$Unique_ID{bob00341} $Pretitle{} $Title{Japan Chapter 6A. Foreign Relations} $Subtitle{} $Author{Toshio George Tsukahira} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{foreign policy japan united economic states world affairs political japan's} $Date{1981} $Log{} Title: Japan Book: Japan, A Country Study Author: Toshio George Tsukahira Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1981 Chapter 6A. Foreign Relations Japan's foreign policy in late 1981 was undergoing a thorough reexamination as the country's leaders and policymakers reviewed and debated the country's course as a member of the world community. The policy Japan had followed throughout the post-World War II period was characterized by concentration on economic growth; flexible accommodation to the regional and global policies of the United States while avoiding major initiatives of its own; adherence to pacifist principles embodied in the 1947 Constitution, referred to as the "peace constitution"; and generally passive and low-profile behavior in world affairs. Relations with other countries were until recently governed by what the leadership called "omni-directional diplomacy," which was essentially a policy of political neutrality in foreign affairs while expanding economic relations wherever possible. This policy was highly successful and allowed Japan to prosper and grow as an economic power, but it was feasible only while the country enjoyed the security and economic stability provided by its ally, the United States. The need for a revamping of Japan's foreign policy posture had become apparent during the 1970s and particularly since the middle of the decade, as major changes in the international situation and the nation's own development into an economic world power made the old diplomacy obsolete. Japan's burgeoning economic growth and expansion into overseas markets had given rise to foreign criticism-charges of "economic aggression" and demands that it adopt more balanced trade policies. Changes in the power relationships in the Asian quadrilateral-made up of the United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and China-also called for reexamination of policies. The deepening Sino-Soviet split and confrontation, the dramatic rapprochement between the United States and China, the rapid reduction of the United States military presence in Asia following the Vietnam debacle, and the sudden expansion of Soviet military power in the western Pacific-all required a reevaluation of Japan's security position and overall role in Asia. Finally the oil crises of the 1970s sharpened Japanese awareness of the country's critical vulnerability to the cutoff of raw material and energy supplies and underscored the need for a more positive, less passive, and more independent foreign policy. In addition to the situational changes outlined above, Japanese thinking on foreign policy was influenced by the gradual rise of a new postwar generation to leadership and policymaking positions. The differences in outlook between the older leaders still in positions of power and influence and the younger generation that was replacing them complicated the ongoing debate. The key issues under study and discussion related to four broad questions: What is Japan's relationship to the rest of Asia? How can Japan play a more positive and constructive role in world affairs, perhaps as a bridge between East and West and between North and South? How should Japan adjust to the changing economic situation and strategic stance of its principal partner and ally, the United States, and to the latter's insistent pressures for more sharing of the security burden in Asia? How can Japan modify its cautious and reactive diplomatic style and pursue a more positive and assertive diplomacy without aggravating its strategic vulnerabilities, abandoning its pacifist principles, or arousing latent antagonisms and fears among former enemies and victims of past militaristic and imperialist policies? As of late 1981 the debate had not abated, and final conclusions had by no means been reached, but there was little doubt among most observers that a new consensus was being forged and that the country's foreign policy was at a turning point. Barring a catastrophic collapse of the existing world order, the new diplomacy was not likely to be a drastic reversal of the old, but rather an evolutionary outgrowth of the existing pattern. Some indication of the direction in which foreign policy was heading was to be found in the government's 712-page foreign policy report, referred to as the "blue book," published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in September 1981. The report characterized 1980 as the year of instability in East-West relations and said that Japan would consolidate its ties with other industrial democracies to counter the Soviet Union whose actions, it charged, had threatened world peace and stability. The report stated that Japan would pursue a "comprehensive security" policy that would involve coordinating basic strategies with other advanced industrial democracies of the West, expanding Japan's defense forces, and playing a political as well as an economic role by giving aid to friendly nations located close to areas of international dispute or conflict, such as Turkey and Pakistan, in order to strengthen them and help them maintain stability. Major Foreign Policy Goals and Strategies Japan's geography-particularly its insular character, its limited endowment of natural resources, and its exposed location near