Internet PKI: Part 1 Certificate and CRL Profile

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X.509 Version 3 Certificate

```
Certificate ::= SEOUENCE
    tbsCertificate
                          TBSCertificate,
     signatureAlgorithm
                          AlgorithmIdentifier,
                          BIT STRING
     signature
TBSCertificate ::=
                     SEQUENCE
    version
                     101
                          Version DEFAULT v1,
     serialNumber
                          CertificateSerialNumber,
    signature
                          AlgorithmIdentifier,
     issuer
                          Name,
    validity
                          Validity,
    subject
                          Name,
     subjectPublicKeyInfo SubjectPublicKeyInfo,
                          IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
     issuerUniqueID
                     [1]
                          -- If present, version must be v2 or v3
                          IMPLICIT UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
     subjectUniqueID [2]
                          -- If present, version must be v2 or v3
    extensions
                     [3]
                          Extensions OPTIONAL
                          -- If present, version must be v3
```

X.509 Version 3 Certificate Syntax (continued)

```
Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1), v3(2) }
CertificateSerialNumber ::= INTEGER
Validity ::= SEQUENCE
    notBefore
                       UTCTime,
    notAfter
                       UTCTime }
UniqueIdentifier ::= BIT STRING
SubjectPublicKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
    algorithm
                       AlgorithmIdentifier,
    subjectPublicKey BIT STRING }
Extensions ::=
               SEQUENCE OF Extension
Extension ::= SEQUENCE {
    extnID OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
    critical BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
    extnValue OCTET STRING }
```

X.509 Version 1 Certificate

Description

- SERIAL NUMBER identififies the certificate. A unique integer is assigned by the Certification Authority (CA).
- SIGNATURE specifies the the signature algorithm and associated hash function used to sign the certificate.
- ISSUER is the distinguished name of the CA that issued the certificate.
- VALIDITY is the time period that the certificate is valid.
- SUBJECT is the distinguished name of the certificate user.
- SUBJECT PUBLIC KEY INFO contains the user's public key. For DSA, it may also conatin

X.509 Version 2 & 3 Certificate Description

- ISSUER UNIQUE IDENTIFIER is not used in the PKIX profile.
- SUBJECT UNIQUE IDENTIFIER is not used in the PKIX profile.

EXTENSIONS is an optional sequence of fields.

Standard Certificate

Extensions

- The X.509 Ammendment defines thirteen extenstions:
 - Authority Key Identifier recommended, non-critical
 - Subject Key Identifier recommended, non-critical
 - Key Usage recommended, critical
 - Private Key Usage Period **not recommended**
 - Certificate Policies recommended, non-critical (?)
 - Policy Mappings recommended, non-critical
 - Subject Alternative Names recommended, non-critical and critical
 - Issuer Alternative Names recommended, non-critical and critical
 - Subject Directory Attributes not recommended
 - Basic Constraints recommended, *critical*
 - Name Constraints recommended, critical

Internet Certificate

Extensions

- Three extensions are specified in the PKIX profile:
 - Subject Information Access recommended, non-critical
 - Authority Information Access recommended, non-critical and critical
 - CA Information Access recommended, **non-critical and** critical

Internet Certificate Extension Syntax

```
SubjectInfoAccessSyntax ::= SEQUENCE OF AccessDescription
AuthorityInfoAccessSyntax ::= SEQUENCE
     certStatus
                       [0] SEQUENCE OF AccessDescription,
     certRetrieval
                       [1] SEQUENCE OF AccessDescription,
                       [2] SEQUENCE OF AccessDescription,
     caPolicy
     caCerts
                       [3] SEQUENCE OF AccessDescription }
CAInfoAccessSyntax
                   ::= SEQUENCE
     certStatus
                       [0] SEQUENCE OF AccessDescription,
     certRetrieval
                       [1] SEQUENCE OF AccessDescription,
     caPolicy
                       [2] SEQUENCE OF AccessDescription,
     caCerts
                       [3] SEQUENCE OF AccessDescription }
AccessDescription
                       SEOUENCE
                  ::=
     accessMethod
                          OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
     accessLocation
                          GeneralName }
```

X.509 Version 2 CRL

Syntax

```
CertificateList ::= SEQUENCE
     tbsCertList
                          TBSCertList,
     signatureAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
     signature
                          BIT STRING
TBSCertList ::=
                  SEQUENCE
     version
                             Version OPTIONAL,
                                  -- if present, must be v2
                             AlgorithmIdentifier,
     signature
     issuer
                             Name,
     thisUpdate
                             UTCTime,
     nextUpdate
                             UTCTime,
     revokedCertificates
                             SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE
          userCertificate
                                  CertificateSerialNumber,
          revocationDate
                                  UTCTime,
          crlEntryExtensions
                                  Extensions OPTIONAL
                                                          OPTIONAL,
     crlExtensions
                             [0] Extensions OPTIONAL
Version ::= INTEGER { v1(0), v2(1) }
```

