Corporate Network Spying

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InfoSec Academy / Training Camp

http://www.infosecacademy.com / http://www.trainingcamp.com

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Who is this guy?

- Director of security course offerings for InfoSec Academy (division of Training Camp)

- Teaches ethical hacking / pentesting courses

- Co-author of <u>Penetration Testing and Network Defense</u> (Cisco Press, 2005)

- Author of other books/articles relating to security / networking

- Pentester of numerous financial and healthcare institutions

- M.Sc., Computer Science; CISSP, CEH, CCSP, CCNP, CCNA, CCDA, MCSE, CNE, A+, Network+, Security+, CTP, et al.

Training Camp

- InfoSec Academy division is world leader in teaching information security
    - Authorized CISSP
    - Certified Ethical Hacker
    - Licensed Penetration Tester
    - Sarbanes Oxley
    - HIPAA Compliance Training
    - Certified Information Systems Auditor (CISA)
    - Much, much more…

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What this is / What this is not

- **What this is**
  - <u>Training</u> on corporate network spying
  - Designed for those with beginner to intermediate skills
- **What this is not**
  - Discussion of hot new exploit (which may only be theoritical or work in a lab environment)
  - An overly technical discussion that only 1% of the techie world can understand

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Agenda

- What the heck is this network spying thing?

- Who does it?

- Legal cases (to scare the begeezes out of ya)

- How to get past those darn switches

- General tools of the trade: Windump / TCPdump, Ethereal

- Analyzing common protocols
  - FTP, MSN IM, Web, SMTP/POP

- Demos to make you druel

What is Network Spying?

- Wiretapping
- Targeted packet capturing

Who Spies on Networks?

- Legitimate: Law enforcement
  - FBI
  - NSA
- Legitimate: Corporations with consent
  - Admins
  - Your boss
- Illegitimate: The "bad" guys
  - Hacker hobbyists
  - Corporate espionage

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Who Spies on Networks?

- Law Enforcement
  - Patent #5,937,422 "Semantic Forests"
    - NSA solution
    - Captures voice conversation
    - Automatic speech transcription
  - Carnivore
    - Abandoned in 2005
    - Part of DragonWare suite
      - Carnivore – packet capturing
      - Packeteer – reassembles packets
      - Coolminer – searching captured packets

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Who Spies on Networks?

- Corporations
  - PC Magazine reported 77% of companies spy on employees
  - Typically e-mail and web surfing
  - Justifications:
    - To ensure employee productivity
    - To ensure company is void of illegal activity
    - To protect trade secrets

Who Spies on Networks?

- Hacker hobbyists
  - Hey, look Ma, a wireless network!
- Corporate espionage
  - Tech companies especially at risk
  - Example: Oracle & Microsoft

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Legal and Ethical Considerations

- 4th Amendment
- 1994 Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
- Federal Electronic Communications Privacy Act (18 U.S.C. § 2511)
- PATRIOT Act

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Cases

- Katz vs. United States, 1967
- 2004 Nicodemo Scarfo ("Little Nicky")

What You Need To Begin

- Commercial: Network Forensics Analysis Tools (NFAT)
- Packet capturing tool
  - Open-source vs. commercial
  - General vs. targeted
  - remote-vs. local
  - switched vs. shared

Sniffing on Switched Networks

Hubs...mmm...good

Frame from UserA is always propagated to UserB & UserC

How Switches Work

How Switches Work

MAC Table	
FA 0/1	01C9:44BB:00A1 (USER A)
FA 0/2	???
FA0/3	???

Fa0/1

Fa0/2

Fa0/3

UserA

UserB

UserC

User A sends a frame to user B.

How Switches Work

MAC Table	
FA 0/1	01C9:44BB:00A1 (USER A)
FA 0/2	???
FA0/3	???

UserA

UserB

UserC

Frame is duplicated out to UserB and UserC.

How Switches Work

MAC Table	
FA 0/1	01C9:44BB:00A1 (USER A)
FA 0/2	0BB0:0E44:2221 (USER B)
FA0/3	???

UserA

UserB

UserC

How Switches Work

MAC Table

FA 0/1	01C9:44BB:00A1 (USER A)
FA 0/2	0BB0:0E44:2221 (USER B)
FA0/3	???

