$Unique_ID{bob00278} $Pretitle{} $Title{Israel Chapter 5E. Israel Police} $Subtitle{} $Author{Richard F. Nyrop} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{police israel israeli territories guard intelligence security occupied court military} $Date{1979} $Log{} Title: Israel Book: Israel, A Country Study Author: Richard F. Nyrop Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1979 Chapter 5E. Israel Police Law enforcement is entrusted to a single national police force called simply Israel Police, having a strength, at the end of 1976, of 16,821 personnel. The budget allocated to the police during FY1976 was nearly 800 Israeli Pounds million (for value of the Israeli pound-see Glossary), excluding an additional 106 Israeli Pounds million allocation conditional on further revenue collections. The strength of the Israel Police, both in terms of manpower and budget allocations, increased significantly during the 1970s, as did its responsibilities. Its assumption in 1974 of responsibility for the maintenance of internal security and for the administration and logistical support of the newly established civilian vigilante organization known as the Civil Guard have been especially significant in the expansion of the role of the Israel Police. Organization The minister of interior is a civilian political appointee who acts as the liaison between the Israel Police and the prime minister. The highest ranking officer and operational commander of the Israel Police is given the title of inspector general (see fig. 16). He is aided by an assistant inspector general and commands from National Headquarters in Jerusalem. National Headquarters comprises a staff divided into five units: operations; administration; investigation; planning, research, and development; and personnel. Operating forces are organized into five major subordinate commands, including three police districts, the Civil Guard, and the Border Guard. The Northern District, headquartered in Nazareth, contains three subdistricts; the Tel Aviv District, headquartered in North Tel Aviv, also contains three subdistricts; and the Southern District, headquartered in Jerusalem, has five subdistricts and one autonomous unit. Police subdistricts are further divided into stations and posts. Civil Guard Headquarters are located at National Headquarters in Jerusalem. The organizational structure of the Civil Guard corresponds territorially to that of the police. Civil Guard district and subdistrict commanders are subordinate to the commanders of the respective police units. Border Guard Headquarters are in Lod. Its military-type organization consists of brigades divided into several companies each. Functions In addition to regular police functions, such as crime prevention, criminal investigation and apprehension, and traffic control, the Israel Police are responsible for a variety of functions unknown to most police establishments. The Marine Patrol unit of the police, for example, performs duties similar to the United States Coast Guard. In 1976 they operated eleven vessels in the Mediterranean Sea, Lake Tiberias, and the Gulf of Aqaba to answer distress calls, patrol beaches, and watch for suspect ships. (After the March 1978 terrorist landing on the Israeli coast, the IDF replaced the Israel Police in patrolling the coastline.) Since 1967 the Israel Police has also been responsible for law enforcement in the occupied territories. Under the general policy guideline to minimize the Israeli presence in the territories, an effort was made to retain local Arab personnel for this function. At the end of 1976, of 1,133 police officers in the territories, 792 were local and 315 were Israel Police officers. In addition, further Israel Police personnel provide administrative and logistical services, and Border Guard units also perform routine policing functions in the territories. The most significant new function of the Israel Police lies in its responsibility for internal security. Formerly an obligation of the IDF, in 1974 the Israel Police was put in charge of the maintenance of internal security during "peacetime," and in 1976 this responsibility was extended to include times of active hostilities so that, in effect, the Israel Police is in charge of defending the rear during a wartime emergency. Personnel from the army and from the intelligence community continued to perform vital internal security functions, but overall responsibility lay with the police. All units of the police are engaged in activities related to the maintenance of internal security. Of special importance in this function, however, are the Border Guard and the Civil Guard. In addition to guarding Israel's borders with Lebanon and Jordan, the Border Guard keeps vigil at Israeli settlements in the occupied territories and at all air and seaports and provides regular police services in several cities within the territories. The primary responsibility of the Civil Guard is to provide guard duty in residential areas, though its volunteers also keep watch on part of Israel's coastline, man roadblocks, supervise security arrangements in schools and other public institutions, and assist police during mass public events. Manpower The expanded role of the Israel Police has created the need for additional manpower. Between 1973 and 1976 Israel Police increased in personnel from just under 12,000 to nearly 17,000. Nevertheless police officials argued in 1978 that the growth had been insufficient to meet new responsibilities. The shortage of qualified recruits has been an increasingly acute problem throughout the 1970s. Of the police personnel at the end of 