potentially hostile giant neighbors-has played an important role in the development of its foreign policy. In pre-modern times, Japan's semi-isolated position on the periphery of the Asian mainland was an asset. It permitted the Japanese to exist as a self-sufficient society in a secure environment. It also allowed them to borrow selectively from the rich culture of China while maintaining their own cultural identity and sense of uniqueness. Insularity promoted a strong cultural and ethnic unity, which underlay the early development of a national consciousness that influenced Japan's relations with outside peoples and cultures throughout its history. Evolution In the early sixteenth century, a feudally divided Japan came into contact with Western missionaries and traders for the first time. The Westerners introduced important cultural innovations into Japanese society during more than a century of relations with various feudal rulers; but when the country was unified at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Tokugawa shogunate decided to expel the foreign missionaries and strictly limit all intercourse with the outside world. Essentially national seclusion was Japan's foreign policy for over two centuries. When the Tokugawa seclusion policy was forcibly breached in 1854 by Commodore Matthew C. Perry of the United States Navy, Japan found that geography no longer provided security-the country was defenseless against military pressures and economic exploitation by the industrialized Western powers. After Perry's "black ships" had compelled Japan to enter into relations with the nations of the Western world, the first foreign policy debate was over the question of whether Japan should embark on an extensive program of modernization to cope with the perceived threat of the "eastward advance of Western power" that had already violated the independence of China or whether Japan should expel the "barbarians" and revert to a seclusion policy. The latter alternative-though it appealed to many-was never realistic. Starting at the time of the Meiji Restoration of 1868, which ushered in a new centralized regime, Japan set out to "gather wisdom from all over the world" and embarked on an ambitious program of military, social, political, and economic reforms that transformed it within a generation into a modern nation-state and major world power. The foreign policy of modern Japan was shaped at the outset by its need to reconcile its Asian identity with its desire for status and security in an international order dominated by the West (see The Meiji Period [1868-1912], ch. 1). The principal foreign policy goals of the Meiji regime (1868-1912) were to protect the integrity and independence of the nation against Western domination and to win equality of status with the leading nations of the West; the main energies of Japan during the Meiji era were singlemindedly directed at the achievement of these objectives. Since fear of Western military power was the chief concern of the Meiji leaders, they directed their priority effort, under the slogan "Rich nation, strong arms" (fukoku kyohei), at building up the basic requirements for national defense. They saw that a modern military establishment required a national conscription system, drawing manpower from an adequately educated population. They also saw that it needed, in addition to a trained officer corps, a sophisticated chain of command and strategy and tactics adapted to contemporary conditions-modern arms together with the factories to make them, sufficient wealth to purchase them, and a transportation system to deliver them. An important objective of the military buildup was to gain the respect of the Western powers and promote the achievement of equal status for Japan in the international community. Inequality of status was symbolized by the treaties imposed on Japan when the country was first opened to foreign intercourse. The treaties were objectionable to the Japanese not only because they imposed low fixed tariffs on foreign imports and thus handicapped domestic industries, but also because their provisions giving a virtual monopoly of external trade to foreigners and granting extraterritorial status to foreign nationals in Japan, thus exempting them from Japanese jurisdiction, placed Japan in the inferior category of uncivilized nations. A good part of the social and institutional reforms of the Meiji period were designed to remove the stigma of backwardness and inferiority represented by the "unequal treaties," and a major task of Meiji diplomacy was to press for early treaty revision (see International Relations, ch. 1). Once created, the Meiji military machine was used to extend Japanese power overseas, for many leaders believed that national security depended on expansion and not merely a strong defense. Within thirty years the country's military forces had fought and defeated Imperial China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-95, winning possession of Taiwan and Chinese recognition of the independence of Korea. Ten years later in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, Japan defeated Tsarist Russia and won possession of southern Sakhalin as well as a position of paramount influence in Korea and southern Manchuria. By this time Japan had been able to negotiate revisions of the unequal treaties with the Western powers and had in 1902 formed an alliance with the world's leading power, Britain. After World War I, in which it participated as one of the Western allies, Japan sat with the