UserA

UserB

UserC

How To Get Around This Problem

- Five Solutions:
  1. ARP Poisoning method 1
  2. ARP Poisoning method 2
  3. MAC Duplicating
  4. MAC Flooding
  5. Port Mirroring

ARP Poisoning Method 1

- A.K.A. ARP spoofing
- Sending crafted replies to ARP requests

MAC Table

FA 0/1	01C9:44BB:00A1 (USER A)
FA 0/2	0BB0:0E44:2221 (USER B)
FA0/3	0BB0:0E44:2221 (spoofed)

Fa0/1 Fa0/2 Fa0/3

What is the MAC address for UserB?

I heard that. Here's the same MAC.

I'm here! Here's my MAC

UserA
10.0.0.11

UserB
10.0.0.12

UserC
10.0.0.13

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ARP Poisoning Method 2

MAC Table

FA 0/1	01C9:44BB:00A1 (USER A)
FA 0/2	0BB0:0E44:2221 (USER B)
FA0/3	0040:5B50:387E (spoofed)
Fa0/4	0040:5B50:387E (Router)

Fa0/4

ARP Reply

Router
10.0.0.1

Fa0/1
Fa0/2
Fa0/3

ARP Reply

UserA
10.0.0.11

UserB
10.0.0.12

UserC
10.0.0.13

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MAC Duplicating

- Used to target traffic sent to a single host (such as a server)
- ARP for a host you want to target to get its MAC address

Switch will send all traffic destined for UserA to UserC as well.

My MAC is 01C9:44BB:00A1

What is the MAC address of 10.0.0.11?

Fa0/1

Fa0/3

New spoofed MAC address: 01C9:44BB:00A1

UserA
10.0.0.11

UserC
10.0.0.13

MAC Flooding

- MAC addresses are stored in CAM table

- Content Addressable Memory (CAM) table

  - Switch must find an exact binary match

  - Information to do a lookup is called a key

  - Key is fed into a hashing algorithm to produce a pointer into the table

Key

↓

Hash Function →

CAM Entries
0101010101010101
0101010101010111
0101010101010001
0101010101011101
0101010101000101
0101010101110101
0101010100010101
0101011101010101
0101000101010101
0101110101010101

MAC Flooding

- CAM is limited on switches (typically 64k)
- If filled up, switch can no longer store new addresses
- Switch effectively turns into a hub

MAC Flooding

- MACOF (part of Dsniff)

- http://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/

Port Mirroring

- Port mirroring is a legitimate method of mirroring one port to another port
- Cisco calls this *switched port analyzer* (SPAN)
  - Remote SPAN (RSPAN) can send traffic from one or more ports or an entire VLAN to another port on a different switch
  - There can be more than one source and more than one destination (up to 64 destination ports!)
- SPAN can copy traffic in one of three ways:
  - Rx SPAN
  - Tx SPAN
  - Rx/Tx SPAN

Port Mirroring

1) Specify source

monitor session *session_number* **source**
  {**interface** *interface-id* | **vlan** *vlan-id*} [**,** |
  -] [**both** | **rx** | **tx**]

2) Specify destination

monitor session *session_number* **destination**
  {**interface** *interface-id* [**,** | **-**]
  [**encapsulation replicate**]

Port Mirroring

Switch(config)#**monitor session 1 source interface fastethernet 0/1 , 0/2 both**

Switch(config)#**monitor session 1 destination fastethernet 0/3**

Fa0/1
Fa0/2
Fa0/3

UserA

UserB

UserC

Packet Capturing Software

- Tons!!!

- PacketStorm Security (http://packetstormsecurity.org/sniffers/) has almost 200 different sniffers

- Most popular freeware utilities:
  - Windump / Tcpdump
  - Ethereal (Now Wireshark)

Windump / TCPDump

- Developed by Loris Degioanni, Gianluca Varenni, Fulvio Risso, John Bruno, Piero Viano

- Http://www.tcpdump.org & http://www.winpcap.org/windump/default.htm

- Requires winpcap / libpcap library

Using WinDump / TCPDump

- tcpdump [-ABdDefILnNOpqRStuUvxX] [-c *count*]

    [-C *file_size*] [-F *file*]

    [-i *interface*] [-m *module*] [-M *secret*]

    [-r *file*] [-s *snaplen*] [-T *type*] [-w *file*]

    [-W *filecount*]

    [-E *spi@ipaddr algo:secret,...*]

    [-y *datalinktype*] [-Z *user*]
    [*expression*]

