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$Title{Japan
Chapter 5A.   The Political System}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{Donald M. Seekins}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{diet
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$Date{1981}
$Log{See Diet Building*0033701.scf
}
Title:       Japan
Book:        Japan, A Country Study
Author:      Donald M. Seekins
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1981

Chapter 5A.   The Political System

     The post-World War II era has seen the development in Japan of a stable,
parliamentary political system. Its institutional foundations are defined in
the Constitution that went into effect in May 1947, replacing the 1889 Meiji
Constitution. The people are defined as sovereign, and the Constitution is
based on the principle of legislative supremacy. Power is entrusted to
popularly elected representatives in the National Diet, and the executive
branch of the government, the cabinet, and civil service are subject to its
will. Local governments have wide areas of discretion free of central
government control, and the judiciary is fully independent. A broad spectrum
of individual rights is guaranteed.

     Although conservatives and rightists continued to demand its revision,
recommending the strengthening of the powers of the central government and the
deletion of Article 9 on the renunciation of war, the Constitution remained
in late 1981 the basis of a system that resembled (in terms of its stability
and the freedoms given its citizens) the constitutional monarchies of Western
Europe more than the governments established in neighboring Asian countries.
Although the current Constitution is very different in basic respects from the
Meiji document, the fact that the latter had allowed for the development of
political parties, a broad (though still exclusively male) electorate, and the
establishment of cabinets run by party politicians during the 1920s and early
1930s gave political leaders valuable experience and precedents in the
building of new parliamentary institutions.

     Although the political system in the early 1980s bore the imprint of the
1947 constitutional reform as well as prewar parliamentary traditions, one of
the most important sources of stability has been the dominance of a single
political party, the Liberal Democratic Party, in the years since its
formation in November 1955. The party, composed of conservative and moderate
elements closely associated with business and agricultural interests, has been
able to form majorities in both houses of the Diet with the exception of the
1976 House of Representatives election, when it could govern only with the
support of independents and one of the smaller parties. The continued success
of the Liberal Democrats can be attributed to a number of factors: rapid
economic growth, bringing a higher standard of living and the creation of a
"new middle class," for which the party can take some credit; and the
inability of the opposition parties to form workable coalitions or provide
viable alternatives to conservative rule. Moreover the fact that electoral
districts have not been redrawn to keep pace with the postwar population
trends has resulted in overrepresentation of rural constituencies, which are
traditional strongholds of Liberal Democratic support.

     Observers claim that traditional values, particularly values of loyalty
and reciprocity associated with patron-client relationships, continue to be of
primary importance in terms of the internal workings of the Liberal Democratic
Party. An intricate "geography of personal networks" extended from the local
level, where party politicians organized citizens into efficient local support
groups (koenkai), to the national level, where Diet members were grouped into
factions led by influential senior political figures.

     In late 1981 factions remained of central importance in choosing the
Liberal Democratic Party president who, with the party's majority in the Diet,
becomes prime minister. Personal networks extended from the party to other
groups, primarily those representing business interests. Ties with top
government bureaucrats were also extremely close. The stability of Liberal
Democratic Party rule promoted the evolution of a policymaking process that
took place largely outside the Diet, and many critics claimed that the system
was in effect a violation of the constitutional principle of legislative
supremacy. Top civil servants were insulated from political pressures exerted
either by cabinet ministers or members of the Diet, and the latter were seen
as merely monitors and critics of, rather than participants in, the political
process.

Japan's Prewar Political Institutions

     The Constitution of the Empire of Japan, or Meiji Constitution (1889),
was a conservative document that combined a native Japanese ideology with
foreign, primarily German, elements and was to serve as the framework upon
which a strong, dynamic state apparatus would be established. It provided for
a centralized executive, with powers invested in the institution, though not
the person, of the emperor. There was also to be an Imperial Diet-a
legislature consisting of an upper and lower house-and a modern judicial
system. The structure of state financing and taxation was outlined, and the
rights and duties of subjects were defined.

