this
Section.
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)"Article I, Section 10, Clauses 1-3
Garamond
*The Congress shall have the obligation to:
.Establish and provide for a Federal Academy to
6educate future officials and Officers of Government in
0the curriculum that the People deem necessary or
4proper for securing the National Interest.  Congress
3shall determine and set forth the curriculum of the
0Federal Academy in
 C-205, and provide complete
6Academic Freedom for all tenured professors, who shall
7consist of one-fourth the Federal Academy faculty after
5the seven years immediately following Ratification of
,this Constitution, and every year thereafter
, provided
m'that tenure is limited to seven years;
5Regulate admissions and all other requirements of the
6Federal Academy, which shall be designated in
 C-210,
4provided that appointments to the Federal Academy be
0made on predominantly objective criteria such as
4grades and entrance examinations; that when nominees
2to the Federal Academy are being considered, their
-names shall be withheld from the Committee on
6Admissions, and that no Officer of Government shall be
.empowered to make personal recommendations for
0admissions to the Federal Academy; that the time
8required to serve in the Federal Academy be three years,
8and that the last year be clinical in nature, including,
5but not limited to, appointment as an Alternate; that
7the tuition for the Federal Academy be publicly funded,
5provided that the initial salaries of Federal Academy
5graduates who assume offices are reduced until parity
7for tuition received is achieved, and that two years of
0Government service be required for every year of
7attendance; and that the student body be proportionally
6represented with regard to sex, race, national origin,
7geographical dispersion, and other factors the Congress
7shall designate as the National Interest requires.  The
3Federal Academy shall be located in the Capitol and
6shall be open to the Public, provided that courses are
Garamond
+m3,subject to no more than minimal disruption;
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The T
enth Section lists the
obligations
, as opposed to the
powers
UGCongress.  Under this Section, the exercise of power by Congress is not
discretionary
 Congress
%pass the legislation in this Section.
gCThe Second and Third Clauses give the Congress as a whole the power
ULto establish the Federal Academy and to provide regulations for the Federal
Academy
)1A.  Because the curriculum of the Federal Academy is designated in
UOSection C-205, (see Section Fifteen, Clause One of this Article), the People of
Jthe United States retain the power to create the curriculum of the Federal
Academy
)1;, if they desire to supplant Congress
 power to create this
curriculum.
ESome of the many courses that may be contained in this curriculum are
The Legislative Process
6(exposure to the pitfalls of writing good legislation,
UIcorrectly defining the problem to be solved, solving problems in the most
cost-effective way
)a<, constructing alternative solutions, educating constituents
UPas to the legitimacy of legislation, the art of compromise, calculating the cost
"of legislation, avoiding ambiguity
", proper legislative form, etc.);
Negotiation
UJ(learning basic negotiating techniques, such as separating the people from
Gthe problem, delineating issues, forging creative alternatives, etc.);
Constitution
)P4(analysis of the differences in the past and present
UGConstitutions with an eye towards understanding how future improvements
may be realized);
American History
)e%(analyzing the key issues in American
history
)$D, such as the American Revolution, the promulgation and ratification
U(of the 1787 Constitution and the Civil W
, as well as recurring themes
UDthroughout that history with a focus on the historical circumstances
Onecessary for the full comprehension of future Legislative initiatives, such as
Jrevision of the tax code, environmental legislation, reduction of waste in
Government, etc.);
International History
)|!(with particular attention to the
UHhistorical background of
hot areas
 such as the Middle East, Russia and
South America);
The Legislative Review Board
(learning how to calculate
UARatings and determine proper Timetables, with extensive empirical
experience);
The Judicial Process
){((studying the civil and criminal justice
UDsystem, and analyzing statistical data with an eye towards reforming
injustices);
Social Problems
)b+(learning about the causes of and potential
UGsolutions for contemporary horrors such as
crack babies,
 child abuse,
illiteracy
),H, pollution, crime, violence, drug abuse, homelessness, etc.); and other
UFimportant courses, such as economics and decisionmaking, and specialty
areas like patent law
)q', telecommunications, environmental law
, research and
U%development, education, and so forth.
<Academic freedom is provided for tenured professors; however
    , tenured
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+U1Hprofessors cannot consist of more or less than 25 percent of the faculty
, and
UJtenure can last only for seven years.  This provision insures a measure of
Istability and freedom, while allowing evolution in the composition of the
Ifaculty over time.  The student must attend the Federal Academy for three
Kyears to graduate, and the last year will consist of hands-on experience in
Government.  T
)T:o insure that poor people have the same chance to get into
U"the Federal Academy as the wealthy
+, tuition will be publicly funded.  This is
not a
freebie,
 however
., since the tuition owed will be repaid to the
UJGovernment in the form of lower salaries.  So, for example, if the tuition
Jowed to the Government after three years was $45,000, and if the salary of
.the Representative was to be $125,000 annually
, that Representative would
UPonly receive $110,000 for the first three years, until the tuition was repaid.
HThe Federal Academy will consist of students who statistically represent
UHa cross-section of the American people, insuring that no one demographic
7category will dominate, and will be open to the public.

Article I, Section 10, Clause 4
Garamond
3Establish a Department of Rights Enforcement, which
7shall investigate and prosecute all violations of civil
0liberties granted under this Constitution by any
4individual, group of individuals, association, legal
7entity, or any official of any Government entity in the
4United States.  The Department of Rights Enforcement
1shall be vested with all the powers necessary for
6securing its mandate, and shall be allocated all funds
3necessary for the faithful execution of its charter
.  The
m2judgments of the Department shall be appealable to
any State or Federal Court;

AUnder the Empirical Constitution, the Government not only has the
U%power to pass an unconstitutional law
 , but if it does pass such a law
, and if
U you are convicted under that law
#must expend funds to attempt to get
that law
),C, and your conviction, overturned.  This is an obvious violation of
UIthe Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment that each person receive the equal
Mprotection of the laws, since only the wealthy can afford to expend the time,
money
)#E, and energy to fight laws of this nature, and endure prolonged legal
UIbattles of three years or more.  The poor and middle-classes must submit,
Nunless they are lucky enough to have their issue fit into the political agenda
0and budget of the ACLU or similar organizations.
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+g1@Even worse, if the Government passes an unconstitutional law and
UNenforces it, neither the Legislators nor enforcers are liable to any penalties
Bunder the present Constitution(s), increasing the probability that
Hunconstitutional legislation will pass.  Under the Eighth Clause of this
Section, Congress is
)o    obligated
)9.to provide penalties for violations, providing
U;a necessary disincentive for the passage and enforcement of
unconstitutional laws.
?The Department of Rights Enforcement will enforce the penalties
ULprovided under the Eighth Clause.  If, for example, a person is arrested for
Npassing out leaflets in a park, that person need only report the arrest to the
IDepartment of Rights Enforcement.  The Department will examine the arrest
Irecord and testimony of witnesses, and, if it decides that the arrest was
Aunjustified, will fine the parties responsible.  Police brutality
, such as that
UFwhich happened to Rodney King in Los Angeles, will become an extremely
'rare occurrence.  Under THE 21ST CENTUR
Y CONSTITUTION, violators of
U1rights are violators of the law; in other words,
    criminals
.  As such, they will
be treated as criminals.
Under THE 21ST CENTUR
(Y CONSTITUTION, rights will be enforced,
U"and rights will be taken seriously

Article I, Section 10, Clause 5
Garamond
5Establish a Federal Elections Commission, which shall
8secure the integrity of the electoral process by passing
9those regulations necessary to secure limited, efficient,
8and impartial campaigns, and to insure discussion of all
8issues significant to the public interest; and to insure
9that all costs of electoral procedures shall be paid from
0public funds, and that there shall be no private
,contributions to candidates; nor any private
5expenditures on behalf of candidates; nor any private
2labor invested in behalf of candidates, unless the
6candidate is wholly unaware of the labor expended.  No
*candidate for office may make any personal
3expenditures in behalf of his or her campaign.  All
1communications franchises licensed by the Federal
7Government shall abide by the electoral regulations set
1forth in
 C-140.  All media shall make available
8advertising space for candidates at the lowest unit rate
*made available to commercial customers, as
5determined by the Senate, and shall observe all equal
Garamond
+m3(access regulations set forth in
 C-145;
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CThe Federal Elections Commission established under this Clause will
insure that elections are fair
(, and the Commission will supplement and
UGenforce the regulations established by the Senate. Private financing of
Kelections is eliminated; no money from special interests (institutionalized
Bbribery) is permitted. Because people sometimes work for political
Mcandidates in the hopes of getting a job later on, which allows for patronage
Kor a
spoils system,
 they are not allowed to inform the candidate they are
 working for his or her candidacy
).  If people want to work for candidates,
UEthey should work for the candidate because they believe in him or her
, not
UCbecause they want to be rewarded with a job if  the candidate wins.
CThis Clause incorporates the Majority view that Representatives and
UESenators should have their campaigns paid for by the public.  Private
Cfinancing leads to enormous advantages for Incumbents, and prevents
Gworthy challengers from competing on the same playing field.  As former
&Senator Barry Goldwater asked in 1986,
@What are we doing?  Are we saying that . . . only the people who
=have influential friends who have money can be in the Senate?
re excluding a lot of young people that I think would make damn
g9good additions to this body by not giving them access to
money . . . .
As Senator Paul W
)g4ellstone (D-MI) stated on the floor of the Senate on
May 22, 1991,
EThere is no question in my mind that the people in this country would
Bgive public financing overwhelming support. . . . Money determines
Fwho gets to run. . . . Money determines who the gatekeepers are. . . .
DThe system is wired for incumbents.  I do not know why in the world,
Bexcept for the fact there are so many incumbents here, why anybody
Bwould not want to have a level playing field to give challengers a
;chance. . . . All too many Senators and Representatives are
Gaccountable to not real constituencies, not the vast majority of people
 that is, democracy
 but to cash constituencies.  That is an
unpleasant truth.
The polls supported Senator W
$ellstone.  Senator John Kerry (D-MA)
reported on the same day that
/Since 1973 through 1990, this was the question:
Times
It has been suggested that the Federal Government provide a
3fixed amount of money for the election campaigns of
=candidates for Congress and that all private contributions be
>prohibited.  Do you think this is a good idea or a poor idea?
>From 1973 until 1990, the American people have never been less
g:than 60 percent in affirmative answer to that question.  T
oday the
gBAmerican people, 88 percent, say there is too much money influence
Cin politics and they would like to have some kind of public funding
involvement.
gEUnder this Clause, the media must sell advertising space to political
UFcandidates at the lowest rate they give to their best customers.  Each
Jcandidate will get equal time.  Elections will no longer be decided on the
Jbasis of which campaign is the best-financed, a system which puts complete
Ipolitical power in the hands of those most capable of financing political
campaigns.
Eo prevent political campaigns of inordinate length, the Commission is
UIalso empowered to regulate their time frames (e.g., all campaigns for the
>office of Representative must be conducted within four weeks).

)"Article I, Section 10, Clauses 6-8
Garamond
6Pass Legislation implementing the National Objectives;
6Pass Legislation regarding the Justiciability of Cases
+and Controversies under the Supreme Court
jurisdiction;
8Enact penalties for the violation of rights, and to pass
6those Laws necessary or proper for securing the rights
.granted under this Constitution, or by Law.

LThe National Objectives, established in Section Fifteen of this Article, are
U*Objectives established by the People that
be implemented by Congress.
UNIf, for example, one of the National Objectives is
Reduce the illiteracy rate
Kin the population to less than one percent by the year 2040,
 Congress must
Kpass legislation implementing that Objective.  Congress has a whole arsenal
Mof Legislative weapons at its disposal necessary for achieving the Objective,
Iincluding tax credits for the purchase of books, distribution of books to
Fchildren in elementary schools, remedial learning programs for adults,
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+U14educational programs over the National Channel, etc.
FThe Seventh Clause of this Section eliminates the power of the Supreme
UICourt to create the rules that determine the cases it hears.  The current
 Constitution gives Congress the
power
to create these rules, but the
U&Congress has been derelict in its duty
.  Consequently
, a vast and unintended
UJpower has been transferred to the Supreme Court.  This Clause restores the
#former balance to the Constitution.
AThe Eighth Clause obligates Congress to provide penalties for the
UJinfraction of rights to be levied by the Department of Rights Enforcement,
Jand to pass laws necessary or proper for securing the rights granted under
the Constitution, or by law
3ithout penalties for the violations of rights, the
UBconcept of a
right
 is a meaningless one.  According to Madison,
 . . . a
right implies a remedy . . .
, and Hamilton stated in
Federalist
g$It is essential to the idea of a law
, that it be attended with a
sanction; or
)I-, in other words, a penalty or punishment for
gBdisobedience.  If there be no penalty annexed to disobedience, the
?resolutions or commands which pretend to be laws will, in fact,
5amount to nothing more than advice or recommendation.

Article I, Section 1
1, Clauses 1-2
Garamond
m6The Right to an Education, and equality of educational
/opportunity to the greatest extent possible, is
2guaranteed to all Persons regardless of sex, race,
9national origin, religion, citizenship, financial status,
6and condition of disability.  The United States may be
6sued for default of this guarantee, and the Department
/of Rights Enforcement is authorized to pass all
8regulations necessary or proper for securing this right.
6Notwithstanding the foregoing, the right of parents to
6provide for education of children in their homes shall
3not be infringed, provided such education meets the
4minimum standards required by law.  Statistical data
;and results of cognitive tests, including tests of reading,
1writing, and reasoning skills, may be utilized as
-evidence of the implementation of this right.
7The Right to an Education shall consist, at minimum, of
;the following rights: the right to learn to read; the right
:to learn to write; the right to learn to reason; the right
Garamond
+m36to development of the imagination; the right of access
5to bookstores and libraries; the right to hear others
*who wish to communicate their opinions, or
4communicate those facts which do not distort or deny
:objectively verifiable reality; the right of access to all
3unclassified information compiled by the Government
:not protected by the right of privacy; the right of access
3to the National Database; and the right to view the
/National Channel and reproduce its programming.
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FThe portion of the First Amendment referring to the freedoms of speech
U1and press reads as follows:
Congress shall make
law . . . abridging the
UHfreedom of speech, or of the press . . .
 (emphasis supplied). While the
Isimplicity of this Amendment is a virtue, it has proven to be unworkable.
LThe First Amendment is framed in absolute terms; yet if observed, would lead
Cto such absurdities as the abolition of laws against libel, slander
, plagiarism,
snuff films,
 the advocacy of Presidential assassination, child pornography
UIadvertisements in the local paper for
hit men,
 (since the Supreme Court
Hhas held that the First Amendment applies to State and Local Governments
Athrough the Fourteenth Amendment), and laws regulating commercial
Espeech and broadcasting.  Because these absurdities would result, the
LSupreme Court has re-written the First Amendment, and stated that it is
#absolute.
  The problem is that it
&absolute!  Section Eleven incorporates
many of the Supreme Court
-s exceptions to the First Amendment, while at
UIthe same time overturning many rulings of the Court which have turned the
LFirst Amendment into a property right: not freedom of the press, but freedom
for those who
.the press, to the exclusion of everybody else.
gHThe First and Second Clauses of this Section establish the framework for
UIwhat is basically a new First Amendment in the area of Freedom of Speech.
CThe First Clause declares that the Right to an Education is a right
Kguaranteed to all persons residing in the United States.  Before speech can
(take place, education must take place. W
ithout education, a person can
U#neither listen nor speak coherently
#. Since the foundation of speech is
UKeducation, the Right to an Education comes first.  The new approach centers
the right on the
receiver
)0!of information as opposed to the
communicator
U-information, by indicating that the right of
access
to information is at least as
important as the right to
communicate
that information.
gGThe Right to an Education includes, but is not limited to, the right to
U9learn how to read, write, reason, and think imaginatively
ithout the ability
to think logically
, creatively
, and/or analytically
, a person can be captured by
ULillogical and unsubstantiated conceptions.  Logical fallacies are used today
Ebecause they persuade. Once people have learned to ferret out logical
Times
fallacies, however
)_;, a very heavy risk will entail if the fallacies are used
namely
)%?, that the credibility of the speaker will be severely damaged.
UIBecause people are currently untrained, there is currently no credibility
Openalty for the use of these fallacies.  Education will alter the balance.  The
<integrity of the information communicated will be preserved.
GUnder the Second Clause, people have the right of access to information
U0compiled by the Government, which is only proper
, since they have paid for
UGthe gathering of this information. There is an exception for classified
Minformation, but this exception, given the greater control by the People over
Pthe Government, will be less likely to be used in the future as is presently the
Pcase.  In addition, people have the right of access to bookstores and libraries,
which means that Congress is
    obligated
); to pass legislation insuring the
ULexistence of these two critical sources of information in local communities.
Ho preserve the free flow of worthwhile information, a right of access to
UHthe opinions of others is protected, as well as the right to hear others
Bcommunicate facts, provided that the facts do not
distort or deny
objectively verifiable reality
  For example, an oil company will be allowed
UDto communicate that nuclear power is an option for our future energy
Jrequirements, provided that the oil company does not exclude the viability
of solar power
)K1, if in fact solar power is also a viable option.

Article I, Section 1
1, Clauses 3-5
Garamond
m5To secure the Right to an Education, the Senate shall
4maintain a National Database, which shall contain in
0electronic form the following: State and Federal
5Legislative history and enactments; State and Federal
7compilations of information, including, but not limited
9to, statistical data, census reports, charts, and reports
6of Administrative Agencies; State and Federal Judicial
1opinions; public domain material; all non-fiction
,copyrighted books, subject to the exceptions
9enumerated in
 C-150; the full text of all the magazines
4and newspapers designated in
 C-150; transcripts of
-specified television news programs; telephone
5directories; and results of the National Poll, voting
8records of Congress, all reports prepared by the Senate,
7certain materials submitted by the public at large, and
5any other materials designated in
 C-150.  Access to
3this database shall be provided via modems or other
6electronic retrieval or data-storage devices.  Boolean
Garamond
+m34logic or superior data-retrieval algorithms shall be
6established by Congress, and research assistance shall
4be provided, if necessary or proper for securing the
implementation of this right.
.The rates for access to and downloads from the
4National Database shall be contained in
 C-155, but
4these rates shall under no circumstances result in a
3net profit to publishers and authors less than that
0available to them through their primary markets.
,Congress may provide financial incentives to
4economically disadvantaged groups who wish to access
8the database, and may set separate rates for day, night,
4and weekend service.  The National Database shall be
/financed exclusively from revenues accrued from
3services provided, provided that those revenues are
8sufficient to provide the level of service guaranteed in
this Section.
5The National Database shall operate twenty-four hours
6a day, and access is guaranteed to all Citizens of the
United States.
Times

9A popular government, without popular information, or the
Dmeans of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or a tragedy; or
=perhaps both.  Knowledge will forever govern ignorance; and a
>people who mean to be their own governors, must arm themselves
%with the power which knowledge gives.
 James Madison, 1782
gBThe right of access to information is worthless unless there is a
means
UJaccessing that information.  In hundreds, if not thousands of towns across
the Country
)A?, there are no bookstores.  And of those towns with bookstores,
UFfew of these bookstores are of the quality and scope of those found in
Boston, New Y
)Y4ork, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Chicago.  These
ULbookstores, if found at all, are typically one to a town and generally stock
Nbestsellers; but only a small percentage can afford to carry an extensive non-
Jfiction back catalog, due to the lack of a substantive market.  Many towns
Nhave libraries, but unless the town is a large one, the size of the library is
"necessarily limited.  Consequently
,, the majority of the Citizens of the United
UBStates are cut off from substantive access to important sources of
Times
information.
:The National Database dramatically solves this problem.  T
    o receive
UJcopyright protection, publishers must consent to the distribution of their
Hnonfiction materials over the Database, which will operate as follows:
0ou are a person researching the Constitution.  Y
ou access the database
from your computer
)l/, and type (or say) the word
Constitution.
ou are
UNthen given a list of books and articles with either the word
constitution
Hthe title, or in the text of the document, as you choose.  Each book and
article has a number
.  Suppose you want to read
The Federalist.
ou type
U&number 6 (the number that appeared by
The Federalist
), and within seconds
the first page of
The Federalist
comes up on your screen.  Y
ou then have
UJthree options: to restrict the search to only those paragraphs or pages of
The Federalist
)X9which have a specific set of terms (for example,
bill of
rights
), to read
The Federalist
)Z$screen by screen (
browsing
), or to
download
The Federalist
)U0into your computer for later study and printout.
UJBoolean logic algorithms will allow the user to combine search terms using
Jvarious connectors such as
 and
 (e.g.,
find all paragraphs with
(the words
constitution
 AND
rights
If you decide to read
The Federalist
)U while connected to the mainframe
UHover 800 numbers or local interfaces (reading
online
), you will pay an
Khourly rate, which will vary depending on the day and/or time.  Assume that
$the rate for access is $6.00 an hour
'.  If you are interested in reading the
UJentire book, you are better off downloading the book.  Because the book is
Fin the public domain, you will be billed only for the time it takes to
Mdownload (i.e., bring the text of the book into your computer for later study
or printout).
The Federalist
)S1is a 1.3 megabyte file (1,300,000 bytes).  If you
UJcan download information at 120K per minute, it will take a little over 10
,minutes to bring the book into your computer
.  But the best is yet to come:
U!new technologies such as T1 and A
)TM will shrink this time to mere seconds.
Hith the help of fiber optics technology (and ISDN networks), you will be
U&able to purchase books of the size of
The Federalist
(that are in the public
UHdomain) for less than $1.00.  If a book is not in the public domain, the
Epublishers and authors will need to be compensated for their efforts.
However
)0D, the cost will still be substantially less than purchasing the book
:, since the cost of printing the book has been eliminated.
gFHere the National Database solves many important problems at once.  It
UGallows for what will be a truly unbelievable Knowledge Explosion, since
Iresearch will no longer be a tedious, and in some cases, impossible task.
NBusinesses will be able to perform various research tasks at a fraction of the
Fcost; schools will be able to give their students access to the world
    s largest
library
)!", a library that is searchable by
$; writers can write incredibly well-
UGdocumented books; and the average Citizen will have instant access to a
Jworld of knowledge.  At the same time, publishers and authors will receive
!compensation for their labors.  T
*oday people make photocopies of materials,
Times
+U1Gand the money goes not to publishers and authors, but to the makers and
Gowners of photocopying machines.  Under the new system, money will flow
Kto the producers of information.  Greater reward means greater incentive to
Eproduce more information.  Books that will never be written under the
Icurrent system will flourish when the National Database is instituted, as
Jinformation is compiled and organized in thousands of different ways.  The
LNational Database will have profound and far-reaching effects in our society
U7and will substantively change its nature for the better
, since the average
ULCitizen will be exposed to the level of knowledge, and beyond, accessible to
Nany college student or professor in the United States.  And, as a final bonus,
Jit will enable the average Citizen to get a grasp on Government, since the
Iwhole world of information assembled by Government is literally at his or
Cher fingertips.  This lack of knowledge has handicapped the average
HCitizens in their interactions with Government. The failure of people to
Dunderstand the working of Government and its laws has contributed to
inequality
.  As Brennan (1982) put it:
g<This disparity between the words of the Constitution and the
>actually enforceable rights of the citizens contributes to the
mystification of law
)o,.  Those who know what the law is become the
oracles of those who don
t know
.  There is a merger of law and
g    authority
)4".  Instead of obedience to the law
, people learn to obey
gBthe policemen, obey the judge, obey the computer-printed official-
'looking notice which comes in the mail.
g%And getting knowledge as to what one
actual
legal rights are is today
UJfinancially prohibitive.  As Whicker (1987) observed,
[b]eing informed is
Fnot cost-effective for voters without special political connections or
personal links to politicians.
+The National Database, by reducing the cost
UFof acquiring information, greatly increases the probability that being
-informed will be cost-effective for voters
voters.
gLThe beauty of the National Database is that, in all likelihood, it will be a
ULfinancially self-sustaining system, with the revenues required for operation
Kreceived from the rates of access.  If 1,000,000 people access the Database
one hour a day (not unlikely
*, given the number of students, law firms,
UGGovernment agencies, and businesses in the United States), and the rate
Naverages $10.00 an hour (the daily rate will be higher than the evening rate),
this will be $10,000,000 a day
&, or $3,600,000,000 a year to fund the
UHDatabase, an amount which should be in excess of that required.  Because
Kthe materials that will actually be contained on the Database are under the
Mcontrol of the Senate, the actual size of the Database will be as large or as
Osmall (within the limits of the Third Clause) as the American people want it to
be.
EAs Thomas Jefferson wrote in 1786,
I think by far the most important
Times
bill in [the V
)C>irginia] code is that for the diffusion of knowledge among the
UHpeople.  No other sure foundation can be devised for the preservation of
freedom, and happiness.
In the 21st Century
, this foundation for progress
UFwill be more necessary than it ever was.  The National Database is the
<ultimate assurance that this critical goal will be achieved.

Article I, Section 1
1, Clause 6
Garamond
m3To secure the Right to an Education, Congress shall
3provide non-repetitive programming for the National
9Channel, which shall be archived after initial broadcast.
5Nine-tenths of the programming must be non-fictional,
+and all programming must serve a legitimate
4educational purpose.  Programming shall include, but
8not be limited to, courses on reasoning skills, American
4History, legal research, parenting, social problems,
7traditional academic subjects, and matters of practical
1interest to the American People.  One-half of the
2programming must reflect the Will of the People as
6determined by the June National Poll.  The Senate may,
7at its discretion, use the National Channel between the
-hours of eight and eleven p.m. to disseminate
4newsworthy information, and to allow Citizens of the
2United States to communicate alternative points of
view.

HThe National Channel is the visual version of the National Database, and
will become America
s National V
ideo University
.  The National Channel will
UOcontain courses on various areas of interest, including: how to raise children;
Gbackground history on certain problem regions in the world, such as the
LMiddle East; social problems such as unnecessary animal research, pollution,
Dand the Greenhouse effect; and courses in art appreciation, literacy
, music,
UGcomputer programming; health care, how to build a solar house, and many
UMmany other topics, including traditional academic subjects.  For less than $1
Ha month per person (an amount much less than the $200 a year most people
Npay for basic cable service), the People of the United States will have access
@to 8760 hours of varied and non-repetitive programming a year
without
commercials
)D@! If a person videotapes only two hours of these programs, he or
U2she will have received more than his or her money
s worth.  For those who
UKmissed the programs the first time around, all broadcasts over the National
Times
+U1-Channel will be archived for future purchase.
EThe National Channel will also give Citizens of the United States the
UKopportunity to sound off on a variety of topics important to them and which
Gare not already extensively covered in the media, producing a very wide
'spectrum of communicated points of view

Article I, Section 1
1, Clause 7
Garamond
m3The Federal Government has a positive obligation to
3secure the right to communicate information, and to
4defend protected speakers against hostile audiences,
1and against the actions of individuals, groups of
<individuals, or legal entities; to insure that all points of
6view are allowed public expression, and to insure that
6all points of view critical to the public interest are
7provided equal time to the greatest extent possible; to
.provide Citizens with access to non-classified
-Government documents which do not violate the
8legitimate privacy rights of individuals; to discern the
5opinions of the Citizenry through use of the National
7Poll; and to take those actions necessary or proper for
securing protected speech.

>The Seventh Clause mandates that the Federal Government has an
obligation
to secure protected speech.  W
ith this obligation must come
enforcement.  W
)V+ithout enforcement, a right is not a right.
This Clause turns a
negative
)3#responsibility (do no harm) into a
positive
UJresponsibility (prevent others from doing harm).  It obliterates the false
Ldistinction between acts and omissions, a distinction which has proved fatal
$to the preservation of our rights.

Article I, Section 1
1, Clauses 8-9
m,The Right to an Education being of paramount
4importance, the right to communicate information and
9have that information received shall be infringed only if
7necessary to secure the public interest, and only under
4such regulations as set forth in this Constitution.
Garamond
+m30Government, in securing the right to communicate
6information and to have that information received, and
.while securing the public interest against the
2communication of any information violative of that
3interest, may not impose any prior restraint on any
.communication by institutionalized or informal
3censorship or coercion, with the exception of child
/pornography; nor abridge the freedom to publish
7books, other than for excessive obscenity and excessive
7violence as described in this Section; nor abrogate the
9right to distribute handbills on streets, nor picket, nor
9boycott; nor abridge the content of speech that is or can
9be objectively verified as true which serves to highlight
/or remediate undesirable social consequences or
6circumstances; nor abridge the right of individuals to
.determine who may send communications to their
2mailboxes, whether conventional or electronic; nor
5impose any other restriction designated in
 A-140.
Times

GThe Eighth Clause is the recognition in the Constitution that, since no
UHright is absolute, the right to communicate information is not absolute.
DManaging the extent to which Government can manage the communication
Mof information is one of the most important, delicate, and difficult areas of
constitutional draftsmanship.
?The Ninth Clause provides express limits on the manner in which
U<Government may regulate unprotected speech. For example, the
JGovernment is not allowed to use the remedy of prior restraint.  It cannot
forbid the
publishing
)?8of material (unless that material is child pornography).
It can, however
)R>, punish publication after the fact.  Governments can regulate
ULthe right to distribute handbills, picket, and boycott, but cannot ban those
2activities; nor are they empowered to regulate the
content
true
speech
UIwhich serves to highlight or remediate undesirable social consequences or
circumstances.
Under the Supreme Court
s ruling in
U.S.
Greenburgh Civic Assns.,
UL453 U.S. 114 (1981), a Citizen is not empowered to allow other people to put
Ematerials in his or her mailbox without going through the U.S. Postal
MService. This Clause reverses that decision, and gives control of the mailbox
back to the Citizens.
Times

Article I, Section 1
1, Clause 10
Garamond
m4Governments are permitted to use against unprotected
6speech only the least restrictive, most efficient, and
6most appropriate remedies of the following listed, and
in the following order
, and only where necessary or
m2proper for securing the foregoing rights or public
-interest: competing publication; equal access
2regulations; time, place, and manner restrictions,
6including licensing, if the foregoing restrictions are
1content-neutral and narrowly tailored to secure a
9compelling public interest; fines, if necessary or proper
6for preventing unprotected speech; taxes, if necessary
0or proper for preventing unprotected speech; and
3arrest, but only if absolutely necessary to prevent
5unprotected speech.  Both public and private property
8typically open to the public shall be made available for
3the exercise of freedoms herein granted, subject to
5regulations serving a significant public interest, on
0the basis of unambiguous, non-discretionary, and
0reasonable time, place, and manner regulations.

