$Unique_ID{bob01018} $Pretitle{} $Title{Iran-Contra Affair: The Report Chapter 3C Alternative Funding Sources: North's Response} $Subtitle{} $Author{Various} $Affiliation{} $Subject{north rodriguez poindexter operation dutton cia president abrams meeting told} $Date{1987} $Log{} Title: Iran-Contra Affair: The Report Author: Various Date: 1987 Chapter 3C Alternative Funding Sources: North's Response The Administration continued to seek an appropriation for the CIA to resume its program of covert assistance to the Contras. In early May, according to Poindexter, the President told him, "If we can't move the Contra package before June 9, I want to figure out a way to take action unilaterally to provide assistance." Poindexter wrote his deputy, Donald Fortier, "The President is ready to confront the Congress on the Constitutional question of who controls foreign policy . . . . George [Shultz] agrees with the President that we have to find some way and we will not pull out." North, who received a copy of Poindexter's PROF note, responded immediately with a suggestion: The Contras should capture some territory inside Nicaragua and set up a provisional government. The President would respond by recognizing the Contras as the true government and provide support. Asked by Poindexter whether he had talked to Casey about his plan, North replied, "Yes, in general terms. He is supportive, as is Elliott [Abrams]. It is, to say the least, a high risk option - but it may be the only way we can ever get this thing to work." The Money: Third Country Assistance By the end of April 1986, the Contras' funding needs were critical. North told Fortier: "We need to explore this problem urgently or there won't be a force to help when the Congress finally acts." The same day, North wrote to McFarlane that "the resistance support acct. is darned near broke," and asked for assistance in filling the gap: Any thoughts where we can put our hands on a quick $3-5 M? Gaston [Sigur] is going back to his friends who have given $2 M so far in hopes that we can bridge things again, but time is running out along w/the money. So far we have seven a/c working, have delivered over $37 M in supplies and ordnance but the pot is almost empty. Have told Dick [Secord] to prepare to sell the ship first and then the a/c as a means of sustaining the effort. Where we go after that is a very big question. An Aborted Solicitation Despite North's reference to "Gaston," it was not Gaston Sigur, but Singlaub who went to the Far East in May 1986 in search of Contra aid. This time, Singlaub wanted to be sue that he would receive the official U.S. "signal" these countries had previously told him was a condition to their aid. Before he traveled to Countries 3 and 5, Singlaub spoke to Elliott Abrams at the State Department and, according to Singlaub, explained that he wanted to know "how the U.S. would send a signal." Singlaub testified that Abrams told him that he (Abrams) would send the signal. Singlaub arrived in Country 3, but before he could meet with his contact, Abrams told him to stop the plan. When Singlaub and Abrams later met, Singlaub testified that Abrams told him that the solicitation was "going to be handled by someone at the highest level." Singlaub assumed that it would be someone from the White House, although Abrams never gave him a specific name. However, Abrams disputed Singlaub's testimony. While acknowledging that he spoke to Singlaub about Singlaub's proposed solicitation, Abrams testified that he never agreed to provide to Singlaub a U.S. Government signal for the solicitation. Abrams' account is supported by the testimony of Richard Melton, at the time Director of the Office of Central American Affairs at the State Department, who was present during Abrams' conversations with Singlaub. The May 16, 1986, NSPG Meeting On May 16, 1986, the President and his advisers discussed the issue of obtaining funds from third countries. In a memorandum to the President for the National Security Planning Group (NSPG) meeting, North suggested three ways to "bridge the gap" in funding: (1) a reprogramming of funds from DOD to the CIA ($15 million in humanitarian aid); (2) a Presidential appeal for private donations by U.S. citizens; and (3) a "direct and very private Presidential overture to certain Heads of state." The last source of funds would, as North put it, eliminate the need "to endure further domestic partisan political debate." Director Casey opened the meeting and explained the Contras' needs. The good news, he told the President, was that the Contras had infiltrated more troops into Nicaragua than ever before, and the troops were now being resupplied by air. The "bad news" was that the Resistance was operating under the assumption that it would receive new funding at the end of May. Only $2 million remained from the humanitarian assistance appropriation. Later in the discussion, Secretary Shultz returned to the Contras' need for funds. Noting the unlikelihood of an immediate Congressional appropriation and the improbability that the intelligence committees could be persuaded to reprogram funds, Secretary Shultz suggested that third countries be approached for humanitarian aid. North added that