     Ito Hirobumi, Inoue Kaoru, and other members of the small circle of
leaders around the emperor saw their constitutional mission in terms of two
conservative objectives: preservation of the unique character of the Japanese
nation, the "national polity" (kokutai), and the maintenance of social order
and stability. The concept of "national polity" reflected the leaders' great
concern that the constitution not be merely an imitation of foreign models
ill-suited to the realities (as they saw them) of social and political
conditions. There was, however, another ethical and even religious dimension
to this somewhat vague concept-kokutai had its roots in Shinto mythology and
principles of filial piety borrowed from Chinese Confucianism. The uniqueness
of Japan, according to the official ideology, was based on the continuity of
the monarchy. The throne had passed uninterrupted from generation to
generation of the imperial family and, according to the preamble to the
constitution, the present monarch was the latest in a "lineal succession
unbroken for ages eternal." The rulers of other countries had gained power
through the use of violence and deceit, but the source of the Japanese
imperial line was the Sun Goddess, Amaterasu Omikami, the chief deity in the
Shinto pantheon and the founder of Japan. The "divinity" of the emperor was
not mentioned in the constitution, but this was the essence of the notion of
"national polity," and it came to be an increasingly dominant theme in state
ideological pronouncements up to the end of World War II (see Liberalism and
Reaction, ch. 1). The emperor was described in the constitution not only as
"sovereign," standing "at the head of the Empire," and exercising the "rights
of sovereignty" (Article 4), but also as "sacred and inviolable" (Article 3).

     The authors of the constitution rejected the notion of legislative
supremacy, as is found in the British parliamentary system, as excessively
democratic. Power was to be concentrated in the hands of the emperor, or
rather, in the executive branch of government acting in his name.

     The Imperial Diet, consisting of an upper house, the House of Peers, and
a lower house, the House of Representatives, was limited in the scope of its
powers. Its "consent" was required for the passage of law, but it was the
emperor who gave "sanction to laws" (Article 6). It could nullify imperial
ordinances that had been made when it was not in session, but it was not
invested with the power to choose the prime minister, or to dissolve the
government on a vote of no confidence and call for general elections. Diet
sessions were short, only three months, although extraordinary sessions could
be "determined by Imperial Order" (Article 42). State revenue and expenditure
required an annual budget that had to be approved by the Diet, but the
government could proceed with the budget of the previous year if the members
of the Diet failed to agree on a new one (Article 71). This, the Meiji leaders
believed, would protect the government from Diet attempts to control it
through controlling its expenditure. The emperor, on his own initiative, could
propose constitutional amendments to the Diet (Article 73).

     Although power was formally concentrated in the hands of the emperor, he
was in fact a passive figurehead rather than an active initiator or
administrator of policy. The real centers of power were located in the
cabinet, the upper levels of the civil and military bureaucracy, the Privy
Council, and within the tight circle of Meiji genro or "elder statesmen,"
which grew up prior to and outside of the constitutional framework. The
constitution was silent on the matter of how the members of these bodies were
to be selected, their precise responsibilities, and the relationship between
them and the legislative and judicial branches of government. In theory all
these men were directly responsible to the emperor, but in fact there was
great ambiguity concerning who exactly was to govern in the emperor's name-a
source of some instability in the prewar political system.

The 1947 Constitution and Government Structure

     On July 26, 1945, the Allied leaders Winston Churchill, Harry S Truman,
and Joseph Stalin issued the Potsdam Declaration, which demanded not only that
Japan agree to unconditional surrender but also that "the Japanese Government
shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic
tendencies among the Japanese people." Occupation authorities assumed that one
important step in this direction would be the adoption of a new constitution.
In late 1945 the government of Prime Minister Shidehara Kijuro began work on
preparing a draft that was subject to the approval of General Douglas A.
MacArthur, the supreme commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP); the new
document was ratified by the House of Peers and the House of Representatives
and promulgated on November 3, 1946, to go into effect six months later on May
3, 1947.

