$Unique_ID{bob01082} $Pretitle{} $Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report Chapter 23B The Other Operations} $Subtitle{} $Author{Various} $Affiliation{} $Subject{north ship erria herup enterprise covert operations operation cia arms} $Date{1987} $Log{} Title: Iran-Contra Affair: The Report Author: Various Date: 1987 Chapter 23B The Other Operations Israel During the 1985-1986 winter, North set into motion a series of projects involving Israel. These took advantage of the close working relationship North had developed with his counterpart in the Israeli Government, Amiram Nir, Adviser to Prime Minister Peres on combatting terrorism. North and Nir had similar backgrounds in working for their respective governments: both believed in unorthodox tactics when dealing with terrorism. According to North, Nir broached the idea for joint operations during a trip to the United States in January 1986. Nir carried a proposal, according to North, that the profits Israel would generate from the Iranian arms sales would be used, in part, for a series of covert operations. These would include gathering intelligence on terrorist groups, seeking the release of hostages, initiating and financing propaganda efforts that would be operated covertly. North recorded in his notebooks that Nir had suggested on January 9 that, from the sale of the first 1,001 TOWs to Iran for $10 million, $2.5 million would be dedicated for "Ops." Each project received a code name in the sequence THE-1, THE-2, and so on. North told the Committees that the projects had not progressed beyond the planning stage and, therefore, he did not seek a Presidential Finding authorizing any of these operations. North testified that he discussed the Enterprise's role in these projects with Poindexter, but Poindexter said he did not recall such a conversation. The only evidence that the President knew of these sensitive projects appears in a September 15, 1986, memorandum from North to Poindexter. North asked Poindexter to brief the President on certain initiatives, including one of the proposed joint U.S.-Israeli covert operations. An attachment to the memorandum which North suggested should be briefed to Casey stated that "covert funds could be made available" for this operation, but the source of the funds was not disclosed. Poindexter noted in the memorandum that he approved North's recommendation to brief the President on these operations and that it was "done." Poindexter testified that he did not know or tell the President that the covert funds referred to by North were coming from the Enterprise. The Lebanese Operation Another initiative undertaken by North involved the use of DEA and Israeli contacts to fund and equip a force in Lebanon. North described the proposed force as part of a "long term operation" to give the United States some future military leverage on the ground in Lebanon. North sent Poindexter a PROF note in June 1986 about Secord's progress in working with a Lebanese group on a hostage rescue operation: "After the CIA took so long to organize and then botched the Kilburn effort, Copp [Secord] undertook to see what could be done through one of the earlier DEA developed [Lebanese] contacts. Dick [Secord] has been working with Nir on this, and now has three people in Beirut and a 40-man . . . force working for us. Dick rates the possibility of success on this operation as 30% but that's better than nothing." In closed testimony before the Committees, North indicated that the project was never carried out even though "we spent a fairly significant amount of money on . . . [this additional] DEA operation." Peter Kilburn, a 60-year-old librarian at the American University in Beirut, was kidnapped on November 30, 1984. U.S. sources believed that, unlike the other hostages, Kilburn was being held by a criminal faction in Lebanon. At one point in the fall of 1985, North had contemplated allocating Enterprise funds to support an operation intended to free him. The plan was terminated when Kilburn was murdered allegedly by agents of Mu'ammar Qaddafi shortly after the American air raid on Libya in April 1986. Other Countries Other projects contemplated by North involved aiding anticommunist resistance groups around the world. North told the Committees that he and Director Casey "had several discussions about making what he called off-the-shelf, self-generating activities that would be able to do a number of these things. He had mentioned specifically an ongoing operation." In addition, North testified, "I concluded within my own mind the fact that it might require [other ongoing] operations [as well]." In testimony before the Committees, North