#The Eleventh Clause enumerates the
kinds
of speech that can be
regulated, and the T
enth Clause indicates the
means
by which Government
UAis empowered to regulate. First, the Government can regulate only
Kunprotected speech, and must use the least restrictive method of regulating
Bspeech; for example, if the Government wishes to reduce the use of
Ncigarettes, and decides that regulating cigarette advertisements is one way to
Eachieve that goal, it must use the least restrictive remedy necessary
Ffor achieving the target. Banning cigarette advertisements entirely is
Hprohibited; therefore, the Government must consider the use of competing
publication as its first remedy
. Under the remedy of
competing publication
UFthe Government would place a counter-ad saying
t smoke
 for every
Had the cigarette company placed.  But this would be extremely expensive,
    obviously
)4A, and would therefore not be efficient.  The next remedy would be
to use
equal access regulations
,;  in every ad the cigarette company placed,
U$a warning label would have to appear
#.  If this did not work, Government
could move to the next remedy:
$time, place, and manner restrictions
.  For
UAexample, only two cigarette ads per magazine, or one if necessary
.  If this did
Times
not work, Government could
)or tax the cigarette companies, to reduce
U8the quantity of the placement of ads.  As a final remedy
, the Government
could
arrest
)$;tobacco company executives if the executives did not comply
U,with the prior remedies.  In all probability
, the remedies would not go
U)beyond the time, place, and manner stage.
?Thus, the Government may regulate certain kinds of speech, but
U4achieves this regulation is itself highly regulated.
FThe final sentence in this Clause states that persons who own property
UMthat is typically open to the public may be asked to provide space for speech
Npurposes.  For example, individuals may pass out leaflets in malls, or in mall
:parking lots (this Clause thus reverses the Supreme Court
s decision to the
contrary in
)E    Lechmere
National Labor Relations Board
, No. 90-970
UD(1992)). Again, the Government must use the least restrictive remedy
Anecessary for achieving the goal of communication of information.

Article I, Section 1
1, Clause 1
Garamond
m.The right to communicate information is not an
6absolute right, and therefore Governments are entitled
5to regulate the following when the public interest so
4requires: malicious or defamatory speech which harms
9individuals and lacks significant redeeming social value;
6speech which knowingly or negligently omits, distorts,
9denies, or misstates, to the significant detriment of the
4public interest, those aspects of reality which have
8been or can be objectively verified as true; advocacy of
5unlawful conduct when significantly disruptive of the
2public interest; speech by political candidates or
2Citizens which, by denying or seriously distorting
:objective reality, disrupts the integrity of the electoral
8process; the right of the media to refuse the acceptance
/of political advertisements, where such refusal
8operates to the detriment of the public interest; speech
2which has a fundamental commercial purpose; speech
7transmitted at decibel levels higher than necessary for
6effective communication, and which breaches the public
6peace; broadcast media licensed to use public airwaves
-by the Federal Communications Commission; and
4sexual or violent conduct described or depicted in a
patently offensive manner
, and which lacks significant
Garamond
+m3,redeeming social value, as determined by the
5application of contemporary standards. The corruption
0of minors, by exposure to obscenity or excessive
7violence, shall be an aggravating factor supporting the
8denial of freedoms granted under this Constitution.  But
4no law proscribing pornography or violence, with the
/exception of child pornography or the excessive
8description or depiction of violence, shall be made that
7invades the personal right of privacy exercised in non-
1public places and by those who are not domiciling
5minors, other than regulation of television and other
1electronic media, whether transmitted by antenna,
6cable, satellite, or any other means.  To maintain the
8integrity of the Judicial process, curtailments on those
4communications necessary to preserve fair trials may
5be authorized by law.  Additional restrictions on and
6clarifications of the right to communicate information
1shall be enumerated in
 A-145, provided that the
.provisions serve a compelling public interest.
Times

FThe Eleventh Clause incorporates several of the exceptions the Supreme
UKCourt has written into the First Amendment.  Under Clause Eleven, the right
Jto communicate information does not include the right to lie, the right to
Kdeceive, the right to defame reputations, the right to tell others to break
Acertain laws, the right to blare a message over loudspeakers that
Dunreasonably infringes on the rights of others, nor the absolute and
Lunfettered right to broadcast commercials,  violence, or pornographic images
Hover the airwaves.  While the Supreme Court has ruled that the media has
Hthe right to refuse political advertisements, this Clause reverses those
Fdecisions, to secure the goal of providing access of the People to all
legitimate points of view

Article I, Section 1
1, Clause 12
m3To secure the right to communicate information, the
7Senate shall poll a statistically representative sample
3of not less than twelve hundred and no greater than
6thirty-six hundred People monthly on their opinions on
4various topics, including, but not limited to, their
Garamond
+m3/satisfaction with Governmental institutions and
6policies on a specific or general basis, or both.  The
0results of the National Poll shall be considered
8evidence of the Will of the People of the United States.
3In June, the National Poll shall be conducted three
3times within a twenty-four hour period, once by the
4Government, and twice by private concerns, and shall
<poll a total of ten thousand Citizens.  If the result of any
5poll is discrepant by more than ten percentage points
.from the average of the other two polls on any
6question, the Senate shall conduct an investigation to
8determine the source of the discrepancy.  The results of
6the foregoing three polls shall be averaged, and shall
6constitute the final result of the June National Poll.
2The June National Poll shall contain the following
4questions:
Should the President be recalled?
7you satisfied with the term for Representatives?
3you satisfied with the term for Senators?
, with
Not Sure
 being the only three responses.
6The June National Poll shall also be used to determine
5the National Objectives to be voted on in the General
5Election, nominations for the National Initiative and
,National Referendum, and programming for the
National Channel.
Times

The T
Bwelfth Clause includes within the right to communicate information
UOthe right of the People to transmit their opinions to their politicians.  Every
Mmonth a statistically representative sample of the People will be asked their
Fopinion on various topics; for example, which are the most significant
problems facing the country
0, what event of the last month has disturbed you
UIthe most, how do you feel about the performance of the Legislative Review
Board and the Federal Academy
+, what matters would you like the Senate to
UOinvestigate, etc.  The results of the National Poll will be considered evidence
of the W
ill of the People.
gKThe June National Poll is the most significant.  In that Poll will be asked
UMthe three very critical questions enumerated.  Because these questions are of
Mthe utmost importance, it will be necessary to insure that the results of the
MPoll are as accurate as possible.  If only the Government conducted the Poll,
Kand 67 percent of the People replied that the President should be recalled,
Jthere would be statistical room for doubt, and the credibility of the Poll
8would suffer with regard to this very critical issue.  T
o insure the integrity of
Times
+U1Mthe polling process, the results will be averaged with the results of private
Pconcerns.  In the event of discrepancies that are not statistically explainable,
?the Senate will conduct an investigation into the source of the
discrepancies.

Article I, Section 12
Clauses 1-2
Garamond
m9All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
?subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are Citizens of the United
-States and of the State wherein they reside.
 State
Government
)S#shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges
immunities
    or rights
Citizens of the United States
granted under this
m2Constitution, or rights granted by the Laws of the
6United States, nor make or enforce any Law which is so
6imprecise or overbroad in its terms that it provides a
+pretext for arbitrary or discriminatory law
6enforcement, or uncertainty in the minds of persons of
4common intelligence as to the meaning of the Law and
6nature of the conduct prohibited, and which would have
8a chilling effect on the exercise of conduct not clearly
proscribed
; nor deny to any person
 within its jurisdiction
m!the equal protection of the laws.

    Section T
)2@welve is the second part of the Bill of Rights incorporated into
the Constitution.
FThe First and Second Clauses contain the essence of the very important
UDFourteenth Amendment, especially the very important Equal Protection
GClause, with the addition of language against the use of vague terms in
Dstatutes (a violation which will inevitably lead to Equal Protection
violations).

,"Article I, Section 12, Clauses 3-4
The Privilege of the W
!rit of Habeas Corpus shall not be
m8suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion
Garamond
public Safety may require it.
* :No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.
Times

writ of habeas corpus
*is a formal order requiring a person to be
UIbrought before a Judge or court to investigate the restraint of a person
liberty
bill of attainder
)[5is a law which inflicts punishment without a Judicial
trial.  An
ex post facto law
)_1is a retroactive law which punishes past behavior
UDwhich was legal at the time it was performed. These Clauses formerly
Happeared in Article One, Section Nine, and have been transferred to this
Section.

Article I, Section 12, Clause 5
 Congress shall make no
shall be made
respecting
m>an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof
)*'. The term
establishment
 shall not be
m6construed to prohibit those traditional prayers at the
4opening of Legislative sessions, which do not amount
3to religious endorsement or indoctrination; nor the
0authorization by State or Local Governments of a
moment of silence
 in elementary school homerooms,
5provided that the moment of silence is not identified
/with any religion or religious concept; nor the
9voluntary recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance; nor the
use of the phrase
In God W
e Trust
 on money; nor
m0those public displays and official proclamations
9recognizing the existence of certain religious or secular
)holidays falling in November and December
, provided
m6that those public displays promote religion only in an
indirect and limited manner
, and are confined to those
m%traditional holidays.  In time of war
, conscientious
m4objectors may substitute public service for military
1service.  The grant of tax exemption to religious
5property shall be upheld, subject to those exemptions
5enumerated in
 A-150, and provided those exemptions
8affect all religions equally.  Income tax deductions for
9religious or secular educational institution tuition, and
Garamond
+m34other education expenses available to all taxpayers,
1shall be allowable only if designated at
 A-115.
Times

DThis Clause, formerly contained in the First Amendment, incorporates
modifications to the W
,ritten Constitution subsequently made by the
Supreme Court.
GThere are two issues that can sabotage a New Constitution, and religion
is one of them.  Consequently
,, the most controversial section of THE 21ST
CENTUR
)29Y CONSTITUTION will be the
moment of silence
 provision.
UBThis provision has been added as a compromise between two opposing
factions in the U.S.
)j5.  The
moment of silence
 provision attempts to meet
each of these groups halfway
1, and head off a potentially divisive struggle at
UOthe pass.  The abstract nature of the Moment of Silence is its strength.  While
Lno religious concept is allowed to be attached to this moment of silence, it
Qnonetheless allows State Legislatures, if they desire, to pass it (for elementary
Bschool homerooms only).  Given that students utter every day (when
Nreciting the Pledge of Allegiance) the state-enforced belief that America is a
INation
under God,
  the Moment of Silence is certainly a great deal more
secular
)$F, and certainly more tolerable from the standpoint of an establishment
of religion.

,"Article I, Section 12, Clauses 6-7
The right of the People
peaceably
assemble
m%associate shall be protected; however
, membership in
m5or collaboration with associations engaged in illegal
1advocacy or activity may carry the presumption of
0sharing in the association
s culpability where a
3member or collaborator possesses specific knowledge
9of such advocacy or activity, and a clear intent that the
1aims be reached or the activities be carried out.
5Associations engaged in unlawful advocacy or activity
/may be compelled to disclose the names of their
2members if such disclosure is essential to serve a
substantial public interest.
9The right of individuals to politically organize shall be
)protected, provided that no time or money
5expenditures, of individuals or groups, shall be made
5which violate any law or regulation pertaining to the
Garamond
+m3#integrity of the electoral process.
Times

CThe Sixth Clause was formerly contained in the First Amendment, and
UHprotects legitimate law-abiding organizations, while allowing the law to
3break up unlawful organizations like mobs or gangs.
gAUnder the Seventh Clause, the People retain the right to organize
politically
)3A.  But no expenditures by private groups may be made in behalf of
ULparticular candidates running for Federal Office.  The advertisements funded
Cby these private expenditures have been demonstrated to be woefully
"lacking in informational integrity
(, partly due to the cost of transmitting
UKinformation (there is not enough money to present every side of the story),
7and partly due to the inherent bias in human beings.  T
o allow distorted
ULinformation to be disseminated among the population is to circulate a cancer
Gthrough the body politic, and reduce the probability that well-informed
Ndecisions will be made.  The net result is a society held hostage by ignorance
Gand disinformation, a society doomed to pursue a wrong course of action
throughout perpetuity

Article I, Section 12
Clauses 8-13
! nor shall any State deprive any
person
shall be
m    deprived
of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of
m>The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses,
2papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
seizures,
)8/electronic interception or recording of private
m.communications, or other actions of Government
designated in
 A-155,
shall not be violated, and no W
arrants
m:shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
8affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
/searched and the persons or things to be seized
or the
m1private communications and parties to be recorded
m3search other than those enumerated in
 B-130 shall
3ensue except under the authority of a valid warrant
issued by a Judicial Officer
, or unless there is informed
m3consent of the individual who is the subject of the
8search and seizure, and provided that the individual has
Garamond
+m35been fully informed of the right to withhold consent.
6The official conducting the search bears the burden of
6proving fully informed consent.  Inadvertent discovery
9of illegal materials pursuant to the execution of a valid
1search warrant shall be held admissible in court,
6provided there are no other compelling reasons for the
4inadmissibility of such evidence, and subject to the
3exceptions enumerated in
 B-135.  Evidence derived
4from any unlawful intrusion shall be inadmissible in
3any Legislative, Executive, or Judicial proceeding.
In all criminal matters,
all persons have the right to
m1assistance by competent counsel from commencement
:of a custodial interrogation, during trial and appeal, and
6whenever they are subject to a deprivation of liberty.
9When arrested they shall be read the instruction of their
4rights as designated in
 B-140, which shall include
6being informed of the right to consult with counsel.
=No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise
:infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
@Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
6or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of W
ar or
public danger
/In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right to a speedy
, fair
and public trial
.  The
m(accused shall enjoy the right to a trial
 an impartial
jury,
)"/unless exceptions to the jury trial requirement
m5have been enumerated in
 A-160.  All juries shall be
1impartial, shall consist of the number of persons
1designated in
 A-165, and shall be derived from
m?State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed,
<which district shall have been previously ascertained by law
and to be
)B The accused has the right to be
informed of the
m=nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him
or her
to the discovery of all the
m%evidence possessed by the state; and
to have compulsory
m'process for obtaining witnesses in his
or her
favor
m0accused persons shall be presumed innocent until
proven guilty.
Nor shall any
person shall be subject for
m    the same
)7     offence
offense
)3#to be twice put in jeopardy of life
m<or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against him
or her
Excessive bail shall not be
Times
Garamond
+m31required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
 and
unusual
nor disproportionate
punishments inflicted,
defined in
 B-145.
)x(The Congress shall have Power to declare
the Punishment of Treason
$ , but no Attainder of Treason shall
m9work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the
Life of the Person attainted
%.  Treason against the United States,
shall consist only in levying W
ar against them, or in adhering
m8to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person
<shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two
9Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open
Court.
 Suits at common law
civil lawsuits
where the value in
controversy shall exceed
 twenty dollars
the amount
m5designated in
 B-150, or where the subject-matter of
-the controversy is that designated in
 B-155
the right of
m>trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
9shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
&States, than according to the rules of
 the common
m8right of access to courts and arbitration proceedings is
5guaranteed to every person, and Congress shall assure
0access to courts and arbitration proceedings for
7financially disadvantaged litigants.  Neither Court nor
5transcript costs shall be required of those litigants
unable to afford them.
8Every crime shall be defined by statute; no person shall
8be arrested, tried, or convicted for violation of common
2law criminal offenses.  Every civil wrong shall be
8defined by statute, and no person shall sue, be sued, or
1be suable for violations of the common law.  This
6Clause shall become effective within seven years after
Ratification.
Times

FClauses Eight through Thirteen incorporate the remaining provisions of
UHthe Bill of Rights, with several important additions (some from Ladanyi
U,codification of the Empirical Constitution).
FThe Ninth Clause gives the People the power to provide restrictions on
U+the extent and kind of Government searches.
The T
Centh Clause incorporates the right to counsel and Miranda rule into
Times
+U1Fthe Constitution.  The Eleventh Clause adds the
innocent until proven
Mguilty
 language to our Constitution that does not currently appear there. It
Nalso prohibits disproportionate punishments (e.g., eight years for child abuse
Jresulting in death, and a life sentence for possession of one and one-half
>pounds of cocaine). The National Poll may be used to determine
disproportionality
gKSince jury trials delay the process of justice, and can thus interfere with
U%the
speedy trial
 requirement, the T
$welfth Clause gives the power to the
UEPeople to decide which criminal and civil cases will be tried by jury
, within
U;limits.   All Citizens are guaranteed access to the courts.
CThe Thirteenth Clause is extremely important.  The current Judicial
U2system allows for what is known as the
common law
 or Judge-made law
UKUnder this system, law is made by Judges who render decisions in individual
5cases.  These decisions then become what is known as
    precedent
UEdecisions that must be followed by future Judges.  Because Judges are
Hobliged to follow precedent, laws grow out of these decisions reached by
Judges.
EThe important question is, why are Judges allowed to make law?  Isn
UOthis a violation of the Principle of Separation of Powers?  Simply put, yes.  A
KLegislature certainly has the ability to pass a law allowing minors to void
Htheir contracts (a law written by Judges), and there is no evidence that
Judges
 are inherently wiser than
Legislators.
  Many
, many factors
U(have to be considered when writing a law
!,  and Judges are poorly equipped
UGfor the task
 Judges don
t conduct hearings, haven
t been educated for
the responsibility
)_4, haven
t been supplied with the necessary staff and
ULresources, and can only author
 on the basis of those individual cases
Gwhich happen to come before them.  Due to the circumstances under which
Hthey are compelled to
legislate,
 they are unable to consider the total
Lpicture
 the interests of society as a whole.  This is not the way to write
JAnother onerous feature of the common law is that is frequently difficult,
UKif not impossible, to determine what the law is!  When laws are codified in
@statutes, you simply go to the statute book, where you read that
contractual clauses limiting the liability of landlords for their negligent acts
are prohibited.
ith the common law
)i%, on the other hand, to find out what
UHthe law is you must read cases.  When you go to the casebooks, you often
Mfind two conflicting
lines
 of cases; one line which holds that such clauses
3are prohibited, and another which allows their use.
If you are about to
ULsign a contract with a clause like this, how do you know that the court will
enforce your contract?  Y
!ou don
t.  According to Madison,
[l]aw is
UKdefined to be a rule of action; but how can that be a rule, which is little
known and less fixed?
g(The common-law approach, needless to say
, provides a never-ending
UKsource of revenue for attorneys who are hired to write
briefs
 (frequently
Times
+U1Ianything but), the essential purpose of which is to convince a Judge what
0the law is on a particular issue.  Unfortunately
, sauce for the goose is a cost
UHfor the gander
 an unnecessary and unjust expense, since only those who
Mcan afford attorneys can afford to convince a Judge that the law is on his or
Kher side.  The common law system is a system which dovetails perfectly into
Ka system which, yet again, gives influence to the wealthy at the expense of
=the rest of society
 and is prohibited under THE 21ST CENTUR
CONSTITUTION.

Article I, Section 12
Clauses 14 -17
Garamond
 nor shall
private property
shall
be taken for public use
without just compensation,
as defined in
 B-145.
m:The right to travel shall not be infringed, subject to the
"exceptions enumerated in
 A-170.
8The right to privacy shall not be abrogated.  The rights
0to privacy recognizable by the Government may be
designated in
 A-175.
6Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a
;punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
=convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.

ISince the term
just compensation
 is vague, provision for its definition
U*is made in the Constitutional Supplement.
EThe Fifteenth and Sixteenth Clauses formally include rights that have
UBbeen recognized by the Supreme Court, but which are not explicitly
Henumerated in the present Constitution.  Under the Fifteenth Clause, the
Kright to travel may only be infringed as Congress and the People may concur
D(for example, you cannot travel unless you first secure a passport).
2The Sixteenth Clause recognizes a right of privacy
.  The extent to which
UFthis right of privacy is recognizable may be determined by Congress or
Cestablished by the People and Congress in Constitutional Supplement
NSection A.  It is under this Clause that any future legislation regarding that
Nmost divisive issue of all, abortion, will be decided.  In all likelihood, the
Ilegislation passed by the Congress and/or the People will attempt to find
Times
+U1Gsome middle ground between the hard-line positions on both sides that a
NMajority of the People can live with.  Note that the Clause is written in such
Ca way as to favor neither the
pro-life
 nor
pro-choice
 position.
GAbortion is the second issue which can sabotage a New Constitution, and
Jfor that reason the chances of the word
abortion
 appearing in any future
Constitution are virtually nil.
!Of course, slavery is prohibited.

Article I, Section 12
Clauses 18-19
Garamond
m7Every Citizen of the United States is eligible to vote,
5provided that the Citizen does not claim the right to
;vote in any other state, territory, or country; is at least
:18 years old on the date of the Election; is registered to
1vote at the time of the Election; and is not made
9ineligible due to mental incapacity or criminal activity,
as regulated in
 B-160.
Every person has the right
 to petition the government for a
redress of grievances.
 Persons directly affected by any
m8claimed breaches of this Section, or persons directly or
6indirectly affected with regard to those issues deemed
2of significant National Interest by a three-fifths
6Majority of the Citizens as determined in the National
7Poll, shall have standing to complain to the Department
6of Rights Enforcement, or to request Judicial remedies
in any State or Federal court.

AEveryone in the United States who meets the qualifications in the
U3Eighteenth Clause is eligible to vote; consequently
, literacy tests, poll taxes
UIand the like are unconstitutional.  Congress retains its current power to
Oregulate the voting rights of individuals confined in institutions and prisons.
-The Nineteenth Clause addresses the issue of
standing
, which is
addressed in our present W
0ritten Constitution.  Under the First Amendment,
UFthe People have the right to
petition the government for a redress of
Ggrievances
 (that is, they have
standing
 to adjudicate their claim in
4court).  Perhaps because of this language, Justice W
illiam O. Douglas stated
Times
in 1970 that
?e have never ruled, I believe, that when the Federal Government
g9takes a person by the neck and submits him to punishment,
Aimprisonment, taxation, or to some ordeal, the complaining person
Bmay not be heard in court.  The rationale . . . is that government
cannot take life, liberty
*, or property of the individual and escape
g9adjudication by the courts of the legality of its action.
gHPerhaps, on these narrow facts (taking a person by the neck), Douglas is
U%correct.  This does not mean, however
!, that the Court has always taken
UIseriously the right of the People in the First Amendment to
petition the
Igovernment for a redress of grievances.
  According to the Supreme Court,
Ma person does not have standing to sue unless there is a direct and immediate
Hpersonal injury to the person in question; that is, a person must have a
requisite
personal
)5!stake in the outcome of the case.
But while on the
UJsurface this requirement may seem reasonable, it has led to dozens, if not
Fhundreds, of extremely questionable decisions by the Supreme Court and
 lower courts.   For example, in
United States
Richardson,
418 U.S. 166
UH(1974), the Court held that an average Citizen does not have standing to
:compel Congress to obey the Constitution!  In that case, W
    illiam B.
U'Richardson, suing as a Federal taxpayer
", claimed that Congress
 statutory
UKrefusal to disclose the expenditures of the CIA violated the requirement of
FArticle One, Section Nine that
a regular Statement and Account of the
JReceipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time
.to time.
  But the Court held that Richardson
s grievance was merely a
generalized grievance,
 and not a
    specific
injury to him.
In other words,
since
every
)&7Citizen was hurt by the decision, no Citizen, including
UCRichardson, would have the power to sue! The Court stated this even
though in an earlier case,
United States v
. Scrap
, 412 U.S. 669 (1973), it held
UJthat
[t]o deny standing to persons who are in fact injured simply because
Dmany others are also injured, would mean that the most injurious and
;widespread Government actions could be questioned by nobody
!e cannot accept that conclusion.
But the Court did accept that
UKconclusion, as it continued to issue similarly flawed decisions.  Along the
Fsame lines of reasoning, the Court held that Citizens did not have the
Dstanding to compel Congressmen to obey the Incompatibility Clause in
-Article One, Section Six of the Constitution.
But the
direct and personal
UMinterest
 requirement utilized by the Court was a smokescreen, since it later
Jrefused to hear a case involving persons who most definitely had a
direct
'and personal interest
 in an outcome, V
ietnam draftees who sought to
U prevent their shipment overseas.
!The most obvious example that the
UAstanding requirement has been used by the Court to evade deciding
Isignificant issues (and thus letting the status quo stand) was reached in
Times
Massachusetts
Laird
1, 400 U.S. 886 (1970), where the court refused to
UNallow the State of Massachusetts to get a ruling on the constitutional ability
Kor inability of the Executive Power to send Massachusetts Citizens overseas
Lto engage in armed hostilities, without a congressional (and constitutional)
declaration of war
.  When even a
State
) %cannot be heard in our highest court,
it becomes clear
)U., as Justice Douglas stated in his dissent to
Schlesinger
UAthe standing requirement
protects the status quo by reducing the
Pchallenges that may be made to it and to its institutions.  It greatly restricts
@the classes of persons who may challenge administrative action.
UBTherefore, as long as the Empirical Constitution (and the standing
Mrequirement contained within it) is allowed to stand, there can be no liberty
and justice for
in America.
g>Notwithstanding the above decisions, the Court has relaxed the
U5requirement when it has so desired.  For example, in
Craig v
. Boren
, 429 U.S.
UK190 (1976), the Court held that a vendor of beer had standing to assert the
Kconstitutional rights of males under the age of twenty-one against the laws
%prohibiting the sale of beer to them.
#And in the area of the environment,
the Court held in
Sierra Club
Morton
))$, 405 U.S. 727 (1972) that injury to
aesthetic and environmental well-being
 could constitute an injury in fact,
Kso that persons who use national forests would have standing.  As the Court
Lstated,
[a]esthetic and environmental well-being, like economic well-being,
?are important ingredients of the quality of life in our society
, and the fact that
UIparticular environmental interests are shared by the many rather than the
Efew does not make them less deserving of legal protection through the
judicial process.
:It is this latter line of reasoning that is adopted in THE
21ST CENTUR
Y CONSTITUTION.
gGThe relaxed standing requirement in the Nineteenth Clause gives private
UHCitizens the power to enforce the edicts of Government in those areas of
Msignificant National Interest (not just the environment), in a variant of the
Nconcept of
citizen arrest.
  This is a right currently available to major law
)firms, who will act as private
attorney
"s general
 in lucrative securities
UNcases (in these cases law firms will seek out stockholders to get the standing
requirement).
But securities law
)b5, as we have seen, is not the only area that requires
UKenforcement of the law by private Citizens.  A relaxed standing requirement
is the People
)Q4s safeguard against runaway Government action, and a
UGpowerful means of insuring that the Constitution will be enforced.  All
Npersons directly affected by breaches of their constitutional rights will have
Gstanding to complain to the Department of Rights Enforcement.  Citizens
Nwill not have to hire an attorney to enforce their rights.  In addition, those
persons
indirectly
)9:affected by Section violations will also have standing, if
UOthat issue (or any other issue) is deemed of significant National Interest by a
Qthree-fifths Majority of the Citizens as determined in the National Poll.  So, if
Lsixty percent of the People (or over) believe that dumping toxic wastes into
Times
+U1@the river without a permit is of significant National Interest,
Citizen is
UHempowered to sue that company on behalf of him or herself, and all other
1Citizens who are directly or indirectly affected.

Article I, Section 12
Clauses 20-21
Garamond
The enumeration in
 the
this
Constitution of certain rights
m,shall not be construed to deny or disparage
 others
other
rights
 retained by the people
The People of the United
m2States may supplement this Section with additional
3rights, to be enumerated in
 A-115, and to be duly
4incorporated in this Section as if set forth herein,
6provided that no right substantially diminishes any of
8the powers explicitly granted to the Federal, State, and
1Local Governments under this Constitution, or any
2rights explicitly granted to any person under this
Constitution.
)^-The powers not delegated to the United States
m<by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
7reserved to the States respectively, or to the People.
5No right under this Constitution or under the laws of
6the United States may be violated by any individual or
group of individuals.

The T
,wentieth Clause incorporates the Ninth and T
enth Amendments of
UQthe Bill of Rights.  The revision of this Clause insures that entities other than
Gpeople may legitimately be seen as having rights (for example, deceased
Hpersons who make requests after their death, small businesses, political
Jorganizations, etc.).  The People are free to add additional rights to the
GConstitution, provided that no right is articulated which substantially
Jdiminishes any of the powers explicitly granted to the Federal, State, and
GLocal Governments under the Constitution, or violates any of the rights
8explicitly granted to any person under the Constitution.
The T
Ewenty-First Clause is an important addition.  Under the existing Bill
UFof Rights, only the Government may not (in theory) deprive you of your
Krights; but there is no restriction on acts by individuals.  Under THE 21ST
CENTUR
)2>Y CONSTITUTION, a right is a right.  No one may deprive you of
Times
+U1Qyour legitimate rights, regardless of their legal status.  From the standpoint of
THE 21ST CENTUR
)m2Y CONSTITUTION, a policeman or private Citizen who
UEprevent you from passing out leaflets in a park are one and the same.
?Anyone who violates those rights explicitly enumerated in the T
welfth
UGSection will have to pay a penalty if found guilty by the Department of
Rights Enforcement.

)"Article I, Section 13, Clauses 1-2
Garamond
:The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the
=States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be
)prohibited by the Congress prior to the Y
ear one thousand
m<eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on
=such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.
:No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any
State
2, subject to the exceptions enumerated in
 B-165.
m:No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce
;or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another:
nor shall V
)B2essels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to
enter
, clear
, or pay Duties in another

FSection Thirteen contains additional restrictions on the powers of the
UEUnited States Government, formerly contained in Section Nine of the W
ritten
Constitution.
)S=The slavery clause is stricken, and the addition in the First
UHClause formally recognizes Supreme Court rewrites found in the Empirical
Constitution.

Article I, Section 13, Clause 3
1No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in
*Consequence of Appropriations made by Law
 ;  and a regular
m=Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all
3public Money shall be published  from time to time

GThe modifications to this Clause, found in Section Three, Clause Six of
UEthis Article, mandate that the People of the United States be given a
Times
+U1PQuarterly report of the financial status of the Nation, essential for preserving
the Principle of Accountability

Article I, Section 13, Clause 4
Garamond
:No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States
m    any State
)?/: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or
m=Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress,
?accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind
whatever
, from any
 King, Prince or foreign State
individual,
m2association of individuals, or Government, whether
Domestic or Foreign

LThe
title of nobility
 Clause is essentially obsolete, but since one reason
UKfor this obsolescence is the existence of this Clause, it is retained.  The
Fsecond part of this Clause prevents the acceptance of gifts, and is an
3important foundation for future ethics legislation.

