


First we break your tag, then  
we break your System  
Attacks to RFID Systems



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# Agenda

- What is RFID?
- How to exploit and attack RFID systems
- Attacks against the middleware
- Reader-emulation, soft-tags
- Unexpected risk middleware
- New ways to exploit the system
- Encrypted RFID Tags (14443, MRTD)

# What is RFID?



- Radio Frequency Identification (RFID)
  - Wireless transmission of information between transponder and reader without visibility
  - Bidirectional transfer (read and write)
  - Transponder (tag) can be attached, embedded or implanted
  - Automatic correlation between object and saved data

# Generic Terms



- RFID is often used as generic term for complete infrastructures.
  - A transponder (aka RFID-chip, -tag, -label, wireless label or simple chip)
  - A reader (in fact most of them can write to the tag too)
  - Some middleware, which connects the reader to a server
  - Some communication infrastructure
  - Integration with server farms, data warehouses, services and supporting systems

# Variants

Different types of RFID transponders

Short range	Mid range	Long range
$\leq 15$ centimeter	$\leq 5$ meter	Up to 500 meter
ISO 14443 A+B	ISO 15693	ISO 18000-xx
13.56 MHz, 125-134.2kHz	13.56 MHz, 125-135kHz	860-956 MHz (UHF) 2.4 GHz (Microwave) 5.8 GHz (Microwave)
E-field, magnetic field	EM-field	EM-field

# Transponders



- There are different kinds of transponders:
  - Only transmitting a unique ID (serial-number)
    - Only passive
    - Identification
    - Tracking (Fast-track)
    - Only clear text communication

# Transponders



- There are different types of transponders:
  - Storage of Data / Metadata R/W WORM
    - Most passive, some active
    - EPC
    - Smart Labels
    - Most use clear text communication, some are with encrypted communication

# Transponders



- There are different types of transponders:
  - Act as Smart Card Interface
    - Most active, some passive
    - Biometric Passport (ICAO - MRTD)
    - Access Control System (Mifare DESFire)
    - Encryption, authentication, encrypted communication



# Generic Attacks



- Sniffing of the communication between transponder and reader
  - Counterfeiting of the communication
  - Obtain UID, user data and meta data
  - Basic attack on structures and tags
  - Replay attack to fool the access control systems

# Generic Attacks



- Counterfeiting the identity of the reader and unauthorized writing to the tag
  - Change of UID via manipulation of the administrative block
  - Declare false identity
  - UID must be readable in clear text
  - Manipulation of product groups and prices

# Generic Attacks



- Manipulation of data stored on the transponder
  - Manipulation of data
  - Manipulation of metadata
  - Swap of objects
  - Logical duplication of objects

# Generic Attacks



- Deactivation of the transponder
  - Disable the traceability of objects
  - Disable the visibility of objects

# Generic Attacks



- Attack the structures in the middleware and backends, manipulation of data structures.
  - Injection of malware into the backend and middleware systems
  - E.g. database worms
  - Manipulation of backend systems
  - Denial of Service attack against the infrastructure

# Generic Attacks



- Jamming of the RFID frequencies
  - Use of “out-of-the-box” police jammer (broadband jamming transmitter)
  - Attack against anti-collision (RSA attack)
  - Prevent reading of the tag
  - Simple denial of service attack against the RFID System
  - Shut down production, sales or access

# Encrypted RFID



- MIFARE are the most used RFID transponders featuring encryption
  - Technology is owned by Philips Austria GmbH
  - Technology is based on
    - ISO 14443
    - 13.56 MHz Frequency

# MIFARE Tags



- MIFARE Standard

- Proprietary high-level protocol
- Philips proprietary security protocol for authentication and ciphering
- MIFARE UltraLight: same tags without encryption



# MIFARE Tags



- MIFARE Pro, ProX, and SmartMX
  - Fully comply to ISO 14443-4 standard
  - The different types of tags offer memory protected by two different keys (A and B)
  - Each sector could be protected with one of these keys.

# Brute Force the Tag

- $2^{64}$  bit for the keyspace
- 25 ms per try with a brute force perl script using Linux and a self written driver
- Using one RFID reader

$$\frac{2^{64} \cdot 0.025s}{3600s} \approx 81445305 \text{ Days} \approx 22623 \text{ Years}$$

# Brute Force the Tag

- $2^{64}$  bit for the keyspace
- 25 ms per try with a brute force perl script using Linux and a self written driver
- Using 1.000 RFID readers

$$\frac{2^{64} \cdot 0.025s}{3600s \cdot 1000} \approx 81445 \text{ Days} \approx 226 \text{ Years}$$



# MIFARE Sector Keys

- Philips puts all information under NDA
- We are not interested to sign an NDA
- Extract information from RFID software via „UNIX strings“
- Google helps a lot, Google desktop search is very popular at smartcard developers' PCs ;-)
- Look at the results



Web [Images](#) [Groups](#) [News](#) [Froogle](#) [Maps](#) [more »](#)

[Advanced Search](#)  
[Preferences](#)

Search the Web  Search English pages

**Web**

Results **1 - 10** of about **18 English** pages for **A0A1A2A3A4A5**. (0.20 seconds)

[\[PDF\] Access7CW ACCESS 9 CM OUTPUT FORMAT DESCRIPTION Version Author ...](#)

File Format: Microsoft Word - [View as HTML](#)

AA <CR>, authenticate with keytype A using tranportkey **A0A1A2A3A4A5** ... Authentication to sector 01 by using transportkey **A0A1A2A3A4A5** as key A ...