explained his motivation for assisting resistance groups. "We cannot be seen . . . in the world today as walking away and leaving failure in our wake. We must be able to demonstrate, not only in Nicaragua, but . . . elsewhere where freedom fighters have been told, we will support you, we must be able to continue to do so." In April 1986, North asked Secord and his partner Albert Hakim to use $100,000 from the Lake Resources Swiss accounts to purchase conventional radio phone equipment for donation to a political party in a foreign country. On April 29, two representatives of a U.S. manufacturer met in Miami with Secord and one of Secord's associates, and the purchasing agent for the political party. At the meeting, the purchasing agent agreed to buy $100,000 of the radio equipment, and Secord - upon North's request - arranged for the Enterprise to wire this amount to the manufacturer. The Erria Another of North's projects involved the purchase by the Enterprise of the M/V Erria, a small coastal freighter of Danish registry used to transport goods between Europe and the Middle East. The Erria, built in 1973, was small, only 163 feet long, and weighed 710 tons. Before its purchase, the Erria was owned by its captain, Arne Herup. In 1984 and 1985, the Erria Was used to run Weapons to the Persian Gulf and then to Nigeria and Central America. Because of its Danish registry, the Erria, was able to escape the scrutiny of customs officials. "When we ended up needing a ship to perform a certain task," recalled North, "there was nowhere to get one on short notice, and so this organization [the Enterprise] produced it practically overnight." Poindexter testified that Secord offered the ship because the Department of Defense could not provide a ship suitable for the covert operation. According to North, Casey said "we can't find one anywhere else, get a ship. It didn't cost the taxpayers of the United States a cent." The money came from the Iran arms sales and other Enterprise funds. The Erria first came to the attention of the Enterprise in April 1985, when it carried arms purchased through Secord to the Contras. En route to Central America, the Erria came under surveillance by an unidentified "fishing boat" which Captain Herup assumed was Cuban. Herup took evasive action and brought the cargo successfully to a Central American country. Herup's actions impressed Secord's associate, Thomas Clines, and when North needed a ship in April 1986, for covert operations, Clines suggested to Hakim that the Enterprise purchase the Erria from Herup, and keep him as Captain. Hakim bought the ship for $312,000 through Dolmy Business, Inc., one of the Panamanian companies owned by the Enterprise, on April 28, 1986. Herup was asked to remain as captain for at least six months, with Danish agent Tom Parlow of SA Chartering continuing as the ship's agent. Hakim and Clines told Herup that they were working for the CIA and that at some future date they might ask him to transport technical equipment for covert operations. They promised that when the project was finished, the ship would be returned to Herup at no cost. The Proposed Charter to the CIA for a Covert Operation The first mission North contemplated for the Erria was for an extended covert operation. On April 28, 1986, Secord sent a KL-43 message to North proposing that the CIA charter the vessel for that purpose: ". . . Abe [Hakim] still in Copenhagen with our lawyer finalizing purchase of ship. Deal has been made after three days of negotiation. The Danish captain is up and eager for the mission - he now works for us. We are asking . . . [of the CIA] for firm fixed price contract of $1.2 million for six months. He will probably balk at this price . . ." As Secord predicted, the Agency felt the rate was excessive (several times the prevailing rate for similar assets) and it balked at chartering the ship. In addition, the CIA informed North that it was not interested on technical grounds and that it did not feel that security could be maintained because of the ship's previous use by North's associates to ferry arms to Central America. The Agency indicated that Tom Clines' involvement was a negative factor of major proportions. North persisted in his efforts to have the CIA lease the ship. He then enlisted Poindexter's help. In a May 14 memorandum, Vincent M. Cannistraro of the SC staff urged Poindexter to take the matter up with Casey: Status of Ollie's Ship. Ollie has offered the use of a Danish vessel for [a covert operation]. He first offered CIA a six month lease. CIA told me that they thought it was too expensive, and the cost and time involved in refitting the vessel for [the] Mission