1976, 13,377 were regular police, the remainder being Border Guard assigned from the army, staff of the Civil Guard, and local Arab police in the occupied territories. Regular personnel included 2,101 policewomen and 1,551 persons from minority groups; 333 police officers were university graduates. With the exception of the Border Guard, all manpower needs are met through voluntary enlistment. A significant number of Border Guards are IDF conscripts assigned to police duty. The Border Guard contains a relatively high percentage of Druzes, who are said to be well suited to the rugged life of patrolling the frontier (see The Arab Minorities, ch. 2). The Civil Guard is staffed by some 900 permanent administrators and contained over 100,000 civilian volunteers who regularly perform guard duties throughout Israel and the occupied territories. Training The vast majority of police training is conducted at the National Police School. Located at Shefaraam, the school was attended by some 2,000 students in 1976. A wide variety of courses were offered on three levels: basic training, command training, and professional training. Basic training lasted for five months and included basic citizenship and military training as well as specialized training in law, investigation, traffic control, and other aspects of police operations. The six-month NCO course was divided into two curricula: operations and investigation. Officer courses varied in length and subject matter and included a variety of specialized training courses. About thirty higher ranking officers yearly attend the Senior Officers' College, where they receive instruction in national policy, staff operations, criminology, sociology, and subjects relating to internal security. Border Guard personnel are trained separately from the regular police. Basic instruction includes small arms training, scouting and patrol, and first aid. Command and specialist courses are provided by the army; senior officers train at the police facility. Police officers are also encouraged to continue their formal education while on the job. Several hundred officers each year attend a variety of classes, some conducted under the auspices of the police, offering secondary, university, and postgraduate courses. Morale and Public Attitude Morale among Israel Police officers has traditionally been high. A sense of mission and professional competence outweighed the adverse effects of relatively low pay and an ever-increasing burden of responsibilities. A wide variety of cash incentives were offered, including a bonus for service inside the occupied territories, a bonus for signing five-year service contracts, and prizes for exceptional performance or for efficiency suggestions, in an effort to offset low pay and to bolster morale. In late 1977 there was evidence that several factors were combining to create a deterioration in police morale. One problem was a lack of financial resources, a perennial complaint of police officials, which was compounded by manpower and equipment needs created by the expanded role of the police and by Israel's growing economic difficulties. Another factor was an increasing rate of crime and an accompanying drop in the arrest rate (only 12 percent of crimes against property in Tel Aviv in 1976, for example, were solved). Still another disturbing factor affecting both police morale and the public attitude toward the police was a growing awareness of the existence of organized crime and of evidence that linked it with corrupt elements within the police establishment. The arrest of several officers in August 1977 on charges of having participated in large-scale thefts in Tel Aviv led to rumors that bribery and corruption within the police and in conjunction with organized crime were widespread. Although these allegations had not been substantiated as of mid-1978, they had proven detrimental to police morale. During the 1970s the public image of the police was greatly improved from that prevailing during the early years of Israel's independence, when police were either a daily reminder of former British rule or a symbol of the persecution and oppression from which many had fled. Thirty years after its formation, the Israel Police was seen as an efficient and professional organization that, in addition to regular police work, played an important role in the defense of the nation. A study commissioned by the Israel Police and published in 1973 found the public's image of the police to be favorable and greatly improved since 1967. This study also found that higher socioeconomic groups in Israel tended to be most critical of the police. In early 1978 it was still too early to determine how adversely the recently surfaced allegations of police corruption would affect public opinion. Intelligence Community Israel's intelligence community is generally regarded as one of the most professional and effective in the world. The services of the intelligence community, along with those of the Israeli Air Force, have been revered in Israel as the most important components of success in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Nevertheless the parts of the 1974 Agranat Commission Report that were published placed considerable blame on intelligence failures for the surprise Arab offensive in 1973. The commission's report led to the dismissal of the intelligence community's most important official, General Zvi Zamir, and to the enactment of measures designed to improve the quality of field intelligence and prevent the false sense of security created by pre-October 1973 intelligence reports. The intelligence community in 1978 consisted of