The history of the labour movement has been marked by, among other things, a long series of conflicts. Why discuss the violent eruptions when so many collective agreements are signed peacefully? A violent strike is a traumatic experience and often causes historical ripples which spread through the society far from the centre of conflict, and only a strike, because it disturbs our tranquility, because it throws into relief the problems of the workers and the concerns of management and government, draws the attention of the general public to the social and economic conditions of the working class. The strikes of 1919 had that kind of impact and so did the Asbestos Strike of 1949. Even though there were other violent strikes in the forties in Quebec - at Montmorency, Louiseville, Shawinigan, Murdochville - the one at Asbestos stands out. The events at Asbestos became a focus for reformers both inside and outside of the union movement in Quebec and had a considerable influence on the development of the CCCL, the Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labour (Confederation des Travailleurs Catholiques du Canada - CTCC). Some historians claim that the Asbestos Strike was the forerunner of what later came to known as the "Quiet Revolution".
A conservative society and a climate of unrest
The nature of Quebec society in 1949 was quite different from that of the other provinces. French Canadians lived under an economy controlled by others which had not adapted to nineteenth century problems as rapidly as other parts of Canada. Besides, social problems could only get worse in a society where the leadership refused all changes which could have modernized Quebec. The political leaders of the province embodied conservatism. Maurice Duplessis's Union Nationale, founded in 1936, enjoyed brief power, and then was reelected in 1944 to continue until 1959. In the 1948 election it had increased its representation in the Legislative Assembly from 82 to 91 of 108 seats. Parliamentary opposition, represented by Liberal Party, was almost non-existent. Many reformers accused the Duplessis government of maintaining its advantage by gerrymandering. A defective electoral map with urban ridings under-represented made it possible for Duplessis to count on the support of a predominately rural electorate, suspicious of change. The unionist party's election machinery was smooth and well-oiled, and its campaign coffers were well stocked. Corruption, nepotism and patronage, it was charged, permeated the provincial government.
Since the turn of the century, the Quebec economy had been undergoing an industrial revolution which had accelerated in the previous thirty years. More and more Ouebeckers were leaving agricultural jobs to work in industry partly as a result of the general expansion of Canadian industry during the war. The country's industrial production, under government control, was oriented toward wartime needs: textiles, and steel and mineral products, including asbestos, were in the midst of expansion. Only one third of national production was destined for domestic consumption. Rationing began with wool, sugar, leather, wood, steel and oil and soon spread to all products of everyday consumption. People had money, for there was no shortage of work, but many goods were in short supply.
At war's end in 1945, there were problems converting industry to peacetime activities, but prosperity remained. The prosperity was, however, accompanied by a surge of inflation caused by the end of wartime price controls. Since incomes remained stable, workers saw their purchasing power reduced. Quebeckers had suffered through the Great Depression, lived with war-time shortages, and now saw their chances to enjoy post-war prosperity minimized by inflation. It seemed to many that they would never know good times, and this frustration increased their determination to secure wage increases.
In Quebec, economic development was based on an abundant supply of manpower and raw materials. The textile, pulp and paper, and mining industries did a booming business. Most of these enterprises were owned and operated by Americans or English Canadians. The few French-Canadian concerns were not expanding and could not meet the challenge of providing capital for the new capital-intensive kinds of industry which would focus on the development of natural resources, the basis of North American prosperity. The Duplessis government took advantage of the post-war prosperity to attract capital to Quebec. A stubborn opponent of government intervention in the private sector, the premier put his faith in the virtues of private enterprise as a guardian of freedom and a bulwark against communism. He consistently sought out American capital on conditions that offered few advantages to Quebec. In the early fifties, for example, the Quebec government allowed an American company to establish an iron mine in Labrador. The province realized only one cent royalty per ton of ore compared to thirty-three cents per ton in Newfoundland mines. Foreign investors were attracted by a government that was stable, cautious and, above all, benevolent.
The industrial revolution, accelerated by the war, had encouraged an exodus from the farms. In 1901, forty per cent of the Quebec population lived in cities; fifty years later, this figure had increased to sixty-seven per cent. In the traditional view of both clerical and secular leaders, urbanization could not but have disastrous effects on the French Canadians. Life in the city, they thought, could only be damaging to body and soul; it would break up the family structure and encourage the hatching of revolutionary ideas and social disturbances.