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Using WinDump / tcpdump

- **Display interfaces:** windump –D
- **Use interface:** windump –i <interface # or identifier>
- **Print out in Ascii:** windump –A
- **Log to file**: windump –w *file.log*
- **Read from log:** windump –r *file.log*
- **Verbose output:** windump –vvv

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Windump Example

23:23:52.991879 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 128, id 11231, offset 0, flags [DF], proto: TCP (6), length: 48)
    A152B.2436 > www.defcon.org.80: S, cksum 0x86d6 (correct), 916679930:916679930(0) win
    16384 <mss 1460,nop,nop,sackOK>

E..0+.@.....

..9..(.   ..P6.l.....p.@............

23:23:53.116681 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 47, id 35735, offset 0, flags [none], proto: TCP (6), length: 44)
    www.defcon.org.80 > A152B.2436: S, cksum 0x2304 (correct), 451321314:451321314(0) ack
    916679931 win 65535 <mss 1460>

E..,..../..]..(.

..9.P   .....6.l.`...#.........

23:23:53.116738 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 128, id 11232, offset 0, flags [DF], proto: TCP (6), length: 40)
    A152B.2436 > www.defcon.org.80: ., cksum 0xf650 (correct), 1:1(0) ack 1 win 17520

E..(+.@.....

..9..(.   ..P6.l.....P.Dp.P..

23:23:53.117616 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 128, id 11233, offset 0, flags [DF], proto: TCP (6), length: 495)
    A152B.2436 > www.defcon.org.80: P 1:456(455) ack 1 win 17520

E...+.@....P

..9..(.   ..P6.l.....P.Dp1/..GET /html/defcon-14/html/dc-css/defconblue

Ethereal / Wireshark

- Packet analyzer
- Original author was Gerald Combs
- Now supported by over 100 programmers
- Can 'dissect' 759 protocols
- Linux & Windows friendly
- Now licensed through CACE Technologies
  http://www.wireshark.org/

Ethereal / Wirehsark


```
GET SNMPv2-SMI::mib-2.25.3.2.1.5.1 SNMPv2-SMI::mib-2.25.3.5.1.1.1 SNMPv
Standard query A www.defcon.org
Standard query response A 216.231.40.180
Standard query A mirror.toolbar.netcraft.com
2552 > http [SYN] Seq=0 Len=0 MSS=1460
Standard query response CNAME p.mii.instacontent.net A 64.191.208.114
2553 > http [SYN] Seq=0 Len=0 MSS=1460
http > 2552 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460
2552 > http [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=17520 Len=0
GET /html/defcon-14/html/dc-css/defconbluestyles.css HTTP/1.1
http > 2553 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=6144 Len=0 MSS=1460
2553 > http [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=17520 Len=0
GET /check_url/http://www.defcon.org/3639027892 HTTP/1.1
HTTP/1.1 302 Redirect (text/html)
```

```
⊞ Frame 2 (74 bytes on wire, 74 bytes captured)
⊞ Ethernet II, Src: GemtekTe_5b:1e:c9 (00:90:4b:5b:1e:c9), Dst: Cisco_ca:b3:80 (00:0a:b7:ca:b3:80)
⊞ Internet Protocol, Src: 10.3.3.57 (10.3.3.57), Dst: 10.10.10.1 (10.10.10.1)
⊞ User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 1314 (1314), Dst Port: domain (53)
⊞ Domain Name System (query)
```

```
0000  00 0a b7 ca b3 80 00 90  4b 5b 1e c9 08 00 45 00   ........ K[....E.
0010  00 3c 43 87 00 00 80 11  d5 e3 0a 03 03 39 0a 0a   .<C..... .....9..
0020  0a 01 05 22 00 35 00 28  42 ad 06 b2 01 00 00 01   ..."..5.( B......
0030  00 00 00 00 00 00 03 77  77 77 06 64 65 66 63 6f   .......w ww.defco
0040  6e 03 6f 72 67 00 00 01  00 01                     n.org... ..
```

File: "C:\DOCUME~1\Andrew\LOCALS~1\Temp\etherXXXXLCBRCT" 6853 Bytes 00:00:06   P: 31 D: 31 M: 0 Drops: 0

