DownLoad
Igor Markovic
Post-Easts and Post-Wests in a Global Village

I would like to try in this short presentation to stress some of, in my opinion, very important new moments which can not be overlooked if we are working and living in a global village, sub-village Europe. Those are antinomies geopolitics-topology at the political ground, centre-periphery at cultural&intellectual and the term 'cultural capital' which, again in my opinion should be re-defined and widely spread. All three 'topics' have close tights with new media development, both in practical and theoretical terms. This is kind of a strange text, definitely 'work-in-progress', with a lot of almost hypertextual references in it, but probably the form which fit very well the topic.


When someone is honestly 55% right, that is very good and there is no use wrangling. And if someone is 60% right, it is wonderful, it is great luck, and let him/her thank God. But what is to be said about 75% right? Wise people say this is suspicious. Well, and what about 100% right? Whoever says he is 100% right is a fanatic, a thug, and a most dangerous man. (an old Jew from Galicia, from Milosz's The Captive Mind, slightly modified)

0.   Before Reading

Let me start with an anecdote I heard last month in Tirana, from a friend and colleague Lucezar Boradjiev, Bulgarian new media artist. In the preparations for the mentioned exhibition, titled Onufri, executive organiser Edi Muka, travelled around the countries and made selections of works for the exhibition. Lucezar was introducing him as a "curator from the West", with a logical explanation that from Bulgarian geographical point of view, Albania is on the West. The story shows us, beside Lucezar's spirit, a very important thing - that terms like East and West, to start with them, are a product not of geography but of geopolitics, and even more important they belong to a historical period which have a very, very few relevance for our lives today. Sure, at the post-East there is a heritage of so-called socialism, mostly economic difficulties we should overcome, but on the other 'side', on post-West, there is also a plenty of problems - social, economical, theoretical, ideological... Also often based on Cold-war era presumptions and political practices. We can continue to 'obey the rules' and use those terms (altogether with ideological and other ballast which came along) or to move (to try in a worst case) to step forward (aside?) and leave dead to the dead.