the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1986 permitted the State Department to approach other governments for nonmilitary aid. No one at the meeting discussed the fact that Country 2 had already given $32 million to the Contras, including a $24 million donation committed to the President personally. Nor was it mentioned that several Far Eastern countries had been approached for donations or that Country 3 had given $2 million only 6 months earlier. Instead, Shultz was instructed to prepare for review by the President a list of countries that could be solicited. Later that day, North told Poindexter that the urgency of the need had lessened: The Enterprise had that day received the last $5 million of the $15 million arms sales to Iran. North wrote Poindexter: "You should be aware that the resistance support organization now has more than $6 million available for immediate disbursement. This reduces the need to go to third countries for help." North later testified that he wrote the message because "it was important he [Poindexter] understand that Secretary Shultz didn't need to go out that afternoon and go ask for additional help." Poindexter testified that he understood the $6 million to which North referred was coming from the Iranian arms sales, but he did not tell the President the $6 million was available. North testified that as he was leaving the NSPG meeting, he mentioned to Poindexter that Iran was supplying $6 million for the Contras, but that he did not know whether he was overheard. North wrote Poindexter that he did not know whether all those present at the NSPG meeting, such as Chief of Staff Donald Regan, knew of "my private U.S. operation." On the other hand, North noted to Poindexter, "the President obviously knows why he has been meeting with several select people to thank them for their 'support for Democracy' in CentAm." North also realized that disclosure of a significant sum of money earmarked for Contra support, but only made possible by arms sales to Iran, could prove politically embarrassing. The more money there is (and we will have a considerable amount in a few more days) the more visible the program becomes (airplanes, pilots, weapons, deliveries, etc.) and the more inquisitive will become people like Kerry, Barnes, Harkins, et al. While I care not a whit what they may say about me, it could well become a political embarrassment for the President and you. He suggested that the problem could be "avoided simply by covering it with an authorized CIA program undertaken with the $15 M" reprogrammed funding from the DOD budget. Poindexter approved North's recommendation to seek the $15 million reprogramming and responded to his concerns: "Go ahead and work up the paper needed for the $15 M reprogramming. . . . I understand your concerns and agree. I just didn't want you to bring it up at NSPG. I guessed at what you were going to say. Don Regan knows very little of your operation and that is just as well." By May 28, however, it was clear that "the votes were not there," and the reprogramming effort was dropped in favor of a campaign to obtain Congressional support for the $100 million aid package. Meanwhile, the concerns that prompted North's silence at the May 16 NSPG meeting persisted: Who knew about the secret aid third countries had given earlier? In the prior 2 years, members of the NSC staff had approached several countries for financial assistance to the Contras. Of these, two had provided funds or other forms of assistance. Those solicitations were made without the knowledge of the Secretary of State and other senior diplomatic officials. The December amendment expressly provided that solicitations for humanitarian aid were not precluded. Now, Secretary Shultz and others were discussing making approaches to countries that had already contributed. Poindexter and North became concerned that their prior actions would be uncovered. On June 10, North wrote Poindexter, "[A]t this point, I'm not sure who on our side knows what. Elliott has talked to Shultz and had prepared a paper re going to [Country 2 and Country 3] for contributions. Elliott called me and asked 'where to send the money.'" North asked Abrams to "keep quiet" until he talked to Poindexter. North added: At this point I need your help. As you know, I have the accounts and the means by which this thing needs to be accomplished. I have no idea what Shultz knows or doesn't know, but he could prove to be very unhappy if he learns of the [Country 2 and 3] aid that has been given in the past from someone other than you. Did RCM [McFarlane] ever tell Shultz. North recommended that Poindexter and McFarlane meet to discuss "how much Sec Shultz does or does not know abt [Country 2 and 3] so that we don't make any mistakes." Poindexter declined to follow North's advice: "To my knowledge Shultz knows nothing about the prior financing. I think it should stay that way." Nonetheless, McFarlane informed Secretary Shultz. As the Secretary described the event, on June 16, 1986, he received a telephone call on a secure phone from McFarlane, who had by then been out of the Government for approximately 6 months. In a conversation that occurred completely out of context and long