Post-Easts and Post-Wests in a Global Village | |
I would like to try in this short presentation to stress some of, in my
opinion, very important new moments which can not be overlooked if we are
working and living in a global village, sub-village Europe. Those are
antinomies geopolitics-topology at the political ground, centre-periphery at
cultural&intellectual and the term 'cultural capital' which, again in my
opinion should be re-defined and widely spread. All three 'topics' have
close tights with new media development, both in practical and theoretical
terms. This is kind of a strange text, definitely 'work-in-progress', with a
lot of almost hypertextual references in it, but probably the form which fit
very well the topic.
When someone is honestly 55% right, that is very good and there is no use
wrangling. And if someone is 60% right, it is wonderful, it is great luck,
and let him/her thank God. But what is to be said about 75% right? Wise
people say this is suspicious. Well, and what about 100% right? Whoever says
he is 100% right is a fanatic, a thug, and a most dangerous man.
(an old Jew from Galicia, from Milosz's The Captive Mind, slightly
modified)
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0. Before Reading | |
Let me start with an anecdote I heard last month in Tirana, from a friend
and colleague Lucezar Boradjiev, Bulgarian new media artist. In the
preparations for the mentioned exhibition, titled Onufri, executive
organiser Edi Muka, travelled around the countries and made selections of
works for the exhibition. Lucezar was introducing him as a "curator from the
West", with a logical explanation that from Bulgarian geographical point of
view, Albania is on the West.
The story shows us, beside Lucezar's spirit, a very important thing - that
terms like East and West, to start with them, are a product not of geography
but of geopolitics, and even more important they belong to a historical
period which have a very, very few relevance for our lives today. Sure, at
the post-East there is a heritage of so-called socialism, mostly economic
difficulties we should overcome, but on the other 'side', on post-West,
there is also a plenty of problems - social, economical, theoretical,
ideological... Also often based on Cold-war era presumptions and political
practices. We can continue to 'obey the rules' and use those terms
(altogether with ideological and other ballast which came along) or to move
(to try in a worst case) to step forward (aside?) and leave dead to the
dead.
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I. Politics - Geopolitics vs. Topology | |
Before I move into a digital, virtual sphere of topology, which rule today's
world in more then one sense, I'd like to say couple of words about some
consequences of collapse of Cold-war division in Europe, and nonsense in
still present, particularly among so-called 'left inteligencia' use of
Cold-war terms. The main problem for all of us is in which terms we can talk
about Europe today, anyway? (and about other parts of the world, but...).
Simplified, American way of thinking about the area(s) is no more valid -
but although use of the terms like ex-East, or ex-Soviet Union are more or
less out of practice, ex-Yugoslavia is still in function. One of the reasons
is irrational, for plenty of Western left intellectuals Yugoslavia was a
more or less successful example of socialist/marxist/leftist ideology in
practise, and it collapse was for lot of them almost symbolic dead, in
Lacanian terms. But the problem is much wider then that - how can we
describe partialised, molecularised Europe of today in social or
socio-eco-geographical terms? Countries in transition is also somehow stupid
- in transition from where to where? Portugal is also in transition, not to
mention Turkey or Germany. Term Post-socialist countries is somehow
acceptable, to the certain level, but it also attempt to put everything in
the same basket. Differences among countries in such a division are in lot
of cases much bigger then between some capitalist and some post-socialist
countries. After all, no one would stand up and say that Hungary, for
example is not capitalist country par excellance.
Just look at the situation in new media, particularly Internet. Recently,
there has been much discussion about "electronic networks and post-socialist
countries" or "electronic networks in Eastern Europe" as a something
essentially different then, for example, electronic networks in Western
Europe, but I would argue that any such idea has nothing to do with reality.
In fact, when we talk about Internet access and web art projects, it is
possible to argue that Slovenia, for example, belongs to the highly
developed West (in old terms); while France, and to certain level even
Germany, can be described as part of a 'soft East' (in old terms) both in
terms of accessibility and quality of web projects.
But, on the other hand it's also clear that there is strong connection among
some of the countries, especially 'new' ones - just look the Slovakia-Czech
or post-Yugoslavia countries which must be took into any serious
consideration of new terms. Post-East and post-West are humorous attempt to
define physical, geographical places, and to add a touch of political and
economic history altogether with cultural cross-references. However, even
better idea is to use post-Easts and post-Wests (in plural) cause of very
simple reason - what have Estonia and Albania in common, except the same
political system in fifty years of history? Or Greece and Sweden?