I.   Politics - Geopolitics vs. Topology

Before I move into a digital, virtual sphere of topology, which rule today's world in more then one sense, I'd like to say couple of words about some consequences of collapse of Cold-war division in Europe, and nonsense in still present, particularly among so-called 'left inteligencia' use of Cold-war terms. The main problem for all of us is in which terms we can talk about Europe today, anyway? (and about other parts of the world, but...). Simplified, American way of thinking about the area(s) is no more valid - but although use of the terms like ex-East, or ex-Soviet Union are more or less out of practice, ex-Yugoslavia is still in function. One of the reasons is irrational, for plenty of Western left intellectuals Yugoslavia was a more or less successful example of socialist/marxist/leftist ideology in practise, and it collapse was for lot of them almost symbolic dead, in Lacanian terms. But the problem is much wider then that - how can we describe partialised, molecularised Europe of today in social or socio-eco-geographical terms? Countries in transition is also somehow stupid - in transition from where to where? Portugal is also in transition, not to mention Turkey or Germany. Term Post-socialist countries is somehow acceptable, to the certain level, but it also attempt to put everything in the same basket. Differences among countries in such a division are in lot of cases much bigger then between some capitalist and some post-socialist countries. After all, no one would stand up and say that Hungary, for example is not capitalist country par excellance. Just look at the situation in new media, particularly Internet. Recently, there has been much discussion about "electronic networks and post-socialist countries" or "electronic networks in Eastern Europe" as a something essentially different then, for example, electronic networks in Western Europe, but I would argue that any such idea has nothing to do with reality. In fact, when we talk about Internet access and web art projects, it is possible to argue that Slovenia, for example, belongs to the highly developed West (in old terms); while France, and to certain level even Germany, can be described as part of a 'soft East' (in old terms) both in terms of accessibility and quality of web projects. But, on the other hand it's also clear that there is strong connection among some of the countries, especially 'new' ones - just look the Slovakia-Czech or post-Yugoslavia countries which must be took into any serious consideration of new terms. Post-East and post-West are humorous attempt to define physical, geographical places, and to add a touch of political and economic history altogether with cultural cross-references. However, even better idea is to use post-Easts and post-Wests (in plural) cause of very simple reason - what have Estonia and Albania in common, except the same political system in fifty years of history? Or Greece and Sweden? One obvious way is to use regions as signifiers, and that's one of the reasons for re-invention and re-use of MittelEuropa, Middle Europe, very fancy term, we can heard on every corner. Regionalism is something which is not just an answer to globalisation or collapse of some states or empires, but revival of cultural traditions and connections. The problem is that notion of regions have some traditional pejorative connotations - look at the Balkan. Geographically inextricable from Europe, yet culturally constructed as "the other", the Balkans became, in time, the object of a number of externalised political, ideological and cultural frustrations and have served as a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the "European' and "the West" has been constructed. The Balkans, in other words, despite their geographical status as European, has become Europe's shadow, the structurally despised alter ego, the dark side within. And those who utilise 'Balkanist' discourse are conveniently exempted from charges of racism or colonialism since the Balkan is, after all, part of Europe. To avoid further confusion, I believe that it's quite useless to talk about geographical and/or geopolitical terms when we have to deal in reality with something completely different. All kind of such a bordering is directly connected with political economy, and in that field borders and states belong to the history. Postindustrial era brought a new model - virtuality. Peter Lamborn Wilson told us during the one conference that in economic terms 94,6 percent of everything is virtual or financial capital, the sad remaining include all of us, all 'hard' industries, and all sources. We live in a global capitalist system which is characterised not only by free trade in goods and services but even more by the free movement of capital. The system is actually based on financial capital which is free to pick and choose where to go and it has led to the rapid growth of global financial markets. It can be envisaged as a gigantic circulatory system, sucking up capital into the financial markets and financial institutions at the centre and then pumping it out to the periphery either directly in the form of credits and portfolio investments or indirectly through multinational corporations. States does not rule the world anymore - virtual multinationals are the real masters. In that world geopolitical powers have no power at all - world leaders are just a kids with some toys. Recent Asian and Russian financial crisis proof very well that thesis, and also show us that such a system is still vulnerable. As George Soros put it: "Financial capital has been fleeing the periphery and in view of the heightened risks it will not return unless it is very highly rewarded. The fact that the financial markets at the centre have escaped relatively unscathed so far should not blind us to the fact that one third of the devastation has been wrought at the periphery." I will even agree with Manuel Casteles who argued, in a monograph published by the University of California, Berkeley, in 1995, that a major factor contributing to the collapse of the Soviet Union was the fundamental contradiction between the Soviet system and processes of innovation and diffusion of information technology. Since information technology, and its diverse uses, are key elements in economic productivity, managerial flexibility, and military power, efforts to correct retardation in this technological area induced perestroika policies that ultimately spun out of control. So, in practical terms topological space of Internet, wired borderless world which serve as a tool for holding financial capital system is only relevant space if we talk about economy or politics. But, consequences are also interesting on a field we are more interested - culture. Along with postindustrial economics and post-Cold War politics, there has been a shift in values from modern to post-modern culture. With the demise of the left, the avant-garde's aesthetic revolutions have been sublimated in the parodic cycles of fashion and in the calculated product obsolescence of the dominant technological monopolies. In the post-West, the purist aesthetics, the politicised art manifestos and the various revolutionary movements are no more. In the post-East, the return to tradition in the cause of nationalism has turned into appropriation in the course of ethically neutral cultural "production." Artistic parody, pastiche, and hybridity prevail in this "post-avant-garde" global culture. Which led us to the second antimony I mentioned is centre-periphery, the best known from post-colonial studies, but also desperately need adjustment to contemporary processes.