$"Article I, Section 14, Clauses 1-3
2No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or
Confederation;
)\& grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal
; coin
Money;
emit Bills of Credit
; make any Thing but gold and
m<silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts;  pass any  Bill of
    Attainder
)44, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation
m-of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility
m<No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any
;Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be
#absolutely necessary for executing
inspection Laws:
m@and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State
>on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of
<the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the
Revision and
 Controul
Control
of the Congress.
m=No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty
&of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of W
ar in time of Peace,
m:enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or
with a foreign Power
, or engage in W
, unless actually
Garamond
+m38invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of
delay.
Times

DSection Fourteen restricts the power of the States.  The language is
U/essentially the same as that appearing in the W
ritten Constitution, although
UIthe language in the First Clause that is obsolete or repetitious has been
    stricken.

)"Article I, Section 15, Clauses 1-2
5The People of the United States reserve to themselves
4the power to change the terms of Representatives and
5Senators, to designate public policy, and to propose,
5adopt, and repeal laws, including those provisions in
5Section C of the Constitutional Supplement subsequent
5to 200, as provided by this Article.  The People also
5reserve to themselves the power to remove from office
#the President of the United States.
.The People have an inalienable right to change
-the terms of the Representatives and Senators
5as provided under this Constitution.  If three-fifths
4of the participants in the June National Poll answer
 to the questions regarding the term lengths
-of Representatives and Senators, the question
#or questions
Shall the term of the
3[Representatives/Senators] be [extended/reduced] to
7[one/two/four] years?
 shall be placed on the ballot of
7the General Election, with the only two responses being
  If a three-fifths Majority of the V
oters
m    answer
)C.es,
 the new term shall be effective with that
m    Election.

"FSection Fifteen contains the
direct democracy
 provisions of THE 21ST
CENTUR
)28Y CONSTITUTION, and stipulates the precise nature of the
UHLegislative Power of the People referred to in Article One, Section One.
EOver 25 States utilize one or more of these provisions in their State
"Constitutions, and THE 21ST CENTUR
Y CONSTITUTION brings these to
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+U1Cthe Federal level, while creating three democracy provisions new to
constitutional draftsmanship: V
    ariable T
)-$erm Lengths, the National Objective,
U and the Legislative Committee.
GThe Second Clause institutes the procedure for changing the term length
U#of Representatives and Senators.  T
+erm length is one of the critical variables
UNin a constitution, perhaps the most critical, and this Clause gives the People
Mthe opportunity to change the term lengths if they feel a change is necessary
and/or desirable.
Under THE 21ST CENTUR
Y CONSTITUTION, there are four
combinations of term lengths:
Combination 1 (total
years)
Combination 2 (total
years)
Representative
Representative
Senator
Senator
Combination 3 (total
years)
Combination 4 (total
years)
Representative
Representative
Senator
Senator
gDThe People are empowered to choose the term length combination that,
U)in their opinion, is best for the country
gJIf only a simple Majority were required to decide this issue, a 51 percent
UJMajority could change the terms, and due to the variability of opinions in
Gthe population, the terms could conceivably alternate every two to four
Hyears, without any chance to gauge the effects of the term length on the
Loperation of the Government.  The three-fifths requirement insures that each
1term gets its day in the court of public opinion.

Article I, Section 15, Clause 3
Garamond
7The right of the People to designate public policy when
6the policy designated is in the National Interest is a
9preeminent right.  To secure this right, the People shall
1determine not less than two and no more than five
4National Objectives annually, which may be expressed
0in specific or general terms, and which shall be
1nominated by Plurality vote in the National Poll,
7seconded by Plurality vote in the Primary Election, and
4determined by Majority vote in the General Election.
3No proposal shall be placed on the National Poll or
Garamond
+m38ballot which relates to the appointment, qualifications,
2tenure, removal, or compensation of Judges; to the
9powers, jurisdiction, creation, or abolition of courts or
7any rules thereof; to the appropriation of money or the
-rates and form of taxes; or to the passage of
7unconstitutional Legislation.   The National Objectives
&may be carried forth from year to year
Times

!IThe Third Clause solves a critical problem.  The People will have certain
U2goals they would like to have implemented; however
, there are times when it
UImight be impractical for the People to propose specific legislation.  For
Mexample, they may be united in their desire to see illiteracy eliminated, yet
Idivided as to the method for attaining this goal.  The National Objective
Iallows People to specify a goal without requiring agreement on the means.
EUnder the concept of the National Objective, the People determine the
2destination, and the Legislature takes them there.
EThe National Objective(s) may be framed in specific or general terms:
reduce unemployment,
reduce unemployment by five percent,
achieve a twenty-five percent reduction in heroin use by 2022,
develop alternative fuels.
  There is a very wide range of options open.
LThe check on the power of the People is, of course, the Constitution itself.

)"Article I, Section 15, Clauses 4-7
1The People of the United States have the right to
4propose Legislation to the House of Representatives,
6and to have that Legislation voted upon, provided that
3the proposed Legislation is not given an indefinite
*Timetable by the Legislative Review Board.
/The Senate shall appoint a Federal Committee as
6provided under Section Three of this Article, which is
3empowered to annually recognize between one hundred
4and one thousand Legislative Committees, as provided
by law in
 C-160.
5A Legislative Committee shall be established when not
7less than one thousand and no greater than ten thousand
7Citizens petition the Federal Committee, as provided by
8law in
 C-165.  Legislative Committees shall consist of
Garamond
+m36all Citizens who have petitioned the Federal Committee
5for passage of a particular Bill, and the Legislative
0Committee shall research, discuss, and draft the
4proposed Legislation.  Upon completion, the proposed
;Bill and all materials used to consider the Bill, including
.research and drafts, shall be submitted to the
2Legislative Review Board, which shall transmit the
4materials to the House of Representatives with their
,Evaluations. No Legislative Committee may be
3authorized which advocates the passage of any Bills
8which relate to the appointment, qualifications, tenure,
2removal, or compensation of Judges; to the powers,
;jurisdiction, creation, or abolition of courts or any rules
7thereof; to the appropriation of money or the rates and
4kind of taxes; or to the passage of unconstitutional
Legislation.
4If the Bill is voted upon, the Legislative Committee
:shall be dissolved by the Federal Committee.   If the Bill
5is not voted upon, the Legislative Committee shall be
6dissolved at the discretion of the Federal Committee.
Times

GThe third new democracy provision involves the proposal of legislation.
UIUnder the present Constitution, anyone may submit a draft of a particular
Mpiece of legislation to their Representative.  The power to submit a piece of
legislation, however
)n0, is not the power to have hearings held on that
UIlegislation, nor the power to have that legislation voted upon.  Requests
Msuch as these are generally ignored (unless the constituent has an
 other
Iconstituents don
t have).  If a Representative does decide to sponsor the
Mlegislation it is sent to a committee, where it is either (generally) amended
Mbeyond all recognition, or simply contained.  If the Bill does pass the House
Kand Senate, it goes to a conference committee, where it is again subject to
Jamendment.  Note that there is nothing
democratic
 about this process; to
the contrary
, the process is
republican
)A"both in spirit and execution.  The
UHodds of a Citizen-proposed Bill emerging from this process unscathed are
Lclose to zero, even though the Bill were a model of prospective legislation.
@The Legislative Committee System reduces the power of individual
UGcongresspeople and/or a Seniority System and/or a subcommittee chairman
bottle up
 legislation.  Under THE 21ST CENTUR
Y CONSTITUTION,
UIany Bill that between 1,000 and 10,000 Citizens would like to have passed
L(and care enough to have passed that they will research and draft it) may be
Times
+U1Hsubmitted to the Legislative Review Board, provided that the legislation
Fdoes not advocate any legislation prohibited by the Constitution.  The
Oproposed Bill will be researched and drafted by these Citizens, and the initial
Njudge of the quality of their legislation will be the Legislative Review Board
 the ultimate judge, of course, will be the House of Representatives and
Gpossibly the Senate and President, who will either vote or not vote the
legislation into law
gCHere is one example of how this may work in the future.  A group of
U%parents are concerned with illiteracy
), and begin to look for ways to solve the
ULproblem.  Discussion takes place over a period of months over the Electronic
FPost Office. At some point, one person suggests a solution, called the
?Monthly Book Program for Elementary School Children. Under that
Iproposal, each elementary school child would be given a book a month (for
Geight months).  At an average cost of $1 per book (mass production will
Jdecrease manufacturing costs dramatically), and with 23 million elementary
Jschool children, the cost of the program would be less than $300,000,000
Ian insignificant price to pay for the societal good it would do (if every
Lperson dropped a $1 bill into a hat, the program would be funded
 to put it
another way
)E8, if one B-2 bomber were scratched, the program would be
funded for
    years).
gKThe initial group of parents decides that the idea is worth exploring.  The
UMmessage goes out over the Electronic Post Office, the National Database,  the
DNational Channel, or all three
those people who are interested in
Lforming a committee to draft this particular legislation contact [the person
Hdesignated the head of the committee].
  9,000 people reply that a) they
Mthink the proposal is an excellent idea, and b) they would be willing to work
Jtowards passage of the legislation.  If the requisite number of people are
interested, the Senate
)u6s Federal Committee will form a Legislative Committee,
UHprovided that the maximum allowable number of Legislative Committees has
not been exceeded.
@The Citizens comprising the Legislative Committee on the Monthly
UGBook Program for Elementary School Children will do their research over
Gthe National Database, gather testimony from experts, and discuss their
Mproposals via the Electronic Post Office. After the Legislative Committee has
Qresearched the Bill, they will submit their final draft (along with all materials
Jused to draft the legislation) to the Legislative Review Board, which will
Iprovide an Evaluation and a Timetable.  Congress, at its option, may hold
Lfurther hearings, but as with any piece of legislation they must vote on the
&Bill within the mandated time frame.
FThe Legislative Committee System can potentially save Congress a great
deal of time and money
1, since much of the necessary legislative work of
UKresearching and draftsmanship will be done by volunteers, which will reduce
Nthe ultimate cost to Government (i.e., the taxpayers) of passing legislation.
DBecause there is an inherent limitation on the number of Legislative
Times
+U1KCommittees that can be formed, the Senate has a perfectly legitimate reason
Hto not allow the formulation of a committee whose Bill may not be in the
PNational Interest.  This structural limitation allows the Senate to legitimately
7filter out the inevitable poorly conceived proposals. Y
et under no
UIcircumstances will less than 100 proposals be allowed, which deprives the
HSenate of total power to prevent the work of Legislative Committees, and
Kthe power of the People to propose legislation and to have that legislation
voted upon.
If the Bill
6voted upon, there is no reason to keep the Legislative
UJCommittee alive: in addition, there are other Legislative Committees which
Iwill have been waiting in line to form.  If a Bill is given an indefinite
Timetable, the Senate may
., at its discretion, continue to recognize the
Legislative Committee involved.

Article I, Section 15, Clause 8
Garamond
4The National Initiative establishes the power of the
-People of the United States to directly enact
6Legislation.  The People shall determine not less than
4two and no more than five proposals for the National
0Initiative annually, which shall be nominated by
0Plurality vote in the National Poll, seconded by
6Plurality vote in the Primary Election, and determined
6by Majority vote in the General Election.  No proposal
;shall be the subject of any Initiative if it relates to the
0appointment, qualifications, tenure, removal, or
4compensation of Judges; to the powers, jurisdiction,
9creation, or abolition of courts or any rules thereof; to
3the appropriation of money or the rates and form of
9taxes; or to the passage of unconstitutional Legislation.
-An Initiative approved by a Majority of the V
oters shall
m3be submitted to the Legislative Review Board for an
6Evaluation and signed into law by the President within
.thirty days after certification by the Senate.

/Another way for the People to implement their W
ill is through a
democratic device known as the
Initiative
)2 .  As of 1977, 21 States and the
ULDistrict of Columbia had adopted the Initiative, from South Dakota (1898) to
;Oklahoma (1907) to Massachusetts (1918) to Illinois (1970).
This device
UNprovides for a direct vote by the People on a particular piece of legislation.
Times
+U1DUnder the system of representative Government, only the men or women
Ielected by voters determine the laws, and the only remedy for a voter who
)disapproved of his or her Representative
s vote on a particular piece of
U9legislation is to vote for the opposition on Election Day
.  The problem with
UPthis method is that it forces the voter either to 1) become a single-issue voter
Lor 2) to take the
 with the good.  Under either of these scenarios, the
Qvoters must order their priorities.  If the issue on which the voter disagrees is
HLESS SIGNIFICANT to that voter than other issues of greater significance
Non which the voter agrees, the voter is forced to cast his vote for a disliked
Mcandidate.  Skillful politicians can hold society
hostage
 by appealing to a
GMajority of the voters on certain
 sentiments like
being tough on
Mcrime
 (and providing more funds for jails and stiffer penalties for crimes),
Mwhile at the same time refusing to allocate funds that would obliterate crime
Jat the source
 not to mention the passage of more subtle and devious laws
)which are not in the interests of society
&, nor in the interests of that person.
UNIn addition, it forces Legislators to take
 positions, or NO position at
Qall, on potentially divisive issues.  This has a potentially destabilizing effect
on society
)7B, as Citizens are forced into vigilantist remedies when Government
UNrefuses to act.  In matters such as these, where a Legislature has refused for
Kpolitical reasons to resolve the issue, the Judiciary has typically assumed
jurisdiction.
LNeither of these two alternatives are preferable.  If the Legislators refuse
UKto pass legislation, the status quo is maintained, and those upset with the
Kstatus quo resort to extra-legal means to achieve their objectives, such as
Hpicketing, strikes, boycotts, and even bombings. The second alternative,
legislation by the Judiciary
, is slightly better
, but because Supreme Court
UHjustices are (in effect) appointed for life, they aren
t obligated to be
-responsive to the constituents.  Consequently
, they can rule in favor of a
U@proposal seen as valid by only forty percent, or for that matter
percent,
U7of the population.  Sometimes this works for the better
, and sometimes not,
but the
underlying
)@;problems are not solved.  The net result is divisiveness, a
UFdivisiveness which can have a negative impact on the rights of others.
Divisive issues are
time-thieves
)A', and time is a precious commodity in a
U)society which moves as quickly as ours. T
angential to all discussions
UBregarding rights is the collective right of the Citizenry to have
every
U0significant issue be placed on the public agenda
. But this right is
U5impossible when divisive issues dominate that agenda.
2For example, imagine that in the decade of the 80
s not a day goes by
without a Letter to the Editor
/, a news report, or some other manifestation of
U)social unrest stemming from the issue of
abortion
.  Imagine, impossible as it
U8may seem, that Supreme Court candidates are selected or
not selected
UNpredominantly with regard to their opinion on this, and only this, issue.  All
Fother issues have faded into the background, and a candidate who holds
Gother opinions noxious to both abortion supporters and opponents may be
Times
+U1Lselected; for example, this appointee may be against antitrust laws, against
<pollution laws, and against rights for victims.  And both Mr
. A and Ms. B,
UDopponents on the abortion issue, may disagree with the appointee on
these other issues.
DThus, the Initiative is necessary not only for the obvious reason of
UKhelping to secure Majority preferences, but also because it helps to remove
wedge issues
 from the Legislative process.  Divisiveness is a potential
Mtool in the hands of unscrupulous politicians, and by removing this tool from
the politician
)I?s arsenal, the Initiative helps to prevent this divisiveness.
gFThe prevention of divisiveness is not the only reason to implement the
process of initiative, however
$.  Another of the chief arguments of
UOproponents of the initiative is that it allows the People to circumvent corrupt
Ior inept Legislatures, which not only improves the quality of legislation
Hpassed, but increases the speed with which legislation is passed.  North
JDakota farmer Lars A. Ueland, a Republican disillusioned by the domination
3of his party by trusts and corporations, wrote that
FWhen I first became familiar with the principles of the initiative and
Creferendum I was impressed with a sense of their value.  The more I
Estudy these principles the more I am convinced that they will furnish
>us the missing link
 the means needed
 to make popular self-
Dgovernment do its best.  Programs and reforms will then come as fast
Aas the people need them, as fast as these changes are safe
 only
Cwhen a majority of the people are behind them.  I would rather have
Bthe complete initiative and referendum adopted in state and nation
Fthan the most ideal political party that could be made, put into power
g%if one or the other could be secured.
g-An obvious objection presents itself, however
.  Couldn
t the Initiative be
U(used by
the Majority
 (or
the Minority
 for that matter) to achieve some
UJsort of unconstitutional goal?  The short answer is NO.  Why not?  Because
Dthe Eighth Clause is constituted to prevent the consideration of any
Junconstitutional Initiatives, which, by definition, are null and void.  No
Munconstitutional Initiative will pass because no unconstitutional Initiatives
Hwill be allowed on the ballot by the Senate.  The question then becomes,
Iwhat Initiatives are unconstitutional?  And the answer is, all those laws
"forbidden by Sections Eleven and T
welve of Article One, and the
UKConstitutional Supplement.  In addition, all Initiatives which are approved
Jby the People shall receive an Evaluation by the Legislative Review Board;
Hif the Evaluation is less than Zero, the Law need not be enforced by the
HExecutive and Judicial Branches.  This triple security (Senate approval,
EConstitutional restrictions, and Legislative Review Board Evaluation)
Ovirtually insures that no Initiatives will pass, or will be enforced,  which do
8not have a proper respect for the rights of individuals.
Times
+g1ABut not everyone is for power to the People.  Notwithstanding the
UJforegoing, some will rehash the old arguments given against the Initiative
K(and democracy in general), and claim that it will be used as a tool by the
?poor and disenfranchised against the richest members of society
.  The facts,
however
).:, provide no evidence for this hypothesis. There have been
UJhundreds of Initiatives considered by the States and Local municipalities,
Iand such proposals have been virtually non-existent (unless tax reduction
NBills are seen as
against the interests of the wealthy
).  Other than the tax
Nissue, few proposed Initiatives could be seen as infringing on private wealth.
JHere are some issues at the State level which have gone before the voters:
taxing and spending limitations
legalized gambling
smoking in public places
abolition of poll taxes
establishment of the Nation
#s first Presidential primary system
campaign finance reform
sunshine
 laws for Legislatures
(prohibition and antiprohibition measures
drinking age
%nonbinding nuclear freeze resolutions
land use
?environmental concerns (such as bottle deposits and regulation
of toxic wastes)
#terms of office for State officials
bans on leghold animal traps
)eliminating sales taxes on food purchases
'streamlining State Government practices
'passing
conflict-of-interest
 statutes
antipornography measures
educational vouchers
gJHardly the picture of a rabid, propertyless Majority seeking to confiscate
the wealth of
the Minority
  Fears such as these have proven utterly
UNgroundless, and, in fact, sometimes the opposite is true: for example, in many
)of these Initiatives, such as California
"s famous Proposition Thirteen, the
U7wealth of
 Minority (and
 Majority) has been
increased,
U&through a reduction of property taxes.
@That the above issues are the type which go before the voters is
UIcompelling evidence against one of the central premises arguing against a
Cmore democratic Constitution.  And, in fact, anyone opposing a more
Jdemocratic Constitution on the basis of confiscation of Minority wealth by
the Majority
 must confront the reality of thousands of state-years of
Mcompletely contrary experience, as well as one of the more curious ironies of
Times
+U1Four time
 that much of the support for the democratic and progressive
$device of the Initiative comes from
conservatives
such as Jack Kemp, Barry
U    Goldwater
)7@, Phil Gramm, Howard Jarvis, Patrick Buchanan, and Arthur Laffer
UFwho in 1978 supported a movement to get a National Initiative adopted.
gCOnce confronted with this strange reality (conservatives advocating
UJprogressive legislation) some critics of the Initiative then make the same
argument from the
opposite
)30end of the political spectrum, which is that the
UFInitiative will be used by
the Majority
 to infringe on the rights of
Idemographic Minorities, outside the realm of economic issues.  Could this
Lprediction be true?  As it turns out, these fears are also groundless, as an
Hexamination of the above list shows.  The issues cover a wide variety of
!concerns, but few of them, if any
(, are aimed at the reduction of existing
Minority
 rights (demographic or otherwise). Moreover
    , even in
UEphilosophically and/or demographically homogenous societies (an event
Bwhich becomes increasingly less probable as the geographic area of
Elegislation increases) it is difficult to predict how a predominantly
Nconservative population, or a predominantly liberal population, will vote.  As
Cronin (1989) stated:
AThe initiative and referendum mechanisms are used by a variety of
Iinterest groups.  Their diversity defies easy generalization, [and] it is
C. . . nearly impossible to predict how voters in certain states and
communities will vote.  V
,oters in normally progressive California and
gAMassachusetts have adopted major property tax reduction measures.
@oters in normally conservative Alaska, Montana, and North Dakota
g@voted to endorse the proposed mutual, verifiable nuclear freeze.
<oters in normally progressive Oregon have approved the death
penalty
)'>, while those in traditionally conservative Utah voted against
g>banning pornographic programming on cable television.  Liberal
@Oregon voted no on legalizing the growing of marijuana.  Liberal
GCalifornia voted for the questionable
English only
 initiative . . . .
Boters have passed bottle bills in several states but defeated them
elsewhere.  V
)L2oters have streamlined and opened up the political
gDprocess in a number of instances.  Time and again they have endorsed
8a tougher criminal justice system and have given greater
-consideration to the rights of the victim.  V
oters in several states have
gDdefeated proposals to prohibit state-funded abortions, although this
/was approved by a slim majority in Colorado.  V
oters have approved
gGstate-run lotteries as a convenient means to raise revenues despite the
Cview that it is apt to place a heavier burden on low- and moderate-
income people.  V
)`3oters have used the initiative to send a message to
g@their national leaders that they want more arms control progress
=(although these measures failed in Arizona and South Dakota).
Times
In reality
)2<, the problem facing Minorities is not a directly democratic
U;political system, nor in fact a representative one, but the
lack of a strong
bill of rights
)Y7(framed as specifically as possible, with sanctions for
U'violations) which prevents Legislators
constituents from passing anti-
ULminority legislation in the areas of individual rights.  In these cases, the
 (a purposefully inefficient and undemocratic Legislative System
designed to ignore Majority W
-ill) can not only be insufficient to cure the
disease,
 but can even exacerbate existing problems by leading to
Feffects
 worse than
diseases
 which never existed in the first place!
LFor those concerned with the most important right of all, the critical right
self-determination
)d;, it is important to note that there has traditionally been
UKmuch public support for the Initiative.  In 1977, Pollster Patrick Caddell
U8survey firm, Cambridge Reports, Inc. found that America
s desire for a
U6National Initiative was double that of the opposition:
M            Public Support for a National Initiative, 1977 (%) (n = 1500)
9ould you favor a Constitutional amendment, similar to the
r8laws which 23 states already have, that would permit the
:citizens of the United States to place a proposed law on a
>national ballot by collecting a specified number of signatures
<on a petition and have that law take effect if approved by a
majority of the nation
(s voters at the next general election or

Not Sure
gEOf course, no National Initiative Amendment was forthcoming, since an
UJamendment of that nature would not have served the interests of the people
Jin charge of our Government.  History has shown that an issue as important
Qas this is too important to leave to the discretion of future Legislators.  Thus,
THE 21ST CENTUR
)}*Y CONSTITUTION includes this most critical
amendment.

) Article I, Section 15, Clause 10
Garamond
4The National Referendum establishes the power of the
1People of the United States to directly repeal or
7prevent the enactment of Legislation.  The People shall
Garamond
+m31determine not less than two and no more than five
5proposals for the National Referendum annually, which
4shall be nominated by Plurality vote in the National
9Poll, seconded by Plurality vote in the Primary Election,
.and determined by Majority vote in the General
2Election.  No proposal shall be the subject of any
,Referendum if it relates to the appointment,
3qualifications, tenure, removal, or compensation of
1Judges; to the powers, jurisdiction, creation, or
0abolition of courts or any rules thereof; to the
3appropriation of money or any Legislation affecting
/taxes; or to the diminishment of the rights and
0protections of any persons as enumerated in this
.Constitution, or provided by law. A Referendum
approved by a Majority of the V
oters shall be signed
m2into law by the President within thirty days after
certification by the Senate.
Times

,The Referendum instituted in THE 21ST CENTUR
Y CONSTITUTION is
essentially a
people
)u7s veto,
 and a final, limited check against the passage
UOof Bills against the National Interest.  If the Congress appropriates funds for
Ia data network that only benefits large corporations, and not the general
Opopulace, the People can directly veto this legislation, if that measure is put
Jon the ballot.  The check on the People, besides the explicit prohibitions
Oagainst various proposals that may legitimately be the subject of veto, is that
Gthe number of proposals for a Referendum may be limited to two annually
ULthe Senate so provides
 a significant check, since hundreds of laws will be
passed in any given year

Article I, Section 15, Clause 1
m0The National Recall establishes the power of the
6People of the United States to remove the President of
0the United States from office.  The Senate shall
7supervise the petition process, including certification
7of the required number of signatures, or other means as
2established in
 C-170, and shall prepare a Recall
5petition in conventional or electronic form when two-
4thirds of the participants in the June National Poll
Garamond
+m3    answer
)G*es
 to the question regarding Presidential
m:Recall.  The issue of Recall shall be placed on the ballot
0of the General Election when the Recall petition
1contains not less than one-twentieth of the total
8number of all votes cast in the most recent Election, or
5not less than one-fourth of the total number of votes
6cast in the most recent Election if done by electronic
6means, as designated in
 C-175.   If the requirements
.are met, the question
Should the President be
4recalled?
 shall be placed on the ballot of the next
General Election, with
 being the only
m&two responses.  If a Majority of the V
oters answer
 the Vice President shall assume the position of
m6President immediately upon verification of the returns
7of the General Election by the Senate, or no later than
3ten days after the General Election, as the law may
;provide.  No Recall shall be initiated within the first six
5months nor the last twelve months of the Presidential
1term, nor upon more than one occasion during that
term.
Times

EAs Jefferson observed in a letter to Judge Spencer Roane in 1819, the
UHpower of Impeachment provided in the 1787 Constitution was (and is)
even a scarecrow
Even during the W
)f"atergate episode (which nearly led
UEto the Impeachment of President Nixon), an historical aberration made
Jpossible only because ex-President Nixon a) taped his conversations and b)
Iwas forced to make the tapes public, the House of Representatives refused
to make Nixon
)[3s secret bombing of Cambodia one of the Articles of
Impeachment.
The President
)N(s vast Executive powers, and the need of
U/individual Legislators to secure the President
s cooperation in running
UHinterference with the Executive Branch, makes his or her Impeachment and
;removal from office an extraordinarily unlikely eventuality
gCThe power of Recall, though a greater threat than Impeachment, will
UGrarely be used, due to several safeguards against ill-considered Recall
    attempts:
Dwo-thirds of the participants in the June National Poll must request
a Recall petition.
 No less than one-twentieth or one-fourth of the voters (depending
Eon the means utilized to fill out the Recall petition), as the Senate
Times
+g1Edecides, must append their names to a written or electronic petition.
EThe Senate has complete control over the Recall process, and will set
5the limit at a level that accords with the National W
ill and Interest.
 A Majority of the voters in the General Election must Recall the
President.
 The time frame of Recall is limited to a two and one-half year
window
 Only one Recall attempt is allowed per term.
=The Recall, not only a greater threat than the
scarecrow
UEImpeachment, will also focus the attention of the President on public
Kopinion, and not the opinions of the Legislative Branch, which of necessity
5will make him or her more responsive to the popular W

) Article I, Section 15, Clause 12
Garamond
9The Senate shall publicize all Initiative, Referendum, or
!Recall measures referred to the V
oters with statements
m/for and against the measures so referred on the
7Electronic Post Office, the National Database, and over
the National Channel.

EThis provision recognizes the obvious obligation of publicity for the
foregoing measures.
    Helvetica
Article II
The Executive Power
Times

Article II, Section 1, Clause 1
Garamond
The executive Power
s as granted herein
shall be vested in a
m+President of the United States of America.
The President
and Vice President
shall hold
 his
their
Office
during the
Term of four Y
# , together with the Vice President
m1chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows
shall be
m4elected by Majority vote of the People of the United
1States in the General Election.  The terms of the
5President and Vice President shall end at noon on the
twentieth day of January.