     The ideological bases of the new Constitution were popular sovereignty,
human rights, and the renunciation of war. Its composers felt it necessary to
make a clean break with the basic principles of the Meiji Constitution.
Nowhere was this more evident than in the preamble to the 1947 document. It
states that "sovereign power resides with the people," that "government is a
sacred trust of the people, the authority for which is derived from the
people, the powers of which are exercised by the representatives of the
people, and the benefits of which are enjoyed by the people." Whereas the
Meiji Constitution was described by its authors as a gift of the emperor to
his subjects, the 1947 document is bestowed by the people-or their
representatives-on themselves. Phrases in the latter such as popular
sovereignty being "a universal principle of mankind" and the assertion that
"laws of political morality are universal," clearly derived from Western
theories of natural right, contrast dramatically with the previous emphasis on
the special status of the emperor and the uniqueness of the Japanese polity
(kokutai), which provided an ideological foundation for the ultranationalism
of the 1930s and 1940s (see Liberalism and Reaction; Occupation and Reform,
ch. 1).

     The role of the emperor in the political system was drastically
redefined. On January 1, 1946, at the prompting of MacArthur, Emperor Hirohito
made a speech renouncing his status as a divine ruler. In the first article of
the Constitution he is described as being "the symbol of the State and of the
unity of the people, deriving his position from the will of the people with
whom resides sovereign power." The powers of the emperor in the old
constitution were broad and undefined. His functions under the new one were to
be narrow, specific, and largely ceremonial, confined to such activities as
bestowing awards and honors, appointing the prime minister designated by the
Diet, and receiving foreign ambassadors and ministers. He was not to have
"powers related to government" (Article 4). The real significance of the
change in the emperor's status is that it precluded the possibility of
bureaucratic or military elites exercising broad powers "in the emperor's
name." The "highest organ of state power" was to be the National Diet, and it
was accountable not to the monarch but to the people who elected it.

     A prominent feature of the Constitution is its careful and comprehensive
enumeration of the "rights and duties of the people," with emphasis on the
former. Given its time in history and the circumstances under which it was
written, the Meiji Constitution was moderately progressive in its recognition
of certain basic rights of subjects. These included equal opportunity to serve
in public office, the right to a trial according to law, the right to private
property, and freedom of movement and choice of residence. Freedom of speech,
writing, publication, and association were granted "within the limits of law."
Freedom of religion was allowed "insofar as it does not interfere with the
duties of subjects." (All subjects were required to acknowledge the alleged
divinity of the emperor, and those, such as Christians, who refused to do so
out of religious conviction were accused of lese majesty.) These rights are
mentioned in the 1947 Constitution without qualification, along with the
principle of separation of church and state; freedom of thought and
conscience; academic freedom; the prohibition of discrimination based on race,
creed, social status, or family origin; and a number of what could be called
"welfare rights": the right to "minimum standards of wholesome and cultured
living"; the right to "equal education"; the "right and obligation to work,"
according to fixed standards of labor and wages; and the right of workers to
organize. Equality of the sexes and the right of marriage based on mutual
consent (rather than arranged marriage in the most traditional sense, in which
parents alone decided on the match) are recognized. Limitations are placed on
personal freedoms only insofar as they are not to be "abused" (Article 12) or
interfere with "public welfare" (Article 13). The bestowal of the power of
judicial review on the Supreme Court (Article 81) is in part meant to serve as
the means of defending individual rights from infringement by government
authorities (see The Judicial System, this ch.).