One obvious way is to use regions as signifiers, and that's one of the
reasons for re-invention and re-use of MittelEuropa, Middle Europe, very
fancy term, we can heard on every corner. Regionalism is something which is
not just an answer to globalisation or collapse of some states or empires,
but revival of cultural traditions and connections. The problem is that
notion of regions have some traditional pejorative connotations - look at
the Balkan. Geographically inextricable from Europe, yet culturally
constructed as "the other", the Balkans became, in time, the object of a
number of externalised political, ideological and cultural frustrations and
have served as a repository of negative characteristics against which a
positive and self-congratulatory image of the "European' and "the West" has
been constructed. The Balkans, in other words, despite their geographical
status as European, has become Europe's shadow, the structurally despised
alter ego, the dark side within. And those who utilise 'Balkanist' discourse
are conveniently exempted from charges of racism or colonialism since the
Balkan is, after all, part of Europe.
To avoid further confusion, I believe that it's quite useless to talk about
geographical and/or geopolitical terms when we have to deal in reality with
something completely different. All kind of such a bordering is directly
connected with political economy, and in that field borders and states
belong to the history. Postindustrial era brought a new model - virtuality.
Peter Lamborn Wilson told us during the one conference that in economic
terms 94,6 percent of everything is virtual or financial capital, the sad
remaining include all of us, all 'hard' industries, and all sources. We live
in a global capitalist system which is characterised not only by free trade
in goods and services but even more by the free movement of capital. The
system is actually based on financial capital which is free to pick and
choose where to go and it has led to the rapid growth of global financial
markets. It can be envisaged as a gigantic circulatory system, sucking up
capital into the financial markets and financial institutions at the centre
and then pumping it out to the periphery either directly in the form of
credits and portfolio investments or indirectly through multinational
corporations. States does not rule the world anymore - virtual
multinationals are the real masters. In that world geopolitical powers have
no power at all - world leaders are just a kids with some toys. Recent Asian
and Russian financial crisis proof very well that thesis, and also show us
that such a system is still vulnerable. As George Soros put it: "Financial
capital has been fleeing the periphery and in view of the heightened risks
it will not return unless it is very highly rewarded. The fact that the
financial markets at the centre have escaped relatively unscathed so far
should not blind us to the fact that one third of the devastation has been
wrought at the periphery." I will even agree with Manuel Casteles who
argued, in a monograph published by the University of California, Berkeley,
in 1995, that a major factor contributing to the collapse of the Soviet
Union was the fundamental contradiction between the Soviet system and
processes of innovation and diffusion of information technology. Since
information technology, and its diverse uses, are key elements in economic
productivity, managerial flexibility, and military power, efforts to correct
retardation in this technological area induced perestroika policies that
ultimately spun out of control.
So, in practical terms topological space of Internet, wired borderless world
which serve as a tool for holding financial capital system is only relevant
space if we talk about economy or politics. But, consequences are also
interesting on a field we are more interested - culture. Along with
postindustrial economics and post-Cold War politics, there has been a shift
in values from modern to post-modern culture. With the demise of the left,
the avant-garde's aesthetic revolutions have been sublimated in the parodic
cycles of fashion and in the calculated product obsolescence of the dominant
technological monopolies. In the post-West, the purist aesthetics, the
politicised art manifestos and the various revolutionary movements are no
more. In the post-East, the return to tradition in the cause of nationalism
has turned into appropriation in the course of ethically neutral cultural
"production." Artistic parody, pastiche, and hybridity prevail in this
"post-avant-garde" global culture. Which led us to the second antimony I
mentioned is centre-periphery, the best known from post-colonial studies,
but also desperately need adjustment to contemporary processes.
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II. Culture - Centre vs. Periphery | |
Usual notion of centre-periphery is that there is an institutionalised
centre, powerful and technologised, and a periphery that dissolves away into
virgin territory, uncontrolled and empty. In a way centre is civilised,
'good', and periphery is not, 'bad'. I will use the terms in different, for
some of you already familiar notion of periphery, taken from a work of
Croatian art historian Ljubo Karaman. He defined peripheral milieu as 'an
area which, being a certain distance from the leading cultural centre,
absorbs influences from different sides, but also processes and recombines
those influences to develop an autonomous arts activity' . Peripheral art
realises a wide synthesis of arts from different origins in space and time,
namely from the motifs that are not only from different places, but also
belonging to different styles. In peripheral art deeply inveterate details
of a one origin survive, even when the area comes under another influence or
source of input. But the most interesting and significant aspect of
peripheral art is the freedom of development - here 'great masters' simply
do not exist. It's obvious that from such a notion position at the periphery
is much more productive and comfortable then at the centre. But why stop at
the art practises - let us translate such a notion of centre and periphery
into contemporary cultural practices.