after the donation had been made, McFarlane told Secretary Shultz about the Country 2 donation to the Contras. Soon thereafter, Abrams recommended Brunei as a likely country from which to seek humanitarian assistance for the Contras. As Poindexter put it, "[t]hey have lots of money." Brunei also qualified for another reason. The Secretary of State did not want to be beholden to any country that was a recipient of U.S. aid. Brunei was not. Originally, the Secretary of State was to make the approach during a meeting with the Sultan of Brunei in June. Before Secretary Shultz left, Abrams asked North for a Contra account to which the money could be sent. North directed his secretary to prepare an index card with the account number on it. North told Abrams that the account was controlled by the Contras and Abrams so informed Secretary Shultz. Following Poindexter's instructions, North did not reveal that the NSC staff "had access to the accounts." North gave the index card to Abrams, who gave it to the Secretary of State. The Secretary decided, however, that he would discuss the general issue of Central America with the Sultan but that he would not make an actual solicitation. The card was not used on that trip. On August 8, 1986, Abrams met in London with a representative of the Government of Brunei. In an unusual occurrence for Abrams, he traveled under an alias. The two men first met at a London hotel, then walked in a nearby park where Abrams requested $10 million in bridge financing for the Contras. Asked by the official what Brunei would receive in return, Abrams responded, "Well, . . . the President will know of this, and you will have the gratitude of the Secretary and of the President for helping us out in this jam." The official persisted, asking, "What concrete do we get out of this?" Abrams responded, "You don't get anything concrete out of it." Abrams then gave the account number that he had received from North to the Brunei official. Although the Sultan of Brunei eventually transferred the $10 million, the funds never reached the account for which they were intended. North testified that he had intended to give Abrams the number of the Lake Resources account controlled by Secord and Hakim, but the account numbers had been inadvertently transposed by North or by his secretary, Fawn Hall. Felix Rodriguez Becomes Disaffected Shortly after North traveled to Central America in late April 1986, Rodriguez decided to leave Central America. Rodriguez testified: "I don't know if I got a sixth feeling or something, but after I saw the people in there, I didn't feel comfortable with it and I thought we had better leave." Rodriguez informed Steele, citing fatigue as the reason for his departure. Rodriguez met with Vice President Bush in Washington on May 1. He had arranged the meeting through the Vice President's National Security Adviser, Donald Gregg. The appointment scheduling memo for the meeting states: "To brief the Vice President on the status of the war in [a Central American country] and resupply of the Contras." Members of the Vice President's staff gave conflicting testimony over how this description was printed on his schedule. Sam Watson, the Vice President's Deputy National Security Adviser, testified that the memo was inaccurate, and that he did not provide the description. Phyllis Byrne, the secretary who typed the memo, testified that Watson had given her the description. In the Old Executive Office Building on his way to the Vice President's office, Rodriguez stopped by to tell North he was leaving the operation. Rodriguez said North asked him to remain in Central America, but he ignored the request. Escorted by Gregg and Watson, Rodriguez then met with the Vice President. Before Rodriguez could tell the Vice President that he was leaving Central America, North arrived and told the Vice President about the good job Rodriguez was doing. Embarrassed to tell the Vice President he was going to leave, Rodriguez left the meeting without discussing his resignation, and eventually returned to Central America. Rodriguez testified that "at no point in any of this conversation did I ever mention doing anything that was remotely connected to Nicaragua and the contras." Moreover, former Senator Nicholas Brady, who was also present at the meeting, testified that the resupply operation was not discussed. Rodriguez stayed in Central America, but his relationship with Dutton became increasingly strained. According to Dutton, they disagreed on how the operation should be run. At the same time, North had his own reservations that Rodriguez was "something of a loose cannon" who might reveal the operation. On June 8, Dutton complained about Rodriguez in a KL-43 message to North: "He now wants a $10K emergency fund that he will control. He also wants partial control of our fuel fund ($50K)." Cash funds translated into unaccountable slush funds so far as Dutton was concerned. Furthermore, with the establishment of cash accounts, the resupply operation would be "losing control of one of the most critical portions of the operation, that is the money." Rodriguez was summoned to meet with North and Dutton in Washington on June 25. North began by showing Rodriguez the