Exporting the Swiss constitution

Nicholas Albery

The Institute for Social Inventions initiated a symposium for Eastern European politicians and constitution designers which took place in Lausanne in 1990, financed by the Swiss government and organised by the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law. I had always admired the Swiss constitution from afar, and I felt that the 50 or so constitutional experts from Eastern Europe who were present for the three days of deliberations could only have benefited from the painstaking immersion into every aspect of the Swiss system. The Swiss, with typical, if misplaced, modesty, made no efforts to 'sell' their constitutional set-up to the Easterners and were scrupulous in drawing attention to Switzerland's failings.

Postitive aspects

I learnt a great deal at this symposium as to the essential ingredients that have made the Swiss constitution so suitable for export to troubled 'hot spots' around the world.

- The most vital aspect of all, I believe, is the rural Swiss commune at the village level, each with a couple of thousand inhabitants enjoying a fair degree of autonomy. These communes have their own constitutions and some meet once a year to debate and vote at open meetings.

'In Switzerland, final sovereignty resides clearly with the people, and so there is not the same chasm of distrust between governors and governed that is apparent in most other countries'

- The main constitutional safeguard against over-mighty government is the right of the Swiss citizen to gather between 50,000 and 100,000 signatures, depending on circumstances, so as to trigger a referendum on a heartfelt topic. These referenda are relatively popular. The average Swiss citizen can vote perhaps three to five times a year in federal referenda, once every two years on a cantonal issue, and once every three years in a communal referendum. There is virtually no limit to the odd and diverse topics that citizens can attempt to add to the constitution in this way. Thus article 32 forbids the sale of absinthe and there was even an (unsuccessful) referendum recently that would have required the abolition of the Swiss army. In Switzerland, final sovereignty resides clearly with the people, and so there is not the same chasm of distrust between governors and governed that is apparent in most other countries.

'Minorities are safeguarded in that a referendum once passed by the voters must also be passed by a majority of the cantons'

- Furthermore, minorities are safeguarded in that a referendum once passed by the voters must also be passed by a majority of the cantons. As for minorities within cantons, those that feel sufficiently oppressed can follow the example of the Jura, who through a complex series of referenda broke away to form their own canton. Although the Swiss constitution makes no allowance for secession, we were assured that if Jura had wanted to leave the federation and join France instead, it would not have been prevented from doing so; in practice such a misguided impulse would not have survived a closer look at the centralised nature of the Napoleonic French system.
- At the federal level, sweetness and light between the different language groups is preserved by reserving each of them a permanent place in the cabinet. And presidential ambitions are curtailed by having a presidency that rotates amongst the seven ministers. Many Swiss do not even know who their current president happens to be. (Uruguay once copied the Swiss constitution only for its president to rebel at his lack of power, with an army coup promoting him to military dictator.)

Improving the Swiss constitution

How could the Swiss constitution be improved by a country in Eastern Europe or elsewhere seeking to adopt it for their purposes? What are the failings of the Swiss system?

- It all works so slowly. A Swiss referendum can take four or five years to achieve its by then obsolete aim. No commercial business could succeed that took four years to make a simple yes/no decision. A total revision of the Swiss constitution has been under way for 25 years, and the end is still not in sight.

I suggest that to prevent the constitution become over-encrusted with obsolete elements, any additions should lapse automatically after a hundred years unless renewed; and also that the whole referendum process should be dragged into the modern era by devoting in-depth television programmes to referenda debates, followed by voting within a few weeks.

'Give lottery tickets to all those who turn up to vote'

- People in Switzerland apparently feel that they suffer from a surfeit of democracy, with apathy spreading amongst the young and the working classes. On several occasions only just over 20% of the electorate have bothered to vote in a referendum. It might be worth trying Peter Mucci's idea to attract working class voters in particular: give lottery tickets to all those who turn up to vote.
- The lowest turnouts are for referenda on abstract constitutional issues 'beloved by law professors.' The highest turnouts are for issues that hit the Swiss citizen in the pocket. The suspicion lurks that the Swiss refused to join the United Nations less for reasons of principle than because it was going to cost them - they prefer to buy into particular programmes a la carte - which might indeed be a sensible way for other nations to fund the UN whilst keeping firm control of the purse strings.