     Perhaps the most striking feature of the Constitution is its inclusion of
Article 9, the renunciation of war. In the eyes of many of the occupation
leaders who guided the constitutional drafting process, democracy was
necessarily linked with pacifism in the strongest sense. Article 9 contains
two paragraphs: the first states that the Japanese people "forever renounce
war as a sovereign right of the nation" and reject the "threat or use of force
as a means of settling international disputes"; in the second paragraph, which
is perhaps the more controversial, it is stated that "land, sea, and air
forces, as well as other war potential will never be maintained." The
inclusion of this article in the Constitution has broad implications for the
conduct of Japan's foreign policy, the institution of judicial review
exercised by the Supreme Court, the status of the Self-Defense Forces (SDF),
and the nature and tactics of opposition politics (see Major Foreign Policy
Goals and Strategies, ch. 7; The Self-Defense Forces, ch. 8).

     The controversy over the status of the Constitution as a whole has been a
constant, if often muted, theme in postwar Japanese politics. The nature of
the process through which it was drafted and approved remains somewhat obscure
and surrounded with diplomatic silence. Most Japanese and American observers
agree that it would not have been written without pressure from MacArthur and
other senior United States occupation leaders; many claim that it was almost
completely a United States document imposed on the government of a defeated
Japan, and the awkwardness of the wording in Japanese would seem to lend
support to the view that it was originally composed by Americans.

     Despite the issue of its origins, the Constitution has proved to be a
workable foundation upon which the postwar political system has been able to
develop. Some would attribute its initial widespread acceptance, if not
support, as a sign of the people's capacity for "accepting the unacceptable"
and making the best of it under difficult postwar conditions, the obverse side
of the coin of single-minded determination, which is seen as a prominent
feature of the Japanese character. Others point to the appropriateness of the
Constitution in terms of postwar trends. Increasing urbanization and
internationalization have encouraged precisely the values of democracy and
individual rights that it stresses. Clearly one factor has been the determined
resistance of the opposition parties to any movement by conservatives to
revise the document in the name of making it a more "Japanese" constitution.
This resistance has been successful largely because the document is extremely
difficult to amend. Amendments to the Constitution require a minimum
two-thirds vote in the two houses of the Diet before they can be presented to
the people in a referendum, and the opposition parties have controlled more
than one-third of the seats in the Diet in the postwar period. Finally the
ability of conservative politicians, members of the Liberal Democratic Party
(LDP), to fashion a policymaking process congenial to their interests within
the framework of the Constitution has made many of them reluctant to pursue
the matter of revision too diligently.

     In 1956 an Investigation Commission on the Constitution was established
in order to consider the ways in which it might be revised. After eight years
of deliberation it recommended modification of Article 9 and the addition of
provisions strengthening the authority of the central government. By late
1981, however, no serious steps had been taken to implement its
recommendations. The more conservative members of the LDP and right-wing
political groups continue to call for constitutional revision, and the issue
remains sensitive and uncertain.

     The determination of liberal and socialist intellectuals to promote the
political values expressed in the Constitution has led in the postwar years to
the emergence of emotionally charged "cultural politics" based on the
confrontation between "democratic" and "feudal" political ideologies and their
symbols. Examples of this have included the controversy over state support for
the Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo; conservatives have introduced bills in the Diet
proposing to make this Shinto shrine, seen as the repository for the souls of
soldiers and sailors who died in battle (thus a holy place rather than simply
a war memorial), a "national establishment." Trade unionists, intellectuals,
and Christians have opposed this measure not only because it would be a
violation of Article 20 of the Constitution, calling for the separation of
religious and state affairs, but also because it implies a repudiation of
Article 9 on the renunciation of war and a revival of the prewar militarist
spirit. Prime ministers and cabinet members, however, have made private visits
to the shrine; Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko and eighteen members of his cabinet
did so on August 15, 1981, the anniversary of the end of World War II. Other
signs of what some critics interpret as a revival of prewar nationalist
sentiment include the reestablishment of National Foundation Day, a prewar
holiday, and the passing of a bill in the Diet in June 1979 giving official
recognition to the traditional gengo system of enumerating years, which is
based on counting from the first year of the reigns of emperors (thus 1980 was
Showa 55, the fifty-fifth year of the reign of the present monarch). When Pope
John Paul II visited Japan in February 1981, Japanese Protestant leaders
protested his visit with the emperor as tacit recognition of the monarch's
status not only as head of state but also as a religious leader, the
semidivine figure of prewar Shinto ideology.