organizational plan drawn up by Dutton, in which Rodriguez was designated "liaison officer." After North stated that he had intelligence that Rodriguez was compromising the operation by talking over open, unsecured telephone lines, Rodriguez complained that the poor condition of the aircraft, the communications equipment, and the lack of adequate radar had endangered the pilots and crew on the flight which hit the mountain, even though on that flight, despite the fog, the pilot was able to locate the drop zone by using the aircraft's radar. North, in turn, offered Rodriguez $3,000 a month to stay in the operation, which Rodriguez later accepted. Rodriguez testified that at the end of the meeting, he asked to see North alone. Rodriguez told North that he had learned "that people are stealing here," in particular Thomas Clines, a former associate of Edwin Wilson. Rodriguez expressed his concerns that arms were being sold at inflated prices. North disputed Rodriguez's conclusions and told Rodriguez that Clines was a patriot, and that he was not buying equipment, only helping to transport the goods. In fact, none of the arms furnished to the FDN and the Southern front since Rodriguez became involved in the operation were sold to the Contras. Instead, the Enterprise purchased arms with money obtained from the arms sales to Iran and private U.S. donors. At the close of the meeting, according to Rodriguez, North made one last comment. Congress was voting that day on the $100-million Contra aid legislation, and the television in North's office carried the floor debate. According to Rodriguez, North looked at the television and said: "Those people want me but they cannot touch me because the old man loves my ass." North did not recall that part of his conversation with Rodriguez. That meeting was the last between the two. New Legislation On June 25, 1986 the House approved the Administration's request for $100 million in Contra aid. Although the bill would not become law for another 3 months, the vote ensured passage of the Contra aid legislation. The President announced at 11:30 a.m. that day that the vote "signal[led] a new era of bipartisan consensus in American foreign policy . . . . We can be proud that we as a people have embraced the struggle of the freedom fighters in Nicaragua. Today, their cause is our cause." The $100 million aid package marked the first time in more than 2 years that the House had voted to provide lethal assistance to the Contras. By June 1986, North had established air resupply to both the Northern and Southern fronts. The Enterprise had succeeded in flying lethal material to the Contra fighters inside Nicaragua; even Americans in the employ of North's organization were flying into that country, all financed by donated funds and proceeds from the Iranian arms sales overseen by North. None of North's activities were disclosed to Congress in advance of the House vote. Only 1 month later, before the aid bill had been signed, Poindexter would write to Congress that the NSC was complying with the letter and spirit of the Boland Amendment. Selling the Assets to the CIA With the House vote in June, North's hopes to reengage the CIA in Nicaragua were on the verge of being realized. North was increasingly occupied with the Iran arms initiative, and he was anxious to give the Contra resupply operation back to the CIA. But North wanted the Enterprise to recoup its investment, and urged the CIA to buy the assets of the resupply operation in Central America. Secord had Dutton prepare a plan to present to the CIA. North wrote to Poindexter: We are rapidly approaching the point where the Project Democracy [PRODEM] assets in CentAm need to be turned over to CIA for use in the new program. The total value of the assets (six aircraft, warehouses, supplies, maintenance facilities, ships, boats, leased houses, vehicles, ordnance, munitions, communications equipment, and a 6520' runway on property owned by a PRODEM proprietary) is over $4.5 M. All of the assets - and the personnel - are owned/paid by overseas companies with no U.S. connection. All of the equipment is in first rate condition and is already in place. It wd be ludicrous for this to simply disappear just because CIA does not want to be "tainted" with picking up the assets and then have them spend $8-10 M of the $100 M to replace it - weeks or months later. Yet, that seems to be the direction they are heading, apparently based on NSC guidance. If you have already given Casey instructions to this effect, I wd vy much like to talk to you about it in hopes that we can reclaim the issue. All seriously believe that immediately after the Senate vote the DRF [Nicaraguan Democratic Resistance] will be subjected to a major Sandinista effort to break them before the U.S. aid can become effective. PRODEM currently has the only assets available to support the DRF and the CIA's most ambitious estimate is 30 days after a bill is signed before their own assets will be available. This will be a disaster for the DRF if they have to wait that long. North predicted "disaster" if his plan was not followed. The plan drafted by Dutton at Secord's request offered two options. The first was to sell the assets of the organization