four components, each with its distinct mission. The Central Institute for Intelligence and Special Missions (Mossad merkazi le-modiin uletafkidim meyuhadim-commonly known as Mossad) had a mission analogous to the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), being responsible for intelligence gathering and operations in foreign countries. Military Intelligence, commonly known as Aman, was assigned particular responsibility for the vital function of intelligence within the Arab world and along Israel's borders; the General Security Service (Sherut Bitahon Kelali-commonly known as Shin Beth) was in charge of internal security and, since 1967, intelligence in the occupied territories; and the documentation unit of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was in charge of routine foreign intelligence gathering. Very little was publicly known about these organizations, although personal accounts by Israelis have revealed details of several well-known missions of Mossad, including the kidnapping of Adolf Eichmann in Argentina in 1960 and the creation of a "hit team" to assassinate members of Black September, an Arab guerrilla group responsible for the death of eleven Israeli athletes at the XXth Olympic Games in 1972. Eli Cohen is perhaps Israel's most famous spy, having infiltrated into the top echelons of the Syrian government during the mid-1960s; he radioed information to Israel for two years before he was uncovered and publically hanged in Damascus Square. Isser Harel, long-time chief of all Israeli intelligence organizations and mastermind of the Eichmann kidnapping, is another name revered in the history of Israeli intelligence. Crime and Punishment Incidence of Crime A report submitted to the cabinet in February 1978 by the government-appointed Shimron Commission confirmed what Israelis had feared for several years: that the incidence of crime in Israel was rapidly becoming a major national problem. Among its many findings, the Shimron Commission discovered that per capita crime had increased fivefold since 1948 and that organized crime was widespread and had penetrated the government. Between 1970 and 1976 the number of criminal offenses reported to police jumped over 40 percent, an increase that was nearly evenly distributed among various categories of crime (see table 25, Appendix A). Israeli criminologists have offered a variety of explanations for the rapid growth of criminal activity, including an overextended police force, a rise in materialistic values in the society, a growing alienation among poorer segments of society-particularly Arabs and Sephardic Jews-and a rapid increase in the number of difficult-to-enforce government laws and regulations. Data compiled by the government's Central Bureau of Statistics confirm at least some of these explanations. With regard to the police, it would appear that they are understaffed and burdened with growing responsibilities for internal security as well as the detection and apprehension of common criminals (see Israel Police, this ch.). The detection rate, that is, the percentage of reported crimes that are solved, has dropped steadily, from 56 percent in 1960, to 47 in 1965, to 35 in 1970, and to 33 in 1974. Data on those who are apprehended and brought to trial show that the rate for Arabs is over 50-percent higher than that for Jews; and that among Jews, those who were born in Africa have the highest rate, followed by those born in Israel, Asia, Europe, and the United States. This stratification is true for juveniles as well as adults. Among adults, statistics show that the younger the individual, the more likely he or she is to be arrested for a crime. Recidivism has gradually grown over the years; in 1974 nearly sixty of every 100 people apprehended for a crime were previous offenders. Criminal Justice System The Criminal Procedure Law of 1965 describes general provisions with regard to application of law, pretrial and trial procedure, and appeal. It supplements the Courts Law of 1957, which prescribes the composition, jurisdiction, and functioning of the court system and provides details of appellate remedies and procedures. Warrants are generally required for arrests and searches, although a person may be arrested without a warrant if there is reason to suspect that he has committed a felony or is a fugitive from justice or is apprehended in the act of committing an offense. A person so arrested must be brought before a judge within forty-eight hours; the judge may order his release, with or without bail, or may authorize further detention for a period up to fifteen days. Authorization for detention may be renewed for an additional fifteen-day period, but any further extension requires the approval of the attorney general. Preventive detention is legal during periods of emergency but is rarely used. Unless detained for an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment, a person who has been arrested may request release on bail, whether or not a formal charge has been entered against him. Bail may consist of personal recognizance, cash deposit, surety bond, or any combination thereof. A person held in custody must be released unconditionally if no charges have been filed against him within ninety days; he must also be released without condition if trial has not commenced within sixty days or if it has not been concluded within one year from the date on which a statement of charge was filed. Only a judge of the Supreme Court may order an extension of these time limitations. Any person is entitled to communicate information on his arrest to a friend or relative and to a lawyer as