Multimedia Mania/abacus-multimedia-mania.iso/dp/0035/00357.txt

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$Unique_ID{bob00357}
$Pretitle{}
$Title{Japan
Introduction}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Hans Binnendijk}
$Affiliation{Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs}
$Subject{foreign
negotiating
style
center
japanese
chinese
affairs
negotiators
national
negotiations}
$Date{1987}
$Log{}
Title:       Japan
Book:        National Negotiating Styles
Author:      Hans Binnendijk
Affiliation: Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs
Date:        1987

Introduction

Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs

     The Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs, established in late 1982 as
part of the Foreign Service Institute, aims to enrich traditional Foreign
Service training by keeping government officials in many agencies abreast of
emerging foreign policy concepts. Its program of conferences, research,
diplomatic exercises and simulation, and publication combines new perspectives
developed in the private sector with practical experience gained by foreign
affairs personnel.

Conferences

     In the last three years, the Center has organized more than 75
conferences and workshops involving approximately 5,000 participants. These
bring together academicians, businessmen, senior government officials,
distinguished private citizens, and Center researchers for in-depth
discussions of foreign policy issues organized around a number of topics:
international negotiation and conflict resolution; Soviet studies; bilateral
and regional issues; science, technology and foreign affairs; economics;
building democratic institutions; and development of the Foreign Service.

     The results of conferences are summarized in three-page leaflets in the
"Fresh Look" series. These are available upon request.

Research

     The Center facilitates research by foreign affairs personnel and provides
a Washington base and an opportunity for participation in State Department
activities for selected professors on sabbatical leave. The research
undertaken by these individuals is coordinated by the Center and brought to
the attention of government decision-makers.

Exercises and Simulations

     A new Center activity is to develop an exercise and simulation program
for the Department of State. Each year several exercises and simulations will
be developed, using the reservoir of expertise within the Department of State
and related agencies. These teaching instruments will provide a dynamic
dimension to the training of Foreign Service officers and, as analytic tools,
will be able to help policymakers avoid diplomatic mistakes.

Publications

     The Center publishes full-length studies of various foreign policy issues
in its Study of Foreign Affairs series-many of these are based on conferences
and workshops held at the Center. These are available for purchase through
the Government Printing Office. (A list of current titles may be found on the
back cover of this book.) In addition, several shorter studies are available
in the Occasional Paper series. (Occasional papers published so far deal with
the Iran-Iraq war, the history of the Foreign Service from 1776 to the Civil
War, and "Crisis in Al Jazira," a foreign policy simulation.)

Foreword

     Different nations negotiate with different styles. Those styles are
shaped by the nation's culture, history, political system, and place in the
world. Of course, each international negotiation has its own set of
substantive issues and each individual negotiator is distinctive. But a better
understanding of each nation's particular style can strengthen the ability of
the United States to negotiate a better deal. With this in mind, the Foreign
Service Institute is pleased to publish this volume containing assessments of
six national negotiating styles.

     This project developed from conversations in 1985 with Richard H.
Solomon, then head of the Political Science Department of the Rand
Corporation. At Rand, Solomon had completed an extensive study of the Chinese
negotiating style. (His chapter in this volume is based on that study.) The
Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs sought to expand his effort to other
countries. Five additional countries were chosen based on their importance to
the United States, their geographic distribution, and the distinctiveness of
their style. Nationally recognized experts in the affairs of each nation were
then asked to prepare a preliminary assessment. In October 1985, the Foreign
Service Institute hosted a day-long workshop in which each expert presented
preliminary conclusions. The workshop results generated a common approach
to each chapter, and final papers were commissioned. Ambassador John W.
McDonald provided wise counsel throughout the process. Diane B. Bendahmane,
a consultant to the Center, provided valued help by editing the final draft
chapters.

     This volume provides a profile of each national negotiating style. It
reviews each nation's historical and institutional setting, the
characteristics of its political culture, the style of the negotiators
themselves, and national strategies and tactics. Finally, each author suggests
bargaining guidelines for U.S. negotiators.

     Solomon finds that the Chinese conduct negotiations in a "linear" manner
of discrete stages and in a distinctive (but not unique) style. The most
fundamental characteristic of Chinese negotiators, he concludes, is their
attempt "to identify foreign officials who are sympathetic to their cause,
to cultivate a sense of friendship and obligation in their official
counterparts, and then to pursue their objectives through a variety of
stratagems designed to manipulate feelings of friendship, obligation, and
guilt" or what Solomon calls, in Chinese terminology, "the games of guanxi."
The process moves through several stages including opening moves, a period
of assessment involving facilitating maneuvers and pressure tactics, and the
end game. The Chinese tend to stress at the outset their commitment to
abstract principles and will make concessions only at the eleventh hour
after they have fully assessed the limits of their interlocutor's
flexibility. After protracted exchanges, when a deadlock seems to have been
reached, concessions may be made to consummate an agreement. And while the
end-game phase may produce a signed agreement, the Chinese negotiator will
continue to press for his objective in a post-agreement phase termed the
implementation stage, giving negotiations with the Chinese the quality of
continuous bargaining in which closure is never fully reached.

     Leon Sloss and M. Scott Davis describe a traditional Soviet negotiating
style that is less subtle and more aggressive than that of the Chinese.
The Soviets see negotiations as part of a larger struggle for increased
power and influence which can be won if the negotiators are tough enough.
Rather than cultivate friends for future manipulation, the Soviets tend to
put their counterparts on the defensive right away with confrontational,
blunt, or combative tactics. While Chinese hosts structure the negotiating
environment to enhance a sense of obligation on the part of their guests, the
Soviets often try to wear down their counterparts with tactics such as
all-night negotiating sessions. The Soviet negotiator traditionally takes
rigid and extreme positions at the outset; and unlike the Chinese, he makes
concessions "slice by slice" in Salami-slicing tactics. A quid pro quo
is expected for each concession. He seeks generally-worded agreements that
give the Kremlin maximum flexibility in implementation.