DUnder the political theory of the Framers, the President was to have
UBlimited powers
 in other words, the President was not to have the
Gextensive powers of a Monarch.  But the Presidency of today has changed
dramatically
)?:.  How dramatically may be seen when we compare the powers
of the President described in
Federalist
by Hamilton with the powers of
the President today
)g9.  For example, under the 1787 Constitution the President
was not able to declare war:
>The President is to be Commander in chief of the army and navy
=of the United States.  In this respect his authority would be
Anominally the same with that of the King of Great-Britain, but in
?substance much inferior to it.  It would amount to nothing more
:than the supreme command and direction of the military and
>naval forces, as first General and Admiral of the confederacy;
.while that of the British King extends to the
    declaring
war . . . .
However
)0=, as history has demonstrated, the President has been able to
U take many actions leading to war
), up to and including the ability to wage
covert operations
 against foreign Governments. And there is no
significant check in the W
/ritten (or Empirical) Constitution against this
usurpation of power
)s3, as the failure of the House of Representatives to
UIimpeach President Nixon for the secret bombing of Cambodia clearly shows.
ITheoretically the President was not above the law; according to Hamilton,
Times
The President . . . would be amenable to personal punishment and
/disgrace: the [King] is sacred and inviolable.
But no President has
UEbeen removed from office by the process of Impeachment, no matter how
Jscandal-ridden his administration (in our own time, the Iran/Contra affair
, the
U?BCCI scandal, and the
October Surprise
 situation have created
Cpotentially impeachable offenses, with no formal action against the
President).
Supposedly
, the President
s veto power was limited:
The [President]
would have a
)N    qualified
)53negative upon the acts of the legislative body: the
[King] has an
absolute
negative.
$The Framers of our Constitution were
UEdead set against giving the Executive an absolute negative.  Benjamin
HFranklin, one of the Delegates from Pennsylvania, had argued against the
Cabsolute veto, stating that
[n]o good law whatever could be passed
0without a private bargain with [the President].
Roger Sherman, the
UDConnecticut Delegate who authored the
Great Compromise,
 was
agst.
Benabling any one man to stop the will of the whole.
  According to
BSherman,
[n]o one man could be found so far above all the rest in
wisdom.
1Gunning Bedford, a delegate from Delaware, stated
UEunequivocally that
[t]he Representatives of the People were the best
Hjudges of what was for their interest, and ought to be under no external
controul whatever
-But it was Mason who made the most vociferous
attack:
?The probable abuses of a negative had been well explained by Dr
g2as proved by experience, the best of all tests.  W
ill not the same door
gAbe opened here.  The Executive may refuse its assent to necessary
>measures till new appointments shall be referred to him . . .
e are
.. Chairman going very far in this business.  W
e are not indeed
g7constituting a British Government, but a more dangerous
monarchy
, an elective one.
gEThus, when the Framers cast their June 4, 1787 vote on the issue, the
vote was zero States
, ten
against
 et as history has developed, the
UGpresent Monarch of England, the Queen, vetoes no act of the Legislature
C(she would dare not), while in our country the President has vetoed
legislation
) /times
 with 96 percent of those vetoes upheld!
UKPresidential veto threats are an omnipresent part of the American political
scene.  The President
)w6s veto is not
absolute,
 but it is close enough.  The
UIthreat of a veto which has so much
sticking power
 is that the Executive
Mcan wield the veto as a club, and force changes in legislation by Congress, a
>power which Madison referred to on September 12 at the Federal
Convention as a
danger
 and which South Carolina Delegate Charles
Pinckney called
dangerous.
North Carolina Delegate Hugh W
illiamson,
ULarguing against a three-fourths veto override requirement, said it would put
Times
too much in the power of the President,
 since a three-fourths requirement
5would produce an absolute or near-absolute veto power
.  But the two-thirds
UOrequirement has also produced this effect, and the net result of the
sticking-
Hpower
 of the veto, as predicted, has been a dangerous transfer of power
-from the Legislative to the Executive Branch.
@The President was to have no power to make agreements with other
U9Nations (
treaties
), without the consent of the Senate:
The [President]
UEwould have a concurrent power with a branch of the Legislature in the
)formation of treaties: the [King is] the
sole possessor
of the power of
making treaties.
et under the Principle of the
Executive Agreement
UGPresidents have evaded the constitutional requirement the old-fashioned
 via semantic subterfuge.
Ostensibly
)7 , there are distinctions between
UIthe treaty and the Executive Agreement, and the State Department has even
Kfashioned a set of guidelines to differentiate between the two, but as Pyle
and Pious (1984) reported,
CIn practice, none of these textbook distinctions have withstood the
demands of political expediency
.  Between 1789 and 1939, over
gB1,300 agreements were concluded with foreign countries without the
@consent of the Senate.  Between 1946 and 1971, the United States
@entered into 361 treaties and 5,559 executive agreements. Of the
C4,359 agreements in force in 1972 . . . 400 of these involved major
Fcommitments and de facto alliances with other nations. . . . Executive
Dagreements have dealt with grave issues of national importance.  For
<example, the Rush-Bagot Agreement of 1817 disarmed the Great
Lakes.  The Root-T
)i0akahira and Lansing-Ishii agreements established
g:American policy toward the Far East for decades, while the
Gentleman
)B6s Agreement
 of 1907 limited Japanese immigration into
g?the United States. . . . McKinley contributed troops to protect
Cestern legations in China from the Boxer Rebellion.  In addition to
g=the Lend-Lease Agreement, Roosevelt made executive agreements
Ewith Churchill and Stalin that helped to reshape world politics after
the Second W
orld W
.  Truman followed suit.
The President
)M7s new monarchical power developed over the years as the
U1creation of a party system led to patronage power
, a power the President
was not supposed to have:
The [President] would have a like
UEconcurrent authority in appointing to offices; the [King is] the sole
author of all appointments.
*et the constitutional safeguard supposedly
UHexisting against this power proved to be a toothless watchdog.  Consider
this excerpt from the
Guide to Congress
[President Eisenhower
s] patronage dispenser
, Postmaster General
gAArthur Summerfield, frequently set up shop in the office of House
Times
+g1AMinority Leader Charles A. Halleck, R-Ind. (1935-69), and berated
BRepublican representatives who broke party ranks.  Insurgents were
>warned that key jobs such as postmasterships might be cut back
%unless they got behind the president
s program . . . .
yC[C]lever use of patronage swayed votes on several key bills . . . .
According to Nelson W
. Polsby
))$, a president can use this power
gAreward and punish congressional friends and foes quite vigorously
g:. . . Small Business Administration and Area Redevelopment
EAdministration loans to certain areas may get more and more difficult
*to obtain, as applications fail to qualify
.  Pilot programs and
g>demonstration projects may be funneled here rather than there.
DDefense contracts and public works may be accelerated in some areas,
retarded in others.
Supposedly
, the President was to have
power under the Constitution
UAto confer privileges on anybody or anything.  As Hamilton wrote,
U5[President] can infer no privileges whatever . . . .
But as a Senate
U"Select Committee reported in 1826,
JIt is no longer true that the President . . . will be limited, as supposed
Cin the Federalist, to the inconsiderable number of places which may
Dbecome vacant by the ordinary casualties of deaths and resignations;
on the contrary
, he may now draw
)g#, for that purpose, upon the entire
g>fund of Executive patronage. Construction and legislation have
accomplished this change.
*In the very first year of the constitution
g=a construction was put upon that instrument which enabled the
?President to create as many vacancies as he pleased, and at any
moment that he thought proper
.  This was effected by
yielding to
g=him the kingly prerogative of dismissing officers without the
formality of a trial.
)w.The authors of the Federalist had not foreseen
gAthis construction; so far from it, they had asserted the contrary
, and
gCarguing logically from the premises,
that the dismissing power was
#appurtenant to the appointing power
 they had maintained, in
=of that standard work, that, as the consent of the Senate was
g*necessary to the appointment of an officer
, so the consent of the same
gCbody would be equally necessary to his dismission from office.  But
?this construction was overruled by the first Congress which was
Bformed under the constitution; the power of dismission from office
+was abandoned to the President alone, and,
with the acquisition of
g=this prerogative, the power and patronage of the Presidential
?office was instantly increased to an indefinite extent, and the
Cargument of the Federalist against the capacity of the President to
>corrupt the members of Congress, founded upon the small number
:of places which he could use for that purpose, was totally
Times
+g1?overthrown.  So much for construction . . . this single act, by
?vacating almost the entire civil list once in every period of a
@Presidential term of service, places more offices at the command
Cof the President than were known to the constitution at the time of
Bits adoption, and is, of itself, again sufficient to overthrow the
7whole of the argument which was used in the Federalist.
g$The President, contrary to Hamilton
s assertion,
been able to confer
U2privileges through the use of this patronage power
, and, in fact, has been
UBable to make appointments to Branches of Government which were not
Beven contemplated by the Framers, through the Delegation Doctrine.
KThis latter observation leads us to the next violation of the theory of the
U    Framers:
The [President] can prescribe no rules concerning the
UIcommerce or currency of the nation: the [King] is in several respects the
arbiter of commerce . . . .
.et the rise of the Administrative Branches, as
UFwe saw in Chapter One, has resulted in a huge transfer of power to the
FPresident, as rulemaking officials beholden to the President for their
Jpositions carry out his wishes (or the wishes of the special interests who
Fhave put the President in office).  As Pyle and Pious (1984) reported,
AIn the
Constitutional Revolution of 1937
 the Supreme Court gave
Gup its resistance to the creation of large bureaucracies with the power
Dto make policy through the issuance of rules and regulations.  These
4executive-made policies, which have the force of law
, are published
first in the
Federal Register
)f"and then collected and republished
topically in the
Code of Federal Regulations
.  The
Code of Federal
Regulations
)F$today is many times larger than the
United States Code
of federal statutes.
g)In light of these developments, Hamilton
s summation is truly ironic:
g=What answer shall we give to those who would persuade us that
@things so unlike resemble each other?  The same that ought to be
@given to those who tell us that a government, the whole power of
:which would be in the hands of the elective and periodical
)servants of the people, is an aristocracy
, a monarchy
, and a
despotism.
g>An aristocracy
 a monarchy
 a despotism.  These would be the
UDconsequences if the safeguards in the Constitution against excessive
GExecutive power were ignored.  As Mason stated on June 4 at the Federal
IConvention,
[i]f strong and extensive powers are vested in the Executive
N. . . the government will of course degenerate (for I will call it degeneracy)
Finto a monarchy
 a government so contrary to the genius of the people
Times
+U21that they will reject even the appearance of it.
But degeneracy into a
UKvariant of monarchical power was inevitable, since there were no safeguards
Hagainst this eventuality written into the Constitution.  As Cooke (1983)
noted,
4Notice the difference in language between [Article T
wo, Section One,
gEClause One] and the first clause of the legislative Article.  Compare
the executive power shall be vested in a President
 with
legislative power
herein granted
)U!shall be vested in a Congress.
gBexecutive power is not modified or confined to only those specific
powers which follow
)s.. This means that the President possesses vast
g7and general powers which have never been defined in the
Constitution.
gFHamilton obviously disagreed with this interpretation, as the excerpts
from
Federalist 69
)N4conclusively demonstrate, but there was no mechanism
UKin the Constitution to prevent this interpretation from predominating.  And
Nthat this interpretation has been given the greatest weight is a Separation of
(Powers violation that must be addressed.
?The revised power of the Legislature in Article One of THE 21ST
CENTUR
)28Y CONSTITUTION addresses the imbalance of power that has
UAresulted over the years. And, in subsequent Sections, some of the
GPresidential powers have been reduced.  The addition of the
as granted
>herein
 language binds the Executive power in the same way the
Legislative power is bound.
?This Clause abolishes the Electoral College, an unnecessary and
UHundemocratic device (the archaic language describing the process [itself
overruled by the T
)m/welfth Amendment] may be found in copies of the
UOConstitution, and is omitted here for reasons of brevity).  Under the Electoral
JCollege System, it is theoretically possible that a future President would
Ahave a Majority of the popular vote, yet not be elected.  This is
Oundemocratic in spirit, as well as a violation of the central paradigms used to
create THE 21ST CENTUR
'Y CONSTITUTION, and is thus eliminated.

Article II, Section 1, Clause 2
Garamond
Every
Person
),, except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen
m9of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this
Constitution,
shall be eligible to the Office
of President
Vice President
)d- neither shall any Person be eligible to that
Office
who shall
 not
)"'have attained to the Age of thirty five
ears, and been fourteen Y
ears a
Citizen and
)J    Resident
 within
Garamond
the United States
)e!, and who shall be without formal
m%affiliation with any political party;
but no person shall
m3be elected to the office of the President more than
/twice, and no person who has held the office of
2President, or acted as President for more than two
6years of a term to which some other person was elected
:President, shall be elected to the office of the President
more than once
Times

CThe addition eliminates the
natural-born
 requirement, which could
UHconceivably be interpreted to mean that a child born of American parents
"overseas could not be President.
CThere is no Federal Academy graduation requirement to be President,
UFalthough half the nominees for the office of President must be Federal
Academy graduates.
)The Second Clause also incorporates the T
erm Limitation provision of the
wenty-Second Amendment.

)"Article II, Section 1, Clauses 3-9
:If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the
8President, the President-elect shall have died, the Vice
7President-elect shall become President.  If a President
8shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the
6beginning of his term, or if the President-elect shall
5have failed to qualify, then the Vice President-elect
3shall act as President until a President shall have
6qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for the
1case wherein neither a President-elect nor a Vice
9President-elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall
5then act as President, or the manner in which one who
6is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act
5accordingly until a President or Vice President shall
have qualified.
* 3The Congress may by law provide for the case of the
2death of any of the persons from whom the House of
3Representatives may choose a President whenever the
6right of choice shall have devolved upon them, and for
Garamond
+m35the case of the death of any of the persons from whom
3the Senate may choose a Vice President whenever the
.right of choice shall have devolved upon them.
>In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his
<Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and
=Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice
;President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case
8of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the
?President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then
?act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until
<the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
9In case of the removal of the President from office or of
9his or her death or resignation, the Vice President shall
become President.
5Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice
8President, the President shall nominate a Vice President
5who shall take office upon confirmation by a Majority
 vote of both Houses of Congress.
5Whenever the President transmits to the President pro
5tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
6Representatives his or her written declaration that he
6or she is unable to discharge the powers and duties of
3his office, and until he or she transmits to them a
4written declaration to the contrary, such powers and
3duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as
Acting President.
4Whenever the Vice President and a Majority of either
6the principal Officers of the Executive departments or
6of such other body as Congress may by law provide in
3C-215, transmit to the President pro tempore of the
6Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives
9their written declaration that the President is unable to
7discharge the powers and duties of the office, the Vice
1President shall immediately assume the powers and
)duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter
)B%, when the President transmits to the
m6President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of
/the House of Representatives his or her written
Times
Garamond
+m35declaration that no inability exists, he or she shall
5resume the powers and duties of the office unless the
5Vice President and a Majority of either the principal
5Officers of the Executive department or of such other
4body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within
4four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate
5and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their
4written  declaration that the President is unable to
.discharge the powers and duties of the office.
5Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling
3within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in
7session.  If the Congress, within twenty-one days after
-receipt of the latter written declaration, or
, if Congress
m8is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress
6is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote
8of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge
7the powers and duties of the office, the Vice President
.shall continue to discharge the same as Acting
4President; otherwise, the President shall resume the
 powers and duties of the office.
Times

'This Clause formally incorporates the T
wentieth and T
wenty-Fifth
U;Amendments into the Constitution, with minor modifications.

Article II, Section 1
Clauses 10-1
m6The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his
or her
Services, a Compensation,
the value of
which shall neither be
encreased
)F    increased
)B$nor diminished during the Period for
m    which he
or she
)- shall have been elected, and he
or she
shall
m;not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the
 United States, or any of them.
Before he
or she
enter on the Execution of his
or her
Office,
or she
)1/shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute
Garamond
+m3=the Office of President of the United States, and will to the
4best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the
$Constitution of the United States.
Times

JMany other countries have had female heads of state, to their credit.  The
People of America, however
,, have not had the opportunity to vote for a
UMfemale Presidential candidate in the General Election.  The additions to this
:Section acknowledge the reality that under THE 21ST CENTUR
UICONSTITUTION, the election of a female President will (and should) become
7a far likelier eventuality than is presently the case.

)"Article II, Section 2, Clauses 1-3
9The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and
<Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several
@States, when called into the actual Service of the United States
m3but shall have no power to declare war or to commit
7troops in any advisory or military capacity without the
1authorization of Congress, as regulated under the
/provisions set forth in
 A-120.  The President
 ; he
m<require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in
<each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating
/to the Duties of their respective Offices, and
shall have
m=Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offenses against the
5United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.
The President
shall have Power
, by and with the Advice
m+and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties
and Executive
Agreements
, provided
 two thirds
a Majority
of the
m    Senators
)5     present
concur; and
shall nominate, and by and
m8with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
:Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of
?the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States,
8whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for
m%and which shall be established by Law
, provided a Majority
of the Senators concur
": but the Congress may by Law vest
m8the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think
proper
)'9, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
mXHeads of Departments.
Garamond
+m3/The President shall have Power to fill up all V
acancies that may
m3happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting
7Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next
Session.
Times

#The new language in THE 21ST CENTUR
Y CONSTITUTION (mandating
the creation of a W
)r2ar Powers Resolution ratified by the People) makes
UKabsolutely clear that the President has no power to declare war unless both
    Congress
=the People approve.  By requiring the approval of the People,
UQit decreases the probability that there will be military interventions in foreign
Ocountries, since it is the People at large who a) finance the wars and b) fight
them.
FThe Second and Third Clauses retain the power of the President to make
UFtreaties and to nominate various officials, and to fill vacancies with
temporary appointments.
,Executive Agreements must now be ratified by
the Senate.

)#Article II, Section 3, Clauses 1-2
The President
shall
 from time to time
give
    annually
m7the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and
:recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall
7judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary
9Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in
;Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time
<of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall
think proper;  he
)l*shall receive Ambassadors and other public
m    Ministers
.  The President
 ; he
shall
 take Care that
faithfully execute
 the
Constitutional
Laws
 be faithfully
m    executed
)B"to the best of his or her ability
 , and shall
m1Commission all the Officers of the United States
m6Neither the President nor any officer of the Executive
3Branch is empowered to disregard any Clause of this
8Constitution, nor enforce any law he or she legitimately
4deems as unconstitutional.  An Evaluation of Zero or
5less on any Legislation may be considered evidence of
unconstitutionality.

Times
+g@IThere are five substantive changes to the Clauses in the Third Section of
U    Article T
)/@wo.  The first addition formalizes the annual State of the Union
UCmessage.  The second addition removes the power of the President to
Bpropose legislation to Congress, a provision which has blurred the
Separation of Powers by
2, once again, transferring a substantial amount of
UALegislative power to the Executive Branch.  Under THE 21ST CENTUR
UBCONSTITUTION, the President has no power to propose the passage of
legislation to Congress.
gHThe third addition provides that the President shall
faithfully execute
U5Constitutional Laws to the best of his or her ability
 since the language
take care
 in the W
)q7ritten Constitution is obviously not strong enough (see
ULChapter One).  The language
shall be responsible for the faithful execution
Jof the laws
 would possibly be desirable, but for the fact that a strictly
Dobserved constitution would hold the President responsible for every
Jinaction of the Executive Branch, and might result in an endless series of
Recall attempts.
EThe fourth addition strikes language that may reasonably be construed
UGto be inconsistent with the Second Clause in the previous Section (
FCongress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as
they think proper
)a., in the President alone, in the Courts of Law
, or in the
UJHeads of Departments . . .
, vs.
[The President] shall Commission all the
#Officers of the United States.
KThe fifth addition states that neither the President nor any officer of the
UHExecutive Branch has the power to enforce any laws he or she believes to
Fbe unconstitutional (and Evaluations of Zero or less may be considered
!evidence of unconstitutionality).
    Helvetica
Article III
The Judicial Power
Times

Article III, Section 1
Garamond
The judicial Power
of the United States
as granted herein
m$shall be vested in one supreme Court
which shall consist
m2of Nine Judges without formal affiliation with any
-political party who are representative of the
6population to the greatest extent possible with regard
8to sex, race, national origin, and age as established in
 B-170
,and in such inferior Courts as the Congress
from time to time ordain and
shall
establish,
which shall
m5consist of Judges without formal affiliation with any
6political party, and who are in their totality equally
7representative of the population to the greatest extent
possible.
)K,The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
m!Courts, shall hold their Offices
 during good Behaviour
Nine Y
+and shall at stated Times receive for their
Services, a Compensation,
the value of
which shall not be
m/diminished during their Continuance in Office.
The terms of
m2the Supreme Court shall be staggered such that one
1Judge is appointed and one Judge leaves the Court
every year
)G), subject to the exception of vacancy, as
Congress shall by law direct.

'The Supreme Court under THE 21ST CENTUR
Y CONSTITUTION
UHformally consists of nine Judges, preventing court-packing schemes.  The
JFederal Judges must be representative of the population with regard to the
Aenumerated demographic categories; if a person has a right to a
of his
UK(or her) peers,
 then that person should have a proportional opportunity to
have a
Judge
of his (or her) peers.
gBThe terms of the Supreme Court are staggered; every year one Judge
UMleaves, and one Judge is appointed, unless there are vacancies, in which case
;more than one Judge would be appointed in a particular year
.  This allows
UIfor gradual change that insures balance over time, with a majority of the
Hcourt changing every five years, preventing not only radical changes in
Judicial philosophy
)j4, but also the power erroneous Judicial philosophies
(such as the
Lochner
doctrine
) have to persist for decades.
Times

)#Article III, Section 2, Clauses 1-2
Garamond
#8The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
?Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
>States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
=Authority;
 to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
6Ministers and Consuls;
 to all Cases of admiralty and
=maritime Jurisdiction;
 to Controversies to which the United
:States shall be a Party;
 to Controversies between two or
more States;
)I0  between a State and Citizens of another State
m;between Citizens of different States,
 between Citizens of
?the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States,
Aand between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States,
Citizens or Subjects
)r(, and all other cases designated in
1The Judicial power of the United States shall not
m4be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity,
1commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
6States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
subjects of any foreign state.
 all
certain
)4)Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
m:Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be
BParty, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction.  In all
 the other
Cases
before mentioned
, the supreme Court
inferior Courts
shall have appellate
and original
m<Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions,
only
)!,under such Regulations as the Congress shall
m&the exclusive power and obligation to
make.

@The First Clause incorporates the Eleventh Amendment to the 1787
UBConstitution. The Second Clause contains one of the most important
additions to the W
)q2ritten Constitution.  Under the 1787 Constitution,
UBCongress has the obligation to create rules for the Supreme Court
ULappellate jurisdiction (that is, which cases on appeal from the lower courts
6the Supreme Court will be allowed to review).  However
, over the years the
UKSupreme Court has created its own rules for hearing cases, and Congress has
Ibasically allowed the court free rein.  Some of the rules are as follows:
Times
+g@01) the court will not issue
advisory opinions
&2) the plaintiff must have
standing
:3) the lawsuit must not be
 due to events which have
-occurred following institution of the action;
B4) the suit must be
ripe,
 (i.e., sufficiently well-developed and
 specific to merit adjudication);
45) the suit must not present a
political question
G6) all remedies in the pertinent lower Federal and/or State courts must
have been exhausted;
B7) the Federal question at issue must be
substantial
 rather than
trivial
<8) if a
case or controversy
 can be decided upon other than
-constitutional grounds, the Court will do so.
gFGoing into the scope of these rules, and the exceptions to them carved
UJout by the Court, is unfortunately far beyond the scope of this book.  But
Mthese rules, and their exceptions, are very important.  And real problems are
;obvious, as the substantial/trivial distinction makes clear
.  What is a
political
UKquestion
?  Does the Court apply these directives consistently?  If so, why
t the
situation moot?
If the Court is allowed to a)
U?create the rules under which it will decide which cases to hear
, and b)
UOactually decide cases using (or not using) the rules it has written, it has the
Jpower to transform the fundamental laws of the land
 to carve them out as
&a sculptor carves stone.  Consequently
", the Supreme Court is a virtually
UEunchecked body under the Empirical Constitution.  The addition of the
language mandates that
,the Supreme Court hears a case, it may do so
only
) 9if Congress has provided for jurisdiction; and conversely
, if the
UBSupreme Court refuses to hear a case, it may do so only under such
regulations as
Congress
)6#(and not the Court) has provided.
g*In a system where the Supreme Court has a
de facto
exclusive power to
decide the cases it will hear
3, the Court has a virtually unrestricted freedom to
pick and choose,
  and can ignore, quite unjustly
, legitimate claims on its
UEattention.  Under the Second Clause, a set of rules will be provided
Kregarding justiciability issues such as
standing,
mootness,
ripeness,
Letc., and a necessary check on unrestricted Judicial power will be restored.
Times

)#Article III, Section 3, Clauses 1-3
Garamond
5No Judge is empowered to disregard any Clause of this
8Constitution, nor enforce any law he or she legitimately
4deems as unconstitutional.  An Evaluation of Zero or
5less on any Legislation may be considered evidence of
7unconstitutionality.  In the event a Judge determines a
6law to be unconstitutional, or that provisions of this
9Constitution or the laws of the land are inconsistent, he
6or she must in writing notify the Department of Rights
0Enforcement and Congress.  No Federal law can be
7declared void for reasons of unconstitutionality by any
Court.
3Congress may empower the Supreme Court and inferior
4Courts to issue injunctions when necessary or proper
-for securing the higher interests of Justice.
4The Supreme Court, inferior Courts, and State Courts
/are empowered and obligated to add hypothetical
2examples or exceptions to statutes for purposes of
7clarification or when the interests of Justice require,
-and to notify in writing the Legislative body
0responsible when additions to statutes are made.
6Statutory additions by the Judiciary may be augmented,
-amended, or repealed at the discretion of the
Legislative body responsible.

HSection Three strips the Supreme Court of its power to void Federal laws
U"for reasons of unconstitutionality
/, and to tailor the law as it sees fit, a power
UHnot granted to them by the Constitution, and a power which has radically
Faltered the system of Checks and Balances as conceived by the Framers.
However
)06, while no Judge may void a Federal law for reasons of
unconstitutionality
)d7, no Judge is empowered to enforce any unconstitutional
.  It is within each Judge
s power
, and at each Judge
s discretion, to
UIrecognize or not recognize a law which has received an Evaluation of less
Ithan Zero.  If the Judge chooses to operate under the assumption that the
Nlaw is invalid, that Judge must notify the proper authorities in writing.  If
2Judges across the Nation refuse to enforce the law
, a new law obviously
Times
needs to be drafted and passed.
GThe New Constitution preserves the power of Courts to issue injunctions
U9against the behavior of private Citizens and Governments.
KThe Third Clause is a final security for the People.  Not every law will be
UNwell-drafted, and the interests of Justice will require that some laws contain
Kexceptions Legislators have not been able to foresee.  The existence of the
QThird Clause is a recognition that the Legislative process is two-fold, the first
step being the
creation
of a law
), , and the second step being the
testing
UFthe law in the real world.  This Clause allows Judges to act as micro-
PLegislators when micro-legislation is required.  If, for example, a statute says
Lthat arson is the crime of burning materials within a public building, and a
Fperson is arrested for cigarette smoking, a Judge will be empowered to
Kdefine the statute with a hypothetical example (i.e.,
lighting a cigarette
Hinside a building is not to be considered a violation of the law against
Marson
).   If this is done, the Judge must notify the appropriate Legislative
H, whether State or Federal, which will consider the addition, and either
let it stand, change the law
, or repeal the addition.
    Helvetica
Article IV
The Federal Article
Times

Article IV
, Section 1
Garamond
m@Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the Public
=Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.
9And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner
<in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved,
and the Effect thereof.

6Under this Clause, if a judgment is reached against Mr
. X by State A, that
UGjudgment will be accorded identical force and effect against the person
Ksummoned, or property attached, by State B.  This Clause, an important part
of Federalism,  is  retained.

Article IV
, Section 2, Clauses 1-2
mBThe Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and
,Immunities of Citizens in the several States
, as defined by
Congress in
 B-145.
* <A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other
;Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another
>State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State
from which
that person
fled, be delivered up, to be
m6removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
;No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the
#Laws thereof, escaping into another
, shall, in Consequence of
m6any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such
Service or Labor
)c+, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the
m2Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.

Times
+g1JThe First Clause, referred to as the
Comity Clause,
 is another important
UKpart of Federalism.  Under the Comity Clause, a State must not discriminate
Iagainst out-of-state Citizens in favor of its own Citizens.  But the term
privileges and immunities
 is vague, as Corwin (1978) noted:
>[F]our theories have been offered as to its real intention and
meaning.
The first is that the clause is
a guaranty to the citizens of
g3the different States of equal treatment by Congress
 is, in other
gCwords, a species of equal protection clause binding on the National
.Government.  The second is that the clause is
a guaranty to the
g>citizens of each State of all the privileges and immunities of
Acitizenship that are enjoyed in any State by the citizens thereof
gDa view which, if it had been accepted at the outset, might well have
Aendowed the Supreme Court with a reviewing power over restrictive
HState legislation as broad as that which it later came to exercise under
Dthe Fourteenth Amendment.  The third theory of the clause is that it
Dguarantees to the citizen of any State the rights which he enjoys as
*such even when sojourning in another State
, that is to say
)K    , enables
gDhim to carry with him his rights of State citizenship throughout the
5Union, without embarrassment by State lines.  Finally
, the clause is
interpreted as
)M3merely forbidding any State to discriminate against
g,citizens of other States in favor of its own
.  Though the first theory
gBreceived some recognition in one of the opinions in the Dred Scott
Dcase, it is today obsolete.  Theories 2 and 3 have been specifically
Brejected by the Court; the fourth has become a settled doctrine of
Constitutional Law
g2What Corwin referred to as
theories
 are in fact
definitions
.  The
UJnecessarily vague language has created a need for definition
 but what is
Ithe proper definition, and who is to do the defining?  The Supreme Court?
DBut the Supreme Court has not only not been allocated this important
responsibility by the W
3ritten Constitution, but its decisions are made, of
U    necessity
, on an
ad hoc
)*4basis, and are thus inadequate or inconsistent.  For
example, in
Shapiro
Thompson,
)@%394 U.S. 618 (1969), the Court struck
UAdown State and District of Columbia laws which had denied welfare
Gassistance to those persons who had not been State residents for a year
.  But
U,in the same decision, the Court also stated:
2e imply no view of the validity of waiting-period
    residence
gJrequirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-free
Ieducation, to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt or fish,
=and so forth.  Such requirements may promote compelling state
interests on the one hand, or
, on the other
, may not be penalties upon
g>the exercise of the constitutional right of interstate travel.
Times
+g@CThe reluctance of the Court to make decisions prospectively creates
UCconfusion, a confusion exacerbated by the inconsistency of existing
decisions.   For example, in
oomer
itsell,
334 U.S. 385 (1948) a statute
UDrequiring a $2,500 license fee from nonresident commercial fisherman
Mseeking shrimp offshore, while residents paid $25, was held unconstitutional.
But in
Baldwin
Fish & Game Commission,
436 U.S. 371 (1978) the court
ULheld constitutional a statute requiring nonresidents to pay $225 license fee
>(as opposed to a $9 resident fee) for recreational hunting.  W
as the
UOdistinction made because of the recreationality aspect in the latter case (even
Gthough recreationality may have been a spurious distinction)?  Perhaps.
But in
ourette
McMaster
#248 U.S. 465 (1919), the court held
UNconstitutional a statute requiring a 2-year in-state residency before a person
(could be licensed as an insurance broker
.  And in
Douglas
New Y
, 279
UNU.S. 377 (1929), the court held constitutional a statute permitting residents,
Jbut not nonresidents, to sue in State courts for damages under the Federal
JEmployers Liability Act arising in other States.  And there have been many
other conflicting decisions.
Unfortunately
)J>, in the process of interpreting these decisions, State courts
UKhave at times done the predictable, and ruled in favor of their States.  As
KCorwin (1978) reported,
[t]he Illinois Supreme Court held that a State law
Ggiving
preference for employment of Illinois residents on public works
Mprojects does not violate the privileges and immunities clause of the Federal
Constitution.
6And the Alaska Supreme Court held in 1977
that it was
UNnot a violation of privileges and immunities to give residents a preference in
9jobs if durational residence requirements were stricken.
These latter
UKdecisions, and the failure of the Supreme Court to overrule them, indicates
.that the Comity Clause needs to be overhauled.
Fo correct these problems, the First Clause gives Congress (and not the
UESupreme Court, nor the State Courts) the power to define what are the
Oprivileges and immunities of the Citizens of the several States.  By fixing the
Mboundary-maintenance for State action at the Federal (Legislative) level, the
BFirst Clause brings the rule of law back into this important area.
CThe Second Clause provides for extradition of criminals back to the
ULjurisdiction where they committed the crime, and is substantially unchanged.
JOf course, the language providing for the return of slaves in the event of
escape is stricken.
Times

Article IV
, Section 3, Clauses 1-2
Garamond
m:New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union
6but no new State shall be formed or erected within the
?Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the
?Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the
>Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as
of the Congress.
8The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
9needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or
=other Property belonging to the United States, and nothing in
;this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any
9Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.