II.   Culture - Centre vs. Periphery

Usual notion of centre-periphery is that there is an institutionalised centre, powerful and technologised, and a periphery that dissolves away into virgin territory, uncontrolled and empty. In a way centre is civilised, 'good', and periphery is not, 'bad'. I will use the terms in different, for some of you already familiar notion of periphery, taken from a work of Croatian art historian Ljubo Karaman. He defined peripheral milieu as 'an area which, being a certain distance from the leading cultural centre, absorbs influences from different sides, but also processes and recombines those influences to develop an autonomous arts activity' . Peripheral art realises a wide synthesis of arts from different origins in space and time, namely from the motifs that are not only from different places, but also belonging to different styles. In peripheral art deeply inveterate details of a one origin survive, even when the area comes under another influence or source of input. But the most interesting and significant aspect of peripheral art is the freedom of development - here 'great masters' simply do not exist. It's obvious that from such a notion position at the periphery is much more productive and comfortable then at the centre. But why stop at the art practises - let us translate such a notion of centre and periphery into contemporary cultural practices. With take-off of a social centre, like for example majority in parliament it's not possible any more to make any relevant political and/or social changes. Post-modern society is not reproducing itself from political centre. Talk from the position of "absolute knowledge" which enable relativisation of any other opinion, different attitude was one of the main characteristic of centre, or more precise central role of intellectuals in society. But such a position today is based on a wrong presumptions - it lay on a quasi-distance from events, and exclude itself from dynamic of reality, and move itself into passive position, lose the possibility of active participation and, consequently, lose relevancy. On the other hand, on periphery we have subculture. And innovative potential which have a chance to create future worlds are not in political parties, or intellectual circles, but in subcultural enclaves in which the new communicative experience earned in play with digital technologies is sedimented. So, there is nothing natural in a superiority of the centre. Even more - subculture can not be organised from above and it's not present in traditional in a political arena, as a side in a fight for power under culture, but it try to actively, creative co-operate at alternative, peripheral political scene. And is there any sense at all to insist on a position of political centre in a time of global, electronic, digital culture, when the terms like hypernation are in use. In my opinion no. There is no more possibility to create place where there will be strict division between popular and elite culture, political questions are deeply into field of culture (as Mark Terkessidis show very well in his book Kulturkampf), so politics without culture is meaningless and primitive, but also culture without politics is empty and academic. Fight for central, privileged position in society is counter-productive, and fascination with the centre is outdated - after all, one can not see centre from the centre. Struggle for central position is simply not productive - political alternative, social margin, dynamic of subculture - those are the places where contemporary intellectual (in all meanings) should feel most comfortable. Places where can be most productive, take part in activities, cultural and theoretical production, refuse the position of the elite... After all authors and artists of the future will still be mythological creators of images with the main difference - that their position will no longer be connected with some cultural or technological privilege. The accent is more and more on different viewpoint and not on different content. In poststructuralist theory, meaning is no longer to be found in the intentions of the author but in the interpretations of the reader. The production of meaning is located in the process of reading and not in writing. In "writerly" post-modern literature the reader is invited to actively participate in the production of meaning. The reading of a text is no longer a passive consumption but the active writing of another. Authorial function now belongs to anybody who cares to set up a few links. Writer/intellectual is not ultimate interpreter of reality, just a part in the complex system or process of distribution of information, which all is possible only from the periphery. Peripheral position also have no problems in acceptance and incorporation of different, interactive, collective modes of production. The birth of collective authorship - what Boroughs called "third mind" - is excellent point, just take a look at the work of Bilwet, Luther Blissett, Irwin&NSK...

One more thing can be l/earned from such a position, but we have to include new technologies and Internet, as a sort of "meta medium". Why? The difference between traditional broadcast media and the Internet is interactivity. In the for example telephone-enabled instantaneous person-to-person interaction, radio and television allow messages to be transmitted from one source to many receivers. Audiences only have to turn on their respective communications appliances to receive ongoing broadcasts. The Internet is a revolution in communications technology as any receiver of messages is now able to broadcast as well. In a famous words not one to many, but many to many. One of the consequences is the collapse of critical into creative productions. "Criticism has ceased to be a matter of scholarly arguments about creative sources and has become a euphoric creative endeavour in its own right. Creative work has, in turn, become multidisciplinary and has made a profound engagement with history and theory" (Steven Connor). New technologies offer us realising techniques and teach us to different modes of communication and social interaction in most wider sense. Avoiding academic erudition, very often content-empty, stuffed with quotations and a heavy language, and without new, original ideas new media with short, fast communication models, messages in full meaning, show us that Academia as a concept is dead, that collecting and creation of knowledge can not be canonised to the level at which lose meaning, auto-gethoised in self-reproduction. Traditional institutions of knowledge were always in a centre, and consequently that lack of sense for new can be considered as a place which should be abandon. The new media shortened transmission period, but the creation and processing still require equal time as before, and in overflow of information it demand synchronisation of texts. It is, indeed, possible to do that and remain as serious as before - a good example is a Very Cyber, Indeed, a magazine published in Ljubljana, which print only articles not longer then one hundred words. As they said "we believe that the short form still allows you to express an autenthic thought, and the only thing that is cut out are the redundancies and the publicity for authors erudition". A controversial topic might be raised here at the end, en passant. It is the fact that women accept a new media much faster and much more productive then man. According to a Susan Herring's sociological research of several discussion lists men would produce more messages and longer ones with strong affirmations. Women would be more brief, supportive and moderate. Women were historically always at the periphery of the society, by all meanings, which might be a final point in favor of periphery rather then central position.