Ethereal / Wireshark

- To view entire conversation, right-click and choose **Follow TCP Stream**

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Ethereal / Wireshark

Follow TCP stream

Stream Content

```
GET /html/defcon-14/html/dc-css/defconbluestyles.css HTTP/1.1
Host: www.defcon.org
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.0.4) Gecko/20060508
Firefox/1.5.0.4
Accept: text/css,*/*;q=0.1
Accept-Language: en-us,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip,deflate
Accept-Charset: ISO-8859-1,utf-8;q=0.7,*;q=0.7
Keep-Alive: 300
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.defcon.org/
If-Modified-Since: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 16:31:58 GMT

HTTP/1.1 404 file does not exist
X-xxxx:xxxxxxxxxxx
Date: Sun, 09 Jul 2006 04:15:41 GMT
Last-Modified: Fri, 26 Mar 2004 16:31:58 GMT
Content-Type: text/html
Transfer-Encoding: chunked

564
<!doctype html public "-//w3c//dtd html 4.0 transitional//en">
<html>
<head>

.<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=iso-8859-1">
.<meta name="GENERATOR" content="vi">
.<meta name="Author" content="web master">
.<meta name="Description" content="html error 404 code">
.<meta name="Keywords" content="html error 404 code">
.<meta name="copyright" content="Copyright . 1996-2004 by DatAmerica. All rights
reserved." />
.<meta name="robots" content="index,follow,noarchive" />
```

Save As | Print | Entire conversation (2039 bytes) | ⊙ ASCII ○ EBCDIC ○ Hex Dump ○ C Arrays ○ Raw

Filter out this stream | Close

Password Capturing

- The following protocols send passwords in plain text
  - Telnet
  - FTP
  - POP
  - SMTP
  - Just to name a few!
- Even if password is not in plain text, it is often easily cracked

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Tool: Cain and Abel

- Developed by Massimiliano Montoro
- http://www.oxid.it/index.html
- Password recovery tool that supports packet capturing
- Can even capture & replay voice conversations

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Cain and Abel

Cain and Abel

Cain and Abel

Cain and Abel

Cain and Abel

Cain and Abel

Tool: Dsniff

- http://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/
- Dsniff can be used to listen only for passwords


```
07/09/06 14:52:59 tcp 10.0.1.3.53364 -> 10.0.1.5.3 (pop)
USER defcon14
PASS 37337h@xor
```

Dsniff password sniffer

```
------------------
07/09/06 14:52:59 tcp 10.0.1.3.53364 -> 10.0.1.5.3 (pop)
USER defcon14
PASS 37337h@xor

------------------
07/09/06 14:53:26 tcp 10.0.1.3.53369 ->                    143 (imap)
LOGIN dcwilliams

------------------
07/09/06 14:53:30 tcp 10.0.1.3.53372 ->                    143 (imap)
LOGIN dcwilliams

------------------
07/09/06 14:53:32 tcp 10.0.1.3.53371 ->                    143 (imap)
LOGIN dcwilliams

------------------
```

✓ Stop listening

Tool: Ettercap

- http://ettercap.sourceforge.net/
- Can be used to sniff passwords
- Active and passive capturing capabilities
- Content filtering

Tool: Ettercap

Analysis of E-mail Traffic

SMTP Commands

HELO	Used to initiate communication to an SMTP server
EHLO	Same as HELO
MAIL FROM:	Address you are sending e-mail from (easy to spoof!)
RCPT TO:	Destination of e-mail
SIZE=*# of bytes*	Not necessary. Specifies size of e-mail in bytes.
DATA	The message body. Terminated with a single period (.) on a line by itself.
QUIT	Terminates the SMTP session
VRFY *username*	Verify that a username is valid. Excellent way to enumerate users.
EXPN *name*	Like VRFY, can verify a username. EXPN can also list out all usernames in a distribution list.