'The Swiss prefer to buy into particular UN programmes a la carte - which might indeed be a sensible way for other nations to fund the UN whilst keeping firm control of the purse strings'

- Cities need subdividing into a network of communes. John Papworth in the Fourth World Review has highlighted the lack of political subdivision within Swiss urban communes. A city commune of half a million voters is absurdly large compared with its rural counterpart. Perhaps this lack of meaningful representation has contributed to the alienation of the young, reflected in the fact that the Swiss have the highest proportion of drug addicts (and AIDS victims) of any country in Europe.
- A tax on the size of firms is needed to control the powers of the large corporations, which otherwise tend to ride roughshod through any constitutional or other safeguards.
- The main present threat to the Swiss constitution is an external one. There are signs that the Swiss economy may be heading for troubled times, as multinationals and banks (pressured by the United States into becoming no longer so secret) move elsewhere in search of the European community market. It is on the horizon that financial fears may push the Swiss into the Common Market, a move that would not only, I believe, diminish their long-term prosperity, but would also homogenise their cantonal diversity and replace a highly evolved system of local autonomy and human scale government with dictates from Brussels.

I am sure that the Swiss 'peasant' farm in the mountains visited by our coachload of East European constitution designers would not survive amongst the EC's industrialised farms. The 82 year old grandfather sang and yodelled for us, saying that he felt like a millionaire, his gold was his life in the mountains and his bevy of grandchildren. His son, with occasional help from the neighbours, looked after forty cows. It is, I believe, as good a test as any as to whether a country's agriculture is sufficiently human scale to find out if the cows have individual names. In this case each had not only a name over her stall ('Amoureuse', 'Bourgeoise', etc) but a posy of flowers and a heavy bell waiting for the ceremonial autumnal descent to lower lands. I bought a distinctive Gruyere cheese that would probably not have met EC pasteurisation standards, and I learnt that farming is more heavily subsidised in Switzerland than even the EC would allow, for it has to take into account the difficult mountainous nature of the terrain.

The dangers of world government

Switzerland's cautious approach to the United Nations made me think some more about the Fourth World distaste for a strong world government or a strong United Nations. The Fourth World position is roughly this: a World Government would inevitably become just one more tyrannous empire, even more remote and inaccessible than the present superpowers.

To quote from the book I co-edited - 'How to Save the World - A Guide to the Politics of Scale':

'We believe that the movement we are supporting for a new localism in world affairs, involving as it does the breakdown of giant nations, needs to be balanced by a sane internationalism.

'We must evolve criteria and safeguards for the federalist and transnational structures that are necessary to confront the complexity of the planet's problems.

'Any form of political or economic power which is not controlled by those affected by it is a threat to peace, or freedom or both. Questions that need to be asked centre on control:

- Who appoints whom?
- Who elects whom?
- Who hires and fires?

'Who decides policy? Who settles the budget?'

- Who decides policy?
- Who settles the budget?
- Who checks the books?
- And who controls those who make these decisions?'

Criteria for sane transnational structures

My exemplar of a sane transnational structure is not the slightly grotesque United Nations but rather the humble international postal union which is based in Berne and quietly gets on with the specialist job of facilitating international mail. Thus my criteria for worthwhile global organisations would include:

- They should be based in various places around the world, not all in one country.
- They should have an incentive to dissolve once their specialist task is completed.
- They should be separate organisations, with separate names, and not under one central or global authority, whether United Nations, World Parliament or similar.
- They should wherever possible consist of concerned professionals and experts getting together on an ad hoc basis, subject to national political supervision and interest group lobbying as required. Thus the international postal union could continue to be based in Switzerland, with a centre for tackling transnational pollution in Kenya, and regional commissions for human rights. There would also at times no doubt need to be ad hoc regional poolings of national armies or militias for service in emergencies, as in the grouping of countries that confronted Iraq - a grouping which could have taken place without the blessing of the United Nations.
- These transnational bodies should have as little power as possible.
- They should incorporate the principle of subsidiarity, leaving powers devolved to the most local levels possible.

'Communism's doomed love affair with the curse of bigness'

Communism's internationalism was not the least of its failings. Internationalism was all part of communism's doomed love affair with the mass scale, with the curse of bigness. Politicians and constitution designers have an obligation to learn the principles of scale, as must architects, town planners, engineers, industrialists, economists and all those who have blighted this century with their over-bloated giantism.

- The Fourth World Review, 24 Abercorn Place, London NW8 9XP (tel 071 286 4366). Subs L10.
- 'The Swiss Constitution - Can it be Exported' by Nicholas Gillett, is available for L8-50 incl. p&p from YES, 14 Frederick Place, Clifton, Bristol BS8 1AS.


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