The economic crisis of 1929 had forced other governments to assume a growing role in the field of social welfare. The Great Depression had prompted the federal government to later bring in the Unemployment Insurance Act (1936-40) and the Family Allowances Act (1944). In Quebec the Duplessis government, in spite of pressure from urban groups, refused to take any social measures. The government held the individual responsible for his difficulties and their resolution; individual weakness could only find help in other stronger individuals. Aid, then, should come, not from government but from private agencies, usually religious in nature, whose function was to alleviate poverty. The absence of social legislation arose from the premier's fear that government social intervention would increase the dependence of the populace and, therefore, multiply their needs. Patronage and nepotism were often substituted for necessary social measures.
The Union Responses
After the war, the labour movement ran up against the prevailing spirit of economic liberalism. Even though unions had the right to exist, this did not mean that government and management always created conditions favouring their freedom to act. In Quebec, it became clear that with nearly one-third of the work force unionized, the labour movement was one of the few forces of opposition to the dominating powers, and an essential tool for the expression of social grievances. Its task, however, was complicated by the prevalence of anticomminist attitudes inspired by the Cold War; any opposition force or progressive group was labelled revolutionary.
Workers' organizations were often consequently engaged in a fight for survival. They demanded the right to organize, the Rand formula (the company deducts from each employee's pay all syndicate dues whether or not he is a member), the improvement of working conditions and, above all, wage increases. For, in fact, Quebec workers were the lowest paid in the country. For the same work, certain companies operating in Quebec paid forty-five cents an hour less than in Ontario. Union demands went beyond labour-related issues and extended to social questions: they called for government action in the fields of health insurance, education, work safety, and housing.
Internally, the labour movement, especially the Catholic union movement, was beginning to undergo profound changes. Under the combined influence of the strikes of the thirties and of industrial growth, Catholic trade unionism was moving from its gestation stage into a transition stage that would lead it toward more militant action. The CCCL was gradually becoming more of a union organization and less of a nationalist movement in which socioeconomic considerations had begun to outweigh religion and nationalism. This evolution within the CCCL was closely related to changes within Quebec society as a whole, where the agrarian way of life was fading in importance. This transformation of the CCCL was also related to the new kind of union leadership. The unions were henceforth to be led by university graduates rather than by grass-roots workers. Gerard Picard and Jean Marchand were characteristic of this new breed of union leader. While they were inspired by the Church's social doctrine they did not have the apostolic mentality of their predecessors.
In the period of industrialization after the war, the Duplessis government repeatedly assured American investors that the working class in Quebec was the best in the world, hard-working and respectful of law and order. In this conservative society, the government's labour policy was extremely restrictive in order to maintain the stability necessary for economic development. In one of his characteristic epigrams, Duplessis remarked, "Workers have the right to organize, but not to disorganize." The Duplessis government, when it was not violently anit-union, encouraged, at best, paternalistic relations between management and labour. It singled out union leaders for attack and tried to discredit them in the eyes of their constituents. Labour legislation voted by the Legislative Assembly seemed intended to muzzle organized labour, and the narrow, legislistic interpretation given to this legislation served to restrict union rights further. The Labour Relations Board moved at an exasperatingly slow pace, and the councils of arbitration were often biased. The provincial police frequently served as the instrument for this anti-union repression.
Management, aware that it had the blessings of those in power, was able to deny the workers most of the rights they claimed. Indeed, the workers often interpreted management decisions as deliberate provocation. The use of strikebreakers, stalling tactics, and deceitful publicity campaigns led to increased tension in the labour movement. Workers were engaged in an intense contest to maintain their freedom and rights, and strikes led to brutal confrontations, particularly in the textile and manufacturing industries.
The strikes at Louiseville in 1947, Montmorency in 1937, Valleyfield in 1946, and Asbestos in 1949, offer an unchanging scenario of labour conflict: after interminable negotiations, the workers go on strike. The strike is usually declared illegal. The employer hires "scabs" and resumes production. The strikers become agitated, the provincial police intervene, and fights and violence break out. The antagonists often wind up in court, and the trials drag on. Weary of conflict, the workers return to their jobs. The dispute then goes before councils of arbitration which are frequently biased in favour of management. After months of waiting, the verdict is almost always unfavourable to the workers. The Asbestos strike conformed to this scenario in all respects.