soon as possible. In felony cases, arrests may be kept secret for reasons of national security upon written request from the minister of defense or for the sake of investigation upon written request from the inspector general of police. Requests are valid for periods not exceeding forty-eight hours; they may be renewed so long as the total does not exceed seven days. All secular courts in Israel deal with criminal as well as civil matters (see The Judicial System, ch. 3). In 1976 about two-thirds of the nearly 400,000 criminal cases (including minor traffic offenses, which account for about half of all criminal court cases) brought to Israeli courts were heard in magistrates' courts, which were the courts of the first instance in most matters. District courts, which try felonies in the first instance and appeals from convictions for misdemeanors and contraventions, heard some 9,000 criminal cases and the Supreme Court heard some 1,300. Juvenile and municipal courts, as well as work tribunals also heard criminal cases. The caseloads of all courts were growing at a rate between 10 and 20 percent a year, and as a result the backlog of criminal cases was growing and had reached 56,000 by the end of 1976. In early 1978 Minister of Justice Shmuel Tamir proposed extending court hours in an effort to diminish the mounting backlog. Offenses committed by civilians (from Israel or the occupied territories) against the Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945 are tried by military courts composed of three commissioned officers. Until 1963 their judgments were final, but at that time the right of appeal was granted under an amendment to the Military Justice Law. Individuals charged with offenses against the Prevention of Infiltration Law are tried by a military court consisting of a single officer; appeals are heard by a court composed of three officers. All or part of the proceedings may be ordered to be held in camera; all other Israeli courts are open. Except in most military tribunals and the Supreme Court, cases are tried before a single judge; there are no juries in Israeli courts. Proceedings begin with the filing of a statement of charge; the state acts as plaintiff, and police officers or state attorneys designated by the attorney general conduct the prosecution. Where an accused is not represented by counsel, counsel is appointed by the court at state expense. The accused pleads to the facts alleged in the indictment, not guilt or innocence with respect to the charge itself. In pleading, the defendant may remain silent, or he may admit or deny any or all of the alleged facts; he may also plead additional facts. During the hearing, a defendant may testify under oath in his own behalf, in which case he is subject to cross-examination; he may make a statement upon which he may not be examined; or he may remain silent. Verdicts of the court must be in writing, together with reasons therefor. If the defendant is convicted, the prosecutor may then present evidence relating to punishment, including any record of previous convictions. The defendant is also permitted to submit evidence in mitigation. After the pronouncement of sentence, the court explains to the accused the appellate remedies open to him. The time limit for appeals is forty-five days; appeal is automatic where a death sentence has been imposed, regardless of action by the accused. Grounds of appeal must be stated and, if insufficient, the court may order that a more detailed statement be made. Appeals may be dismissed for lack of grounds. New evidence is rarely taken by an appellate court; its decisions are ordinarily based on evidence already presented to the lower court, although it may reach different conclusions as to the facts or the law. Analysts generally agree that court procedures in Israel are fair; the accused is considered innocent until proven guilty, and guarantees of due process of law are observed. Punishments for convicted criminals include suspended sentences, fines, a choice of imprisonment or fine, imprisonment and fine, and imprisonment. The death penalty may be imposed for treason or conviction for Nazi war crimes, but as of mid-1978 Eichmann was the only person ever to be executed by Israeli authorities. Prison sentences are mandatory only for exceptional crimes, such as attacking a policeman. In fact, of over 61,000 criminals convicted during 1975 in courts other than military tribunals, only 2,700 were sentenced to prison. Sentences in military tribunals are generally more harsh; terms of imprisonment from fifteen years to life are not unusual. Penal System The penal system is administered by the Prison Service, a branch of the Ministry of Interior but independent of the Israel Police. It is headed by the Prison Service Commissioner. The prison system consists of about a score of prisons, most of which were built in the 1930s by British Mandate Authorities, located throughout Israel. Detention centers outside the authority of the Prison Service include police lockups, located in every major town, and military detention centers in the occupied territories (common criminals in the territories are detained by local police authorities). During the 1970s the penal system drew considerable criticism both at home and abroad, as Israel's prisons became increasingly overcrowded due both to a growing incidence of common crime and a rapidly increasing number of security offenders, most of whom were Arabs from the occupied territories. For example, in 1976 the prison population grew 15 percent, from 5,075 to 5,852, while the number of security offenders grew by 18 percent, from 2,725 