The Diet

     The structure and purposes of the Diet are defined in the Constitution,
the Diet Law of 1947, and the Rules of the House of Representatives and the
House of Councillors. Article 41 of the Constitution defines it as "the
highest organ of state power," which is the "sole lawmaking organ of the
State"; the emperor is no longer the holder of "legislative power" with merely
the "consent of the...Diet" (Meiji Constitution, Article 5). The
responsibilities of the Diet include the making of laws, the approval of the
national budget submitted to it by the government, and the ratification of
treaties. It also initiates draft amendments to the Constitution, which must
then be presented to the people in a referendum. The Diet may conduct
"investigations in relation to government" (Article 62), and government
officials, including the prime minister and the ministers of state, are
required to appear before investigative committees of the Diet and answer
inquiries. The Diet also has the power to impeach judges convicted of criminal
or irregular conduct, and a Judge Impeachment Court has been established for
this purpose. Fifty members of the House of Representatives can introduce a
motion of no confidence and, if this is passed, the government will be
dissolved.

     The Diet is bicameral. Both the upper house-the House of Councillors-and
the lower house-the House of Representatives-are elective bodies. Article 14
of the Constitution declares that "peers and peerages shall not be
recognized," so, upon its enactment, the old House of Peers was abolished.
Members of the two houses are elected by universal adult suffrage and secrecy
of the ballot is guaranteed (Article 15). The term of the House of
Representatives is four years, unless the prime minister or the members of the
House dissolve the government and call for a general election before the
expiration of that term. Representatives are elected from 130 constituencies
and in late 1981 numbered 511. Members of the House of Councillors have a
six-year term, one-half of these expiring every three years. There are two
types of constituencies in the House of Councillors-prefectural constituencies
corresponding to the forty-seven prefectures and municipalities, and a
"national" constituency in which candidates are selected by the national
electorate as a whole. In late 1981 there were 252 councillors, of whom 100
were selected by the national constituency (see The Electoral System, this
ch.).

     Article 67 of the Constitution, stating that the prime minister should be
designated by a resolution of the Diet, establishes the principle of
legislative control over the executive branch of government. The Diet Law
designates that the budget of the legislature be under its own control rather
than that of the Ministry of Finance (MOF), that members of the Diet be given
salaries comparable to those of the highest civil servants, as well as
franking and travel privileges, and that the presiding officers of each house
be elected by its members rather than appointed by the emperor. Ordinary Diet
sessions are 150 days long, and the two houses can convene extraordinary
sessions. A Diet Library, modeled on the United States Library of Congress,
and research and reference staffs are established to assist members of the
Diet in the drafting and assessing of bills.

     The House of Representatives has the greater power of the two houses, in
contrast to the prewar system in which they were considered equal. According
to Article 59 of the Constitution, a bill that is approved by the
representatives but turned down by the councillors returns to the lower house.
If the representatives pass it with a two-thirds vote or more on this second
ballot, it becomes law. If the upper and lower houses have a disagreement over
the national budget or the approval of a treaty, which is not resolved by a
joint committee of the two houses, then after a lapse of thirty days the
"decision of the House of Representatives shall be the decision of the Diet"
(Articles 60, 61). Choice of the prime minister, when there is a conflict
between the two houses, is also decided in the same manner (Article 67).
Nevertheless the House of Councillors, with its fixed term, cannot be
dissolved by the prime minister. In times of emergency he can convoke the
House of Councillors rather than the House of Representatives.