III.   So what?

Digital revolution brought among other things a demand for certain cultural revolution. In one way technical revolution in broader sense and digital in particular is define as an universal and permanent change of structure and dynamics of producing forces. "I do not accept that it is the Internet that is transforming society. Fundamental changes in the provision of information and knowledge are not driven by innovations in information technology. Rather, I argue that such changes are due to economics", as William F. Birdsall said. "Cyberspace is not a disembodied fantasy but is embedded in the material space of global economics and infrastructure", as someone said. So, what now - on one side we have a positive effect of new media theory and even more practice at the level of intellectual productivity, communication on the other possibility that Negropontian anti-utopia (world will became a single media machine) of global state with perhaps two or three meta-multinationals ruling the world. Over the past few years, the debate over technology has been dominated by the louder voices at the extremes. Good example of one side is from William F. Birdsall's text: "Here is another vignette in the document: "A single mother with a small child can't afford child care but desperately wants to continue her training in computer programming. Right from her home PC she attends lectures, researches subjects at the library, submits assignments and even takes exams. Nearing completion of her degree she electronically searches the federal government's job bank and submits her resume to several potential employers." Here we might ask, why isn't there affordable child care available? And if she can't afford child care, how can she afford the course fees, a PC, a modem, the monthly communications charges, a printer, and the software necessary to do the tasks attributed to her? The message of these vignettes is clear: Don't spend money on public safety, child care, and other social services; rather, channel it into information technology, the solution to all our social and economic woes. The Ideology of Information Technology masks real political and social issues behind the glamour of the electronic impulse." The other side might be find in Barlowian and before that Toffler-type utopias. The Net is an extraordinary communications tool that provides a range of new opportunities for people and communities, but also for businesses, and government. Yet as cyberspace becomes more populated, it increasingly resembles society at large, in all its complexity. For every empowering or enlightening aspect of the wired life, there will also be dimensions that are malicious, perverse, or rather ordinary. No doubt telecommunication technologies offer new tools for creating new social interactions. Will we use these tools for further escapisms from reality? Void of personal identity and responsibility, further compounding our isolation and social problems? Or will they actually enhance our ability to converse, coalesce and create new places? Vibrant new places, infused with human creativity and caring and community? There is two possibilities The use of the Net to communicate local, ethnic, religious, and national cultures to a world-wide and international audience. This could be called optimistic multiculturalism on the Net where anyone with access can participate. And the world-wide diffusion of dominant cultures through the global marketplace (Western and American cultures globalised through ownership of infrastructure and production), reading "globalisation" as another case of hegemony, cultural imperialism, or Americanisation. It's important to stress that information technologies with their nomadic power structure and spreading of topological periphery as a most common place are not utopic models. Developments in information technology are claimed to be revolutionary innovations that will propel societies and nations toward renewed economic growth, new modes of political participation, and a rejuvenated sense of community. Countless reports from all levels of government, think tanks, futurists, management gurus, and the popular press extol the need to promote the exploitation of information technology to increase productivity and to ensure economic, political, and cultural development. It is asserted by many that the primary commodity to be processed by this steam engine of the new economy is information itself. Which mean that cyberspace offer great means of exchange between individuals, communities and democracy, and that is why, according to Howard Rheingold "we must try to understand the nature of CMC, cyberspace, and virtual communities in every important context - politically, economically, socially, cognitively". This can prove to be of crucial importance not only for us as individuals, who in our little pocket of resistance try to wrestle off multinationalism and similar processes (because, as CAE well pointed out, that's not enough), but also in permanently demystifying the vision of on-line communities of virtual identities, "that do not have bodies, so order cannot be perpetuated by physical repression" (J.P.Barlow).While the greatest part of our struggle for freedom and the free expressions of the individual goes on in the virtual world, it is deliverance in the real world that's the only way to build the virtual world as a space of freedom. All around us, information is moving faster and becoming cheaper to acquire, and the benefits are manifest. That said, the proliferation of data is also a serious challenge, requiring new measures of human discipline and scepticism. We must not confuse the thrill of acquiring or distributing information quickly with the more daunting task of converting it into knowledge and wisdom. Regardless of how advanced our computers become, we should never use them as a substitute for our own basic cognitive skills of awareness, perception, reasoning, and judgement.

Thesis submitted to the Translocation conference
Wien, 29-31 January 1999