All MPs as leadership candidates
Dr David Chapman
From a paper distributed by the Institute for Social Inventions to relevant members of the Conservative Party hierarchy.
This paper proposes a way out for the Conservative Party from the nightmare of its leadership election procedure (and could also to advantage be used by the other parties). The last Conservative leadership contest was too complicated and protracted, and its working created great disruption and discord. On top of that, it cannot be relied on to elect the right person - after all the effort and disturbance, in theory there could well have been someone else whom a majority would prefer to whoever was elected as leader.
'The Conservative Party's leadership election procedure is too complicated and protracted, and its working creates great disruption and discord'
How then could this happen? One way is that this right person - the one preferred by a majority to any other person - might be a cabinet minister, who was thus unable, out of loyalty, to stand against the existing leader. Thus if either Mrs Thatcher or Mr Heseltine had been elected in the first ballot, though we would never have known for sure, a majority might nevertheless have preferred to have had one of the cabinet ministers as the leader.
Another way a candidate could be majority-preferred and still lose is on the third ballot. This could even have happened in the last election, if a third ballot had been held. According to the rules, three candidates stand in the third ballot, and MPs can give second as well as first preferences. Thus in this hypothetical third ballot, Hurd could well have got back the votes of those of his sympathisers who, seeking a quick decision on the second ballot, are reported to have voted for Major. Suppose that Hurd still got fewest first preferences, but obtained the second preferences of those who voted first for Heseltine, and of those who voted for Major. By the rules, Hurd would be eliminated, and have the votes of his first-preference supporters transferred to their second preferences, and presumably Major would have been elected. But a majority (the Heseltine and Hurd supporters) would have preferred Hurd to Major, and another majority would have preferred Hurd to Heseltine.
Fortunately, however, there is a method of election which the Conservative Party could use in future, which would avoid such mistaken results, and would also be much less disruptive, and less protracted.
'Conservative MPs are automatically listed on the ballot paper as candidates for the leadership, without their having to put their names forward'
The first feature of this method is that Conservative MPs are automatically listed on the ballot paper as candidates for the leadership, without their having to put their names forward, or having to be nominated. Thus Hurd and Major would have been candidates from the start, without being open to any accusations of disloyalty. When voting, an MP would then put as many names in order of preference as he or she felt inclined.
'The votes are sorted and counted, to find out if there is one candidate who is preferred to each other candidate by a majority of those expressing a preference between the two of them'
The winning candidate is then found by a variation of the Condorcet method (first proposed by the French philosopher Condorcet in 1785). The votes are sorted and counted, to find out if there is one candidate who is preferred to each other candidate by a majority of those expressing a preference between the two of them. For example, if Hurd were preferred by a majority to Major, and to Heseltine, as described above, and also to each other candidate, Hurd would be elected.
It would be possible, if the Conservative Party so wished, to keep the present 15 per cent rule, and require the winner to get this 15 per cent margin over each other candidate. If no one did so, another ballot would have to be held, at which only a bare majority would be needed.
'A stronger incentive to run the party as the majority of the party's MPs preferred'
What then are the advantages for any party that adopts this new method of electing the leader? First, there would be no need for open challenges to, or campaigns against, the current leader, so that there would be less disruption and bad feeling, and less harm to the party's electoral prospects. Second, because of the wider field of alternative candidates, the prospect of this more effective competition in the future would give the leader - at all times, not just when a leadership election was coming up - a stronger incentive to run the party as the majority of the party's MPs preferred. Third, any leader who lost the MPs' confidence, for whatever reason, would soon be replaced, relatively quietly and without bitter strife or disruption. Fourth, the methods currently used by the Conservatives and others virtually compel MPs to engage in tactical voting. But with the new method, the best way for any set of MPs to influence the result in the direction they want, would nearly always be to vote according to their true preferences. Lastly, the candidate elected would in general be that one who was preferred by a majority to the other candidates, a result which is by no means guaranteed by the present method of election.
David Chapman, Democracy Design Forum, Coles Centre, Buxhall, Stowmarket, Suffolk IP14 3EB (tel 0449 736 223).
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