With take-off of a social centre, like for example majority in parliament
it's not possible any more to make any relevant political and/or social
changes. Post-modern society is not reproducing itself from political
centre. Talk from the position of "absolute knowledge" which enable
relativisation of any other opinion, different attitude was one of the main
characteristic of centre, or more precise central role of intellectuals in
society. But such a position today is based on a wrong presumptions - it lay
on a quasi-distance from events, and exclude itself from dynamic of reality,
and move itself into passive position, lose the possibility of active
participation and, consequently, lose relevancy. On the other hand, on
periphery we have subculture. And innovative potential which have a chance
to create future worlds are not in political parties, or intellectual
circles, but in subcultural enclaves in which the new communicative
experience earned in play with digital technologies is sedimented.
So, there is nothing natural in a superiority of the centre. Even more -
subculture can not be organised from above and it's not present in
traditional in a political arena, as a side in a fight for power under
culture, but it try to actively, creative co-operate at alternative,
peripheral political scene. And is there any sense at all to insist on a
position of political centre in a time of global, electronic, digital
culture, when the terms like hypernation are in use. In my opinion no. There
is no more possibility to create place where there will be strict division
between popular and elite culture, political questions are deeply into field
of culture (as Mark Terkessidis show very well in his book Kulturkampf), so
politics without culture is meaningless and primitive, but also culture
without politics is empty and academic. Fight for central, privileged
position in society is counter-productive, and fascination with the centre
is outdated - after all, one can not see centre from the centre. Struggle
for central position is simply not productive - political alternative,
social margin, dynamic of subculture - those are the places where
contemporary intellectual (in all meanings) should feel most comfortable.
Places where can be most productive, take part in activities, cultural and
theoretical production, refuse the position of the elite... After all
authors and artists of the future will still be mythological creators of
images with the main difference - that their position will no longer be
connected with some cultural or technological privilege. The accent is more
and more on different viewpoint and not on different content. In
poststructuralist theory, meaning is no longer to be found in the intentions
of the author but in the interpretations of the reader. The production of
meaning is located in the process of reading and not in writing. In
"writerly" post-modern literature the reader is invited to actively
participate in the production of meaning. The reading of a text is no longer
a passive consumption but the active writing of another. Authorial function
now belongs to anybody who cares to set up a few links. Writer/intellectual
is not ultimate interpreter of reality, just a part in the complex system or
process of distribution of information, which all is possible only from the
periphery.
Peripheral position also have no problems in acceptance and incorporation of
different, interactive, collective modes of production. The birth of
collective authorship - what Boroughs called "third mind" - is excellent
point, just take a look at the work of Bilwet, Luther Blissett, Irwin&NSK...
One more thing can be l/earned from such a position, but we have to include
new technologies and Internet, as a sort of "meta medium". Why? The
difference between traditional broadcast media and the Internet is
interactivity. In the for example telephone-enabled instantaneous
person-to-person interaction, radio and television allow messages to be
transmitted from one source to many receivers. Audiences only have to turn
on their respective communications appliances to receive ongoing broadcasts.
The Internet is a revolution in communications technology as any receiver of
messages is now able to broadcast as well. In a famous words not one to
many, but many to many. One of the consequences is the collapse of critical
into creative productions. "Criticism has ceased to be a matter of scholarly
arguments about creative sources and has become a euphoric creative
endeavour in its own right. Creative work has, in turn, become
multidisciplinary and has made a profound engagement with history and
theory" (Steven Connor). New technologies offer us realising techniques and
teach us to different modes of communication and social interaction in most
wider sense. Avoiding academic erudition, very often content-empty, stuffed
with quotations and a heavy language, and without new, original ideas new
media with short, fast communication models, messages in full meaning, show
us that Academia as a concept is dead, that collecting and creation of
knowledge can not be canonised to the level at which lose meaning,
auto-gethoised in self-reproduction. Traditional institutions of knowledge
were always in a centre, and consequently that lack of sense for new can be
considered as a place which should be abandon. The new media shortened
transmission period, but the creation and processing still require equal
time as before, and in overflow of information it demand synchronisation of
texts. It is, indeed, possible to do that and remain as serious as before -
a good example is a Very Cyber, Indeed, a magazine published in Ljubljana,
which print only articles not longer then one hundred words. As they said
"we believe that the short form still allows you to express an autenthic
thought, and the only thing that is cut out are the redundancies and the
publicity for authors erudition".
A controversial topic might be raised here at the end, en passant. It is the
fact that women accept a new media much faster and much more productive then
man. According to a Susan Herring's sociological research of several
discussion lists men would produce more messages and longer ones with strong
affirmations. Women would be more brief, supportive and moderate. Women were
historically always at the periphery of the society, by all meanings, which
might be a final point in favor of periphery rather then central position.
