

The Value of Common Criteria Evaluations

Stuart Katzke, Ph.D.
Senior Research Scientist
National Institute of Standards & Technology
100 Bureau Drive; Stop 8930
Gaithersburg, MD 20899
(301) 975-4768
skatzke@nist.gov
fax: (301) 975-4964

Presentation Contents

- The Common Criteria (CC)
 - What is it
 - How is it used
- The significance of the Linux CC evaluation
- The role and importance of product CC evaluations in achieving system assurance

The International Common Criteria Standard (ISO/IEC 15408)

What the standard is –


- Common structure and language for expressing product/system IT security requirements (Part 1)
- Catalog of standardized IT security requirement components and packages (Parts 2 and 3)

How the standard is used –

- Develop protection profiles and security targets -- specific IT security requirements and specifications for products and systems
- Evaluate products and systems against known and understood IT security requirements

An Evolutionary Process

Two decades of research and development...



IT Security Requirements

The Common Criteria defines two types of IT security requirements--

Functional Requirements

- for defining security behavior of the IT product or system:
- implemented requirements become security functions

Assurance Requirements

- for establishing confidence in security functions:
- correctness of implementation
- effectiveness in satisfying security objectives

Examples:

- *Identification & Authentication*
- *Audit*
- *User Data Protection*
- *Cryptographic Support*

Examples:

- *Development*
- *Configuration Management*
- *Life Cycle Support*
- *Testing*
- *Vulnerability Analysis*

Evaluation Assurance Levels

Common Criteria defines seven hierarchical assurance levels--

	<i>EAL Designation</i>
EAL1	Functionally Tested
EAL2	Structurally Tested
EAL3	Methodically Tested & Checked
EAL4	Methodically Designed, Tested & Reviewed
EAL5	Semiformally Designed & Tested
EAL6	Semiformally Verified Design & Tested
EAL7	Formally Verified Design & Tested

Protection Profiles (generic) & Security Targets (specific)

Protection Profile contents

- Introduction
- TOE Description
- Security Environment
 - Assumptions
 - Threats
 - Organizational security policies
- Security Objectives
- Security Requirements
 - Functional requirements
 - Assurance requirements
- Rationale

Security Target contents

- Introduction
- TOE Description
- Security Environment
 - Assumptions
 - Threats
 - Organizational security policies
- Security Objectives
- Security Requirements
 - Functional requirements
 - Assurance requirements
 - *TOE Summary Specification*
- *PP Claims*
- Rationale

Profiles and Targets


(Some Examples)

- ▣ *Protection Profiles (Product Independent)*
 - ▣ Operating Systems (C2, CS2, RBAC)
 - ▣ Firewalls (Packet Filter and Application)
 - ▣ Smart cards (Stored value and other)
- ▣ *Security Targets (Product Specific)*
 - ▣ Oracle Database Management System
 - ▣ Lucent, Cisco, Checkpoint Firewalls

Defining Requirements

ISO/IEC Standard 15408

Protection Profiles



- ✓ Operating Systems
- ✓ Database Systems
- ✓ Firewalls
- ✓ Smart Cards
- ✓ Applications
- ✓ Biometrics
- ✓ Routers
- ✓ VPNs

A flexible, robust catalogue of standardized IT security requirements (features and assurances)

Consumer-driven security requirements in specific information technology areas

Industry Responds

Protection Profile

Security Targets




- ✓ CISCO Firewall
- ✓ Lucent Firewall
- ✓ Checkpoint Firewall
- ✓ Network Assoc. Firewall


Consumer statement of IT security requirements to industry in a specific information technology area

Vendor statements of security claims for their IT products

Demonstrating Conformance



Validating Test Results



Significance of the Linux Evaluation

- CC was not designed for open source products.
 - Open source not “in vogue” 10 years ago.
- CC assumes a “normal” development process
- Open source does not follow a “normal” development process
- Linux was first attempt at evaluating an open source product
- Linux functionality and development process imposed some limitations on achievable evaluation results
- Demonstrated that an open source product can undergo a successful, traditional CC evaluation –but requires additional developmental activity (as one would expect due to the way open source products are developed).

Assurance in Information Systems (IS)

Building more secure systems requires:


- Well defined system-level security requirements and security specifications
- Well designed component products
- Sound systems security engineering practices
- Competent systems security engineers
- Appropriate metrics for product/system testing, evaluation, and assessment
- Comprehensive system security planning and life cycle management

Supporting Tools and Programs

Building more secure systems is enhanced by:

- Standardized Security Requirements and Specifications
 - U.S. Common Criteria protection profile development project
 - Private sector protection profile contributions
 - ❖ BITS functional packages
 - ❖ Smart Card Security Users Group (SCSUG)
 - ❖ Process Control Security Requirements Forum (PCSRF)
- IT Component-level Product Testing and Evaluation Programs
 - Common Criteria Evaluation and Validation Schemes (CCRA)
 - Cryptographic Module Validation Program (U.S. NIST/Canada CSE)
- Security Implementation Guidance
 - Security Technical Implementation Guides
 - Security Reference Guides
- System Certification and Accreditation

Supporting Tools and Programs



Certification and Accreditation: The Big Picture