Analysis of E-mail Traffic

- POP Commands (RFC 1225)
  - USER
  - PASS
  - QUIT
  - STAT
  - LIST
  - RETR
  - DELE
  - LAST
  - RSET

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Analysis of E-mail Traffic

Analysis of E-mail Traffic

Analysis of E-mail Traffic


```
smtp > 1815 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=5840 Len=0
1815 > smtp [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64240 Len=0
Response: 220 smtp-2.hotpop.com ESMTP Postfix
Command: HELO TTCQ7VTFQEOBOC
smtp > 1815 [ACK] Seq=38 Ack=22 Win=5840 Len=0
Response: 250 smtp-2.hotpop.com
Command: MAIL FROM: <victim14@PunkAss.com>
Response: 250 Ok
Command: RCPT TO: <attacker14@PunkAss.com>
smtp > 1815 [ACK] Seq=69 Ack=92 Win=5840 Len=0
Response: 250 Ok
Command: DATA
smtp > 1815 [ACK] Seq=77 Ack=98 Win=5840 Len=0
Response: 354 End data with <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>
Message Body
Message Body
smtp > 1815 [ACK] Seq=114 Ack=1558 Win=8760 Len=0
```

Analysis of E-mail Traffic

The DefCon conference is coming up. Can we send some feds to it?

```
Follow TCP stream

Stream Content
220 smtp-2.hot
HELO TTCQ7VTFQ
250 smtp-2.hot
MAIL FROM: <vi
250 Ok
RCPT TO: <attacker14@PunkAss.com>
250 Ok
DATA
354 End data with <CR><LF>.<CR><LF>
Message-ID: <000b01c6a2ca$e5651ba0$1301040a@TTCQ7VTFQEOBOC>
From: "victim14" <victim14@PunkAss.com>
To: <attacker14@PunkAss.com>
Subject: Hi There!
Date: Sat, 8 Jul 2006 16:12:53 -0400
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/alternative;
.boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0008_01C6A2A9.5E09A160"
X-Priority: 3
X-MSMail-Priority: Normal
X-Mailer: Microsoft Outlook Express 6.00.2800.1158
X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2800.1165

This is a multi-part message in MIME format.

------=_NextPart_000_0008_01C6A2A9.5E09A160
Content-Type: text/plain;
.charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

The DefCon conference is coming up.  Can we send some feds to it?

Sincerely,
Victim14@PunkAss.com
------=_NextPart_000_0008_01C6A2A9.5E09A160
Content-Type: text/html;
.charset="iso-8859-1"
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//W3C//DTD HTML 4.0 Transitional//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<META http-equiv=3DContent-Type content=3D"text/html; =

charset=3Diso-8859-1">
<META content=3D"MSHTML 6.00.2800.1276" name=3DGENERATOR>
<STYLE></STYLE>
</HEAD>
<BODY bgColor=3D#ffffff>
<DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>The DefCon conference is coming =
un   Can we=20
```

Save As Print Entire conversation (1793 bytes)   ⊙ ASCII ○ EBCDIC ○ Hex Dump ○ C Arrays ○ Raw

Filter out this stream   Close

Analysis of E-mail Traffic:Ettercap

Tool: Mailsnarf

- Part of Dsniff: http://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/
- Dug Song
- Listens only for e-mail

Tool: Mailsnarf

```
root@1[ettercap]# mailsnarf
mailsnarf: listening on eth0
```

```
Mime-Version: 1.0 (Apple Message framework v752.2)
To: David Williams
Message-Id: <E7819150-0632-42A5-B70B-F447CF313500@trainingcamp.net>
Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary=Apple-Mail-4-218664851
From: David Williams
Subject: Defcon 14  Mailsnarf
Date: Sun, 9 Jul 2006 15:07:20 -0400
X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.752.2)


Testing Mail Snarf


David Williams
Information Systems Support Specialist

Tech Train | The Training Camp | Infosec Academy
Visit our website at http://www.trainingcamp.net
```

Analysis of FTP Traffic

Analysis of FTP Traffic

Analysis of FTP Traffic

Analysis


```
..Z)..... ...r..E.
.E*]@.@. .P.......
...j.... Y...i...
.X...... ........
FPASS 3 7337h@xo
r..
```

```
000
File  Edit  View  Go  Capture  Analyze  Statistics  Help

Filter:

No. .  Time       Source      Destination   Protocol   Info
    1 0.000000    10.0.1.2    10.0.1.4      TCP        54890 >
    2 0.014835    10.0.1.4    10.0.1.2      TCP        compres
    3 0.014990    10.0.1.2    10.0.1.4      TCP        54890 >
    4 0.015894    10.0.1.4    10.0.1.2      TCP        compres
    5 0.015998    10.0.1.2    10.0.1.4      TCP        54890 >
    6 0.139052    10.0.1.2    10.0.1.4      TCP        54890 >
    7 0.140186    10.0.1.4    10.0.1.2      TCP        compres
    8 0.140331    10.0.1.2    10.0.1.4      TCP        54890 >
    9 0.140771    10.0.1.2    10.0.1.4      TCP        54890 >
   10 0.147176    10.0.1.4    10.0.1.2      TCP        compres
   11 0.147335    10.0.1.2    10.0.1.4      TCP        54890 >
   12 0.147796    10.0.1.2    10.0.1.4      TCP        54890 >
   13 0.152160    10.0.1.4    10.0.1.2      TCP        compres
   14 0.152327    10.0.1.2    10.0.1.4      TCP        54890 >
```