[See Diet Building: The Diet building, meeting place of the Japanese
legislature Courtesy Embassy of Japan]

     According to the Diet Law, the formal process through which a bill
becomes a law begins with a minimum of twenty representatives or ten
councillors supporting the proposed legislation; the minimum is fifty
representatives or twenty councillors for a bill concerning the national
budget. The bill is then referred to the appropriate committee in the house in
which it was proposed, where it is discussed and revised before being
presented for balloting to a full meeting of that house. The Diet Law
specifies that there should be sixteen standing committees in each house;
twelve of them corresponding to the government ministries, two dealing with
internal Diet matters, and two of them-the Audit Committee and the Budget
Committee-dealing with financial and budget matters (see fig. 10). Each
standing committee has its own research staff, although many staffers are
senior members of the bureaucracy (see Bureaucrats and the Policymaking
Process, this ch.). The budget committees of the two houses are especially
important not because of their formal role of overseeing the budget, but
because it is during their public meetings that members of the Diet can
question cabinet members and high officials about government policies.

     Joint meetings of the same committee in both houses are held when it is
necessary to resolve differences of opinion. Special committees, outside of
the sixteen standing committees specified in the Diet Law, can be established
in response to what are seen as urgent national priorities. In 1981 there were
nine special committees in the House of Representatives and eight in the House
of Councillors. They dealt with such matters as pollution and the environment,
traffic safety, science and technology, public election law reform, energy,
inflation, national calamities, and energy policy.

The Cabinet and Ministries

     Executive power in the postwar political system is vested in the cabinet.
The head of the cabinet is the prime minister who is responsible for
appointing the other government ministers, whom he can also dismiss. His
responsibilities also include supervising the government administration and
civil service, presiding at cabinet meetings, representing the cabinet in the
Diet, and submitting his government's proposals (including the national
budget) to the legislature for approval. Article 7 of the Constitution gives
him the power to dissolve the House of Representatives. Cabinet ministers
include those appointed to head the ministries, of which there are twelve, and
ministers without portfolio, who are put in charge of the commissions and
agencies of the Office of the Prime Minister, which itself has the status of a
ministry. Its agencies include the Defense Agency, equivalent to a department
of defense, but lacking ministerial status, reflecting the renunciation of war
found in Article 9 of the Constitution; and other bodies such as the Fair
Trade Commission, the Environmental Disputes Coordination Commission, the
Economic Planning Agency, the Science and Technology Agency, and the Hokkaido
Development Agency. The Imperial Household Agency, which manages the affairs
of the emperor and the imperial family, is also a part of the Office of the
Prime Minister in contrast with the prewar system in which the Imperial
Household Ministry was independent of the cabinet and the legislature.

     The Constitution states that cabinet ministers must be civilians and that
a majority of them must be Diet members. In practice only a small minority
have come from outside the legislature. Some ministers, specifically those
without portfolio, may assume more than one post because the cabinet can
contain no more than twenty minister (not counting the prime minister), all
of whom attend cabinet meetings and participate in policy discussion.

     The Cabinet Secretariat coordinates the activities of the different
ministries, does research on policy matters, and prepares material to be
discussed at cabinet meetings. Its chief secretary works closely with the
prime minister and, although he does not have ministerial rank, is an
influential person within the cabinet. The Cabinet Legislative Bureau advises
cabinet members on the drafting of legislation to be proposed to the Diet. The
Board of Audit, comparable to the United States General Accounting Office,
reviews government expenditures and submits an annual report to the Diet. The
Board of Audit Law of 1947 gives this body substantial independence from both
cabinet and Diet control. There is also the National Defense Council, which
advises the prime minister on defense matters, and the Ministerial Council on
Overall Security Problems.

     The National Public Service Law, passed in 1947 and revised in 1965,
established the structure of postwar public administration. It makes a
distinction between "special" and "regular" categories of public servants.
Appointments in the special category are governed by political or other
factors and do not involve examinations. Included in this category are cabinet
ministers, heads of independent agencies, members of the Board of Audit, all
elective officials, judges, members of the SDF, Diet officials, and
ambassadors. The core of the civil service is composed of the regular category
who are recruited through competitive examinations. These are divided into
junior service and upper professional levels, the latter forming a
well-defined civil service elite (see The Elite Civil Service, this ch.).