     Nathaniel B. Thayer and Stephen E. Weiss present a Japanese negotiating
style that is fundamentally different from both the Chinese and the Soviet
model. The Japanese prefer to avoid formal negotiations because negotiations
are a form of social conflict, and "every Japanese has been taught at his
mother's knee to avoid social conflict." For the Japanese negotiator the
development of personal relations with his counterpart is critical, but the
relationship is not established primarily for the purpose of manipulation.
Rather, personal relationships are of value to the Japanese negotiator for
informal, frank discussions where social conflict is minimal and progress can
be made on a pragmatic basis. The Japanese negotiator has neither the
aggressively blunt style of the Soviets nor the subtle manipulative style of
the Chinese, but he can be extremely rigid because the complex Japanese
consensus-building, decision-making process that sets the limits for the
negotiation is itself rigid and inflexible. Japanese positions are offered as
final solutions, fair to all, which cannot be bargained away. But Thayer and
Weiss say that fundamental changes in the Japanese setting-Japan's
relationship with the United States, the number of ministeries involved in
international affairs, and the strengthened Liberal Democratic Party committee
system-are all changing in ways which may complicate the Japanese negotiating
style and U.S. Japanese relations.

     Michael M. Harrison argues that like the Japanese, the French dislike
formal face-to-face discussions, especially on national security matters. This
French tendency developed not because the French want to avoid social
conflict, but because they want to "avoid situations where concessions might
have to be made to stronger states or coalitions of states" and wish to
preserve their independence in a situation of declining national power.
Protecting their own status and prestige is sometimes best achieved, the
French feel, by "rejecting discussions or concessions, or taking a conflictual
stand on grounds of principle." Their style can change dramatically depending
upon whom they are negotiating with. Traditionally, they rely on highly
rational abstract logic and general principles and their positions are often
rigid and legalistic. Like the Japanese, they may not have fall-back
positions. Like the Soviets, they can be abrupt and confrontational. Authority
in France's Fifth Republic generally flows directly from the president, and
though French negotiators are given tactical flexibility, major concessions
must be approved by the president.

     The Egyptians, according to William B. Quandt, are motivated by pride in
their country's past, an acceptance of the need for a strong ruler in the
pharaonic mold, and the traditions of a highly developed bureaucracy. Like the
French, the Egyptians are suspicious of negotiations because historically
their independence has been threatened by the collusion and intervention of
external powers. Quandt argues that, depending upon the situation, Egyptian
negotiators will either haggle in the suq (bazaar) model or will work through
an intermediary in the Bedouin model. A U.S. negotiator must know which
situation exists. It is also important for the U.S. negotiator to realize that
his Egyptian counterpart may or may not know precisely where his president's
bottom line is. Egyptian presidents have proven adept at bold actions designed
to set the stage for negotiations and are capable of suddenly changing the
Egyptian negotiating position.

     The Mexicans, George W. Grayson believes, are strongly influenced by
anti-Americanism and bruised dignity that give them a generally defensive
negotiating style when dealing with the United States. Bilateral negotiations
with the United States, many Mexican officials believe, are a zero-sum game in
which they always stand to lose. In formal settings they often respond with
rhetoric and lofty principles befitting a country which many Mexican leaders
consider to be a repository of moral values. They also respond frequently by
manufacturing delays. But when circumstances warrant, Mexico's small pool of
world class negotiators can be pragmatic and effective. Ongoing informal
discussions on technical issues such as in the Bilateral Energy Consultation
Group can also be businesslike and productive. As is the case with France and
Egypt, Mexico's negotiators are responsive to a president with immense
authority who can personally shift negotiating positions. Also Grayson
believes that the implementation of negotiated agreements with Mexico presents
a problem because compliance can be slowed or frustrated by the massive
bureaucracy.

     These assessments of selected national negotiating styles suggest several
general guidelines for U.S. negotiators. They are summarized here and
discussed in greater detail in various chapters.

     - Know your substance and be well prepared because your interlocutor
probably will be.

     - Have clear objectives and know your bottom line.

     - Understand the negotiating style of the country you are dealing with.

     - Do not negotiate with yourself.

     - Do not stake out extreme positions but be consistent.

     - Be patient and use time deadlines sparingly.

     - Develop personal relationships with your interlocutor, but be careful
not to be manipulated.

     - Seek opportunities for informal sessions because they are where most
agreements are made.

     - Use appropriate protocol because the other side will probably be status
conscious.

     - Use media pressure carefully because it could backfire.

     - Understand the national sensitivities of your interlocutor and do not
violate them unless it is unavoidable.

     - Assess your interlocutor's flexibility and the obstacles to his
accepting your bottom line.

     - Know the decision-making process of your counterpart and assess when it
may be necessary to circumvent the negotiators.

     - Be involved in your own decision-making process because this will
probably give you an advantage over your counterpart.

     - Pin down details where possible, especially when the other nation has
compliance problems.

     We hope that this book will lead to further detailed studies on national
negotiating styles. U.S. negotiators often deal with counterparts who have
decades of substantive and negotiating experience on a given issue, while the
U.S. team is relatively new to the issue. By communicating more about each
nation's negotiating style, perhaps such studies can help to correct this
imbalance.

Hans Binnendijk, Director
Center for the Study of Foreign Affairs
February 1987