made the alternative option . . . more attractive. Ollie then offered to [perform the mission] using his own resources. [C/NE] has told me that because of the alleged involvement of one Tom Clines (who was involved with Wilson and Terpil), CIA will have nothing to do with the ship. In the end, Casey supported Clair George's decision that the ship was not suitable for Agency use. The Odyssey of the Erria On May 9, 1986, the Erria commenced its operations under its new owners, the Enterprise. The ship was to travel to pick up technical equipment for a covert operation. On May 16 Herup was ordered to abort the mission and return to Larnaca, Cyprus. The new plan for the ship was to pick up any American hostages released as a result of the DEA initiative. En route to Larnaca, Herup received instructions to take up a position off the coast of Lebanon and to await further directions. As described earlier in this Chapter, the DEA hostage ransom plan failed. Accordingly, after a 48-hour wait, Hakim ordered the ship to sail on to Larnaca. On June 5, Herup received instructions to head for Gibraltar, but at the last moment the ship was diverted to Cagliari, Sardinia. From there, he was told to take the ship to Setubal, Portugal, to await an arms cargo from Defex. The cargo at Setubal was not ready for loading, and Herup was instructed to return to Copenhagen, where he arrived on July 4. The Erria then was ordered to Szczecin, Poland, where it arrived on July 10. The cargo it picked up was marked "machine parts," but actually consisted of 158 tons of Communist-bloc weapons, including AK-47 assault rifles, hand grenades, mortars, and a variety of ammunition. The shipment was consigned to Energy Resources International, an Enterprise company. The Erria's next stop was Setubal, Portugal, where on July 19, it loaded an additional 222 tons of arms from Defex Portugal in the presence of Parlow and Clines. Herup was told to set his course for a Central American port. According to Hakim, the total cargo, which he called the "stranded shipment," cost $1.7 million; Secord placed the cost at about $2.4 million. En route to Central America, Parlow called Herup and told him to stop the ship: Congress was in the process of repealing the Boland Amendment. The vessel sat in the water for 4 days. Captain Herup then was ordered to return to Portugal, where he was met by Clines. The Enterprise decided to find a buyer for the 380-ton cargo of arms now on board the Erria. Defex sold the arms to an intermediary for $1.2 million. The intermediary, in turn, sold the cargo for $2,156,000 (including transportation), to the CIA, which did not want to deal with the Enterprise because of Clines' involvement. The arms were transferred from the Erria to another ship on September 20 for delivery to the CIA. Hakim and Secord continued their efforts. Herup was ordered to take the now-empty Erria to Haifa, Israel, where it was to receive a new shipment of arms. So as not to run afoul of the Arab boycott, the name of the ship was altered to read, "Ria," and false entries were placed in the Captain's log. On October 13, at Haifa, Herup loaded a crate containing eight tons of Eastern Bloc arms that Nir had promised for the Contras. The captain also had been told he was to pick up pharmaceuticals for Iran. No pharmaceuticals were loaded. Herup was then ordered to go to Fujairah in the Gulf of Oman. The Iranians had promised North two Soviet T-72 tanks, but after the Erria waited 6 weeks in the Gulf, the plan failed to materialize. On December 9, Herup was ordered to open the Israeli crate. He found only 600 well-used AK-47 assault rifles and 15 cases of ammunition - valued at approximately $100,000 - a cargo not worth transporting to Central America. After the revelations of the Iran-Contra covert operations in November 1986, Clines or Hakim ordered the Erria on December 14 to return to Ellat, Israel, where the crate of weapons that had been received in Haifa were unloaded. The Erria returned to Denmark later in December. Its missions on behalf of the Enterprise were at an end. Conclusion The Erria was in a sense a metaphor for the other operations of the Enterprise - ventures that began with ambitious expectations but accomplished nothing. But the fate of these ventures cannot obscure the danger of privatization of covert operations or the fact that the participants in the Enterprise had audacious plans for covert operations. Had the architects of the other operations been emboldened by success, and not frustrated by failure, the Committees can only conjecture, with apprehension, what other uncontrolled covert activities on behalf of the United States lay in store.