The Asbestos Strike
Represented by local organizations affilited with the National Federation of Mining Industry Employees, nearly 5,000 workers were affected by this work stoppage and several mining companies in Asbestos, Thetford Mines and the surrounding area were paralysed.
The miners demanded that the basic wage be increased by fifteen cents to a dollar per hour. This demand seemed justified. While the hourly rate in asbestos mines was eighty-five cents, it was more than a dollar in other mines. In addition, the miners wanted two weeks of annual holidays and a contribution of three per cent of wages by the company for the worker's welfare fund. They insisted on eight Catholic holidays with pay and an inquiry into Sunday work. The workers demanded the Rand formula, which provided for compulsory checkoff of union dues at source and which was seen as a guarantee of union strength. Their demands included mention of the union's right of consultation in matters of promotion, transfer, or dismissal. Another cause of the asbestos strike was the hazard of asbestosis. The working conditions were considered scandalous because of the incidence of this deadly disease. Some felt that it was criminal to make people work under such conditions. Gerard Filion alluded to asbestosis in an article in Le Devoir on June 12, 1949: "There are crimes in Quebec that go unpunished, with the approval of public officials."
In response to union demands, the six mining companies had little to offer: a wage increase of five cents an hour and two additional paid holidays. The Rand formula, labelled anti-democratic, was rejected. The employers would not hear of proposals for joint management or of any union right of review over personnel management. This demand was denounced as a socialist attack on the employer's right to manage his business. The two parties were far from agreement. Negotiations promised to be long and difficult. They began late in December, 1948 and broke down on January 24, 1949. On February 1, 1949 the Quebec Department of Labour sent Mr. Leopold Rodgers as conciliator. In the event that this conciliation failed, the two parties were to submit their differences to arbitration. On February 13, 1949, 1,500 miners attended a general meeting at which Jean Marchand presented the alternatives: arbitration or an illegal strike. To cries of "We want to strike", the miners refused arbitration. Arbitration, the workers felt, was nothing but a weapon in the hands of management. Above all, on the basis of previous experience, they feared that a decision reached through long arbitration would be unfavourable to them. The same day, 2,500 workers from Canadian Johns-Manville Ltd. had walked off the job in Asbestos. A few days later their number had grown to 5,000 with work stoppages in Thetford Mines and the surrounding area.
The company and Antonio Barrette, the Minister of Labour, immediately declared that the strike was illegal because the miners had resorted to it at the end of the conciliation period without going on to arbitration as the law prescribed. Premier Duplessis accused the union leaders of acting in their own interests, stirring up the workers and subverting the province's labour legislation. On February 19, 1949, the Labour Relations Board withdrew its certification of the asbestos workers' unions at Asbestos and Thetford Mines and the National Federation of Mining Industry Employees on the grounds that they had instigated an illegal strike. This move struck a direct blow against union rights, for it took the power to negotiate away from a duly representative workers' association. It seemed that the Labour Relations Board had exceeded its commission. The next day, more than a hundred provincial police officers arrived in Asbestos. They systematically patrolled the neighbouring roads and the town council sent an appeal for their removal to the director of provincial police, alleging that some, under the influence of alcohol, had committed acts of violence and indecency and had made summary arrests. The police presence aggravated the workers' dissatisfaction. At the end of April, the company recruited strikebreakers, or "scabs", and announced with a good deal of publicity, both at the plant and in the newspapers, that they would be given job priority when the conflict was settled.
May was marked by extreme violence. The strikers, faced with the prospect of a prolonged conflict, decided to prevent the hiring of strikebreakers and paralyse production. The company responded by demanding police protection, and a convoy of twenty-five provincial police cars left Sherbrooke for Asbestos to bring the strikers to their senses. The workers set up tight picket lines and obstructions on the main roads; automobiles were overturned and dynamite was exploded; in the town, there was marching in the streets. Early on the morning of May 6, the Riot Act was read. Police arrested 180 workers and intimidated others by various brutal acts. As a result of the clash, a number of workers were bruised or had swollen faces. Some police officers warned that they would be arrested again if they did not return to work that very morning.