victors at Versailles and enjoyed the status of a great power in its own right. Between World War I and World War II, the nation embarked on a course of imperialist expansion, using both diplomatic and military means to extend its control over more and more of the Asian mainland. It began to see itself as the protector and champion of Asian interests against the West, a point of view that brought it increasingly into conflict with the Western powers. When its aggressive policies met firm resistance from the United States and that country's allies, Japan made common cause with the Axis powers of Germany and Italy and launched into war with the United States and the Western alliance. After Japan's devastating defeat in World War II, the nation came under an Allied occupation in which the United States, as the principal occupying power, was charged with the demilitarization and democratization of the state. Major changes were made in the political, social, and economic fabric. During this seven-year period, the country had no control over its foreign affairs and became in effect the ward of the United States on the international scene. It adopted a new constitution renouncing war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as an instrument of national policy (see The 1947 Constitution and Government Structure, ch. 6). When Japan regained its sovereignty in 1952 and reentered the international community as an independent nation, it found itself in a world dominated by the cold war between East and West, in which the Soviet Union and the United States headed opposing camps. By virtue of the Peace Treaty signed in San Francisco on September 8, 1951, ending the state of war between Japan and most of the Allied powers except the Soviet Union and China, and the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan also signed in San Francisco the same day, Japan was now essentially a dependent ally of the United States, which continued to maintain bases and troops on Japanese soil. Japan's foreign policy goals during most of the early postwar period were essentially to regain economic viability and to establish its credibility as a peaceful member of the world community. National security was entrusted to the protective shield and nuclear umbrella of the United States, which was permitted under the security treaty which came into effect in April 1952 to dispose its forces in and about Japan and to use them against any military threat-internal or external-in the region. A special diplomatic task was to assuage the suspicions and alleviate the resentments among Asian neighbors who had suffered from Japanese colonial rule and imperialist aggression in the past. Japan's diplomacy toward its Asian neighbors, therefore, tended to be extremely low key, conciliatory, and nonassertive. With respect to the world at large, the nation maintained a low-profile approach, avoiding political issues and concentrating on economic goals. Under its omni-directional diplomacy, it sought to cultivate friendly ties with all nations and, proclaiming a policy of "separation of politics and economics," adhered, to the extent possible, to a neutralist position on East-West issues. During the 1950s and 1960s foreign policy actions were guided by three basic principles: close cooperation with the United States for both security and economic reasons; the promotion of a free trade system congenial to Japan's own economic needs; and international cooperation through the United Nations (UN)-to which it was admitted in 1956-and other multilateral bodies. Adherence to these principles worked well and contributed to phenomenal economic recovery and growth during the first two decades after the end of the occupation period. Recent Formulation In the 1970s the basic postwar principles remained unchanged but were approached from a new perspective owing to the pressure of practical politics at home and abroad. In Japan there was growing domestic pressure on the government to exercise more foreign policy initiatives independent of the United States, without, however, compromising vital security and economic ties with the latter. The nation's phenomenal economic growth had made it a ranking world economic power by the early 1970s and had generated a sense of pride and self-esteem especially among the younger generation. The demand for a more independent foreign policy posture reflected this enhanced national self-image. Additionally changes in world economic relations during the 1970s encouraged a more independent stance. Japan had become relatively less dependent on the Western powers for its resource needs. Oil, for example, was being obtained directly from the producing countries and not from the Western-controlled multinational companies. Other important materials also came increasingly from sources other than the United States and its allies, while trade with the United States as a share of total trade dropped significantly during the decade of the 1970s. Thus political leaders began to argue that in the interests of economic self-preservation, more attention should be paid to the financial and developmental needs of other countries, especially those that provided Japan with vital energy and raw material supplies. The move toward a more autonomous foreign policy was accelerated in the 1970s by the United States decision to withdraw troops from Indochina. The collapse of the Vietnam War effort was seen as the end of an era of United States military and economic dominance in Asia and brought to the fore a marked