to the CIA at cost; the second would continue the operation on behalf of the CIA for a monthly fee. Although Dutton, Secord, and North differed in their public testimony over whose idea it was to include these two options (and Secord denied that he ever authorized a sale of the assets), Dutton's plan contemplated that the Enterprise would continue in operation. The plan indicated a preference for a sale because the funds generated would permit the Enterprise to engage in other covert action projects: "[W]e prefer option 1 with the proceeds from the sale going back into a fund for continued similar requirements." North testified that the idea to sell the Enterprise's assets to the CIA was Director Casey's. In a PROF note to Poindexter at the time, North said that the sale to the CIA would be the only way to finance purchases for the Contras prior to the time the Congressional appropriation became effective: Given our lack of movement on other funding options, and Elliot/[C/CATF's] plea for PRODEM [Project Democracy] to get food to the resistance ASAP, PRODEM will have to borrow at least $2 M to pay for the food. That's O.K., and Dick is willing to do so tomorrow - but only if there is reasonable assurance that the lenders can be repaid. The only way that the $2 M in food money can be repaid is if CIA purchases the $4.5 M worth of PRODEM equipment for about $2.25 M when the law passes. Concluding his efforts to "sell" the project, North offered to send Poindexter a copy of Dutton's "prospectus," or, as he wrote, "the PROJECT DEMOCRACY status report. It is useful, nonattributable reading." Poindexter responded that he had not given Casey any "guidance" against the sale and, indeed, that he approved of North's plan. Poindexter explained that he had told CIA Deputy Director Robert Gates "the private effort should be phased out," but he agreed with North and asked him to talk to Casey about the plan to sell Project Democracy to the CIA. Clair George, the CIA Deputy Director for Operations, testified that North asked him to buy the aircraft, but that he declined because their use in private resupply could result in criticism of the CIA. "I wouldn't buy those planes if they were the last three planes in Central America," he said. The Resupply Operation is Interrupted Relations between Felix Rodriguez and the resupply operation continued to deteriorate. Tensions increased when early in August a dispute erupted between Secord's deputy, Rafael Quintero, and Rodriguez. Ignoring Quintero's instructions not to use the aircraft, Rodriguez took an Enterprise-owned plane in Miami and flew into the Airbase with a load of spare parts and medicine. By the time Rodriguez arrived in Central America, Quintero was claiming that the plane had been stolen. Quintero gave instructions to refuel and send the plane back to Miami, full of the supplies. Rodriguez ignored the order and told the crew to unload. Rodriguez maintained that all the aircraft belonged to the FDN, and expressed his concern to the Commander that the Enterprise would pull out, taking the planes away from their rightful owners - the FDN. On August 6, Dutton called North to tell him that Rodriguez "took C-123 from Miami." North later complained to Gregg, the Vice President's National Security Adviser, that Rodriguez had "made off with an airplane," and asked him, "Will you call him and find out what the hell is going on?" Rodriguez told Gregg he had decided to tell Gregg "about what had been going on." Steele then called North to tell him that the "situation was not good." Steele warned North there was no one on the "scene who can take charge," and that the Commander was becoming a "potential problem" because he believed that the aircraft "belong[ed] to the DRF [Democratic Resistance Forces]." Steele added that Rodriguez was "enroute to see Don [Gregg]." North sent his colleague and aide, Lt. Col. Robert Earl, to sit in on the Rodriguez-Gregg meeting. Briefing Earl before the meeting, North portrayed Rodriguez as someone who had "insinuated himself into the organization and was giving rudder orders and it was not his place to do so." In the dispute with Rodriguez, Quintero had also accused Rodriguez of air piracy. Now, after conferring with Rodriguez, the Commander understood that he too was accused of air piracy, and feared the aircraft themselves would be taken. On August 8, Rodriguez met with Gregg and set out his allegations about the Secord group. Gregg noted the points Rodriguez made: "using Ed Wilson group for supplies"; "Felix used by Ollie to get Contra plane repaired . . ."; "a swap of weapons for $ was arranged to get aid for Contras, Clines and General Secord tied in"; "Hand grenades bought for $3 - sold for $9." Gregg, according to Earl, expressed shock about the involvement of Clines. On August 12, Gregg convened a meeting to discuss Rodriguez's allegations with a group of Administration officials involved in Central American policymaking: Steele; Ambassador Edwin Corr; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Walker; the Chief of the Central American Task Force; and from the NSC, Earl and Ray Burghardt. Gregg testified that he "went over the notes with the people who were there." Without