X.509 Version 2 CRL

```
AlgorithmIdentifier ::=
                          SEQUENCE
     algorithm
                             OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
     parameters
                             ANY DEFINED BY algorithm OPTIONAL
                                  -- contains a value of the type
                                  -- registered for use with the
                                  -- algorithm object identifier value
CertificateSerialNumber ::=
                             TNTEGER
Extensions ::= SEQUENCE OF Extension
Extension ::=
               SEQUENCE
     extnId
                             OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
     critical
                             BOOLEAN DEFAULT FALSE,
     extnValue
                             OCTET STRING
                                  -- contains a DER encoding of a value
                                  -- of the type registered for use with
                                  -- the extnId object identifier value
```

X.509 Version 1 CRL

Description

- SIGNATURE specifies the the signature algorithm and associated hash function used to sign the CRL.
- ISSUER is the distinguished name of the CA responsible for this CRL.
- THIS UPDATE is the date and time when this CRL was issued.
- NEXT UPDATE is the date and time by which the ISSUER will issue the next edition of the CRL.
- REVOKED CERTIFICATES is a sequence entries consisting of :
 - the <u>SERIAL NUMBER</u> of the revoked certificate.
 - the <u>REVOCATION DATE</u> when the certificate was

X.509 Version 2 CRL

Description

- CRL EXTENSIONS is an optional sequence of fields pertaining to the whole CRL.
- CRL ENTRY EXTENSIONS is an optional sequence of fields pertaining to a specific CRL entry.

Standard CRL

Extensions

- Five CRL extensions are defined:
 - Authority Key Identifier recommended, non-critical
 - Issuer Alternative Name recommended, **non-critical and critical**
 - CRL Number recommended, non-critical
 - Issuing Distribution Point recommended, critical
 - Delta CRL Indicator recommended, *critical*

Three CRL entry extensions are defined:

- Reason Code recommended, non-critical
- Hold Instruction Code recommended, non-critical
- Invalidity Date recommended, non-critical

ISO/IEC and ITU-T X.509 Amendment on Certificate Extensions: Changes Since the DAM

Warwick Ford June, 1996

Areas of

- Criticality-related changes
- Key usage bits
- Name forms
- Constraints
- Indirect CRLs
- Hold mechanism
- Delta CRL mechanism
- Matching rules

Note: Every extension syntax change will mean a new OID. Old OIDs to be phased out over time.

Criticality-Related Changes (General)

- Criticality of all extensions reviewed
- Still 3 alternatives:
 - always critical
 - always non-critical
 - critical/non-critical as CA choice
- More extensions are now at CA choice
- Rationale given for each standard rule; more explanation overall
- Any extension that can be critical now has clearly stated mandatory semantics

Criticality-Related Changes (Specific)

- keyAttributes split into 3 extensions:
 - subjectKeyId (always non-critical)
 - keyUsage (CA choice)
 - privateKeyUsagePeriod (always non-critical)
- certificatePolicies changed to "CA choice"
- keyUsageRestriction dropped
- subjectAltNames and issuerAltNames changed to "CA choice"
- nameConstraints and policyConstraints changed to "CA choice"

Key Usage Bits

- Definitions clarified
- No change in the set of bits

Name Forms

New options added to GeneralName: **URI** ™IP-address object identifier General Name now usable for any of: end entity NUL CA CRL issuer CRL distribution point Clear rules as to non-requirement for implementing all name forms

Constraints

New name constraints extension

- takes permitted subtrees and excluded subtrees constraints from X9.55
- adds the ability to chop the subtrees at numbered levels (min and max)
- the policy-linking and the complex name subordination options from the old name constraints have been dropped
- chain validation algorithm is now significantly simplified

Basic constraints

- mno name constraints
- simplified to a single Boolean plus a length constraint

Indirect CRLs

- Can have a CRL Issuer whose CRL contains revocation notifications from multiple CAs
- Extensions relating to CRL distribution points enhanced to support this
- New CRL entry extension "certificatelssuer"

Hold Mechanism

- Mechanism retained but simplified
- Expiry date dropped
- A "hold" reason code means that you should currently consider certificate revoked but it may be reinstated later
- If reinstated, entry just disappears from CRL
- If revoked rather than reinstated, reason code changes on entry

Delta CRL mechanism

- Mechanism clarified
- Problems with links to CRL number corrected
- Deltas can now be cumulative from any desired base CRL

Matching rules

- New "exact" matching rules added for all attributes (for admin. purposes)
- Extra fields added to the "certificate match" rule