shift in Japanese perceptions and attitudes concerning the United States. This shift, which had been developing since the early 1970s, took the form of questioning the credibility of the United States nuclear umbrella, as well as whether Japan could continue to depend on the United States to underwrite a stable international currency system, guarantee Japanese access to energy and raw materials, or secure Japanese interests in a stable political order. The shift, therefore, required a reassessment of omni-directional diplomacy. As Professor Gerald Curtis of Columbia University has pointed out, the growing perception of United States weakness and decline has underlain Japanese concern for what in the late 1970s came to be called "comprehensive security"-a concept that calls for the development of new, more active political, economic, and diplomatic strategies; the strengthening of national defense forces; and closer political and strategic cooperation with the United States and the other advanced industrial democracies of the West. The new approach was reflected to some extent in Japan's efforts to cultivate closer ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN); in its pro-Arab tilt since the 1973 oil boycott; in the new interest in military defense; and in the departure from a diplomacy focused exclusively on protecting Japan's access to vital resources to one which would include politically motivated aid to strategically located Third World countries. Despite these and other manifestations of a changing posture, it was clear in mid-1981 that no revolutionary change in foreign policy was about to take place. Constrained by the terms of the 1947 Constitution and by strong political opposition to rearmament, the nation was not ready to consider the development of independent military capabilities or the assumption of a major role in regional security (see Missions, ch. 8). Efforts would be made to improve the nation's defensive capabilities under the 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, but a firm military alliance and economic cooperation with the United States was repeatedly reaffirmed as the "basic law" and keystone of foreign policy. Foreign Policy Formulation Institutional Framework Under the 1947 Constitution, the cabinet exercised the primary responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs, subject to the overall supervision of the National Diet. The prime minister was required to make periodic reports on foreign relations to the Diet, whose upper and lower houses each included a foreign affairs committee. Each committee reported its deliberations to plenary sessions of the chamber to which it belonged. Ad hoc committees were also formed occasionally to consider special questions. Diet members had the right to raise pertinent questions-officially termed interpellations-to the foreign minister and prime minister on policy. Foreign treaties required ratification by the Diet. As head of state, the emperor performed the ceremonial function of receiving foreign envoys and attesting to foreign treaties ratified by the Diet. As the chief executive and constitutionally the dominant figure in the political system, the prime minister had the final word in major foreign policy decisions. The minister of foreign affairs, usually a senior member of the cabinet, acted as the prime minister's chief adviser in matters of planning and implementation. The minister was assisted by two vice-ministers: the permanent vice-minister was in charge of administering the ministry and was picked for this position from among senior career officials of the ministry; the parliamentary vice-minister was responsible for political liaison with the Diet. The latter position was customarily held by a political appointee, who was a member of the Diet and belonged to the prime minister's own party. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was organized on functional and geographical lines and as of mid-1981 had a staff of about 3,500 (see fig. 14). The staff included an elite career foreign service corps, recruited on the basis of performance in a competitive examination, and thereafter trained by the ministry's Foreign Service Training Institute. The handling of specific foreign policy issues was usually divided within the ministry between its geographic and functional bureaus so that a minimum of overlapping and competitive involvement occurred. Bilateral issues were assigned to the geographic bureaus whereas multilateral problems went to the functional bureaus. Only the Treaties Bureau, with its wide-ranging responsibilities, tended to get involved in the whole spectrum of issues dealt with by the ministry. The Research and Analysis Department in the ministry's secretariat engaged in comprehensive and coordinated policy investigation and planning, but its role in practice was circumscribed by the reluctance of the regular bureaus to accept outside involvement. Long a profession of high social prestige, diplomatic service was traditionally a preserve of the upper social strata and-aside from formal qualifications-proper social origin, family connections, and graduation from Tokyo Imperial University were important as requirements for admission into the service. After World War II these requirements were changed as part of reform measures to democratize the political and governmental processes. In mid-1981 the overwhelming majority of career foreign service officers had won the coveted certificate indicating they had successfully passed the postwar Higher