mentioning North's involvement, Gregg emphasized that he considered Clines not reliable but that he had faith in Rodriguez. Gregg knew by this time that North was involved in the operation. Rodriguez had made that clear at his initial August 8 meeting, and Gregg's notes reflect that knowledge. Gregg testified that at no time did he pass that information on to the Vice President. Gregg did not report the meeting, because he believed it "was a very murky business . . . . We had never discussed the Contras. We had no responsibility for it. We had no expertise in it. I wasn't at all certain what this amounted to . . . . I felt I had passed along that material to the organizations who could do something about it, and I frankly did not think it was Vice Presidential level." The Resupply Operation Resumes Shortly after Gregg's August 12 meeting, Steele was scheduled to meet with Dutton in Washington to resolve the dispute with the Commander. Dutton had told Steele by KL-43 that "It is everyone's intent to continue to support the effort," but that the aircraft were owned by an independent company, not the FDN, in part so they could be used to support the Southern front forces as well as the FDN. Secord, too, insisted that the aircraft belonged to a private company. Earl, North's deputy, told Secord by K143 on August 13 that the crew should simply pull out because the threat of a lawsuit against the Commander had "poisoned the atmosphere." Secord responded that there was more than "1 million dollars worth equipment" in Central America owned by the Enterprise, which had no intention of abandoning them. Secord explained that the "threat of air piracy lawsuit has nothing to do with [the Commander]. This was comment made to VP by Ollie ref Max [Felix Rodriguez] vice [the Commander]." Dutton later met with Steele in Washington and by the end of the meeting, Steele had agreed to help to solve the brewing "confrontation" between the Commander and the resupply operation. The warring parties reached an uneasy resolution after Steele returned to Central America. Steele took a more active role in overseeing the flights and was told to inform the Commander that, while the assets were made available to the Contra cause, they belonged to a private company whose desire was to turn them over to the CIA once the Agency resumed Contra support. Steele felt that he would have trouble persuading the Commander to accept this position until he was assured that the CIA would continue to provide support. On August 22, Dutton was able to reassure Steele: Received new guidance through Goode [North] from his boss. We are to stay in full operation supporting the drops until 1 Oct. At that time NSC says that CIA will have been in operation approx. 1 month. The CIA will go to [The Central American government] and explain that they, the CIA, are now in control. During the fall of 1986, problems continued in the resupply operation, but some success on both the Northern and Southern fronts was finally achieved. The resupply operation delivered more than 180,000 pounds of lethal supplies to the Southern front in September alone. In late August, North attended a Restricted Interagency Group meeting at which the Chief of the CATF and others were asked what steps the airlift - i.e., according to North, the "covert operation being conducted by this government to support the Nicaraguan Resistance" - should take now that the CIA was due to assume control. According to North, he described at that meeting the activities in which the Enterprise was engaged and sought approval from the Restricted Interagency Group to continue until the CIA could take over. While the Chief of CATF acknowledged that North discussed airdrops to the Contras, he testified that he did not recall North discussing "his full service covert action program." On August 22, Dutton met with Quintero and devised a new plan for Southern front resupply that he presented to North: The initial arrival over the drop zone should be at dusk; once the zone has been identified by the pilots, repeated sequential drops would be made in the evening without communication to the troops. Castillo agreed with the plan, as did Steele. North also approved it. On September 4, North met with Poindexter. North asked Poindexter for the "go/no go" on sequential air deliveries to the Southern forces. Shortly afterwards, North told Secord to implement the new drop plan and conduct a "force feed" operation to the South where all supplies would be delivered sequentially in accordance with Dutton's plan. On September 9, Dutton flew with the crew in the second C-123 (now operational) inside southern Nicaragua to attempt a lethal drop to the troops Castillo had identified. But this mission was unable to locate the troops, prompting Dutton to propose to North using two aircraft on each mission to increase delivery potential once troops were located and to protect against increased Sandinista anti-aircraft fire. Dutton also asked North for help on weather information and troop location. North approved the use of two aircraft and told Dutton to obtain weather information from Steele, and that he would speak to Castillo about troop locations. North cautioned Dutton not to