[aut-bscw.hut.fi/pub/bscw.cgi/d6792/T00723E.doc](#) - Supplemental Result - [Similar pages](#)

[Mifare smart card NO TAG](#)

Command for loadkey function is 0x4C : Where Key A = **a0a1a2a3a4a5** Key B = **b0b1b2b3b4b5** : Then may be the key set 0, key set 1, and key set 2, was wrong. ...

[www.epanorama.net/wwwboard/messages/4136.html](#) - 9k - [Cached](#) - [Similar pages](#)

[\[PDF\] ap dev data sheet](#)

File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - [View as HTML](#)

The cards do not contain access control data, but are programmed with. Philips default keys (**A0A1A2A3A4A5** & **B0B1B2B3B4B5**) in all sector. trailers. ...

[www.hidcorp.com/pdfs/products/mifare\\_devloperskit.pdf](#) - [Similar pages](#)

[\[PDF\] standardisation group observing the following proposed opens a lot ...](#)

File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat

released for public reading using the default key A: **a0a1a2a3a4a5** hex. ... key A: **a0a1a2a3a4a5** hex. Access conditions should allow reading with key A|B and ...

[www.semiconductors.philips.com/acrobat/other/identification/M001824.pdf](#) - [Similar pages](#)

[\[PDF\] CardMan 5x21-CL Reader Developer-222s Guide](#)

File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - [View as HTML](#)

Key A: **A0A1A2A3A4A5**, Key B: **B0B1B2B3B4B5**. The Mifare cards supplied with the ... The public key for MAD is "**A0A1A2A3A4A5**". For complete understanding of MAD ...

[www.omnikey.com/index.php?id=5&rName=RFID%20Developer%20Guide&did=5](#) - [Similar pages](#)

# Default Keys



- Found the following default keys:
  - Key A A0 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5
  - Key A FF FF FF FF FF FF
  - Key B B0 B1 B2 B3 B4 B5
  - Key B FF FF FF FF FF FF
  - About 60 keys from example applications
  - No protection 00 00 00 00 00 00



MAD

- Additional found the Mifare Application Directory, a PDF that shows how MIFARE are specifying the type of use of one of the transponders, each applications should have an entry to show the Type of Service

# Example Layouts



- In the datasheets and „googled“ documentation are a lot of examples.
- These examples include different keys and tag / memory layout and data structure for:
  - Ticketing
  - Access Control
  - Online Payment





# Software developers are lazy

- Checking a couple of cards shows that more than 75% use one of these default keys!
- It compiles let's ship it !
- The programmers use not only the example layouts, they also use the example keys !

# Attack the Tag



- Directory attacks are possible with found default and example keys
  - Variations of the directory are always possible
- „Smart“ brute-force attack to the tag are possible
  - never seen a lockout or false login counter
  - a delay for a false key does not exist

# Attacks to the Backend




- The memory of a ISO 15693 tag acts like a normal storage
- RFDump (Black Hat 2004) could help to manipulate data like with a hex-editor
- SQL-Injection and other attacks are possible

# Preventing security functions




- If the tag is „read only“ read it with RFDump and write the manipulated data to an empty one
- Checksum, some implementations use the UID (Unique ID) as mirror block in the UD, both must be changed
- If the block is encrypted, the Sector Key must be broken

# The RFID Supply chain



# Break into the Systems



# Problem Memory Size

Adr	Memory
0x1	00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
0x2	00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
0x3	00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
0x4	00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
0x5	00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
0x6	00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
0x7	00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
0x8	00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
0x9	00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
0xa	00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
0xb	00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
0xc	00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
0xd	00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
0xe	00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000
0xf	00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000

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Byte 6



# Representation to the Backend

- Looks like unlimited space on the tag
  - E.g. RFDump uses a tag database to avoid reading over the boundary
- Normally reading is event-driven
  - Reading up to the EOF
  - Input is unchecked in all implementations we have seen



# Tag DoS with C-Strings

End of String

Adr	Memory
0x1	68547369 69202073 6e616520 6178706d 656c6f20 20662061 616d696e 75706100
0x2	FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
0x3	FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
0x4	FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
0x5	FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
0x6	FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
0x7	FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
0x8	FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
0x9	FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
0xa	FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
0xb	FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
0xc	FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
0xd	FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
0xe	FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
0xf	FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF





# Soft-Tags



- Emulation of RFID-Tag and/or reader
- Serial-Emulation of any ISO 15693 tag
- Useful for testing backend and middleware
- Reads „backup“ from real tags
- Manipulation of any UID, User Data or administrative block.

Thank You



Questions ?