Foreign Service Examination before entry into the service. A greater proportion of the certificate holders still were graduates of the prestigious law faculty of Tokyo University. In 1980 and early 1981 virtually all the ambassadorial appointments were made, as they had been in recent decades, from among veteran diplomats, and politically appointed ambassadors were distinct exceptions to the rule. Diplomacy was not a monopoly of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Given the overriding importance of economic factors in foreign relations, the ministry worked closely with the Ministry of Finance (MOF) in matters of customs, tariff, international finance, and foreign aid; with the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) concerning exports and imports; and with the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries (MAFF) in connection with questions of foreign agricultural imports and fishing rights. The foreign ministry also consulted other agencies, such as the Fair Trade Commission, the Export-Import Bank, the Japan External Trade Organization, the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, and the Overseas Technical Cooperation Agency. On many issues affecting the country's foreign economic activities-and thus its diplomatic relations as well-the ministries of foreign affairs and of finance were known to have generally favored measures liberalizing import restrictions. On the other hand MITI and MAFF had adhered to a more protectionist stand, evidently because of pressures from special interest groups (see Institutions for Trade, ch. 5). The vital importance of foreign affairs expanded to affect virtually every aspect of national life as Japan entered the 1980s, and the multiplicity of agencies involved in external affairs continued to be a source of confusion and inefficiency in the formulation of foreign policy. On the other hand as the postwar generation of leaders and policymakers began to assume a greater role in government decisionmaking and as public attitudes on foreign policy issues matured, there were indications that foreign affairs were being conducted on the basis of a stabler consensus than had existed in previous postwar history. Foreign Affairs in Domestic Politics During the decade of the 1970s, most Japanese remained preoccupied mainly with domestic problems, as they had been in earlier years, but there was also a marked increase in popular interest in foreign affairs. This was the result not only of the country's rising international prestige and a corresponding growth of national pride, but also because of the uncertainty stemming from unsettling developments on the world scene and from major changes in relations among the leading world powers. There was an acute awareness, revealed in public opinion polls and in commentary literature, that in a world of increasing economic interdependence, Japan's own political stability and economic health could be adversely affected by events taking place in distant foreign areas. The oil crises of the 1970s, for example, underscored the nation's vulnerability to the repercussions of conflict in the Middle East. Additionally the aggressive moves of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan and particularly its military buildup in the southern Kurils and other islands close to Japan did much to raise the level of public concern about the conduct of foreign affairs. The government, more firmly than ever under the control of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) after the party's sharp gains in the 1980 elections, continued its major efforts to popularize its basic policy of close economic and security ties with the United States; of responding to international expectations of greater political as well as economic contributions on the part of Japan; and of international cooperation through the UN in the cause of world peace, disarmament, aid to developing countries, and educational and technical cooperation. Foreign policy speeches by the prime minister and the minister of foreign affairs were widely disseminated, and a number of pamphlets and booklets on major foreign policy questions were frequently issued. Political elements opposing the government's foreign policy stands were able to present their views and alternatives freely through political parties they supported or through the mass communications media, which often took vocal and independent positions on wide-ranging external issues (see The Press and Politics, ch. 6). Some of the opposing elements were leftists who sought to exert their influence through their representatives in the Diet, the mass organizations to which they belonged or which they supported, and-although less frequently than in the 1960s-by participating in mass rallies and street demonstrations. In contrast, groups supporting the government-notably the business community and agricultural interests-brought pressure to bear on the prime minister, appropriate cabinet members, and members of the Diet, usually through behind-the-scenes negotiations and compromises. Partisan political activities of all ideological tendencies were undertaken freely and openly, but the difference in foreign policy perspectives appeared to derive less from doctrinaire than from issue-oriented considerations. Broadly stated, the partisan disagreement among the various groups competing for power centered on the question of Japan's safety from external threat or attack. The dominant view in 1981, as in the preceding three decades, was that although