personally fly inside Nicaragua again: The operation could not afford the exposure if the plane were shot down inside Nicaragua with Col. Robert Dutton at the controls. The pace of delivery stepped up. The resupply operation was finally becoming effective only weeks before the CIA would be back in the business. On September 11, a lethal drop was successfully made to the South using the C-123 while the C-7 delivered more arms for the FDN in the northern regions. Dutton reported the success of the southern delivery to North. On the 12th, three aircraft made more deliveries: a C-123 delivered 10,000 pounds to the South and a CT and a Maule delivered to the FDN. September 13 was "a red letter day," Dutton wrote to North. All five aircraft flew at the same time, with lethal loads dropped in both the North and South. "The surge is now in full force," Dutton relayed to North. The plan at last was working. Things were going so well that Dutton advised North that an additional $20,000 in cash was needed for the fuel fund and that the "C-123 is now armed with HK-21/7.62 machine gun on the aft ramp, bring on the MI-24." In fact, before Dutton returned to Washington, he could report to North that "all troops should now have equipment. Will stand by for direction from [Castillo]. He already told us not to send any more to [a Southern commandante] for a while. Never thought we would hear that." The "hand-to-mouth" operation that had limped along on limited resources for so long had, with the support of certain individuals, finally delivered the goods. Under North's direction, Dutton's operational control, Castillo's critical assistance in locating, dispatching, and scheduling the needs of the Southern troops, and Steele's coordination with the Commander, the South received arms, while deliveries continued apace to the FDN in the North. Indeed, for the rest of September, lethal drops were successfully made to both the FDN and the Southern forces. North duly reported the operation's success to Poindexter. When Dutton returned from Central America later that month, he met with North. North asked him to arrange a 1-day trip to the region so that he could personally thank the pilots and crew. North told him, "Bob, you will never get a medal for this, but some day the President will shake your hand and thank you for it." Dutton had also prepared a photograph album depicting the operation: the operational bases, drop zones, aircraft, munitions, and the crew replete with assault machine guns and other assorted weapons. Dutton showed the album to North, who liked it and said he wanted to show it to "the top boss." North testified that he sent the album to Poindexter to show to the President, but never heard further about the album. Poindexter testified that he did not show the album to the President. North Expands His Special Operations Even with the $100 million in appropriated funds becoming available in the near future, North tried to get other aid for the Contras. In May, Israeli Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin had offered to provide Israeli military advisers for the Southern front. Although nothing came of this offer, North and Rabin met again in September and discussed an Israeli transfer of Soviet bloc weapons to the Contras. Rabin wanted "to know if we had any need for SovBloc weaps and ammo he could make avail." Rabin asked whether North's ship, the Erria, had left the Mediterranean. When North responded that it was in Lisbon, Rabin suggested that it dock at Haifa and "have it filled w whatever they cd assemble" of a "recently seized PLO shipment captured at sea." Poindexter sanctioned the Israeli arms offer: "I think you should go ahead and make it happen. It can be a private deal between Dick [Secord] and Rabin that we bless . . . . Keep the pressure on Bill [Casey] to make things right for Secord." Later, Poindexter cautioned "[a]bsolutely nobody else should know about this. Rabin should not say anything to anybody else except you or me." On September 15, North told Poindexter that "orders were passed to the ship this morning to proceed to Haifa to pick up the arms. Loading will be accomplished by Israeli military personnel." Despite Poindexter's caution, North later recounted the offer in a memorandum briefing the President for a visit from Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres. North wrote that Prime Minister Peres was likely to raise certain sensitive issues, such as the transfer of Soviet bloc arms by the Israelis "for use by the Nicaraguan democratic resistance." North recommended: "If Peres raises this issue, it would be helpful if the President thanked him since the Israelis hold considerable stores of bloc ordinance compatible with what the Nicaraguan resistance now uses." Next to this sentence, Poindexter penciled: "Rabin. Very tightly held." As another expansion of his special operations, North received an offer from a third party to engage in sabotage and other activities inside Nicaragua, to be financed with Enterprise funds. Poindexter approved the sabotage plan, but instructed North not to become involved in conspiracy or assassinations. According to North, the plan was never implemented because North was dismissed.