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III. So what? | |
Digital revolution brought among other things a demand for certain cultural
revolution. In one way technical revolution in broader sense and digital in
particular is define as an universal and permanent change of structure and
dynamics of producing forces. "I do not accept that it is the Internet that
is transforming society. Fundamental changes in the provision of information
and knowledge are not driven by innovations in information technology.
Rather, I argue that such changes are due to economics", as William F.
Birdsall said. "Cyberspace is not a disembodied fantasy but is embedded in
the material space of global economics and infrastructure", as someone
said.
So, what now - on one side we have a positive effect of new media theory and
even more practice at the level of intellectual productivity, communication
on the other possibility that Negropontian anti-utopia (world will became a
single media machine) of global state with perhaps two or three
meta-multinationals ruling the world.
Over the past few years, the debate over technology has been dominated by
the louder voices at the extremes. Good example of one side is from William
F. Birdsall's text: "Here is another vignette in the document: "A single
mother with a small child can't afford child care but desperately wants to
continue her training in computer programming. Right from her home PC she
attends lectures, researches subjects at the library, submits assignments
and even takes exams. Nearing completion of her degree she electronically
searches the federal government's job bank and submits her resume to several
potential employers." Here we might ask, why isn't there affordable child
care available? And if she can't afford child care, how can she afford the
course fees, a PC, a modem, the monthly communications charges, a printer,
and the software necessary to do the tasks attributed to her? The message of
these vignettes is clear: Don't spend money on public safety, child care,
and other social services; rather, channel it into information technology,
the solution to all our social and economic woes. The Ideology of
Information Technology masks real political and social issues behind the
glamour of the electronic impulse." The other side might be find in
Barlowian and before that Toffler-type utopias.
The Net is an extraordinary communications tool that provides a range of new
opportunities for people and communities, but also for businesses, and
government. Yet as cyberspace becomes more populated, it increasingly
resembles society at large, in all its complexity. For every empowering or
enlightening aspect of the wired life, there will also be dimensions that
are malicious, perverse, or rather ordinary. No doubt telecommunication
technologies offer new tools for creating new social interactions. Will we
use these tools for further escapisms from reality? Void of personal
identity and responsibility, further compounding our isolation and social
problems? Or will they actually enhance our ability to converse, coalesce
and create new places? Vibrant new places, infused with human creativity and
caring and community? There is two possibilities
The use of the Net to communicate local, ethnic, religious, and national
cultures to a world-wide and international audience. This could be called
optimistic multiculturalism on the Net where anyone with access can
participate.
And the world-wide diffusion of dominant cultures through the global
marketplace (Western and American cultures globalised through ownership of
infrastructure and production), reading "globalisation" as another case of
hegemony, cultural imperialism, or Americanisation.
It's important to stress that information technologies with their nomadic
power structure and spreading of topological periphery as a most common
place are not utopic models. Developments in information technology are
claimed to be revolutionary innovations that will propel societies and
nations toward renewed economic growth, new modes of political
participation, and a rejuvenated sense of community. Countless reports from
all levels of government, think tanks, futurists, management gurus, and the
popular press extol the need to promote the exploitation of information
technology to increase productivity and to ensure economic, political, and
cultural development. It is asserted by many that the primary commodity to
be processed by this steam engine of the new economy is information itself.
Which mean that cyberspace offer great means of exchange between
individuals, communities and democracy, and that is why, according to Howard
Rheingold "we must try to understand the nature of CMC, cyberspace, and
virtual communities in every important context - politically, economically,
socially, cognitively". This can prove to be of crucial importance not only
for us as individuals, who in our little pocket of resistance try to wrestle
off multinationalism and similar processes (because, as CAE well pointed
out, that's not enough), but also in permanently demystifying the vision of
on-line communities of virtual identities, "that do not have bodies, so
order cannot be perpetuated by physical repression" (J.P.Barlow).While the
greatest part of our struggle for freedom and the free expressions of the
individual goes on in the virtual world, it is deliverance in the real world
that's the only way to build the virtual world as a space of freedom.
All around us, information is moving faster and becoming cheaper to acquire,
and the benefits are manifest. That said, the proliferation of data is also
a serious challenge, requiring new measures of human discipline and
scepticism. We must not confuse the thrill of acquiring or distributing
information quickly with the more daunting task of converting it into
knowledge and wisdom. Regardless of how advanced our computers become, we
should never use them as a substitute for our own basic cognitive skills of
awareness, perception, reasoning, and judgement.
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