The clergy, because of the central role they played in Quebec life, had traditionally intervened in labour disputes. The increasing seriousness of the conflict at Asbestos and the denunciation of the CCCL by management and government threatened the very existence of Catholic syndicalism. The clergy could not remain indifferent to attacks against a movement which they, themselves, had fostered. The abbΘs Pichette of the CCCL and Camerand of the union local supported the strikers publically. Camerand said "If I were a miner, I would be a striker".
In the face of the prolonged conflict, religious authorities, as well, began to intervene. Some bishops applied pressure on public authorities to encourage them to take a more humane and less legalistic view of the situation. Mgr. Georges Courschene wrote in a letter to the premier ``The Asbestos strike is illegal but just.'' Throughout the conflict, Monsignor Maurice Roy of Quebec acted as mediator. Monsignor Phillipe Desranleau of Sherbrooke and Joseph Charbonneau of Montreal preached in favour of the strikers' cause from the pulpit. In many dioceses, in the name of justice and charity, collections of food were taken to alleviate the needs of strikers' families.
The month of June saw a decrease in tension. Three companies in Thetford Mines signed a settlement. Monsignor Maurice Roy of Quebec City acted as mediator in the Asbestos conflict, conferring alternately with the two parties, and on July 1, the strike, which had lasted five months, finally ended with an agreement in principle between the parties. Each side announced its satisfaction with the settlement. The union leaders diplomatically credited the Premier with achieving a suitable agreement.
The settlement provided for official recognition of the union, rehiring of all strikers, the stopping of legal proceedings against strikers and the union, a wage increase of ten cents an hour and appeal to an arbitration board for negotiation of disputed points in the new contract. The union's victory was a narrow one. The workers were obliged to recognize the company s management rights and to give up their right of review over dismissals and transfers. The Rand formula was not implemented and the creation of a welfare fund was abandoned. The union had nevertheless won the battle for restoration of their certification and obtained a small wage increase. The results of arbitration on the points in dispute were hardly more favourable to the workers. On January 15, 1950, the miners signed a new work agreement. The conflict had occupied Quebecers' attention for almost a year.
The place of the Asbestos strike in history
The Asbestos strike continues to arouse a great deal of interest among sociologists, historians and trade unionists. Some analysts argue that it marked the beginning of the Quiet Revolution; others feel that its impact has been overestimated. Both arguments hold some validity. The Asbestos strike did mark the beginning of the Quiet Revolution, in that it embodied the victory of the forces of change over social conservatism. Various members of society began calling for government intervention in social and economic affairs for the benefit of Quebecers. The traditional organization of Quebec society was increasingly abandoned as people began to accept the social consequences of the industrial revolution. The stike had also raised many questions about the Duplessis regime. The citizens who participated in the outcry against the handling of Asbestos strike demonstrate the emergence of extra-parliamentary opposition groups and the awakening of a powerful minority in Quebec composed of intellectuals, journalists, trade unionists, politicians, academics and even a portion of the clergy.
The strike also represents a turning point in the history of the Canadian and Catholic Confederation of Labour, for it enabled the Catholic trade union movement to realize its strength and to triumph over the employer-government coalition that sought to weaken the unions. With the Asbestos strike, Catholic trade unionism changed its orientation. The CCCL passed from a conserative attitude, inspired by the Church's social doctrine which preached cooperation between union and management, to a very militant attitude. Henceforth, relations between employers and employees were to be characterized by conflict; there would be a trial of strength to improve the workers' social and occupational status. The CCCL had come of age.
But not everyone agrees that the Asbestos strike had such a profound impact. Pierre Vallieres, writing in the January 1965 issue of the publication RΘvolution quΘbΘcoise, from the point of view of the radical left, remarked that this strike "gave rise to many sentences and many words, but in actual fact, nothing revolutionary came from it. In the aftermath of this major conflict, Quebec's working class was no more advanced than before. Only a few intellectuals had acquired a taste for the social sciences." The judgment is a harsh one, but, in ValliΦres opinion, this work stoppage may have been endowed with more glory and significance than it deserves, considering that the results were seemingly rather unimpressive. In Asbestos, miners still die of asbestosis, and labour conflicts recur throughout the province. Still, for many Quebecers the Asbestos strike stands as a symbol of the beginning of a process of change which continues today while for some more radical Quebecers, the strike symbolizes the kind of compromise which they hold responsible for current problems. The student of Canadian history can learn much about the relationship between political philosophy and historical interpretation by observing the conflicting theories surrounding this key event in Quebec labour history.