to 3,227. In 1977 Prison Service Commissioner Haim Levi stated that the average living space per prisoner in Israel was 2.2 square meters, less than one-third the average in many Western countries. Some prisons are worse; Ashqelon prison had an average of 2 square meters. Prison authorities admit that there is no room for beds in many cases, and prisoners are forced to sleep on floor mats. Other prison conditions, such as food quality and the availability of medical care, are more favorable. Nevertheless prison conditions were the principal cause of a growing number of strikes by highly politicized prisoners, the most significant being a hunger strike that began in Ashqelon in late 1976 and subsequently spread to many other prisons in Israel and the occupied territories. Such incidents have aroused fears of large-scale prison riots in the future that, along with criticisms voiced by the International Committee for the Red Cross and the United States Department of State, have led to plans to expand the capacity of the prisons. At least two new prisons, at Beersheba and Atarot, were scheduled to open in the late 1970s. Prisoners are offered vocational training in a variety of trades, including carpentry, bookbinding and printing, tailoring, and shoemaking. Employment is also available at token wages in the production of such articles as clothing and shoes for the prison service and other government agencies. Two hours of each day are allotted for recreation, and most prisoners are allowed two visitors per month. Short-term furloughs are granted for good behavior, and a temporary parole is often allowed common criminals after serving one-third of their sentence. After completing two-thirds of the sentence, nonsecurity prisoners may receive a permanent parole for good behavior. Many of the parole benefits are not available to security prisoners, although Israel's president has the power to grant pardons and, on occasions, amnesty is offered to groups of security prisoners. * * * New literature on Israeli national security is constantly being made available; the reader interested in pursuing the subject further should consult a recent bibliography. One of the best sources is the quarterly Middle East Journal. Of the literature available in mid-1978, the best overall view of the IDF from both a historical and current perspective is The Israeli Army by Edward Luttwak and Dan Horowitz. Other useful surveys include History of the Israeli Army, 1870-1974 by Zeev Schiff and Between Israel and Death by Edward Bernard Glick. Two edited volumes that are useful for their presentation of the views of Israeli citizens and soldiers toward questions of war and peace are The Seventh Day: Soldiers Talk About the Six-Day War by Avraham Shapira and Mission Survival, edited by Ruth Bondy, et. al. Two yearly publications that are particularly useful for current information regarding the size of forces and military equipment are The Military Balance and the SIPRI Yearbook. In "How Much Is Too Much?" Anthony Cordesman forecasts Israel's defense requirements into the 1980s. Military doctine is discussed most usefully by Michael I. Handel in Israel's Political-Military Doctrine, Yehoshafat Harkabi in Arab Strategies and Israel's Response, and Fuad Jabber in Israel and Nuclear Weapons. Internal security aspects of the problem of Palestinian Arabs are usefully detailed in "The Palestinians and the PLO, A Historical Approach" by Bernard Lewis and Revolutionary Warfare in The Middle East: The Israelis vs. the Fedayeen by Bard O'Neill. Politics and the IDF are discussed in a general sense in Edward Glick's volume and in detail by Amos Perlmutter in his two volumes, Military and Politics in Israel: Nation-Building and Role Expansion and Politics and the Military in Israel, 1967-77. The occupied territories are the subject of a rapidly expanding volume of literature, and here especially, a recent bibliography should be consulted. In 1978 Bernard Reich's "Israel and the Occupied Territories" was perhaps the most balanced and well-researched study, retaining its relevance and accuracy despite its being five years' old. The published hearings of the subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee on "The Colonization of the West Bank Territories by Israel" contain a wide variety of information and reprinted materials critical of Israeli policies there. "The Occupied Territories" by Steven J. Rosen pursues a more balanced approach in the context of their strategic importance. The State Department's annual "Country Reports on Human Rights Practices" surveys Israeli policies in Israel and the territories from the human rights standpoint. "Israel and Torture," a study conducted by a team from the London Sunday Times, which is available as a reprint from The Palestine Human Rights Campaign, provides the most devastating evidence of Israeli violations of human rights in the territories, though its conclusions were widely disputed after some of its authors discredited their sources. The legal aspects of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories are discussed in "Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories" in The Review of the International Commission of Jurists. Ann Mosely Lesch offers a variety of information concerning the settlements in "Israeli Settlements in the Occupied Territories, 1967-1977." Those interested in nonfiction accounts of activities of the Israeli intelligence community may read David Tinnin's Hit Team, Isser Harel's House on Garabaldi Street, and Eli Ben-Hanan's Our Man in Damascus: The Story of Eli Cohen. (For further information see Bibliography.)