ESection Three is fairly straightforward, and satisfactory as written.

Article IV
, Section 4
m@The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican
or Democratic
Form of Government,
provided
m4that no Government be formed which shall infringe on
7the rights, privileges, and immunities granted to every
!Citizen under this Constitution,
and shall protect each of
m@them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or
:of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened)
against domestic Violence.

:The Guarantee Clause of the 1787 Constitution guaranteed a
Republican
 form of Government.  But if a State allows a democratic
Ldevice such as the Initiative, Referendum, or Recall, has the State violated
Article Four
)C:, Section Four?  This murky area is too critical to remain
U$unresolved.  As Cronin (1989) wrote,
Times
+g1CThe precise meaning of the clause has never been wholly determined,
Cin large part because the Supreme Court has consistently refused to
2decide questions that have arisen under it. . . .
9The controversy arises when opponents of direct democracy
gDdevices contend that only a representative legislature acting as the
Bsole lawmaking branch of a state can qualify the state as having a
Frepublican form.  The gist of their argument is that voter initiatives
Dviolate the guarantee clause.  In a landmark Oregon court case, they
Bcontended that the Constitution made no provision for overt action
'by the people in lawmaking, and further
, that the
Republican Form of
gBGovernment
 clause was meant to establish the states as republics,
Hwhereas the initiative process in the states in effect transferred power
Caway from the representative legislature to the people at large and
:hence converted republics into pure or at least quasi-pure
democracies. . . .
:State supreme courts have responded to such contentions by
gDdenying that direct democracy devices such as the initiative violate
Bthe principle of a republican form of government.  They have ruled
Cthat a republican government is one administered by representatives
7chosen or appointed by the people or by their authority
.  The
gFinitiative and referendum merely reserve to the people a certain share
of the legislative power
0.  Government is still divided into legislative,
g?executive, and judicial departments, and their duties are still
5discharged by representatives selected by the people.
The rewrite in THE 21ST CENTUR
$Y CONSTITUTION ratifies these latter
UFdecisions, and closes a dangerous loophole which could be used by non-
Fprogressive Judges to declare State Initiative, Referendum, and Recall
legislation unconstitutional.
    Helvetica
5    Article V
The Amending Power
Times

+G)    Article V
, Clauses 1-2
Garamond
The Congress, whenever
 two thirds
a full Majority
of both
Houses shall deem it necessary
or upon the request of a
m7two-thirds Majority of the People voting in the General
Election
)53, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or
m;on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the
several States
)R%, or upon the request of a two-thirds
m5Majority of the People voting in the General Election
m;shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in
either Case, shall be valid
% to all Intents and Purposes, as Part
of this Constitution,
)x%when ratified by the Legislatures of
 three
fourths
two-thirds
)H(of the several States, or by Conventions
 three fourths
two-thirds
)H    thereof,
or by a three-fifths
m6Majority of the People voting in the General Election,
 the
one or the other Mode
of Ratification may be
proposed by the Congress;
rovided that
 no Amendment
m which may be made prior to the Y
ear One thousand eight
m:hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and
Bfourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that
=no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal
Suffrage in the Senate.
 Amendments shall be incorporated
m7in the text of the Constitution, and a New Constitution
+shall be published upon Ratification of the
Amendments.
5Every twenty-five years following the Ratification of
2this Constitution, the following question shall be
7placed on the ballot in the General Election:
Should a
4Constitutional Convention be called?
, with the only
two responses being
  If a Majority of
the V
oters answer
 Congress shall call a
m5Constitutional Convention within six months after the
General Election.

Times
+g1;Every constitution must contain a process for amendment. No
UNconstitution has been, nor ever will be, perfect; as the times change, so must
Ithe form of Government.  The Framers of our own Constitution realized the
<importance of an amending clause.  On June 5, Elbridge Gerry
, a delegate
UJfrom Massachusetts, stated at the Federal Convention that
[t]he novelty &
;difficulty of the experiment requires periodical revision.
Mason echoed
this sentiment on June 11:
-[t]he plan now to be formed will certainly be
U    defective
)2A, as the Confederation has been found on trial to be.  Amendments
therefore will be necessary
2, and it will be better to provide for them, in an
<, regular and Constitutional way than to trust to chance and
violence.
gGBut Article Five, as originally framed, is perhaps the most problematic
UEsection of the 1787 Constitution.  The two-thirds requirement of both
Dhouses of Congress to send amendments to the States for ratification
(applicable to
7amendments, even simple amendments), and the two-thirds
U@requirement by State Legislatures for the mandatory calling of a
AConstitutional Convention, have proven to be extremely rigid, and
ultimately
)3D, deleterious.  This rigidity was apparent less than 100 years after
U3our Constitution was ratified.  As British author W
alter Bagehot wrote in
1867,
AEvery alteration [to the Constitution], however urgent or however
Etrifling, must be sanctioned by a complicated proportion of States or
Dlegislatures.  The consequence is that the most obvious evils cannot
Dbe quickly remedied; that the most absurd fictions must be framed to
Cevade the plain sense of mischievous clauses; that a clumsy working
?and curious technicality mark the politics of a rough-and-ready
people.
gGThis observation was quite ironic, given that an amendment process that
UNwas too difficult was one of the defects in the Articles of Confederation that
@the Framers were supposed to correct!  As Hamilton stated at the
Convention on September 10,
<It had been wished by many and was much to have been desired
7that an easier mode for introducing amendments had been
:provided by the articles of Confederation.  It was equally
9desirable now that an easy mode should be established for
?supplying defects which will probably appear in the new System.
gABut an
easy mode
 was not established at the Federal Convention.
UHOne problem was the two-thirds requirement for proposal of amendments by
FCongress; a second, related problem was that amendments made necessary
Eby Congressional negligence or malfeasance (such as a Congressional T
Times
+U1CLimitation Amendment or an Amendment mandating Public Financing for
KCongressional Elections) would be difficult to attain.  As Mason had stated
.earlier at the Federal Convention on June 11,
[i]t would be improper to
UHrequire the consent of the Natl. Legislature [to proposed constitutional
/amendments], because they may abuse their power
, and refuse their
consent on that very account.
Later
", on September 15, two days before
UIthe Convention adjourned, Mason objected to Article Five, stating that he
=saw the plan of amending the Constitution as
exceptionable &
Fdangerous,
 since
the proposing of amendments is in both the modes to
 depend, in the first immediately
, and in the second, ultimately
, on Congress,
UIno amendments of the proper kind would ever be obtained by the people, if
Gthe Government should become oppressive, as he verily believed would be
Mthe case.
  In the margin of his copy of the draft of the Constitution, Mason
wrote on September 12 that
9By this article Congress only have the power of proposing
@amendments at any future time to this constitution and should it
;prove ever so oppressive, the whole people of America can
;make, or even propose alterations to it; a doctrine utterly
Dsubversive of the fundamental principles of the rights and liberties
of the people.
g?And though history has proven Mason correct, this objection was
UHdismissed by the Framers who signed the Constitution.  Hamilton wrote in
Federalist 85
gAIn opposition to the probability of subsequent amendments, it has
Bbeen urged that the persons delegated to the administration of the
>national government will always be disinclined to yield up any
Cportion of the authority of which they were once possessed.  For my
6own part, I acknowledge a thorough conviction that any
amendments which may
', upon mature consideration, be thought
gEuseful, will be applicable to the organization of the government, not
Fto the mass of its powers; and on this account alone, I think there is
)no weight in the observation just stated.
According to Hamilton,
[w]henever nine or rather ten states, were
UCunited in the desire of a particular amendment, that amendment must
infallibly take place.
He also wrote that
[t]he national rulers
whenever nine States concur
&will have no option upon the subject.
g7By the fifth article of the plan, the Congress will be
obliged
on the
gEapplication of the legislatures of two thirds of the States (which at
;present amount to nine), to call a convention for proposing
Times
amendments, which
shall be valid
)K&, to all intents and purposes, as part
gGof the Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths
=of the States, or by conventions in three fourths thereof.
    The words
of this article are peremptory
. The Congress
shall
call a
gDconvention.
 Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of
    that body
. . . .
5Nor however difficult it may be supposed to unite two
gFthirds or three fourths of the State legislatures, in amendments which
Bmay affect local interests, can there be any room to apprehend any
Esuch difficulty in a union on points which are merely relative to the
*general liberty or security of the people.
However
, Hamilton
)>/s prediction was erroneous, notwithstanding the
UJexplicit language of the Constitution.  Perhaps Hamilton could not foresee
Athat the Congress would consider the lifetime of applications for
)Constitutional Conventions to be limited.
Because of this
de facto
UIconstitutional amendment, Congress has been able to circumvent the strict
JArticle Five language.  By 1987,
more than 400 applications calling for a
Gconvention to propose constitutional amendments [had] been presented to
 Congress by state legislatures.
These 400 petitions included
supplications from all fifty states,
far in excess of the two-thirds
requirement.   Had this
time-frame
)@$requirement not been implemented, at
UCleast two Constitutional Conventions would have been called in this
century; one dealing with the
!repeal of the Sixteenth Amendment
U income tax), and the other with
apportionment.
States
have requested a
U/Constitutional Convention on the tax issue, and
States
have requested a
UFConvention on the apportionment issue, in each case more than the two-
thirds required.
9And yet the Congress has refused to call a Convention, in
UKviolation of the mandatory form of Article Five (
The Congress . . . on the
EApplication of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States,
shall
call a
Convention . . .
time-frame
requirement, however
)t$, is only the first hurdle for State
UHConvention applications, as demonstrated by the time period of 1976-1983
K(which fell within the seven year limit typically given for ratification of
2constitutional amendments).  In that time period,
States
requested a
UFConstitutional Convention: 30 to consider a Balanced Budget Amendment,
Jand 6 to consider a constitutional amendment regarding abortion.  This was
Htwo more than was necessary for calling a Constitutional Convention, but
Ithe Congress had promulgated another requirement not contained in Article
Five, which is that the
subject-matter
of Constitutional Convention
applications be
)S    identical
These
requirements
+stipulated in Article Five), taken together
UKmakes it extremely unlikely that a Constitutional Convention will be called
in this, or any other
    , century
!o make matters worse, Convention
Times
+U1Happlications are not a matter that Congress has taken as seriously as it
#should.  As Caplan (1988) reported,
<Congress has never kept regular track of incoming convention
Happlications, and there exists no official catalogue of the applications
Dadopted by the states since 1789.  No federal official has ever been
Fdesignated to receive and keep track of applications separately . . .
=The application totals for convention campaigns is more often
g@than not inexact; even the question whether there are thirty-two
@valid applications for a convention to propose a balanced budget
amendment is disputed.
gEAs if the above considerations weren
t enough, there is the intrinsic
UFproblem of the addition of new States to the Union, which has made the
Hcalling of a Convention a mathematically more difficult proposition.  As
MHamilton wrote, it is
one of those rare instances in which a political truth
<can be brought to the test of a mathematical demonstration.
    Back when
UJthe United States consisted of 13 States, if one wanted to lobby the State
ILegislatures to call a Convention, and one had only enough funds to reach
K9 of the 13 States (9 states only being receptive), the odds of picking the
receptive States were roughly
one chance out of 1000
.   T
, one has to
UNreach 34 of 50 states, and if there are only 34 States that would be receptive
I(and there are only enough funds to reach 34 States), the odds of picking
$the 34 receptive States are roughly
one in
5,000,000,000,000
U<proposition that is over 5,000,000,000 times more difficult!
g)All told, Article Five (coupled with the
de facto
amendments by
UGCongress and the Bicameral requirement of Article One) has demonstrated
Mason
))Fs point on the necessity of keeping the National Legislature, at least
UDin part,
out of the loop.
  Over 10,000 amendments were proposed in
CCongress from 1789 to 1981, but only 33 were sent to the States for
ratification.
Unfortunately
)J+, many more amendments have been needed, as
UKthe existence of the Empirical Constitution conclusively demonstrates.  (As
does the behavior of
State
) 0Governments: in the same time period, there have
been
different
State
constitutions and
amendments to those
constitutions!).
:The rigidity of the amendment process at the Federal level
UBhas resulted in an enormous transfer of power to the Judiciary (an
    unelected
);:Branch of Government), and is even undemocratic in another
>Chief Justice Marshall characterized the Constitution-amending
Amachinery as
unwieldy and cumbrous.
  Undoubtedly it is, and the
Ffact has had an important influence upon our institutions.  Especially
,has it favored the growth of judicial review
, since it has forced us to
g>rely on the Court to keep the Constitution adapted to changing
Times
+g1.conditions.  What is more, this machinery is,
prima facie
)G    at least,
g>highly undemocratic.  A proposed amendment can be added to the
CConstitution by 38 States containing considerably less than half of
the population of the country
!, or can be defeated by 13 States
g;containing less than one-twentieth of the population of the
country
gEThus, in allowing a minuscule Minority (less than five percent of the
UFpopulation) to have such an enormous
 and deleterious
 effect on the
Jpublic good, the language of Article Five acts to violate one of the chief
KObjectives of the Constitution established in the Preamble: that it promote
General
, and not the
Local,
elfare.
gCIn light of the foregoing, it is obvious that Article Five needs to
U&be rewritten. In fact, THE 21ST CENTUR
Y CONSTITUTION contains
UJextensive amendments to Article Five (the Constitutional Supplement is, in
Neffect, an extensive rewrite of Article Five).  The forty-eight Clauses of THE
21ST CENTUR
)Y/Y CONSTITUTION referenced to the Constitutional
UHSupplement may be amended far more easily than otherwise allowed by this
KArticle, since they are the Clauses which require the most flexibility over
time.
LThere are four other changes to Article Five.  The first is that only a full
UFMajority of both houses of Congress are needed to send an amendment to
Lthe States for ratification.  This change is made necessary not only because
Gof the increased need for amendments in a high-technology age, but also
Fbecause the size of the House of Representatives has been increased to
B1000 members.  The second change is that the People can circumvent
ICongress on the proposal of amendments or the calling of a Constitutional
EConvention, via the National Initiative (with a two-thirds Majority).
FThe third change is that a constitutional amendment may be ratified by
UMthree-fifths of the People voting in the General Election, which is obviously
Fconsistent with the language in the Preamble that it is the People who
ordain and establish
 Constitutions, and which removes the filter of
*Legislators from the ratification process.
GThe fourth change, the addition of the question at the General Election
ULregarding the calling of a Constitutional Convention, is the final guarantee
Ito the People that the calling of a Constitutional Convention will not be
Kdependent on the whims of Legislators.  In addition, this Clause recognizes
Ethat the right of self-determination is a right that belongs to every
Jgeneration.  It is a right which is not only the
supreme Law of the Land
5as enumerated in the Preamble, but is also one of the
inalienable
rights
UFreferred to in the Declaration of Independence
 and therefore a right
1which cannot be taken away from the People under
circumstances.  In a
U?letter to Madison dated September 6, 1789, Jefferson noted that
Times
+g1>The question Whether one generation of men has a right to bind
another
)(@, seems never to have been started either on this or our side of
g    the water
7et it is a question of such consequences as not only to
gCmerit decision, but place also, among the fundamental principles of
every government.
gCIn a letter to Major John Cartwright dated June 15, 1824, Jefferson
U&answered the question in the negative:
?[C]an [constitutions] be made unchangeable?  Can one generation
bind another
)D;, and all others, in succession forever?  I think not.  The
gDCreator has made the earth for the living, not the dead.  Rights and
Dpowers can only belong to persons, not to things, not to mere matter
gEunendowed with will.  The dead are not even things.  The particles of
Bmatter which composed their bodies, make part now of the bodies of
>other animals, vegetables, or minerals of a thousand forms.  T
o what
gFthen are attached the rights and powers they held while in the form of
Emen?   A generation may bind itself as long as its majority continues
Gin life; when that has disappeared, another majority is in place, holds
Fall the rights their predecessors once held, and may change their laws
Fand institutions to suit themselves.  Nothing then is unchangeable but
+the inherent and unalienable rights of man.
gDAnd Jefferson concluded in his letter to Madison that constitutional
U4revitalization must occur with every new generation:
2The earth always belongs to the living generation.
They manage it
gFthen, and what proceeds from it, as they please . . . They are masters
Btoo of their own persons, and consequently may govern them as they
@please.  But persons and property make the sum of the objects of
?government. The constitution and the laws of their predecessors
Bextinguished then in their natural course with those who gave them
Jbeing.  This could preserve that being till it ceased to be itself, and no
longer
'Every constitution, then, and every law
, naturally expires
g1at the end of 19 years.  If it be enforced longer
, it is an act of force,
not of right.
gBThus, under the Second Clause, every American who lives an average
UMlifetime will have the chance to vote at least twice on this important issue,
Iproviding for a perpetual Ratification of the Constitution by the People.
    Helvetica
Article VI
_(The Supremacy of the National Government
Times

Article VI, Clauses 1-3
Garamond
m=All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the
<Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the
3United States under this Constitution, as under the
Confederation
prior Constitution
m:This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
=shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
>which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
.shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Persons,
m%Legislators, Executive Officers, and
Judges in every State
m=shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws
0of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
:The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the
<Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive
;and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the
9several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to
>support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be
?required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under
the United States.

@The Constitution is the Supreme Law of the Land, and everyone is
U(bound by it.  No person is above the Law
gIAs under the 1787 Constitution, all public officials are required to take
U/the oath of office to support the Constitution.
    Helvetica
Article VII
The Constitutional Supplement
Times

Article VII, Clauses 1-4
Garamond
m7The Constitutional Supplement shall consist of Sections
0A, B, and C; shall be bound separately from this
4Constitution; and shall be duly incorporated in this
$Constitution as if set forth herein.
/All provisions in Section A shall be augmented,
3amended, or repealed by a full Majority vote of the
0House of Representatives and the Senate, and the
4concurrence of a three-fifths Majority of the People
2voting in the General Election.  There shall be no
6numbers in Section A other than those provided in this
Constitution.
/All provisions in Section B shall be augmented,
3amended, or repealed by a full Majority vote of the
5House of Representatives and the Senate.  There shall
7be no numbers in Section B other than those provided in
this Constitution.
/All provisions in Section C shall be augmented,
3amended, or repealed by a full Majority vote of the
2House of Representatives, unless this Constitution
shall otherwise provide.
8Sections A-100, 105, 120, 125, 130, and 170, and Section
:C-110, shall be filled in provisionally by a full Majority
3vote of the House of Representatives and the Senate
-within ninety days after Ratification of this
Constitution.

CThe addition of the Constitutional Supplement insures that THE 21ST
CENTUR
)2=Y CONSTITUTION will remain current and responsive to changing
UGtimes
 but, since different provisions are more subject to change than
Eothers, a variable ease and/or difficulty of amendability needs to be
Times
+U1Oinstituted.  Thus, the provisions contained in Section A are the most difficult
7to amend, and the provisions in Section C the easiest.
EThe Constitutional Supplement also serves another extremely important
function, by formalizing the
bodies
responsible for constitutional
UAamendment, and providing the appropriate Separation of Powers and
GChecks and Balances necessary for these widely disparate constitutional
=changes. For example, equal access regulations are annexed to
>Constitutional Supplement Section C-145, which means that the
Senate
, and
) Bthe Senate, is responsible for passing those regulations.  This is
U7important, because a) it is consistent with the Senate
s Oversight function,
U:and therefore b) preserves the Principle of Accountability
, by determining
His responsible for the passage of those regulations.  If the regulations
UGare in some way inadequate, the People know who is responsible, and can
act accordingly
)T:. The other significant reason that one body is given this
UPparticular power is that, as previously indicated, certain regulations will need
Jto be more flexible to keep up with the changes in technology and society;
consequently
)G7, the provisions should be more readily amendable. This
UGflexibility is provided by the Unicameral requirement of Sections C-100
:through 200 (see Article One, Section Three, Clause Six).
JIn addition, the Constitutional Supplement insures that the People will be
U@consulted regarding those constitutional amendments which have a
Jprofound impact on their rights or duties.  Three notable examples are the
Mlimitations on Government restriction of speech, which crimes will be triable
by jury (
serious
)l8.
petty
), and what power (if any) the President has to
UJcommit Americans to military action.  Any such changes require the consent
of the House
the Senate
%a significant Majority of the People,
UKinsuring that any such changes are well-deliberated over (and well-filtered
0through the proper bodies) before being enacted.
HBecause of their importance, certain enumerated Clauses are to be filled
in provisionally
)T:, since they will need to be in place for the operation of
UIGovernment.   Subsequent amendments to those Sections will be ratified as
required under Article Seven.
    Helvetica
Article VIII
Rules of Construction
Times

Article VIII, Clauses 1-2
Garamond
m8In this Constitution, affirmative provisions are limited
1by those provisions which circumscribe them.  The
terms
Order
Resolution,
associate,
establishment,
due process,
speedy,
excessive,
cruel,
unusual,
disproportionate,
 and other
0terms in this Constitution deemed ambiguous by a
4Majority of the People as determined in the National
8Poll or by a Majority of the Senate, shall be defined in
 B-145, but no definition may be promulgated which
3would provide less protection to Citizens than that
:existing at the time of Ratification of this Constitution,
3nor may any definition be promulgated which differs
6substantially from the sense predominating at the time
3of the Ratification of this Constitution.  The term
average,
 as used in this Constitution, shall refer to
.the mean obtained by adding several quantities
.together and dividing the sum by the number of
.quantities.  The term
shall,
 as used in this
8Constitution, shall be construed in its mandatory sense.
2The terms
 and
legislation,
 as used in this
2Constitution, shall refer to Legislation passed by
8Congress, or any regulatory activity, or any activity by
0any Branch of Government which may be considered
-Legislative or Quasi-Legislative in character
.  The term
Government,
 as used in this Constitution, refers to all
2Governments in the United States, including State,
6Federal, and Local Governments and agencies.  The term
speech,
 as used in this Constitution, shall be
5considered as a generic term for the communication of
5any form or type of information in any mode or media,
7and the term
speaker
 shall be considered as a generic
1term for any person who communicates information.
-The term
National Interest,
 as used in this
5Constitution, shall be broadly construed to serve the
Garamond
highest standards of Justice.
* 7Unless otherwise indicated in this Constitution, strict
8terms such as
 shall be strictly construed,
8and broad terms such as
liberty
 and
justice
 shall be
3broadly construed to serve the higher ends of civil
society.
Times

HOne of the major omissions in the current Constitution is the failure to
UAprovide for Rules of Construction.  How is the Constitution to be
$interpreted?  Strictly?  Broadly?  W
)ith reference to the
original intent
U<the Framers? This question is of critical importance, since
the method of
UCinterpretation used can determine the content of the constitutional
language
)4C!  For example, if one adopts the
original intent
 argument, it is
UJconceivable that the right to bear arms would not exist on the State level
J(even though the express language of the Constitution is to the contrary),
Osince there is some historical evidence to indicate that the Bill of Rights was
not binding on the States (see
Barron
    Baltimore
, 8 L. Ed. 672 (1833)).
UNBut, if one adopts the
strict construction
 line of interpretation, the right
Fexist at the State level, since the amendment does not expressly apply
UKto the States or the Federal Government, as does the First Amendment.  Over
Ithe years, the following
theories
 of constitutional interpretation have
/been advanced, either explicitly or implicitly:
strict construction
broad construction
narrow construction
natural law
)D,(a/k/a the doctrine of
fundamental
 rights)
original intent of the
framers
of the constitution
original intent of the
)v    ratifiers
of the constitution
original understanding
stare decisis
)G (applying applicable precedents)
anti-stare decisis
)a (ignoring applicable precedents)
pragmatism/public policy
balancing
evolution/historical precedent
refusal to interpret
political questions,
standing,
 etc.)
g>The problem is that since no one Rule of Construction has been
UEmandated, the Supreme Court has
interpreted
 the Constitution in any
Lway it sees fit!  So, Article One, Section One is interpreted
pragmatically
ULArticle One, Section Three is
strictly construed,
 and Article One, Section
7Eight is
broadly construed.
  Article Three, Section T
wo is interpreted
Times
historically
 and Article Five will not be construed at all (since its
UJinterpretation is a
political question
 beyond the purview of the Court).
LWhere certain other provisions are concerned, the Constitution itself is not
Leven consulted, and the rule of
stare decisis
 is used (prior Supreme Court
Erulings are seen as the law).   Still other times, the Supreme Court
ignores
distinguishes
) applicable precedents (formerly seen as
the law
) when it
*does not want to formally overrule them.
FGiven this extensive menu of
interpretive
 options, none of which are
UIauthorized, mandated, or regulated by the Constitution, the Supreme Court
Ois free to re-write the Constitution as it pleases.  Functionally speaking, the
Kultimate mode of interpretation of the Constitution by the Supreme Court is
the way we
=to interpret it.
  As Tugwell stated,
. . . a student trying
ULto understand the Constitution is at times unable to conclude whether strict
4or loose constructions remain the controlling theory
.  Perhaps this is one
UCreason why the Court has been able to remain the source of enlarged
Kconstructions when specific directives are lacking in the document itself.
gAArticle Eight brings order to the critical area of constitutional
UNinterpretation, and recognizes that there are two broad categories of terms in
#the constitution.  Where a term is
broad
)%%(or ambiguous), that term will either
U<be defined in Section B-145, or will be broadly construed.
Strict
terms such
UEas
supreme,
sole,
 and
exclusive
 are to be strictly
construed (the
reason
strict language was chosen).
    Helvetica
Article IX
The Ratification Article
Times

Article IX
Garamond
The Ratification of
this Constitution by
 Conventions of
nine
People of the United
States
as provided for in the
Second Federal Convention Act
, shall be sufficient for the
m#Establishment of this Constitution
 between the States so
ratifying the Same
Provisions of this Constitution
m5requiring the passage of certain contingencies become
,operative only upon the fulfillment of those
6contingencies.  Until such time as these contingencies
9are satisfied, previous operative clauses of the existing
Constitution remain in effect.