> Frame 9 (83 bytes on wire, 83 bytes captured)
> Ethernet II, Src: AppleCom_81:df:72 (00:0d:93:81:df:72), Dst: 3com_29:a2:b7 (00:10:5a:29:a2:b7)
> Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.1.2 (10.0.1.2), Dst: 10.0.1.4 (10.0.1.4)
> Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 54890 (54890), Dst Port: compressnet (3), Seq: 16, Ack: 65, Len: 17
  Data (17 bytes)

```
0000  00 10 5a 29 a2 b7 00 0d  93 81 df 72 08 00 45 00   ..Z).... ...r..E.
0010  00 45 2a 5d 40 00 40 06  fa 50 0a 00 01 02 0a 00   .E*]@.@. .P.....
0020  01 04 d6 6a 00 03 86 b8  59 df 84 2e 69 f0 80 18   ...j.... Y...i...
0030  af 58 8e 86 00 00 01 01  08 0a 17 80 ba e5 00 00   .X...... ........
0040  20 46 50 41 53 53 20 33  37 33 33 37 68 40 78 6f    FPASS 3 7337h@xo
0050  72 0d 0a                                           r..
```

File: "/var/tmp/etherJtChY4Iust" 3755 Bytes 00:00:00   P: 40 D: 40 M: 1 Drops: 0

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Analysis of FTP Traffic

```
 X  (Unt

File  Edit  View  Go  Capture  Analyze  Statistics  Help

🖳  🖳  🖳  🖳  🖳  │  📂  💾  ✖  ❂  🖨  │  🔍  ⬅  ➡  ➤

☑ Filter:                                                    ▼  ➕

No. .  Time       Source      Destination  Protocol  Info
   1  0.000000   10.0.1.2    10.0.1.4     TCP       54890 > compressnet
   2  0.014835   10.0.1.4    10.0.1.2     TCP       compressnet > 54890
   3  0.014990   10.0.1.2    10.0.1.4     TCP       54890 > compressnet
   4  0.015894   10.0.1.4    10.0.1.2     TCP       compressnet > 54890
   5  0.015998   10.0.1.2    10.0.1.4     TCP       54890 > compressnet
   6  0.139052   10.0.1.2    10.0.1.4     TCP       54890 > compressnet
   7  0.140186   10.0.1.4    10.0.1.2     TCP       compressnet > 54890
   8  0.140331   10.0.1.2    10.0.1.4     TCP       54890 > compressnet
   9  0.140771   10.0.1.2    10.0.1.4     TCP       54890 > compressnet
  10  0.147176   10.0.1.4    10.0.1.2     TCP       compressnet > 54890
  11  0.147335   10.0.1.2    10.0.1.4     TCP       54890 > compressnet
  12  0.147796   10.0.1.2    10.0.1.4     TCP       54890 > compressnet
  13  0.152160   10.0.1.4    10.0.1.2     TCP       compressnet > 54890
  14  0.152327   10.0.1.2    10.0.1.4     TCP       54890 > compressnet

▷ Frame 10 (96 bytes on wire, 96 bytes captured)
▷ Ethernet II, Src: 3com_29:a2:b7 (00:10:5a:29:a2:b7), Dst: AppleCom_81:df:72 (
▷ Internet Protocol, Src: 10.0.1.4 (10.0.1.4), Dst: 10.0.1.2 (10.0.1.2)
▷ Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: compressnet (3), Dst Port: 54890 (54890), Seq: 65. ck: 33, Len: 30
  Data (30 bytes)

0000  00 0d 93 81 df 72 00 10  5a 29 a2 b7 08 00 45 00    .....r.. Z)....E.
0010  00 52 1a 70 40 00 80 06  ca 30 0a 00 01 04 0a 00    .R.p@... .0......
0020  01 02 00 03 d6 6a 84 2e  69 f0 86 b8 59 f0 80 18    .....j.. i...Y...
0030  ff df 4b 2f 00 00 01 01  08 0a 00 00 20 46 17 80    ..K/.... .... F..
0040  ba e5 32 33 30 20 55 73  65 72 20 64 65 66 63 6f    ..230 Us er defco
0050  6e 31 34 20 6c 6f 67 67  65 64 20 69 6e 2e 0d 0a    n14 logg ed in...

File: "/var/tmp/etherJtChY4lust" 3755 Bytes 00:00:00          P: 40 D: 40 M: 1 Drops: 0
```



```
......r.. Z).....E.
.R.p@...  .0......
......j.. i...Y...
..K/....  .... F..
..230 Us er defco
n14 logg ed in...
```