the Japanese people should be responsible for the defense of their homeland, they should also continue their security ties with the United States-at least until they could gain sufficient confidence in their own self-defense power. Proponents of this view agreed that this self defense capability should be based on conventional arms and that any nuclear shield should be provided by the United States under the 1960 security treaty. Since the United States rapprochement with China and China's endorsement of the United States-Japan security tie, the demand for the termination of the security treaty, which had previously united all opposition political groups, became less insistent. The Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) and the Clean Government Party (Komeito) have indicated their readiness to support the treaty, while the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) dropped its demand for immediate abrogation, suggesting instead that the security treaty should be replaced in time, through agreement with the United States, by a peace friendship pact. Only the Japan Communist Party (JCP) remained adamant. Despite partisan differences, however, all political parties and groups were nearly unanimous in their view that Japan should exercise more independence and initiative in the conduct of its foreign affairs and not appear to be so ready to follow the United States lead on matters affecting Japan's interests. They also adhered to the view that Japan should retain its non-nuclear weapons policy, which does not permit the introduction of such weapons into Japan. These shared views stemmed from the resurgence of nationalism during the postwar era and from the Japanese people's pride in their own heritage and in the economic recovery and achievements of the post-World War II decades. Although there were indications that the "nuclear allergy" produced by Japan's traumatic experience with the atomic bombings of August 1945 was beginning to moderate with the passage of time, it still remained in 1981 a sensitive political issue. Except for security-related matters, most foreign affairs issues involved economic interests and primarily attracted the attention only of the specific group or groups affected. The role of interest groups in the formulation of foreign policy varied with the issue at hand. Because trade and capital investment issues were involved in the negotiations for normalizing relations with China and with the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and in the negotiations with the Soviet Union on Siberian resources development, the business community played a significant role as an interested party. Similarly, when fishery rights or agricultural imports were being negotiated, representatives of the industries affected worked with political leaders and the foreign affairs bureaucracies concerned in shaping policy. Because of the continuous control of the government enjoyed by the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) since its formation in 1955, the policymaking bodies of the LDP had become the major loci of government policy formulation. Since the unified will of the majority party almost invariably prevailed in the Diet, that body had been virtually reduced to a mere sounding board for government policy pronouncements and a rubber-stamp ratifier of decisions made by the prime minister and his cabinet. This meant that significant debate and deliberations on foreign policy matters generally took place not in the Diet but inside the closed doors of the governing LDP in meetings, for example, between representatives of the Foreign Affairs Section of the LDP'S Policy Research Council and officials of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, MITI, or leaders of major LDP support groups, such as the Federation of Economic Organizations (Keizai Dantai Rengokai-better known as Keidanren). The role of public opinion and public attitudes in the formulation of foreign policy remained as difficult to determine in late 1981 as it had been throughout the three decades since the end of the Allied occupation. Japan continued, however, to be extremely public opinion minded, and opinion polling became a conspicuous feature of national life. The large number of polls on public policy issues, including foreign policy matters, conducted by the prime minister's office, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and other government organizations led to the presumption by analysts that the collective opinions of voters do exert significant influence on policymakers. The public attitudes toward foreign policy that had pertained throughout much of the post-World War II period appeared at the beginning of the 1980s to have shifted. Opinion polls reflected a marked increase in national pride and self-esteem. Moreover public discussion of security matters by government officials, political party leaders, press commentators, and academics had become markedly less volatile and doctrinaire, more open and pragmatic, suggesting indirectly that public attitudes on this subject had matured as well. The mass media, and particularly the press, continued to play their role as major molders of public attitudes. The press sought to fulfill its traditional mission as the champion of the public interest and unrelenting critic of the government. It was the chief source of demands that the government exercise a more independent and less "weak-kneed" diplomacy in view of the changing world situation and Japan's increased stature in the world.