!The Second Federal Convention Act
$is the legislation that will provide
UMthe dates, times, rules, and funding for what will be only the Second Federal
8Constitutional Convention in our history
 a Convention
long
overdue.
g!The Second Federal Convention Act
will, at minimum, contain the
following strictures:
<There will be at least 1200 delegates to the Convention (the
g<number of people necessary to insure that the delegates are,
statistically
):;, a mirror of the populace), to be chosen from the millions
g=of people who will have applied with Congress to serve at the
<Convention. The selection process shall insure that there is
Ademographical representation of the population with regard to the
Gfollowing factors: sex, race, national origin, regional representation,
Gage, and financial status.  In addition, the Congress shall insure that
Ano single occupation, such as attorneys, comprises more than five
=percent of the delegates to the Convention.  Once demographic
>representation is insured, the candidates for each seat at the
CConvention (Seat One will be a white male from Florida over the age
of forty-five, Seat T
)k/wo will be a black female from California under
the age of thirty
)_0, etc.) will be tested on their knowledge of the
g#Constitution, constitutional policy
#, and constitutional draftsmanship.
gGThe highest scoring candidates eligible for each seat will serve at the
Convention.
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@Prior to attending the Convention, each delegate will be charged
g=with studying various texts on the drafting of constitutions,
including, but not limited to,
The Federalist
The Antifederalist
Papers
, Madison
.Notes on the Debates at the Federal Convention
The 21st Century Constitution.
AThe Convention will deliberate over dozens of draft constitutions
(including THE 21ST CENTUR
 Y CONSTITUTION), and hundreds of
gAproposals for amendments submitted by academics, politicians, and
members of the public.
=At the conclusion of their deliberations (between two and six
g:months), the Convention will submit between three and five
Dconstitutions to the voting population.  The only restriction on the
Dconstitutions to be issued will be that the same ratification Clause
F(direct ratification by the People in a General Election) be contained
Gin every constitution, and that the States retain equal suffrage in the
Senate.  T
)4*o preserve the Principle of Accountability
, Congress shall be
gCresponsible for establishing and enforcing restrictions on delegate
behavior
).<, and no court shall have jurisdiction over any case arising
out of, or in regards to,
)z!The Second Federal Convention Act
!The Second Federal Convention Act
will contain equal-time
gFregulations for the broadcast media, and insure that all constitutions
are equally
, fairly
)'*, and extensively discussed, compared, and
gCcontrasted.  After a three month period of extensive public debate,
Cthe Federal Government will hold Primary and General Elections. The
&constitutions, including our present W
ritten Constitution with the
gBNew Ratification Clause, will go to a vote.  The two constitutions
Cwhich receive the highest vote will go to the General Election. The
Ewinning Constitution will be considered ratified by the People of the
?United States
 those who
ordain and establish
 constitutions.
7Those provisions of THE 21ST CONSTITUTION requiring the
Gsatisfaction of certain contingencies (e.g., the Qualifications Clauses
Arequiring a group of Federal Academy graduates), become effective
Gonly when the contingencies are satisfied.  Until such time, clauses of
;the 1787 Constitution which are operative remain in effect.
THE 21ST CENTUR
)s*Y CONSTITUTION changes the requirement for
UNRatification from three-fourths of the States to Ratification by the People of
@the United States. This Clause pays homage to the Framers of our
EConstitution, obeying their major premise (as expressed by Madison in
Federalist 40
that:
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+g@A[I]n all great changes of established governments, forms ought to
Bgive way to substance . . . a rigid adherence in such cases to the
former
)&8, would render nominal and nugatory the transcendent and
gCprecious right of the people to
abolish or alter their governments
<as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and
Chappiness,
 since it is impossible for the people spontaneously and
>universally to move in concert towards their object; and it is
;therefore essential that such changes be instituted by some
&informal and unauthorised propositions
, made by some patriotic
g6and respectable citizen or number of citizens. . . .
@Had the convention . . . taken the cold and sullen resolution of
gBdisappointing its ardent hopes, of sacrificing substance to forms,
;of committing the dearest interests of their country to the
Cuncertainties of delay and the hazard of events; let me ask the man
:who can raise his mind to one elevated conception, who can
>awaken in his bosom one patriotic emotion, what judgment ought
Ato have been pronounced by the impartial world, by the friends of
@mankind, by every virtuous citizen, on the conduct and character
of this assembly [?] . . .
7[I]f they had exceeded their powers, they were not only
g>warranted, but required, as the confidential servants of their
country
)+4, by the circumstances in which they were placed, to
g:exercise the liberty which they assumed; and . . . finally
    , if they
gAhad violated both their powers and their obligations in proposing
@a Constitution, this ought nevertheless to be embraced, if it be
Acalculated to accomplish the views and happiness of the people of
America.
As Madison stated later in
Federalist 43
)I ,
[t]he safety and happiness of
UQsociety are the objects at which all political institutions aim, and to which all
&such institutions must be sacrificed.
$This was consistent with the view of
Hamilton expressed in
Federalist 22
that:
gJIt has not a little contributed to the infirmities of the existing federal
Asystem, that it never had a ratification by the PEOPLE. . . . The
Gpossibility of a question of this nature proves the necessity of laying
Bthe foundations of our national government deeper than in the mere
sanction of delegated authority
The fabric of American empire
g6ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE
3PEOPLE. The streams of national power ought to flow
?immediately from that pure, original fountain of all legitimate
    authority
Times
+g16This right is formally stated in the Preamble to our W
ritten Constitution.
U4This is a right appropriate not only for our Century
, but also the 21st
U Century
 and for all Centuries.
Times
+g97Chapter Three
Epilogue
AIt is a matter both of wonder and regret, that those who raise so
Amany objections against the new Constitution should never call to
Dmind the defects of that which is to be exchanged for it.  It is not
Fnecessary that the former should be perfect; it is sufficient that the
@latter is more imperfect.  No man would refuse to give brass for
@silver or gold, because the latter had some alloy in it.  No man
Dwould refuse to quit a shattered and tottering habitation for a firm
Band commodious building, because the latter had not a porch to it,
@or because some of the rooms might be a little larger or smaller
gAor the ceiling a little higher or lower than his fancy would have
planned them.
 James Madison,
Federalist 38
gE[T]he choice must always be made, if not of the lesser evil, at least
of the GREA
)G!TER, not the PERFECT good . . . .
 James Madison,
Federalist 41
g?[T]he evils we experience do not proceed from minute or partial
Bimperfections, but from fundamental errors in the structure of the
>building, which cannot be amended otherwise than by alteration
7in the first principles and main pillars of the fabric.
 Alexander Hamilton,
Federalist 15
g@Happy will it be if our choice should be directed by a judicious
<estimate of our true interests, unperplexed and unbiassed by
Aconsiderations not connected with the public good.  But this is a
?thing more ardently to be wished than seriously to be expected.
AThe plan offered to our deliberations affects too many particular
=interests, innovates upon too many local institutions, not to
Einvolve in its discussion a variety of objects foreign to its merits,
=and of views, passions and prejudices little favorable to the
discovery of truth.
 Alexander Hamilton,
Federalist 1
Times
+g1AHearken not to the voice which petulantly tells you that the form
?of government recommended for your adoption is a novelty in the
Epolitical world; that it has never yet had a place in the theories of
Ethe wildest projectors; that it rashly attempts what it is impossible
>to accomplish.  No, my countrymen, shut your ears against this
?unhallowed language.  Shut your hearts against the poison which
it conveys . . . .
 James Madison,
Federalist 14
gBThe establishment of a Constitution, in time of profound peace, by
5the voluntary consent of a whole people, is a PRODIGY
, to the
g9completion of which I look forward with trembling anxiety
 Alexander Hamilton,
Federalist 85
THE DIFFICULTY OF
ABLISHING A NEW CONSTITUTION
Ee have come a long way in the last two hundred and fifty pages.  Over
UIthe course of this book, a great deal of evidence has been presented that
Eindicates there are serious defects in our political system, and that
Lsubstantive societal change for the better is impossible without remediating
these defects.  W
)])ithout substantive political change, our
is our
future
U?If Government wasted money in the past, it will waste it again.
NIf Government refused to take action on critical problems in the past, it will
Jcontinue to do so.  If Government in the past raised our taxes and lowered
Gour standard of living to finance its inefficiencies, you, the taxpayer
, can
UGexpect more of the same in the years to come.  The tragedy is that this
"insanity is completely unnecessary
gDIn the perfect world, every American would read this book, seriously
UKevaluate the arguments contained within it, and then take action to convene
Ja Constitutional Convention that would formally and rigorously investigate
Dthe issues raised here, and that would propose such amendments as it
'viewed necessary or efficacious.  That
"s the perfect world
 the world we
)    /live in.  In the imperfect world, the world we
live in, only a few
UGAmericans would read this book.  Of those who did read the book, only a
+few would have the will and wherewithal to
on the arguments and
UHimperatives it espoused.  But those who read the book and then attempted
Jto act on what they knew would find that evidence, even piles of evidence,
@would prove a flimsy tool in the face of sociopolitical inertia.
Unfortunately
)J:, there are many obstacles to enacting a New Constitution.
UKEven more formidable than the legal obstacles contained in Article Five are
psychological
logical
),*impediments that obscure rational thought.
Times
+U1FAn earlier draft of this book contained a 150 page discussion of these
obstacles. Here
)^2s a brief listing of these psychological/cognitive
impediments
need to belong
cognitive dissonance
escalation
pluralistic ignorance
, the
frame
closed systems of thought
irrational
individualism
, the
(inability to conceive of rival hypothese
availability
biases
overconfidence
, the
$inability to access latent knowledge
faulty
mental models
fear of the unknown
phobias
projection
repression
U    avoidance
vertical thinking
, the
rubber band effect
innumeracy
genetic
undertow
    defeatism
societal apathy
, the
self-fulfilling prophecy
node flow-chart
habit
need to relax
confusion of happiness with
the good,
 short-term thinking
need to win
tunnel vision
minority
vision
, the
QWERTY problem
reification
identification with the other
boredom
egocentrism
short-term memory
implausible what-if scenarios
need to believe
g6Here is one way that these obstacles, working together
, can create a
U4conceptual network impervious to rational discourse:
. X, due to
irrational individualism
, utilizes the
framing
technique to create a
particular
closed system of thought
which
gHserves to secure his short-term financial self-interest (in this case, a
?closed system which rationalizes the logically inconsistent co-
Aexistence of a 1787 Constitution with an Empirical Constitution).
CThough this is unethical, he rationalizes away his guilt, to reduce
cognitive dissonance
.  Other individuals,
unable to conceive of
rival hypotheses
)]6, see the closed system as
legitimate,
 in a striking
case of
overconfidence
.  Because they are
unable to access latent
g    knowledge
)<5, they cannot see the inconsistencies in their newly-
g)acquired belief system.  And, due to the
need to belong
, neither they
gAnor anyone else objects to the system in public, so that everyone
believes that
everyone else
)N+believes its true.  In a society beset with
this
pluralistic ignorance
)x(, people perpetually think that
someone
g8else
 will solve their problems, and, because they have
faulty mental
models
of reality
)1., these same people do not understand the true
g0nature of the problems; furthermore, due to the
tendency to blame
the self
)        they see
themselves
)@#as the cause of their problems.  As
escalation
)@5occurs, these problems get worse, but no one objects,
g@because the people have previously accepted the status quo.  The
fear of the unknown
)x/created by an undue familiarity with the status
!makes people more susceptible to
phobias
, which abort the quest
g#for fundamental solutions.  Finally
, because of
availability biases
g5those initially interested, when confronted with the
societal apathy
g=produced by the preceding factors, put the issue on the
 burner
 where it evaporates.
Times
Het these psychological impediments, formidable as they are, are only the
U=first hurdle, because these impediments also function as the
engine
UHrationalization
 that is, they provide the emotional motor powering the
Ecreation and acceptance of conceptions reducing cognitive dissonance,
?leading to the second hurdle
 the rationalizations themselves.
-Most people are familiar with this concept of
cognitive dissonance
UOthrough the concept of rationalization, and the old story illustrating it,
JFox and the Grapes.
  In that fable, the Fox attempted to jump for grapes,
Nbut could not reach them.  After several
fruitless
 attempts, the Fox stalked
;off, muttering
aah, those grapes were probably sour anyway
  But this
U@hypothesis was a spurious one: if the grapes were
probably sour
 why did
UMthe Fox begin jumping for them in the first place?  Faced with this question,
Kthe Fox might conceive of new rationalizations:
I wanted to get exercise.
I had nothing better to do.
jumping for grapes.
g@What motivated the Fox to conceive his before and after-the-fact
UGhypotheses?  The answer is cognitive dissonance, a conflict between two
opposing premises:
the desire for grapes;
the desire to conserve energy
gEHad both these desires not been mediated by the Fox through his power
UFto rationalize, the Fox would have been in a state of terminal anxiety
.  His
UKdesire for grapes would have been opposed by his desire to remain inactive,
Gand the Fox would have vacillated between the two until collapsing in a
Kstate of nervous exhaustion.  Aronson (1980) gave the following description
of cognitive dissonance:
D[C]ognitive dissonance is a state of tension that occurs whenever an
Aindividual simultaneously holds two cognitions (ideas, attitudes,
Gbeliefs, opinions) that are psychologically inconsistent. . . . Because
@the occurrence of cognitive dissonance is unpleasant, people are
Jmotivated to reduce it . . . here, the driving force arises from cognitive
3discomfort rather than from physiological needs.  T
o hold two ideas
g;that contradict each other is to flirt with absurdity . . .
gHThe upshot of this theory bodes ill for constitutional analysis in three
U+ways.  First, people are likely to support
    decisions
made by Governmental
UHbodies because they have a psychological need to do so, not because they
Gfeel that those decisions are legitimate.  As Chemerinsky (1987) wrote:
@Decisions that might otherwise be opposed, and thus threaten the
Gstability of the government, gain support from the realization that the
Times
+g1Fresult is based on constitutional interpretation.  People who disagree
Awith the result, but support the Constitution and judicial review
, face
g/a situation labeled by social psychologists as
cognitive dissonance
gCThere is a tension between their negative beliefs about the outcome
Jof a case and their positive attitudes about the institution and its basis
Dfor decision.  Some people might resolve this dissonance by changing
#their mind and accepting the court
s decision. At the least, their
support for the government
's structures and processes might lessen
g*their opposition to the particular result.
Secondly
)19, an inability of people to affect social change due to a
UDfundamentally unresponsive Government may lead to a
you can
t fight
city hall
 mentality
)i6, which reduces dissonance by relieving the Citizen of
UBthe need to devote time to changing a defective Government: if you
 fight Government, then there is no point in fighting it.  By this
reasoning, some people
2s worship of the 1787 Constitution may be a direct
UIconsequence of the fact that they don
t think that there is anything they
can do about it!  T
)g6aken to its extreme consequences, people may resort to
the ego defense mechanism of
denial
)#): refusing to see reality for what it is.
UDAt a subconscious level, people may warp their own previously-formed
Gvalue judgments.  Hazlitt (1942) comprehended the ultimate consequence:
AOne result of this impotence of the people to make their opinions
Deffective, as we have seen, is to pervert the nature of the opinions
Fthemselves.  There is a pathology of masses as well as of individuals.
HWhen an individual feels powerless to correct a certain situation in his
Bprivate life, he often refuses to face the situation realistically
.  He
g?argues to himself that the situation is not so bad as it seems.
gEThe third consequence of cognitive dissonance is that people can then
form what is known as a
schema
)(', which Duke and Nowicki (1979) defined
U3as a frame of mind that adversely affects a person
ability to see the world
accurately
*One particular form of schema is known as
attitudinal
distortion
)6E; a frame of mind that lets in only the information confirming a pre-
existing belief.
=This psychological phenomenon means that the more a person is
UKcommitted to a belief, the more resistant the person will be to information
Qthat threatens that belief.  The effect this will have on constitutional analysis
Eis that, in any public debate on the topic, whether discussions on TV
, at social
U!gatherings, letters to the editor
(, etc., a large number of people will be
U<committed, for various reasons, to the Old Constitution. Now
, many
UKarguments will be made for and against the proposition that alternatives to
1our present Constitution(s) be explored.  However
, if people have been
committed to the
status quo
)>0first, all the evidence for and against the idea
Times
+U1Lwill be filtered through this perception.  Many people will do to a proposed
INew Constitution what the supporters of the Articles of Confederation did
Mto the 1787 Constitution!  As Madison stated in 1787,
they . . . scanned the
Lproposed Constitution, not only with a predisposition to censure, but with a
"predetermination to condemn . . .
, as opposed to implementing an
UHobjective, criteria-based, evidentiary and/or operational constitutional
    analysis.
GDue to this
predetermination to condemn
 (a predetermination that will
UJbe broadcast by the Establishment Media), various logical impediments will
Nbe created, and then disseminated among the populace.  Here is a short list of
&the impediments we can expect to find:
Begging the Question
Argument
by Metaphor
, Argument by Abstraction
Las V
egas Fallacy
loaded
double-bind
&doublethink, distortion, the Straw Man
equivocation
analysis within a single frame
circular reasoning
illicit
contrast
argument by innuendo
 distinction without a reasonable
difference
Fallacy of Composition
Fallacy of Division
wishful
thinking
inference from a label
contrary-to-fact hypothesis
causal
oversimplification
post hoc ergo propter hoc
Poisoning the W
ad hominem
tu quoque argument
distortion
unrepresentative statistics
Red Herring
on Domarus reasoning
Is/Ought Fallacy
Opinion/Fact Fallacy
Language/Reality Fallacy
Subjective/Objective Fallacy
Relevant/Irrelevant Fallacy
U3Essential Similarity/No Functional Identity Fallacy
Act/Omission to
Act Fallacy
faulty analogy
%neglect of relevant evidence, special
pleading
pseudoreasoning
false dichotomy
and the
false dilemma.
gDThe number of ill-conceived remarks that may be made in reply to the
UDarguments for a New Constitution boggles the mind.  The most popular
fallacies employed are
Begging the Question
(e.g.,
the Constitution is
the way it is
Argument by Abstraction
(e.g.,
the Constitution
safeguards our precious rights
and should not be
tampered with
), the
Red Herring
)J (e.g.,
you have not proposed a
perfect
Constitution
Las V
Fallacy
(e.g.,
people
!elect officials who will pass the
UCnecessary legislation without the need to amend the Constitution
@Consider the following question-begging
argument
 made before a
ECongressional Subcommittee on the Constitution by Nobel Prize-winning
economist Paul Samuelson:
[T]here is
no inherent flaw
)a'in our checks and balances and division
g@of responsibility among the legislative, executive, and judicial
"branches of government that makes
inevitable
a process of
logrolling
 designed to swell the level of expenditures and taxes
Fbeyond that truly desired by the effective majority of the electorate.
Times
+g1FThis comment is not even an argument (a claim buttressed by evidence),
U#and therefore cannot possibly be a
argument.  Nor can Samuelson
U+observation regarding the inevitability of
logrolling
, which is only one of
UMseveral causes underlying the deficits we have run for decades, be (in and of
Litself) a compelling argument against revising the form of Government.  That
Jan occurrence is
not inevitable
 is no rationale for pursuing a course of
1action; if it were, we would all play the Lottery
, because losing was
UHinevitable
; jog in Central Park at midnight, because getting mugged was
not inevitable
; and smoke two packs of cigarettes a day
, because dying of
U lung cancer
 according to the T
(obacco Institute, at any rate
 was
inevitable.
IIn truth,
not inevitable
 fails utterly to meet the standard of a useful
UMbarometer for action, and is, therefore, invalid as a tool for constitutional
analysis.  It may arguably
, even plausibly
)U!, be argued of our constitutional
UQform that under it, logrolling is
not inevitable.
   But what is at issue is not
inevitability
of X, but the
probability
of X.  And under the 1787
UKConstitution, experience has amply demonstrated that logrolling is, and has
#been, a fact of life in our Nation
)s Capitol, and shows no signs of abating.
U6Indeed, in a situation where there are many incentives
a behavior
, and no
sanctions
against
))0, how could it be otherwise? If a Representative
logrolls,
 he or she gets Federal dollars for his or her District, and therefore
Oincreases the chances of being re-elected.  Is there any reason to believe that
Fthis system of incentives without punishments will produce a change in
Hbehavior in the near future contrary to 200 years experience?  Samuelson
Moffers no such evidence; instead, we are offered the trivial (and potentially
Dinaccurate) observation that a phenomenon which has occurred for 200
0years is
not inevitable.
  But what occurrence
?  For all we know
, the
U-sun, which has risen for billions of years,
not rise tomorrow
.   But that
UMsomething may or may not occur cannot, in and of itself, operate as a guiding
Gprinciple in life, except for hypochondriacs, chronic gamblers, and the
Bxenophobic (those most susceptible to this line of
reasoning
FHopefully the eminent economist Samuelson will recognize that those of
UOus footing the bill for this current Constitution may wish to disagree with his
analysis,
 and institute measures that will
decrease the probability
U(logrolling, if not eliminate it entirely
Unfortunately
)J6, it is not only eminent economists who wish to purvey
UItheir sophistry on an unsuspecting public.  Many other people will, quite
readily
)#I, see their opinions as facts, oversimplify issues, verbally attack those
UJwho threaten their unsubstantiated pre-existing beliefs, and throw out all
Esorts of smokescreens to divert discussion from the issues at hand. T
ULintelligently discuss the need for a new form of Government, one needs to be
+not just a political scientist, but also a
    logician.
Times
THE LEGAL IMPEDIMENTS TO
ABLISHING A NEW CONSTITUTION
gGOf course, even if one can get past the psycho/logical impediments, the
UKlegal impediments to structural reform remain.  And they are serious indeed
 so serious, in fact, that the legal impediments may buttress the
)psycho/logical impediments by creating a
learned helplessness
effect.  As
Sundquist (1986) observed,
;Even those most profoundly convinced that the United States
8government has serious structural weaknesses come to ask
themselves and one another:
Why even try to change the
gAConstitution?  Why not take for granted that it cannot be altered
gBand settle for whatever improvements can be made by lesser means
;by passing laws, or changing party rules and structures, or
;concentrating on electing better officials to high office?
The process
g<of amending the country
s two-hundred-year-old charter is so
Aformidable that reformers can be excused for being daunted at the
<outset, and theorists forgiven for devoting their analytical
energies to other subjects.
$Not only may an amendment be blocked
gDby 34 percent of the voting members of one house of Congress but, if
Git passes that hurdle, it can still be defeated by the adverse vote, or
?simple inaction, of as few as thirteen of the ninety-nine state
-legislative houses, or fewer than 14 percent.
g@The institutional structure makes forging the necessary Majority
UHcoalitions near-impossible, because any substantive change, whatever its
Nnature, will have a short-term adverse effect on powerful political Minorities
 who are able to nip in the bud any such efforts.  And the subtle nature of
Ninstitutional reform means that it will be difficult to arouse popular support
-for what seem to be ephemeral considerations:
GInstitutional structure is not an issue likely to arouse popular fervor
gCthe absence of a patent breakdown in the functioning of government,
#and even then
 as at the time of W
atergate
 most people are
gGinclined to place the blame on the failure of individual leaders rather
Ethan of institutions.  Proposals for structural change may not arouse
fervent opposition either
+, but in the absence of popular support any
gIorganized institutional opposition is likely to be sufficient to prevail.
BIf either of the major parties sees its interests jeopardized by a
Dproposal, or incumbent legislators discern a loss of power for their
Fbranch, or the president and defenders of presidential power foresee a
Dweakening of the executive, the proposal is doomed.  Any significant
Cideological bloc, also, would surely have enough strength in enough
Times
+g1?states to block an amendment; so no proposal has much chance of
Fsuccess if it arouses conservative concern that it hides a bias toward
Ebig government, or liberal concern that it favors weak government, or
5elitist worry that it embodies an excess of democracy
g?antiestablishment fear that it upsets the balance the other way
tCBut institutional changes are seldom neutral, and even if one could
g@be conceived that is truly neutral
 and would be perceived that
<way
 neutrality is not enough.  Each of the elements of the
Dinstitutional system, and each major ideological group as well, must
Dsee some benefit.  Unless something is to be gained, why risk change
:at all?  But gains for everyone is a logical impossibility
.  True, the
g&government as a whole can accrue power
, as it has been doing for
g>most of two centuries, but the division among institutions and
Cofficeholders of the right to exercise any given aggregate of power
Fbecomes a zero-sum game.  If one institution or one political party or
Done ideological group gains, another loses.  That, at bottom, is why
?there has not been a single amendment in two hundred years that
 redistributed governmental power
!.  The two amendments that can be
gBclassed as even affecting the institutional structure at all
Seventeenth and the T
)x+wenty-second
 concerned only the selection
g6of the individuals who would wield institutional power
, not the scope
g&of the institutional authority itself.
7But the distribution of power among the elements of the
gHgovernmental system is what . . . constitutional changes . . . would, in
:one or another degree, affect. The scale of the benefit to
Cgovernmental effectiveness to be derived from any measure or set of
>measures would depend on the magnitude of that effect.  But so
@would the vigor of the opposition each measure would incite.  It
Dbecomes an axiom of constitutional reform, then, that any structural
=amendment that would bring major benefits cannot be adopted
Eagain, barring a governmental collapse that can be clearly attributed
>to the constitutional design
 while any measure that stands a
,chance of passage is likely to be innocuous.
g*Nor can we expect our representatives in W
ashington, who are
U0ostensibly in charge of promoting
the general W
elfare,
 to promote the
U    general W
)58elfare by changing the nature of their job descriptions:
gAThe proposal for change will certainly not come from the existing
Bheads of the multitude of permanent committees in Congress.  These
Dheads of committees have come to their positions not on their merits
@as recognized by their present fellow members but by the rule of
    seniority
.  They are
sitting pretty
 and mean to hold on to their
prerogatives and power
0.  The situation is not likely to be challenged,
Times
either
C, by the majority members next in line under the seniority rule, or
gBby the ranking minority members of the committees, who stand to be
Athe actual heads if there is a shift in the balance of parties in
Congress.  Why
, then, does not the new member
, the
outsider
g9man who has got poor committee assignments, challenge the
<arrangement?  Because, unless his campaign can be assured of
Asuccess in advance, no individual member wants
to stick his neck
 by incurring the displeasure of the existing Congressional
Aleaders and committee heads, who have it in their power to decide
Dwhether or not he shall get a good appointment and be an influential
Amember of Congress.  It may be almost as difficult to effect this
Cchange, in short, as it would be to amend the Constitution directly
gHThe upshot of the political reality is that any movement for substantive
U@political change must come from those who
ordain and establish
constitutions, the PEOPLE:
>Government by the people means that the people themselves must
Eplay their part in deciding what is to be done with their government.
>And that means the people must be informed and must themselves
>The methods for changing our governmental institutions must be
g9orderly and thoughtful and the changes themselves must be
Dstatesmanlike and forward-looking.  This cannot be done hurriedly or
haphazardly
t:What could be better disposed to meet these grave national
g9responsibilities than a Second Constitutional Convention?
g;The convening of a Constitutional Convention is the People
s sacred
UGright, and the Constitutional method for circumventing a corrupt and/or
Nineffective Legislative Branch.   But is there a way to force Congress to call
$this Convention?  The answer is YES.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL SAFETY
g)Luckily for Americans in the 21st Century
 , the Framers provided a safety-
UIvalve in the Constitution in the event the Federal Government ignored its
Aconstitutional strictures
 perhaps the most significant check on
NGovernmental irresponsibility in that document.  This safety valve lies in the
House of Representatives
$ith smaller voting Districts (making
UIcommunication between the People easier), a two-year term (increasing the
IAccountability of the Representative to the People), and the control over
Frevenue (and thus Appropriations) granted to the House in Article One,
JSection Seven, the People were given the ultimate tool to prevail upon the
Times
+U1>House of Representatives to prevail upon the other Branches of
KGovernment to take those actions that became necessary to force a return to
%basic principles.  As Madison wrote,
@The house of representatives can not only refuse, but they alone
Bcan propose, the supplies requisite for the support of government.
8, in a word, hold the purse; that powerful instrument by
g?which we behold, in the history of the British Constitution, an
8infant and humble representation of the people gradually
@enlarging the sphere of its activity and importance, and finally
>reducing, as far as it seems to have wished, all the overgrown
Aprerogatives of the other branches of the government.  This power
over the purse may
)l/, in fact, be regarded as the most complete and
g8effectual weapon with which any constitution can arm the
Cimmediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a redress of
<every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and
salutary measure.
Madison later stated that
the house of representatives, with the people
UNon their side, will at all times be able to bring back the Constitution to its
primitive form and principles.
Under this Madisonian strategy
, the
UGfrequency of elections provided by the two-year term of the House would
;furnish the means of bringing Government back to its roots.
CThe brilliance of the strategy implied by Madison is that it is not
UOnecessary to get 140 million people to agree on a political course of action, a