Analysis of FTP Traffic

Analysis of FTP Traffic

Analysis Of FTP Traffic: Ettercap

Analysis of FTP Traffic: Ettercap

Analysis of MS

Victim14@PunkAss.com: "We need to send feds to the Defcon conference. Hackers are bad…very bad.

Attacker14@PunkAss.com: "No, there is no need to send a fed…I am sure nobody will do anything illegal there.

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Analysis of MSN Messenger Traffic

- MSN Sniffer

- www.effetech.com

- Also have ICQ Sniffer, AIM Sniffer, HTTP Sniffer, ACE Password Sniffer, and much more

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Analysis of MSN Messenger Traffic

MSN Sniffer 15-day Evaluation Version

Start Stop Save Config Register About Exit

MSN messenger conversation list:

#	IP	port	User(email)	Messa...
0	TTC-Q7VTF...	1872	victim14@punkass....	2

#1, 2006-7-8 16:30:28

attacker14@punkass.com (attacker14@punkass.com) says:

No, you have nothing to worry about. Where do you live again?

#0, 2006-7-8 16:30:16

victim14@punkass.com (victim14@PunkAss.com) says:

Is it it ok to leave my wireless open? You don't think anyone will use it, do you?

Capturing..   Buffer Usage: 16 KB   Conversations: 1

Web Traffic:URLSnarf

- Part of dsniff, written by Dug Song

- http://www.monkey.org/~dugsong/dsniff/

- urlsnarf [-n] [-i interface] [[-v] pattern [expression]]

   -n   Do not resolve IP to hostname

   -i   Interface

   -v   "versus mode" Invert the pattern you are matching

   pattern   Specify regular expression to match

   Expression Specify a tcpdump filter expression to select traffic to dump

Web Traffic: URLSnarf

Tool: Ettercap

ettercap NG-0.7.2

Start Targets Hosts View Mitm Filters Logging Plugins Help

Host List ✖ Connections ✖ Connection data ✖

```
>....D.(m*..7............         ........
1.............................`SP.R....Y..........D.E4....text/aolrtf;
charset="us-ascii"....<html><body bgcolor="#ffffff"><font lang="0">
on the shitty computer<br>.<br>.<br>.<br>.<br>.<br>.<br>.</fon
t></body></html>.
..D.......text/aolrtf; charset="us-ascii"....<html><body bgcolor="#
ffffff"><font lang="0">down in scranton<br>.<br>.<br>.momma is buyi
ng stuff for my condo!! </font></body></html>....D.Eq*..8.P.......J
s.............AOLYellowPages........$.....D................H#.......
a..........................<font face="Times new roman" size="
2">Sorry, I couldn't find any matching listings for <b>"Testing Def
con"</b> in East Stroudsburg, PA 18301. To start a new search, jus
t enter the search term or "<b>cl</b>" to change your location.
```

Inject File   Kill Connection

```
s.............AOLYellowPages........$.....D................H#.......
a..........................<font face="Times new roman" size="
2">Sorry, I couldn't find any matching listings for <b>"Testing Def
con"</b> in East Stroudsburg, PA 18301. To start a new search, jus
t enter the search term or "<b>cl</b>" to change your location.
```

Join Views | Inject Data | Inject File | Kill Connection

DHCP: [00:0A:95:DA:F9:3C] REQUEST 10.0.1.3
DHCP: [10.0.1.1] ACK : 10.0.1.3 255.255.255.0 GW 10.0.1.1 DNS 10.0.1.1 "cmts.sth.ptd.net"

Countermeasures

- Port Security
- IPSec

Demo Time