Summary of "What are we obligated to do?" June 24th, 1999
By: Bernard Roy
Adjunct Assistant Professor
Department of Philosophy
Baruch College of The City University of New York--212-387-1684
General Studies Program
New York University--212-998-7120
We had a very impressive crowd. I counted over 30 participants. We met in the back, as is the custom this summer. Most of us were seated; on chairs, sofas, or stools, but a number of you was standing, leaning against columns or walls, having incessantly to move so that the waitresses could get in the kitchen and the café patrons could make their way to the bath rooms. The main dining room had been plundered of its small tables, which had to be abutted to our rectangular table. And it was very hot. What a display of dedication on your part, I thought to myself. There we were, a two-deep huddled crowd of perspiring intellectuals, pitting our voice decibels against those of the convection oven and of the juice maker, uninterruptedly spilling our noetic guts between mouthfuls of crêpes and gulps of whatever each was drinking. We are making a little history.
My opening remarks aimed at establishing distinguishable levels of obligation.
All of us have legal obligations; for example, that of paying taxes. Most
of us have social obligations; for example, that of returning phone calls.
Most of us also have moral obligations: for example, that of keeping promises.
Some have religious obligations; for example, that of praying, or, in some
cases, that of loving our neighbor. Finally, most of us have rational obligations;
for example, that of accepting the conclusion
of a valid argument. I pointed out that in the case of legal, social
and moral obligations, there was a sort of hypothetical imperative. If
you don't do X, you'll somehow be punished. On the other hand, I expressed
my puzzlement at our rational obligation, and at the Christian obligation
to love. People constantly deny conclusions of valid arguments, and nothing
happens. And, how can love truly obtain when it's done out of obligation?
The first respondent denied that we had any obligations. Then, someone thought that we had to distinguish between "being forced to do X," and "being obligated to do X." Obligation implies an element of choice, whereas force does not. I do not have a choice of paying or not paying taxes; but I do have a choice whether or not I return certain phone calls. This suggests that the consequences of not meeting one's obligations are not always bad or opprobrious. Someone then suggested a hierarchy of obligations, whereby some are more difficult to break than others. No one, however, was willing to come up with an example.
Emmanuel or Jean-Luc thought that in countries where there were laws
requiring its citizens to assist persons in danger, there was a greater
sense of obligation. The comment brought about the thought experiment of
the baby innocently playing on a railroad track unaware of the danger caused
by the oncoming train. Who would not feel that one has an obligation to
save the baby? "Were there risks involved in saving the baby?" someone
asked. "No!" was the response. Most thought that it was an instinctual
response; among those, some thought that it was a species reaction. We
have in us the desire to immortalize our species.
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