Iwell-nigh impossible task, and which, if required, would doom the chances
&for any grass-roots movement.  Luckily
%, no such effort is required.  Due to
UGthe way the House is elected, and the fact that millions of people have
Ndropped out of the political process, it will be possible to force Congress to
+call a Constitutional Convention with only
22,236,000
people voting
U"strategically: still a high number
, to be sure, but only
twelve
percent of the
voting age population in 1988.
gDThe reason for this is that only 218 of the 435 Districts have to be
UAcaptured to secure a Majority in the House. And voter turnout for
3Representative elections has historically been poor
, especially in those years
UBwhen there is no concurrent Presidential election.  In 1986, only
UApercent of the voting-age population turned out to vote for their
Representatives on a
National
basis
; and many
Districts
had even lower
U=voter turnouts. In 1986, for example, 50,738 people voted for
;Representative Thomas Manton in the Ninth District of New Y
UKDistrict had a population of approximately 525,000, with a resultant voting
age population of 394,000.
)This means that Representative Manton was
elected by only
thirteen
)04percent of the eligible voters in his District!  Put
another way
)E    , a mere
)2    fourteen
)3+percent of the voters in the Ninth District
Times
+U1Ccould have elected a Representative who had pledged to work for the
passage of the
Second Federal Convention Act
, the legislation creating the
U    rules for
)*-, and convening, a Constitutional Convention.
gHIf the 51,000 voters required to elect an alternative candidate had held
Cof the 218 Districts in 1986, this would have meant that a Majority
UGof the House of Representatives would have been composed of alternative
candidates had
18,000
)*/people pursued the strategy on a National basis
UPin that election!  Of course, these totals are misleading, because few Districts
<in the United States had the incredibly low turnout of New Y
s Ninth
UIDistrict.  Still, even assuming that 102,000 voters would be required, on
Oaverage, to elect an alternative candidate in the 218 Districts with the lowest
Fvoter turnout, this means that only 22,236,000 Americans would need to
pursue the political strategy
.  A formidable number
, certainly
, but not an
insurmountable hurdle.
IAssuming that this twelve percent of the population could organize itself
U,to pursue this particular political strategy
, what would the Congressional
UHoutcome be in the event the strategy is successful?  Simply this: if the
$alternative candidates are elected,
&the candidates would vow to vote no on
UGEVERY piece of legislation but the Second Federal Convention Act, until
Ethe Senate would also agree to vote for the Second Federal Convention
6Act, and the President would agree to sign it into law
If 218 Districts are
UGrepresented by the alternative candidates, the Senate and the President
would have
)D    no choice
)92but to support the Act, since the Government would
UDcome to a standstill, given that the source of revenue, the House of
.Representatives, had turned off the spigot.  W
ith millions of Federal
U$employees no longer drawing a salary
, and thousands of Government
UIservices no longer being offered, the Senate and the President could ill-
Oafford to withstand the political fallout that would accrue to them.  In short,
Jthe Senate and President would be forced to capitulate, and the Convention
Jwould be called under the provisions of the Act.  The Convention, itself a
Jdemographic mirror of the People, would turn out one or more constitutions
for the People to consider
4.  A vote would be taken.   If the People decided to
U1vote for the 1787 Constitution, that, as they say
, would be that.  This latter
U'eventuality would be extremely unlikely
", but if it happened, at least the
People (not their
representatives
)S)) would be responsible for the subsequent
political consequences.
T YOU CAN DO
gIIf you feel that working for a New Constitution is a goal worth pursuing,
U:there are at least two significant actions you can pursue:
Times
alk About It
g/One of the simplest strategies to pursue is to
talk about
the need for a
UFNew Constitution in discussions with friends, fellow students, and co-
<workers.  Discuss the social problems found in society today
, and trace their
UBgenesis to a constitutional form that does not allow for the ready
Iamelioration of social problems.   Having read this book, and being newly
Linformed, you will be surprised at the level of ignorance in society on this
Omost critical of issues.  This level of ignorance is truly humbling, and even a
>bit intimidating; but the only way to deal with it is through
communication
U5which of necessity must begin on an individual basis.
The V
ote-Out-Incumbent Strategy
g5Another simple strategy to pursue, but an enormously
    effective
)2    political
URstrategy that requires virtually no effort at all, is (as previously discussed) to
simply
refuse to vote for Incumbents
, and to pursue that strategy
tenaciously
)<#, without regard to political party
, the
character
 of the
UGIncumbent, or similar factors irrelevant to the success of the strategy
.  One
UFcan refuse to vote for an Incumbent simply by staying home on Election
J, but an even more effective route is to go into the voting booth and pull
U!the lever next to the challenger
(s name, whomever s/he happens to be.  If
U;only twelve percent of the population pursues this strategy
, big changes will
occur in W
)??ashington, as politicians realize that Americans will no longer
ULtolerate the waste of their hard-earned dollars, and have decided to finally
exercise
)2>that small amount of political power they have been allowed to
UOretain.  Since this strategy (like any political strategy) is effective only if
pursued on a
)N    National
)6/basis, it must be communicated
 a goal one can
UJachieve simply by discussing it in conversations, but far more quickly and
7effectively by pursuing the three strategies to come.
The exception to the V
ote-Out-Incumbent strategy
, of course, is if the
UFIncumbent has agreed to vote for the Second Federal Convention Act AND
has voted (and will
continue
to vote)
all other legislation
until
U&the Act is passed.  Such an Incumbent
deserves
your vote.
gIThis implementation of this strategy (which received a jump-start in 1992
UEthanks to the Congressional Check-Bouncing Scandal of that year) will
'require no investment of time nor money
, but will be devastatingly
    effective
 and its implementation will in all probability be
n    essential
for achieving
substantive change.
Times
THE BENEFITS OF ACTION
:It is difficult to capsulize the effect(s) THE 21ST CENTUR
UHCONSTITUTION will have on society in a few short pages.  The best way to
gauge the
operational
)D5effects of the provisions
 the impact they will have
UOon society
 is to discuss this book with other interested parties.  If you are
Oa student in a political science class, you are ahead of the game.  If not, you
Hmay want to mention this book to your friends or co-workers, and discuss
Lthe various provisions with them: what role will the National Database play?
AHow will the Federal Academy work?  What will be broadcast on the
FNational Channel, and what effect will it have on the education of the
Lpopulace?  How will the National Poll help politicians implement the desires
Oof the People?  It is also important to note that these provisions, significant
Pas they are standing alone, are substantially more powerful in their totality of
operation.  Here
)Y;s a brief explanation of how certain provisions of THE 21ST
CENTUR
)28Y CONSTITUTION can work together to greatly increase the
UFprobability that one of the more significant problems of our day
problem of
child abuse
)]*will be solved (note that these procedural
U#changes have far-reaching effects):
The Legislative Review Board
(Article One, Section Seven)
u?streamlines the passage of legislation.  Under the new system,
pork barrel
 Bills will no longer exist, freeing funds for worthy
Dcauses, such as the amelioration of child abuse.  Ridiculous waste,
#such as the B-2 program and
Star W
 will no longer be
funded.
The Federal Academy
(Article One, Section T
en) will educate
uBpoliticians in the nature and causes of social problems, and they
>will be more inclined and better able to take action on those
    problems.
The National Database
$(Article One, Section Eleven) makes
uFarticles on the topic available to the general public. The facts will
be readily accessible to all.
The National Channel
,(Article One, Section Eleven) allows social
uBinterest groups to broadcast their messages to the entire Nation.
DThe issue will no longer be abstract, and will appear as compelling
Das it actually is (for some measure of the National impact, compare
9the effect the Rodney King videotape had on the National
*consciousness regarding police brutality).
Times
The Legislative Committee
!provisions (Article One, Section
uDFifteen) allow groups of concerned Citizens to draft legislation on
Bparticular topics and have them submitted to Congress, where they
will be voted upon. Children
(s organizations could draft legislation
uFproviding for a National child abuse hotline, increased penalties for
Achild abuse, preliminary intervention before abuse is allowed to
reach critical levels, etc.
The Electronic Post Office
#(Article One, Section Nine, Clause
uCSeven) allows organizations to send electronic mail to hundreds of
Ethousands of people at a fraction of the current postal rates.  More
Epeople will have the capacity to join these organizations due to the
1increased ease and reduced cost of communicating.
The addition of the
Right to an Education
(Article One, Section
uAEleven) means that it will be easier to persuade Citizens of the
Jnecessity of legislation, since functional illiteracy will be drastically
reduced, and everyone
$s general knowledge will be greatly
increased.
g#The New Constitution thus provides
many avenues
for the amelioration
UMof social problems (including others not listed, such as the relaxed standing
Grequirement, the Department of Rights Enforcement, equal representation
"provisions, etc.).  In this manner
, THE 21ST CENTUR
Y CONSTITUTION
U7gives individuals with heightened social awareness the
tools
)"    to attain
UJworthy social goals.  A thorough discussion of the interrelated provisions
    with one
)3Fs contemporaries will aid the analysis that will reveal these effects.
gIOther than discussion of operational effects with friends and associates,
UEthere is another useful way to provisionally evaluate THE 21ST CENTUR
U9CONSTITUTION (or any constitution, for that matter)
analysis with
U7reference to the criteria necessary for good Government
. A useful
UQtechnique is to posit essential criteria that a constitution should satisfy (such
efficiency in Government
-), and then ask,
Does this Constitution I am
UJevaluating satisfy these criteria?
  The best constitutions, provisionally
,  are
USthose which best satisfy the criteria.  Here is a list of criteria that may be used
Lto evaluate the Constitution proposed in this book (with selected provisions
Ethat secure them), and future constitutions that may be proposed by a
Constitutional Convention:
Establish Justice
EEqual rights under the law and equal access to the justice system are
sine qua non
)N5aspects of a constitutional system.  No person should
gGreceive more or less justice based on irrelevant criteria such as race,
Times
+g1Hwealth, etc.  All Citizens have a right to arbitration of their disputes
Eby a Judicial tribunal, without having to invest an inordinate amount
Dof time, or inordinate expense, in the resolution of those disputes.
3[Department of Rights Enforcement; Relaxed Standing
:Requirement; Common-Law Codification; Equal Representation
;Provisions; Obligations of Congress; Right to an Education]
Promote the General W
elfare
g@When people enter into a social contract, they do so because the
Ebenefits of organizing and cooperation outweigh the risks of division
and disunity
)E4.  That being the case, the role of Government is to
gAimprove the society in a way not otherwise attainable without the
;social cooperation regulated and enforced by Government. In
2addition, a National constitution must secure the
National
Interest
first, and afterwards,
local
)"%interests.  If America is not healthy
g&State or City within it can be healthy
g>[Revised Bill Procedure; Legislative Review Board; Evaluation;
Performance Ratings; V
ote-T
 rading Prohibition; Conflict-of-
g9Interest Prohibition; Prohibition Against Political Party
0Membership; Obligations of Congress; Legislative
&Responsibilities; National Objectives]
$Provide for Efficiency in Government
?The Constitution should remove all procedural roadblocks to the
=contemplation and passage of Constitutional legislation. High
6technology times and a more competitive world economic
@environment demand that the Legislative process be responsive to
Ethese changing times.  It should implement all procedural legislation
"necessary for achieving this goal.
6[Timetables; Evaluation; Revised Separation of Powers;
=Oversight by Senate; Federal Academy; Delegation Allowed with
Legislative V
)J2eto; Revised Bill Procedure; Revised Article Five]
Insure Fiscal Responsibility
@It goes without saying that one of the primary considerations in
Bforming a constitution is that it contains mechanisms that help to
Ainsure fiscal responsibility by preventing
log-rolling,
 deficit
Gspending, and other institutional effects that increase the probability
of fiscal imprudence.
*[Auditor; Revised Borrow Clause; Revised T
ax Clause;
Times
+g1?Legislative Review Board; Quarterly Publication of Receipts and
Expenditures; V
ote-T
$rading Prohibition; Federal Academy]
Accountability
FNecessary legislation must be passed, and must be enforced.  If either
Fof these situations fail to obtain, the constitutional process must be
Cconstructed to provide for immediate determination of the source of
@the failure, and to provide for swift correction of the problem.
    [Annual T
)H+erm for Representatives; One-Subject Bills;
g>Evaluation; Oversight by Senate; National Database; Electronic
!Post Office; National Objectives]
'Provide Mechanisms for Self-Enforcement
@A good Constitution will establish Governmental bodies that will
enforce
)->its provisions.  If, as an example, the Supreme Court is given
gAthe power of declaring laws unconstitutional
 and does not do so
Cwhen the exercise of the power is indicated
 then the Constitution
@is flawed. If Judicial interpretation changes the meaning of the
CConstitution, the Constitution should provide a swift mechanism for
"restoring the original parameters.
>[Department of Rights Enforcement; Oversight by Senate; Annual
7erm for Representatives; Federal Academy Rule Proposal;
g>Performance Ratings; Federal Elections Commission; Legislative
?Committees; Electronic Post Office; National Database; National
:Referendum; National Recall; Relaxed Standing Requirement;
*Constitutional Convention Query on Ballot]
    Stability
CA Constitution must ensure that the Government of the United States
&proceed in a stable, orderly fashion.
[Revised Articles One, T
wo, and Three; Alternate]
Flexible Amendability
FNot every aspect of a constitution is as necessary for the security of
Dliberty as another; in addition, some aspects of a constitution will
8become outdated before others.  A Constitution should be
modular
 to the extent that it allows for this varying amendability
[Constitutional Supplement; V
    ariable T
erm Lengths]
g1Insure that All People are Adequately Represented
?Every United States Citizen is equal under the eyes of the law;
Times
consequently
)G7, every Citizen has the right to be heard by his or her
g@Government; and no Citizen shall have any more of a voice in the
"Government than any other Citizen.
![Equal Representation Provisions]
2Guarantee Fairness to the Greatest Extent Possible
0The law should not only represent people equally
, but treat them
equally
)&9.  No Constitution can permit the unfair treatment of one
group of people by another
g:[Equal Protection Clause; Equal Representation Provisions]
5Decrease the Irrational Forces Which Mold Legislation
In any civilized society
)}., various groups will attempt to influence the
g>passage of legislation by use of irrational cues such as party
Jaffiliation, or by the use of logical fallacies, direct misstatements, and
even bribery
)C7.  A Constitution should ensure that those who make our
gIlaws consider only the facts, the values of their constituents, and their
2Constitutional mandate while creating legislation.
4[Federal Academy; Federal Academy Proposal of Rules;
1Prohibition Against Political Party Membership; V
ote T
rading
Prohibition; T
)W,erm Limitation Provisions; Public Financing;
g1Federal Elections Commission; Ethics Legislation]
*< Minimize or Eliminate Corruption
.Corruption, the most insidious form of tyranny
, is the bane of all
gAcivilized Governments.  The most delicately balanced constitution
Bthat could be devised will be toppled if it contains no mechanisms
Dthat operate to minimize or eliminate the political cancer which has
#historically afflicted societies. W
!ith privately financed elections,
gBnewly-elected Officers of Government are beholden to the interests
Ewhich put them there. This is no less a distortion of the Legislative
Iprocess than a direct bribe is in the Judicial process.  Since the proper
Dfunctioning of the State is dependent on the balanced representation
Cof the population, the Government must provide for the financing of
elections.
>[Public Financing Provisions; Oversight by Senate; Prohibition
7Against Political Party Membership; Increased Number of
Representatives; T
)i.erm Limitation Provisions; Ethics Legislation;
Times
+g1(Performance Ratings; Nominating Process]
 Provide for Direct Citizen Input
#A constitution is a document of, by
!, and for the People; as such, it
g?should provide for ways in which groups of Citizens united on a
9particular issue can place issues on the National Agenda.
9[Legislative Committees; Electronic Post Office; National
0Channel; National Database; National Objectives]
Provide for Direct V
oter Decisionmaking
gDBecause Legislatures are not always responsive to their constituents
Cwhen they ought to be, and because certain volatile issues are best
Fleft out of the Legislative process, a constitution should provide for
direct
)%?legislation by the Citizens.  A constitution is only as good as
gEthe legislation which it authorizes; the People of America, being the
Bgreatest source of new ideas, should be encouraged to take part in
Gthe political process.  Among other things, this will have the salutary
<effect of restoring Citizen confidence in Government, and of
decreasing voter apathy
g5[National Initiative; Recall; Legislative Committees]
    eto Power
Bo reduce the need for
single-issue
 voting, a constitution should
g,allow Citizens to directly veto legislation.
[National Referendum]
%Guarantee the Education of the People
AAn informed populace necessary for any process which claims to be
Hdemocratic in nature, a constitution should insure that all its Citizens
Dreceive (to the greatest extent possible) the education they need to
Fachieve their highest potential, both as Citizens and as human beings.
DIn addition, a constitution should provide continuing education (and
>access to the resources which make education possible) for the
People.
<[Right to an Education; National Database; National Channel;
Electronic Post Office]
    Filtering
>While the constitution must be responsive to the wishes of its
ECitizens, it must also filter all the requests for future legislation
8through a set of criteria; among them, constitutionality
, necessity
Times
simplicity
)1', cost-effectiveness, and the General W
elfare of society
gBThus, Bills introduced by Citizens should be examined according to
@the above criteria, and evaluated accordingly before being acted
upon.
;[Legislative Review Board; Evaluation; Performance Ratings;
4Timetables; Revised Bill Procedure; Federal Academy]
5Ensure that Officeholders are Adequately Educated for
their Positions
In society
)58, we don
t trust our bodies to doctors who have not been
g>properly trained; nor do we trust enforcement of our rights to
=attorneys who have not been educated for the task.  Similarly
g1should not trust the promulgation of our country
s laws to those who
g@have not received the training necessary for their positions.  A
Aconstitution must provide for the rigorous schooling of those who
&will shape society by their decisions.
3[Federal Academy Graduation Requirement; Alternate]
0Provide a Nominating Process for All Branches of
Government
EAs the primary step in securing candidates for office, the nominating
?process needs to be clearly articulated in the constitution.  W
ithout
gEsuch a provision, there is no guarantee that the initial selection of
+candidates will have been educated properly
, nor be fairly
g?representative of the populace, nor be free of
hidden agendas
$favoring special or local interests.
Separation of Powers
?For reasons of efficiency and to prevent concentration of power
gApower should be dispersed, and the integrity of the Branches must
remain intact.
[Revised Articles One, T
wo, and Three; Common-Law
Codification]
Enumeration of Powers
CA Constitution should clearly designate specific powers to specific
<Branches of Government, and clearly delineate the boundaries
'beyond which the power may not extend.
[Revised Articles One, T
wo, and Three]
Checks and Balances
Times
A constitution should not only
separate
powers, but
distribute
those
gApowers when necessary to preserve the integrity of the Branches
and to
disperse
)4-political power when necessary for reasons of
efficiency
[Revised Articles One, T
"wo, and Three; Revised Impeachment
g:Process; Timetables; Evaluation; Branches Not Empowered to
>Enforce Unconstitutional Legislation; National Recall; Relaxed
7Standing Requirement; Senate Restrictions on Delegates]
"Resolve Internal Inconsistencies W
ithin the Document
Bo the greatest extent possible, constitutions should be drafted to
gBavoid internal inconsistencies.  One contemporary example would be
a journalist
)?7s right to report a trial interfering with the accused
s right
gDto a fair hearing.  If internal inconsistencies are unavoidable, the
DConstitution should provide for their resolution within the document
 to the greatest extent possible.
?[Rules of Construction; Definition in Constitutional Supplement
1Section B-145; Hypothetical  Example Requirement]
Easily Comprehensible
BThe Constitution should be written in a language understandable by
the average literate American.
Specificity
DIt is a fundamental Principle of jurisprudence that the laws we live
Bunder be as unambiguous as possible.  The more vague the term, the
Emore latitude granted the Judicial power;  if a construction is vague
Henough (e.g.,
speedy trial
), the court is forced to legislate and give
5content to the provision, violating the Principle of
Separation of
Powers.
)52Because the use of ambiguous terms is unavoidable,
however
).6, a mechanism for definition should be made within the
gDConstitution itself, to prevent the creation of informal mechanisms.
7[Definition in Constitutional Supplement Section B-145;
9Hypothetical  Example Requirement; Rules of Construction]
Formal Rules of Construction
;Certain constitutional matters, such as the mode of textual
Cinterpretation, must be articulated in the document itself, and not
enunciated on an
ad hoc
basis.
[Article Eight]
Times
Majority Representation
!Minority Rule, or rule by the few
, is found in oligarchy
, monarchy
, and
tyranny
Majority Rule
is the Principle of
)d    Democracy
, and must be
gBpreserved to the greatest extent possible.  This being the case, a
@constitution must provide a mechanism for gauging the National W
and thus determining the W
ill of the Majority
g/[National Poll; National Objectives; Right to V
ote; Annual T
g9for Representatives; Increased Number of Representatives;
National Initiative]
0Guarantee All the Rights to Which People are Due
Since
7people fall into one Minority classification or another
gAcorollary of Majority rule is a proper constitutional respect for
@legitimate Minority rights, which function to limit the scope of
Federal, State, and Local power
 .  No Constitution can enumerate
g<every right to which Americans are entitled; it can, however
, articulate
gCand secure all those rights which the People deem as fundamental to
&insure a society of political equality
 .  As part of the guarantee, the
gDarticulation of a right must include sanctions for those who violate
the right.
8[Penalties for Violation of Rights; Department of Rights
5Enforcement; Revised Bill of Rights; Relaxed Standing
Requirement]
When THE 21ST CENTUR
)Y CONSTITUTION is analyzed with reference
UPto the preceding criteria, one can see that the provisions established within it
were designed specifically to
secure
)'(their existence.  By this analysis,  THE
21ST CENTUR
)P0Y CONSTITUTION is both successful and desirable.
gGBoth analytical approaches have their strengths
 analysis by reference
to criteria is more
)a    objective
)20, but the operational mode of evaluation is more
vivid
N.  Utilizing the operational approach, it is useful to filter existing reality
UJthrough the proposed constitutional provisions, and to imagine the results
Iunder those provisions.  When ugly National incidents take place like the
Evideotaped beating of Rodney King, ask what the outcome will be under
THE 21ST CENTUR
)l1Y CONSTITUTION
 ask yourself what will happen to
UMthe perpetrators of that offense.  Call into mind the relevant constitutional
Aprovisions: the Department of Rights Enforcement, the Legislative
ICommittees, the National Objectives.  When you read about the Savings and
JLoan scandal and the billions of taxpayer dollars required to bail out the
Ibanks, and the hundreds of thousands of dollars the banks lavished on the
Hpoliticians who arranged this bailout, ask yourself
is it reasonable to
Times
+U1=believe that such a fiasco would happen under THE 21ST CENTUR
U>CONSTITUTION?
 After careful thought and close analysis of the
Gprovisions, you
ll see that the short answer is
  Ask yourself,
ill we
U=have a $4,000,000,000,000 National Debt under THE 21ST CENTUR
CONSTITUTION?
 Answer: No.
$ill billions of dollars be wasted on
U2unnecessary defense projects under THE 21ST CENTUR
CONSTITUTION?
 Answer: No.
$ill billions of dollars be wasted on
U1unnecessary animal research under THE 21ST CENTUR
CONSTITUTION?
 Answer: No.
ould the EP
A identify only seven
U8hazardous chemicals as
hazardous
 under THE 21ST CENTUR
CONSTITUTION?
 Answer: No.
'ould there be a feeling of helplessness
U8in the face of Government inaction under THE 21ST CENTUR
CONSTITUTION?
 Answer: No.
ould the networks be able to
UHmonopolize the airwaves and exclude alternative political dialogue under
THE 21ST CENTUR
Y CONSTITUTION?
  Answer: No.
In short, THE 21ST CENTUR
%Y CONSTITUTION is the key
 it is the
U    tool, an
absolutely necessary
)v-tool, for the social change we so desperately
need.  T
)+;o fail to work for this New Constitution is to condemn one
s future
UDself to the past
 a past that is in many ways, and for many people,
extraordinarily unpleasant.
DThe 1787 Constitution has changed your role in life
 from master to
servant.  Y
)>5our employees issue commands
 commands which you are
UIcompelled to obey (
pay your taxes!
), even if the commands have no basis
in reason.  Y
)D?ou have no choice, because organizing against this structure is
UOmade extraordinarily difficult, given that the financial resources necessary to
Iretain control of the structure are withheld from your paycheck!  And the
Iresulting monolith (the Political/Educational/Media complex) controls the
Fflow of information
 we are not provided with the facts (nor even the
%concepts) necessary to evaluate what
s happening.
g?Children without hope?  Or Children who can create Paradise?  T
o what
/orld will you send our future generations?  A W
orld where every move to
UBcreate a rational and just society is fought at every turn, or a W
orld where
U6good ideas are evaluated, considered, and implemented?
Do you want a better W
orld?  Do you have a
dream
?  Then give yourself
to make your dream a
reality
g+Ask yourself the critical question
 what W
orld was always
possible
Imagine that W
)QBorld.  Then ask yourself, is it plausible that it will be achieved
U<under our present political system?  If it is not
 and the
of evidence
U-points directly to that conclusion
 then it
s time to roll up your sleeves.
gDHuman beings have enormous capacities.  Our Greatness is unexplored.
U$If you don
t work to make this New W
orld a reality
it will not happen
U@Apathy is expensive.  In fact, if people knew the cost of apathy
, they would
work 24 hours a day
)m., seven days a week, to avoid paying its cost.
Dou sow what you reap.  If you don
t work for the Good, the Good will
Times
+U16remain unborn.  The Good, today only a dim possibility
, yells out to the
orld currently existing:
Fight
)!    for me!
gJBut if you pick up the remote control instead, the Good remains invisible.
The Good is the W
)b$orld you never saw
 and never will.
g@A New Millennium gives us a new mindset, and therefore gives us
 and a chance to achieve enormously significant social change for the
Kbetter that comes along only once every 1000 years.  Ignore that hope?  Let
it die?
*That would be the greatest Tragedy of all.
I Caslon 540 Italic
THE BEGINNING
Times
+U98Further Reading
THE 21ST CENTUR
)n0Y CONSTITUTION attempts to summarize many of the
UOarguments against our current constitutional structure, but it is impossible to
do justice to
3of these arguments in a 300 page book
 indeed, for
UOreasons of space, many significant issues have been given short shrift, or left
out entirely
)C8. Certain topics, such as the existence of the Empirical
Constitution
)H=and the vastly different role of the Supreme Court under that
UJConstitution, are worthy of their own books.  No study of the Constitution
-ends with one book, and the reader is urged (
strongly
urged) to gain further
U<knowledge of the problems with our constitutional structure.
KThe following bibliography contains the books that were the most helpful in
writing THE 21ST CENTUR
+Y CONSTITUTION.  For historical background,
U&the most essential reading is Madison
Notes on the Debates of the
Federal Convention
)o%, which is also found in Max Farrand
Records of the
Federal Convention
)o+.  Another essential read is Ralph Ketcham
)        The Anti-
U;Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates
UIextremely concise and well-edited discussion of the Constitution, pro and
con.  Also essential is
The Federalist
)R , which contains many nuggets of
UIpolitical wisdom useful for drafting and evaluating New Constitutions.  V
Bowling and Bickford
Creating the Bill of Rights
is the documentary
UNrecord from the first Federal Congress, and contains all the discussion on the
Fdrafting of those provisions, as well as the text of over 100 proposed
4amendments to the Constitution that were, ultimately
, rejected.
Founder
s Constitution
)T1is a five-volume compendium, clause by clause, of
UPvirtually all the historical material relating to the Constitution
 a must-read
for constitutional scholars.
HThe best single view of what comprises the Empirical Constitution, aside
from Ladanyi
The 1987 Constitution
, is Corwin
The Constitution and
What It Means T
7, an extraordinarily detailed analysis of Supreme Court
interpretations
 of the Constitution.  Congressional Quarterly
Guide to
the U.S. Supreme Court
1contains a great deal of interesting and valuable
U&information on the scope of the Court
s expanded power
, up to and
including
)<    de facto
constitutional
rewrites.  Louis Fisher
Constitutional
U,Conflicts Between Congress and the President
gives dozens of examples of
disparities between the W
%ritten and Empirical Constitution.  T
wo other
books of interest are Siegan
The Supreme Court
s Constitution,
Tugwell
)    'The Compromising of the Constitution.
Also useful in this regard
U>are two summaries of Constitutional Law used by law students,
Gilbert
Emanuel
s Constitutional Law
Times
+U1?The best books on the defects of the Constitution are, in order
Constitution Under Pressure
!Government for the Third American
Century
A New Constitution Now
Cracks in the Constitution
Laurence Dodd
)Y7s essay
Congress and the Quest for Power
 is a concise
UIattack on the Committee System in Congress.  The two law review articles,
Return to Philadelphia
 and
Constitutional Conventions and the
Deficit
 are
-reading.  W
ilson
Congressional Government
is a classic
U-criticism of our political system, and Beard
Economic Interpretation of
the Constitution
)f)is of equal stature.  Chapter Six of the
Economic
Interpretation
)MA, 36 pages in length, is the single best summary of the political
U#science of the Framers extant today
'.  No study of the 1787 Constitution is
complete without it.
KSome excellent studies of the political process today are (in no particular
order), Stern
 The Best Congress Money Can Buy
The Rape of the
axpayer
, Greenberg
The American Political System
    ,  Kerbo
Social
Stratification and Inequality
, Parenti
Inventing Reality
)^    , Strick
    Injustice
for All
, Pascall
The T
rillion Dollar Budget
, and Domhoff
    Who Rules
America Now?
)R@.  For a nice dose of politics as it really is, subscribe to the
Congressional Record
)|2, and read the debates on the various issues
UOthe political system in action.  Another good idea is to walk into a university
Nbookstore, and peruse the political science section for books on our political
Aprocess.  Look for the ones which contain extensive quotations.
U)Statistical Abstract of the United States
!contains many valuable statistics
on our country
Plunkitt of T
ammany Hall
is probably the most ruthless
UBexpose of politics as it really is
 very readable, and very scary
U6The two best books on a Constitutional Convention are
Constitutional
Brinksmanship
, and
Unfounded Fears
.  If you fear a Constitutional
Convention, read these books.
DDecisions of the Supreme Court and other Federal Courts contain much
explication of the W
)x2ritten (and Empirical) Constitution, and make fine
reading.  The
Atkins
Chadha
)/+decisions cited in the bibliography are two
UBextremely important Separation-of-Powers decisions, and well worth
Gstudying.  Also interesting are certain decisions of the Supreme Court,
Lwhich, contrary to popular opinion, do nothing to preserve our
rights,
/in fact limit them.  Among these decisions are
U.S.
Stanley
, 483 U.S. 669
U    (1987);
Columbia Broadcasting System
Democratic National
U    Committee
, 412 U.S. 94 (1973);
Barron
    Baltimore
, 8 L. Ed. 672 (1833);
United States
Richardson
, 418 U.S. 166 (1973);
Muntz
Hoffman
, 422
U.S. 454 (1975);
Schlesinger
"Reservists Committee to Stop the W
, 418
U.S. 208 (1974);
Duncan
    Louisiana
, 391 U.S. 145 (1968);
Lehman
City of Shaker Heights
, 418 U.S. 298 (1974);
Letter Carriers
, 413
Times
U.S. 548 (1973);
Feres
United States
, 340 U.S. 135 (1950);
Massachusetts
Laird
, 400 U.S. 886 (1970);
Miami Herald
ornillo
, 418
U.S. 241 (1974);
McKeiver
Pennsylvania
, 403 U.S. 528 (1971);
DeShaney
innebago County
, 109 S.Ct. 998 (1989);
    Korematsu
323 U.S. 214 (1944);
San Antonio
    Rodriguez
, 411 U.S. 1 (1973);
Callahan
Parker
arden
, 395 U.S. 258 (1969);
Poulous
U    Hampshire
, 345 U.S. 395 (1953);
Breard
Alexandria
, 341 U.S. 622
(1951);
Perry Education
Perry Local Educator
s Ass
, 460 U.S. 37
(1983);
Los Angeles
axpayers for V
incent
, 466 U.S. 789 (1984);
Postal Service
Greenburgh Civic Assns
, 453 U.S. 114 (1981); and
Feiner
New Y
=, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).  (The latest such decision, as of this
writing, is
)?    Lechmere
National Labor Relations Board
, No. 90-970,
UIdecided January 27, 1992
 more to follow!).  These decisions make a good
Jstarting point for those readers who want to find out what the role of the
Supreme Court
really
)%5is.  Of course, the decisions listed only scratch the
U1surface
 readers further interested should read
The Constitution and
What It Means T
Finally
)#/, readers should acquire some general books on
informal fallacies
the art of critical thinking.
'The study of informal fallacies and the
study of critical thinking are
,the single most important topics that can be
studied by a human being
, bar none.  W
ithout this study
, one is helpless in
U!the face of rhetoriticians like W
illiam F
)&    . Buckley
, Pat Buchanan, and T
icker
, who
:studied these fallacies, and who use them to their (short-
term) benefit.  T
)X3ake it from your humble author
 your ignorance is
bliss.
  Some excellent books on informal fallacies are: Kahane
Logic
and Contemporary Rhetoric
Damer
Attacking Faulty Reasoning
Johnson and Blair
Logical Self-Defense
, Rothwell
elling It Like It Isn
Huck and Sandler
Rival Hypotheses
Chase
The T
yranny of W
eddle
)    &Argument: A Guide to Critical Thinking
, and
Moore and Parker
Critical Thinking
)`7.  One of the best books around that can teach you
U)to think
 is the third edition of Hosper
 An Introduction to Philosophical
Analysis
.  Baron and Sternberg
eaching Thinking Skills
, while addressed
UPto the teachers of the art of critical thinking, contains many valuable insights
Eeveryone can use.  (These books, and books like them, can be found in
university bookstores).
OOne cannot seriously evaluate the legitimacy of claims, political or otherwise,
Mwithout serious study of the art of critical thinking.  If you do not have at
)least four of these books in your library
, consider yourself at an
UEextraordinary disadvantage; not only in political discussions, but in
Eeveryday life.  Rest assured that when the time comes to evaluate new
Cconstitutions, the fallacies will fly fast and thick.  Be prepared!
Times
+U94Selected Bibliography
Constitutional Background
-The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787
, ed. by Max Farrand (Y
ale: 1966).
U2Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787
, James Madison (Norton: 1987).
The Federalist Papers
)U=, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, John Jay (Bantam: 1988).
UDThe Anti-Federalist Papers and the Constitutional Convention Debates
, Ralph Ketcham
(Mentor: 1986).
The Founder
s Constitution
):G, ed. by Philip Kurland and Ralph Lerner (University of Chicago: 1987).
USCreating the Bill of Rights: The Documentary Record from the First Federal Congress
, ed. by Helen
Beit, Kenneth Bowling, and Charlene Bickford (Johns Hopkins: 1991).
U'A Detailed Analysis of the Constitution
*, Edward Cooke, 5th Edition (Helix: 1984).
U*Contemporary Criticism of the Constitution
!The Constitution Under Pressure,
3Marcia Whicker, Ruth Strickland, and Raymond Moore
(Praeger: 1987).
U(Rewriting the United States Constitution
, John V
ile (Praeger: 1991)
U)Government for the Third American Century
, ed. by Donald Robinson (W
estview Press: 1989)
Reforming American Government
, ed. by Donald Robinson (W
estview: 1985).
A New Constitution Now
)h/, Henry Hazlitt, 2nd Edition (Arlington: 1974).
Cracks in the Constitution
, Ferdinand Lundberg (L
yle Stuart: 1980).
UCAn Economic Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States
, Charles Beard
(Free Press: 1986).
ime for Change
)>/, Alexander Hehmeyer (Farrar & Rinehart: 1943).
The United States Constitution
., ed. by Bertell Ollman and Jonathan Birnbaum
(New Y
ork University Press:  1990).
Koward An American Revolution: Exposing the Constitution and Other Illusions
, Jerry Fresia
(South End Press: 1988).
Congress and the Quest for Power,
 Lawrence C. Dodd,
Studies of Congress
j((Congressional Quarterly: 1985), p. 516.
Return to Philadelphia,
 Thomas Brennan, 1
Cooley Law Review
)U    1 (1982).
Constitutional Conventions and the Deficit,
 E. Donald Elliot, 1985
Duke Law Journal
1077
(1985).
Time for a People
s Convention,
 Gore V
idal,
The Nation
, Jan. 27, 1992.
U(Historical Criticism of the Constitution
The Anti-Federalist
)M7, ed. by Herbert Storing (University of Chicago: 1985).
The Anti-Federalists
)Q%, Jackson Turner Main (Norton: 1974).
Congressional Government,
oodrow Wilson (1886).
The English Constitution,
alter Bagehot (1867).
The American Commonwealth,
James Bryce (1889).
U&A New Constitution for a New America,
William McDonald (1921).
The Empirical Constitution
The 1987 Constitution
)]M, Thomas Ladanyi (Tribonian: 1987).  This book may be difficult to find. The
gGlatest address for Tribonian Press Publishers is Rockefeller Center, NY
, Box 4459,
10185-0038.
Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court
:, Elder Witt, 2nd Edition (Congressional Quarterly: 1990).
U$The Constitution and What It Means T
3, Edward Corwin, revised by Harold Chase and Craig
Ducat (Princeton: 1978).
Flowcharting the First Amendment,
Cornell Law Review
936 (1987).
U;Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President
(, Louis Fisher, 3rd Edition (University
Press of Kansas: 1991).
U$The Compromising of the Constitution
%, Rexford Tugwell (Notre Dame: 1976).
Times
The Supreme Court
s Constitution,
)@$Bernard Siegan (Transaction:  1987).
The Evolving Constitution,
)s'Jerome Lieberman (Random House:  1992).
Constitutional Law
)PO, Jesse Choper (Gilbert: 1989).  This book is a legal outline available at law
school bookstores only
Constitutional Law
)NG, Steven Emanuel (Emanuel: 1990).  Outline
 law school bookstores only
The American Political System
The Best Congress Money Can Buy
 , Philip Stern (Pantheon: 1988).
U#Open Secrets: The Dollar Power of P
ACs in Congress
, Larry Makinson
g (Congressional Quarterly: 1990).
Reconsidering American Politics
7, Nicholas Henry and John Hall (Allyn and Bacon: 1985).
The American Political System
)~=, Edward Greenberg, 4th Edition (Little, Brown, & Co.: 1986).
Guide to Congress
)J., 3rd Edition (Congressional Quarterly: 1982).
UBPolitics and Structure: Essentials of American National Government
, Robert O
Connor and Thomas
g+Ingersoll, 3rd Edition (Brooks/Cole: 1983).
Studies of Congress
)P6, ed. by Glenn Parker (Congressional Quarterly: 1985).
Plunkitt of T
ammany Hall
)6!, William Riordon (Dutton: 1963).
U4Chadha: The Story of an Epic Constitutional Struggle
, by Barbara Craig
g (Oxford University Press: 1988).
Direct Democracy
)G , Thomas Cronin (Harvard: 1989).
Reason in Law
)<#, Lief Carter (Little Brown: 1979).
U)Statistical Abstract of the United States
-(United States Department of Commerce: 1991).
U6Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial T
imes to 1970
g((U.S. Government Printing Office: 1975).
Chadha
, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
Atkins
United States,
556 F
.2d. 1028 (1977).
Congressional Oversight and the Legislative V
2eto: A Constitutional Analysis
  Jacob Javits and
Gary Klein,  52
New Y
ork University Law Review
455 (1977).
rong with America
America: What W
ent W
rong?
B, Donald L. Barlett and James B. Steele (Andrews and McMeel: 1992)
Injustice for All
, Anne Strick (Penguin: 1977).
The Rape of the T
axpayer
$, Philip Stern (Random House: 1973).
The T
=rillion Dollar Budget: How to Stop the Bankrupting of America
, Glenn Pascall
(University of W
ashington: 1985).
U$Social Stratification and Inequality
#, Harold Kerbo (McGraw-Hill: 1983).
Crisis in the Classroom
, Charles Silberman (V
intage:1971).
Savage Inequalities
, Jonathan Kozol (Crown: 1991).
How Children Fail
, John Holt (Dell: 1964).
Animal Factories
)E+, Jim Mason and Peter Singer (Crown: 1980).
The Farm Fiasco
)D , James Bovard (ICS Press: 1991)
The Permanent W
ar Economy
, Seymour Melman (T
ouchstone: 1985).
U(Corruption and Racketeering in the New Y
ork City Construction Industry
, New Y
ork State Organized
Crime T
ask Force (NYU: 1990)
Corporate Crime
, Marshall Clinard and Peter Y
eager (Free Press: 1980).
Essay on the Status of the American Child, 2000 A.D.: Chattel or Constitutionally Protected
.Child-Citizen?
, The Hon. Charles D. Gill, 17
Ohio Northern Univ
. Law Review
543 (1991).
Constitutional Convention
Constitutional Brinksmanship
)y , Russell Caplan (Oxford: 1988).
Unfounded Fears
, Paul W
)#)eber and Barbara Perry (Greenwood: 1989).
How the Media Distorts Reality
The Whole W
)7    orld Is W
atching
,odd Gitlin (University of California: 1980).
U1Inventing Reality: The Politics of the Mass Media
, Michael Parenti (St. Martin
)w    s: 1986).
Times
    Helvetica
Founders' Constitution
419, 459, 463.
Federalist 84
, pp. 436-7 (Hamilton)
Founders' Constitution
Records
565 (September 10). (
Records
is Farrand
!Records of the Federal Convention
BLetter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, September 6, 1789,
Founders' Constitution
Political Disquisitions
, James Burgh, 1
Founders' Constitution
54-5.
Remarks on Annual Elections for the Fairfax Independent Company
 George Mason,
April 1775, 1
Founders' Constitution
Founders' Constitution
Notes on the State of V
)b/irginia, Queries 14 and 19,
 Thomas Jefferson,
Founders' Constitution
674.
4s Letters, no. 38,
 Thomas Gordon, July 22, 1721, 1
Founders' Constitution
Founders' Constitution
Founders' Constitution
Founders' Constitution
9-10.
Founders' Constitution
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780,
 Articles 5 and 7, 1
Founders' Constitution
Federalist 22
, p. 111 (Hamilton).
Federalist 40
, p. 202 (Madison).
Federalist 63
, p. 321 (Madison).
7s Letters, No. 60,
 John Trenchard, January 6, 1721, 1
Founders' Constitution
Federalist 51
, p. 262 (Madison).
Remarks on Annual Elections for the Fairfax Independent Company
 George Mason,
April 1775, 1
Founders' Constitution
Federalist 62
, p. 315 (Madison).
Federalist 10
, p. 47 (Madison).
Federalist 29
, p. 142 (Hamilton).
Federalist 78
, p. 395 (Hamilton).
Congressional Record
, May 21, 1991, S6193.
Congressional Record
)W5, May 21, 1991, S6202 (typographical error replaced).
Congressional Record
, May 21, 1991, S6194.
Second Treatise,
 225, John Locke, 1
Founders' Constitution
Federalist 28
, p. 136 (Hamilton).
Federalist 51
, p. 262 (Madison).
Second Treatise,
 163,
 John Locke, 1
Founders' Constitution
Founders' Constitution
Federalist 78
, p. 397 (Hamilton).
Founders' Constitution
)b7453-4 (November 28-December 4, 1787) (first paragraph);
Records
)"+142 (November 24, 1787) (second paragraph).
Congressional Quarterly W
eekly Report
)3 , September 14, 1991, page 2607.
The Constitution Under Pressure
p. 182.
JSenate Select Committee Report on Amendment to Constitution, Mar 1, 1826,
U0Sen. Doc. no. 52, 19th Congress, 1st session, 2
Founders' Constitution
Federalist 53
, p. 271 (Madison).
Founders' Constitution
667-8.
Observations on the Government of Pennsylvania,
 Benjamin Rush,
U    1777,  1
Founders Constitution
Times
    Helvetica
NDefence of the Constitutions of Government of the United States,
 John Adams,
1787, 1
Founders' Constitution
120.
Observations on the New Constitution, and on the Federal and State Conventions by a
Columbian Patriot,
 Mercy W
arren, 1788,
The United States Constitution
, ed. by Bertell Ollman and
Jonathan Birnbaum (New Y
)n#ork University Press: 1990), p. 80.
Federalist 21
, p. 100 (Hamilton).
Federalist 57
, p. 289-91 (Madison).
Federalist 28
, p. 135-6 (Hamilton).
Federalist 71
, p. 364 (Hamilton).
Federalist 78
, p. 395 (Hamilton).
Federalist 63
, pp. 324-5 (Madison).
Records
360 (June 21).
Records
381 (June 22).
Records
361 (June 21).
Records
361 (June 21).
Records
365 (June 21).
BCaleb Strong in the Massachusetts Convention, January 15, 1788, 2
Founders' Constitution
Federalist 53
, p. 275 (Madison).
Federalist 53
, p. 274 (Madison).
Federalist 37
, p. 178 (Madison).
Federalist 53
, p. 274 (Madison).
Federalist 53
, p. 272 (Madison).
Federalist 52
, pp. 269-70 (Madison).
Federalist 55
, p. 281 (Madison).
Data from T
able 440 of the 1991
Statistical Abstract
)L*.  The lowest percentage of incumbents re-
hHelected in the 1964-1988 time frame was 86.6 percent in 1964.  In 1988,
98.3
percent of the
incumbents were re-elected.
A New Constitution Now
, p. 29.
McCulloch
Maryland
)%", 4 Wheat 316 (1819), quoted in 3
Founders' Constitution
The T
rillion Dollar Budget
)S    , p. 139.
    The New Y
ork T
B, September 6, 1991, p. A-16. And Senator D
Amato (R-NY) stated in
h    The New Y
ork T
imes
?magazine on October 27, 1991,
I wanted to make sure that New Y
ork got
h#more than its fair share.
 (p. 31).
The Best Congress Money Can Buy
%, p. 195 (Figure is in 1986 dollars).
Congressional Record
, May 22, 1991, S 6296.
    The New Y
ork T
, June 23, 1991, p. E-5.
A New Constitution Now
, p. 29.
Fortune
, May 6, 1991, p. 76.
Federalist 52
, p. 267 (Madison).
Founders' Constitution
Federalist 57
,  p. 289 (Madison).
Federalist 62
, p. 316 (Madison).
Federalist 56
, p. 285 (Madison).
Federalist 53
, p. 252 (Madison).
Nebraska Government and Politic
9s, ed. by Robert Miewald (University of Nebraska: 1984),
p. 71.
The T
rillion Dollar Budge
)P    t, p. 81.
Times
    Helvetica
The T
rillion Dollar Budget
, p. 83.
Federalist 35
, p. 168 (Hamilton).
Federalist 62
, p. 315 (Madison)
Federalist 62
, p. 315 (Madison)
Federalist 64
, p. 330 (Jay)
6Letter from John Adams to Roger Sherman, July 1789, 4
Founders' Constitution
106-7.
ashington
))'s Farewell Address,
 September 1796, 1
Founders' Constitution
Federalist 1
, p. 3 ((Hamilton).
Federalist 1
, pp. 3-4 (Hamilton).
Federalist 81
, p. 410 (Hamilton).
Federalist 65
, p. 331 (Hamilton).
XThis figure was derived by dividing the number of votes cast for President Bush in 1988,
ha48.886 million, by the voting age population in 1988, 178.1 million.  130 million eligible voters
Sdid not vote for President Bush, or did not vote at all (all numbers from the 1991
Statistical
Abstract of the United States
ables 426 and 450).
Federalist 64
, p. 325 (Jay).
Under the
))    Prisoner
)#    s Dilemma
),8, mutual cooperation benefiting two parties is extremely
hBimprobable, if the parties are put in a situation where one party
s cooperation combined with the
other party
)-Is defection would result in severe consequences for the cooperating party
.  For further
hediscussion of this extremely important effect, see the essay
Irrationality is the Square Root of All
    Evil
Metamagical Themas
)U/, by Douglas Hofstadter (Bantam: 1985), p. 756.
Federalist 3
, p. 12 (Jay).
Federalist 50
, p. 260 (Madison).
Federalist 10
, p. 47 (Madison).
Records
578 (July 11)
Federalist 37
, p. 181 (Madison).
The Constitution Under Pressure
    , p. 136.
Federalist 14
, p. 62 (Madison).
The Constitution Under Pressure
    , p. 111.
Who Rules America Now?
, G. William Domhoff (T
ouchstone: 1986), p. 117.
The Constitution Under Pressure
    , p. 131.
illiams
Rhodes
, 393 U.S. 23, 54 (1968).
ZWhile history may on rare occasions produce an occasional superpatriotic multibillionaire
hc(H. Ross Perot in 1992) willing to invest up to $100 million of private funds to win a Presidential
`election in times of extreme anti-establishment sentiment (the only candidate who may be able to
hsurmount the traditional institutional hurdles), this eventuality that does not alter the fact that more
ctraditional (and underfinanced) third-parties and/or independents, such as the Libertarians and the
Greens, labor in obscurity
Who Rules America Now?
)k    , p. 118.
The Constitution Under Pressure
    , p. 136.
Congressional Record
, May 21, 1991, S6196.
The Constitution Under Pressure
    , p. 138.
Congressional Record
, May 22, 1991 , p. S6297.
CSenator Kerry did not give the equivalent figure for the Democrats.
See 2 U.S.C.A. 431
et seq.
, and 26 U.S.C.A. 9001,
et seq
., especially 9004.
Buckley
I, 424 U.S. 1, 293-4 (1976).  The court had stated earlier that
there are
h]legitimate reasons not to provide public funding, which would effectively facilitate hopeless
candidacies.
Buckley
at 95.
Direct Democracy
)G    , p. 165.
Times
    Helvetica
    The New Y
ork T
, September 29, 1991, p. L-22.
Direct Democracy
)G    , p. 210.
    The New Y
ork T
, August 4, 1991, p. E-5.
The Constitution Under Pressure
, pp. 141-42.
    The New Y
ork T
, July 14, 1991, p. 1.
    The New Y
ork T
, July 14, 1991, p. 16.
Who Rules America Now?
, p. 120.
Who Rules America Now?
, p. 120.
Who Robbed America?
, p. 82.
Branti v
. Finkel
, 445 U.S. 507, 529 (1980).
Federalist 76
, p. 385 (Hamilton).
Federalist 77
, p. 390 (Hamilton).
Commentaries on the Constitution,
 1523, Joseph Story
Founders' Constitution
117.
Branti
#at 522, 29, 31 (citations omitted).
Guide to Congress
)J6, 3rd edition (Congressional Quarterly: 1982), p. 769.
    The New Y
ork T
, September 11, 1991, p. A-26.
Plunkitt of T
ammany Hall
, p. 3.
Plunkitt of T
ammany Hall
, p. 13.
Plunkitt of T
ammany Hall
, p. 74.
Who Robbed America?
, p. 78.
Branti
at 530-31.
Federalist 60
, p. 305 (Hamilton).
Letter Carriers
, 413 U.S. 548, 564-65 (1973).
at 567.
Federalist 44
, p. 229 (Madison).
Congressional Record
, May 22, 1991, S6301.
Direct Democracy
)G    , p. 211.
The Constitution Under Pressure
p. 189.
The Constitution Under Pressure
p. 192 .
The Political W
ritings of John Adams
, ed. George A. Peek, Jr
. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,
1954), p. 86.
Records
132 (June 6).
Federalist 35
)3I, pp. 166-9 (Hamilton) (order of sentences reversed) (emphasis supplied).
 The Best Congress Money Can Buy
by Philip Stern.
    The New Y
ork T
, October 16, 1991, p. C-4.
Congress and the Nation
((Congressional Quarterly: 1985), p. 281.
]If a Representative is discrepant ten times in ten votes, however, s/he by necessity breaches
h7the 10 percent mark, since 10 out of 100 is 10 percent.
Founders' Constitution
ime for Change,
)D8Alexander Hehmeyer (Farrar & Rinehart: 1943), pp. 100-1.
!The Constitution Under Pressure,
pp. 184-8 (citations omitted).
The Constitution Under Pressure
    , p. 189.
    The New Y
ork T
,  September 29, 1991, p. L-22.
Times
    Helvetica
    The 1990
)))Statistical Abstract of the United States
!shows that in 1988, 214.1 million
dollars was paid in
interest
on the public debt
)K,(table 497).  This figure was approximately
8 percent of the
outstanding gross Federal debt
){3[2.6008 trillion dollars, according to table 497].
Thus,
Ewe are paying approximately 8 percent interest on the National Debt.
1991
)Statistical Abstract of the United States
7, perhaps for political reasons (an upcoming election),
omits the interest paid on the
public
Adebt figure in table 507, the equivalent of table 497 in the 1990
Statistical Abstract
)LT.  However, the interest paid on the public debt can be calculated by extrapolation.
The figure for the 1990
outstanding gross federal debt
given in the 1991
Statistical Abstract
estimated figure) is
13 trillion dollars
)\#(table 507).  Assuming the rate of
    8 percent
h    interest
))Spaid by the United States government to the holders of the Federal Debt in 1988 (as
indicated by the 1990
Statistical Abstract
), this gives a figure of
$240 billion dollars
paid in
hginterest.  The National Debt is expected to hit 4 trillion dollars at the end of 1992, which would give
a figure of
$320 million dollars
)i>in interest paid, assuming that the rate of 8 percent interest
remains constant (
Congressional Quarterly W
eekly Report
)3!, September 14, 1991, page 2607).
In 1988, according to the 1990
Statistical Abstract
)O+(table 497), 214.1 million dollars was paid
hJin interest on the public debt.  In that same year, according to the 1991
Statistical Abstract
(table
h[522), 473.7 million dollars was paid in individual income taxes.  214.1 million dollars is
percent
heof 473.7 million dollars.  In 1980, by contrast, the interest paid on the national debt (74.9 million
dollars [see table 497, 1990
Statistical Abstract
]) was
+percent of the individual income taxes paid
h2(287.5 million dollars [see table 522 of the 1991
Statistical Abstract
)L#]).  There is a clear upward trend,
for obvious reasons.
    The New Y
ork T
, September 29, 1991, p. L-22.
?The figures for calculating the percentages were obtained from
    The New Y
ork T
Win or
h$Lose, Democrats Frustrated by Bush V
"eto,
 September 29, 1991, p. L-22.
The Anti-Federalist
)ME, ed. by Herbert Storing (University of Chicago: 1985), pp. 150-1.  Y
h<was writing under a pseudonym, as was customary at the time.
Creating the Bill of Rights
, ed. by V
)'4eit, Bowling, and Bickford (Johns Hopkins: 1991), p.
26, and
Are W
e to Be a Nation?
)E,, Richard Bernstein (Harvard: 1987), p. 270.
In 1988, according to the 1990
Statistical Abstract
)O+(table 497), 214.1 million dollars was paid
hJin interest on the public debt.  In that same year, according to the 1991
Statistical Abstract
(table
h[522), 473.7 million dollars was paid in individual income taxes.  214.1 million dollars is
percent
of 473.7 million dollars.
I.N.S.
Chadha
, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
The Best Congress Money Can Buy
, p. 37.
Congressional Record
, May 22, 1991, S6302.
Congressional Record
)W*, May 22, 1991, S6303 (emphasis supplied).
Federalist 43
, p. 229 (Madison).
Federalist 15
, p. 72 (Hamilton).
7wo particularly obnoxious decisions in this regard are
Democratic National
Committee,
)3Z412 U.S. 94 (1973), where the Court held that a broadcaster had the right to refuse to air
h?politically-oriented messages paid for by private parties, and
Miami Herald Pub. Co.
ornillo
, 418
hbU.S. 241 (1974), where the Court held unconstitutional a statute that required newspapers to print
@the replies of political candidates whom the paper had attacked.
Letter from James Madison to W
. Barry
, August 4, 1782,
The Complete Madison
(Harper:
1953), p. 337.
Cooley Law Review
1, 53-4 (1982).
The Constitution Under Pressure
    , p. 197.
(Letter from Thomas Jefferson to George W
ythe, August 13, 1786, 10
Papers of Thomas
h    Jefferson
4The language in the Second Clause is derived from Dr
. Ladanyi
s reduction of the
Empirical Constitution.
Times
    Helvetica
.The language in this Clause is derived from Dr
. Ladanyi
s reduction of the Empirical
h,Constitution.  Other amendments to Section T
1welve were derived from Supreme Court re-writes,
hda draft District of Columbia constitution (in the event it was granted statehood), and by the Author
See generally
Reason in Law
)<B, Lief Carter (Little Brown: 1979), an excellent book devoted to a
hestudy of the judicial lawmaking process, and especially pp. 28-35 and 112-25.  Also of interest is an
article which appeared in
)e    The New Y
ork T
,on January 3, 1992, p. A-28, on a judge who
h&judicial colleagues for inconsistency!
Federalist 62
, p. 317 (Madison).
Massachusetts
Laird
, 400 U.S. 886, 896 (1970).
Baker
L, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962) (the party suing should have a
personal stake in
the outcome of a controversy
Richardson
)/Nat 176.  The First Amendment gives citizens a right to petition the government
for grievances.  Ostensibly
, this does not mean
grievances, but
grievances, including
generalized
 ones.
Scrap
    at 688.
Schlesinger
Reservists to Stop the W
418 U.S. 208 (1974).
Mora
McNamara
, 387 F
.2d. 862,
cert. denied
),', 389 U.S. 934 (1967).  The lower court
harefused to hear the case because it claimed it was a nonjusticable
political question,
  and the
dSupreme Court denied to hear the case on appeal.  In his dissent to the denial of certioari, Justice
!Douglas quoted Justice Holmes in
Nixon
Herndon
)!(, 273 U.S. 536, 540, who wrote that
heobjection that the subject matter of the suit is political is little more than a play upon words.  Of
ecourse the petition concerns political action but it alleges and seeks to recover for private damage.
aThat private damage may be caused by such political action and may be recovered in  a suit at law
Dhardly has been doubted for over two hundred years . . .
  See also
Luftig
McNamara,
252 F
Supp. 819 (1966), and
Luftig
McNamara,
373 F
).2d 664 (1967).  In this case, the court
s technique
hhis to raise standing as the first line of defense.  If one crosses the standing threshold, the court can
use the
political question
)HKrationalization to avoid hearing the case.  The rationalization is a way of
h<denying standing to those who obviously have standing.   In
Edwards
Carter
, 580 F
.2d 1055
h`(1978), the court decided the merits of the case even though the appellants lacked standing (see
Edwards
)#    at 1057).
Schlesinger
at 229 (1974).
Craig
at 497.
Sierra Club
at 734.
See, e.g.,
New Y
United States
)57, 326 U.S. 572 (1946) (tax allowed on articles exported
from state,
contra
Article One, Section Nine).
Direct Democracy
)GF, p. 51.  Florida and Illinois adopted constitutional initiatives only
.  6 other
states adopted the referendum.
Direct Democracy
, p. 46 (quoting Raymond V
)q&. Anderson,
Adoption and Operation of
h_Initiative and Referendum in North Dakota
 [Ph.D. diss., University of Minnesota, 1962], p. 38)
Direct Democracy
, pp. 185, 186, 199, 202.
Direct Democracy
)G>, pp. 172-3 (this movement received over 200 endorsements from
h/congressional candidates in the 1978 campaign).
Direct Democracy
, pp. 204-5.
Cambridge Report
)I!, Fourth quarter 1977 (quoted in
Direct Democracy
, p. 174).
Founders' Constitution
$The Constitution and What It Means T
    , p. 203.
Federalist 69
, p. 350 (Hamilton).
Federalist 69
, p. 353-4 (Hamilton).
Federalist 69
, p. 354 (Hamilton).
Records
99 (June 4).
Records
99 (June 4).
Times
    Helvetica
Records
101 (June 4).
Records
101 (June 4).
Records
103 (June 4).
Data obtained from
)O    The New Y
ork T
, September 29, 1991, p. L-22
Records
586-87 (September 12).
Federalist 69
, p. 354 (Hamilton).
-The President, Congress, and the Constitution
*, Christopher H. Pyle and Richard M. Pious
h2(Free Press: 1984), pp. 274-5 (footnotes omitted).
Federalist 69
, p. 354 (Hamilton).
Guide to Congress
, 3rd edition, pp. 768-770.
Federalist 69
, p. 354 (Hamilton).
Senate,
) 4Select Committee Report on Amendment to Constitution
, Mar
. 1, 1826, Sen. Doc.
h no. 52, 19th Cong. 1st Sess., 2
Founder
s Constitution
Federalist 69
, p. 354 (Hamilton).
-The President, Congress, and the Constitution
,  p. 171.
Federalist 69
, p. 354 (Hamilton).
Records
113 (June 4).
)A Detailed Analysis of the Constitution,
    pp. 64-5.
Lochner
New Y
C, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Court held that a law limiting the number
h^of hours that bakers could work unreasonably interfered with the
freedom
 of contract between
master
 and employee.  See also
Hammer
    Dagenhart
)(&, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), which held that
h3Congress could not pass laws regulating child labor
The Judicial Process
)Q%, Henry J. Abraham, 2d Edition (New Y
"ork: Oxford University Press), pp.
355-377.
Roe v
H, 410 U.S. 113, 124-5 (1972).  The Court acknowledged that the issue was
h#moot, but allowed the appeal anyway
$The Constitution and What It Means T
pp. 255-56 (emphasis supplied).
Shapiro
Thompson
)+), 394 U.S. 618, 638 (footnote 21) (1969).
See Justice Brennan
s dissent at page 394.
7According to Justice Blackmun,
the contours of Art. IV
 2, Cl. 1 are not well
h0developed  . . . .
  See the cases discussed in
Baldwin
$The Constitution and What It Means T
p. 258 (See
People ex rel Holland
Bleigh
Construction Co.
, 335 N.E. 2d 469 (1975)).
$The Constitution and What It Means T
p. 258 (See
Hicklin
Orbeck
, 565 P
.2d. 159
(1977)).
Direct Democracy
, p. 34.
Records
122 (June 5).
Records
. 202-03 (June 11).
A New Constitution Now
p. 84 (quoting
The English Constitution
, Bagehot, p. 199).
Records
558 (September 10).
Records
202-03 (June 11).
Records
629 (September 15).
Federalist 85
, p. 448 (Hamilton).
Federalist 85
, p. 447 (Hamilton).
Federalist 85
, p. 448 (Hamilton).
Federalist 85
, p. 448 (Hamilton).
SIn fact, Congress has passed no law regarding the deadlines for applications.  See
Constitutional Brinksmanship
at page 110.
Unfounded Fears
, p. 55.
Times
    Helvetica
Unfounded Fears
, p. 56.
Unfounded Fears
, pp. 168-9.
[Some of the States restricted their call for a Convention to the balanced-budget issue, but
h_Article Six states that the Constitution (and the laws of the United States passed in pursuance
athereof) are the
supreme Law of the Land,
 and that
 legislative power granted is vested in
Congress
.   According to the T
)V?enth Amendment,
powers not delegated to the United States
hgreserved to the States.  But any such power to restrict the meaning of Article Five, if there were such
a power, would be vested in
Congress
.  The Constitution grants
)l    Congress
the power to make all
heLaws which are
necessary and proper
 for carrying into execution its powers (which include calling a
bconvention), provided, of course, that the Congress does not pass laws which function to amend the
YConstitution (such as adding subject-matter and time-frame requirements to Article Five).
Constitutional Brinksmanship
)y    , p. xix.
Federalist 85
, p. 448 (Hamilton).
[The mathematics are as follows: assume 9 red balls in a box, with 4 additional white balls.
hdThe odds of picking a red ball on the first pick are 9 chances out of 13, or .69230769.  Assume that
ga red ball is picked.  There are now 8 out of 12 balls that are red.  The odds of picking a red ball on
ethe second pick are 8 chances out of 12, or 0.66666667.   The odds of picking a red ball on the first
Xsecond pick is the probability of occurrence of the first instance (.69230769) times the
hAprobability of occurrence of the second instance (.66666667).   T
o get the final probability
, the
hdprobabilities are multiplied all down the line.  The resulting probability
 of picking 9 red out of
X13 total
 is 0.001398601.  The odds of picking the 34 red balls out of a total of 50 is
W.00000000000020309972030, a task that is 6,886,279,295 times more difficult to achieve.
(Rewriting the United States Constitution
, John V
ile (Praeger: 1991), p. 5.
 Data compiled from table 1-2 in
$ital Statistics on American Politics
, 3rd edition, ed. by
hKHarold Stanley and Richard Niemi (Congressional Quarterly: 1992), pp. 13-4.
$The Constitution and What It Means T
pp. 270-71.
Papers of Thomas Jefferson
)q0392, ed. Julian Boyd (Princeton, N.J.: 1950-82).
ritings of Thomas Jefferson
ed. H.A. W
ashington (T
aylor & Maury: 1854).
Papers of Thomas Jefferson
395-6.
$The Compromising of the Constitution
    , p. 104.
Federalist 40
, p. 202 (Madison).
Federalist 43
, p. 224 (Madison).
Federalist 22
, p. 111 (Hamilton).
Federalist 38
, p. 187 (Madison).
Federalist 41
, p. 203 (Madison).
Federalist 15
, p. 70 (Hamilton).
Federalist 1
, p. 2 (Hamilton).
Federalist 14
, p. 66 (Madison).
Federalist 85
, p. 449 (Hamilton).
The Social Animal
, pp. 102-04.
Interpreting the Constitution
)s*, Erwin Chemerinsky (Praeger: 1987) p. 91.
On Death and Dying
)R*, Elisabeth Kubler-Ross (Macmillan: 1969).
A New Constitution Now
, p. 91.
Abnormal Psychology
)Z@, Marshall Duke and Stephen Nowicki (Brooks/Cole: 1979), p. 209.
Federalist 37
, p. 176 (Madison)
Unfounded Fears
, p. 138.
.Constitutional Reform and Effective Government
$, James Sundquist (Brookings: 1986),
pp. 242-3.
.Constitutional Reform and Effective Government
, pp. 246-7.
A New Constitution Now
    pp. 94-5.
Times
    Helvetica
ime for Change
, p. 6.
Federalist 58
, pp. 296-7 (Madison).
Federalist 63
, pp. 324-5 (Madison).
4The voting age population in 1988 was 182,779,000 (T
able 454, 1991
Statistical Abstract
able 453, 1991
Statistical Abstract
1987
Congressional Staff Directory
)w&, ed. by Charles Brownson (CSD: 1987).
2The district population in 1984 was 516,143 (1987
Congressional Staff Directory
), and on a
national basis,
Lpercent of the United States was of voting age.  (In 1988, the United States
population was 245,051,000 [T
able 2 of the 1991
Statistical Abstract
], and the voting age
UMpopulation was 182,779,000 [table 454], giving a percentage of approximately
    percent.)
The President
)8Hs support will be required if aspects of the Act are considered to fall
UKunder Article One, Section Eight of the Constitution, and not Article Five.
    ;AB*
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Fs in the face of rhetoriticians     temp.0001
fallacies, and who use them to their (short-term) benefit.  Take it from your humble author
 your ignorance is not
bliss.
  Some
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