$Unique_ID{bob00219} $Pretitle{} $Title{Indonesia Chapter 4C. Political Organizations} $Subtitle{} $Author{Riga Adiwoso-Suprapto} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{political party pancasila government golkar indonesian ppp soeharto parties leadership} $Date{1982} $Log{} Title: Indonesia Book: Indonesia, A Country Study Author: Riga Adiwoso-Suprapto Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1982 Chapter 4C. Political Organizations Political activities must be channeled through a legally prescribed system consisting of what Soeharto has called "the three legitimate political organizations"-the ruling Golkar and the two opposition parties. Any activity taking place outside this tripartite arrangement is illegal. The rationale behind the arrangement, in place since 1973, is that, given the country's ethnic, cultural, and regional diversity, the multiplicity of political parties catering to parochial interests would hinder the process of political and economic stabilization. Unmitigated partisan political strife would be seen as hardening and even widening the country's sociopolitical cleavages. In the early 1980s the tripartite system continued to fulfill the political requirement of the Soeharto leadership as the best possible means of developing "pancasila democracy." Opposition groups were guarded, however, because any criticism of the system would be viewed as an attempt to undermine the constitutional and ideological foundation of the state. Party politics were among the major targets of reforms after Soeharto's rise to power in 1966. Initially, the official intention was to create a two-party structure, but in view of strong objections by various party leaders, a new plan was offered so that all parties could come under three major groupings. As a prelude to a reorganization, the government in 1970 called on all parties to contest the parliamentary elections of July 1971 on the basis of a three-way realignment. The first grouping would be associated with the supposedly neutral, nonpolitical, and secularist Golkar, whose officially assigned mission was to "engage in politics to suppress politics"; the second grouping, described as "spiritual," would embrace all Muslim parties; and the third, identified as "nationalist," would represent the remaining parties. Despite serious reservations, the nine parties of the day- five nationalist and four religious-agreed to contest the elections under the new format, provided that they were allowed to retain their individual party identities. In the first test of electoral strength in 1971, Golkar-little known then outside Jakarta and other major cities-surprised many by scoring a landslide victory. Golkar's victory proved demoralizing for the other parties, and in fact it signaled the collapse of multiparty politics. Weakened by internal fissures within each party, not to mention government pressure, the nine parties finally in January 1973 were obliged to merge into two new parties: the Development Unity Party (PPP) and the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). In doing so the two parties have pledged-over muted protests within each group- that they would no longer question the validity of pancasila and the Constitution and that their political programs would be formulated accordingly. Interestingly, whereas the PPP and the PDI are officially referred to as "parties," Golkar is not. Apparently, this practice derives from the negative image the government attaches to the term "political party" as an instrument of self-seeking associated with parochial interests. Another interesting aspect is the government's refraining from using the term "opposition." Evidently, this stems from the belief that politics should be guided by, as Soeharto put it, "a true family spirit" of consultation, consensus, unity, and mutual aid; such family spirit has been officially extolled as the quintessence of pancasila. Viewed from the official perspective, there can be no manifestations of opposition or adversary politicking in the "big family" that is Indonesia. There may be political differences, but according to Amir Murtono, a retired major general who in 1982 directed Golkar under the title of general chairman, "different opinions do not imply an attitude of opposition." Indeed, the concept of family togetherness has been embraced with utmost seriousness by the Soeharto leadership. Efforts to induce the PPP and the PDI to cooperate with Golkar have been extensive-these in addition to measures taken to reinforce Golkar's already formidable grip on the political structure. A familiar part of these efforts has been to lend support to "nonpolitical" moderates within each party and to undercut the strength of those elements still disposed toward "old-fashioned" politics. Evidently, this tactic has worked, as indicated by the ascendancy of factions in both parties considered to be amenable to the government's wishes. In the early 1980s Soeharto readily acknowledged that some people were not satisfied with the existing tripartite party system, without which, he warned the nation in August 1981, the country would revert to "the bitter times of the past, the era of dozens of parties." In the following month he let it be known that any attempt to create a new party outside the existing framework would be in violation of the law. Golkar Golkar is a creation of the military and remains under its dominance. The organization had its beginning in 1964 when army officers formed it to counter the growing power of the Indonesian Communist Party and that group's front organizations. By 1969 it had been brought under government control as a political machine with which to co-opt various social groups and provide a broad base for the military-dominated Soeharto government. In that year Golkar claimed to speak for about 270 groups supposedly representing farmers, workers, youths and students, women, fishermen, crewmen, businessmen, civil servants, professionals, intellectuals, veterans, and members of the armed forces. After the 1971 elections this loose federation of functional groups was reorganized on a "nonpartisan" basis in an effort to tighten internal discipline and to make it more responsive to unified leadership under a central executive board, which was to be assisted by a central advisory board, of which Soeharto remained chairman in 1982. These two bodies in late 1982 continued to be composed of generals, cabinet ministers, and senior civilian technocrats. Golkar's rapid ascendancy is not surprising, given ABRI's active support for the organization. All civil servants were urged to join Golkar, for there was to be no neutrality or nonpartisanship where the government's development strategy was concerned. The government at the regional level saw to it that credits, loans, and fertilizers were given preferentially to those willing to be, or believed to be, supporters of Golkar. Furthermore, Golkar benefited considerably from the ban on organizing mass support at the village level. This measure kept all political workers out of the rural areas-a potential reservoir of support for the PPP-so that the mass of the people would remain unpoliticized between elections every five years. Yet Golkar was able to bring its "nonpartisan" influence to bear on the people, if indirectly, through local military and civil authorities who maintained an extensive web of patron-client relations with local leaders. Golkar influence was strengthened under a political party law that went into effect in August 1975. Adopted after several months of acrimonious debate between Golkar and the PPP, this law formally recognized Golkar, the PPP, and the PDI as the only three legal political organizations with rights to participate in parliamentary and regional elections. Any activity other than that permitted within the tripartite party structure would constitute "opposition" to the state, its pancasila, and the Constitution. The law contained several concessions, however, in view of strong representation by the two parties. Islam was recognized as an organizing principle for the PPP so long as pancasila was not questioned as the basic ideology of the state, and the three political organizations were permitted to have their representatives in the villages. In addition, the 1975 bill banned top-level government officials down to the district level from joining any political organization except with written permission. This was intended ostensibly to keep the top layer of the bureaucracy unpoliticized, but its practical effect has been to dissuade top officials from supporting the two opposition parties and to constrain them to back Golkar. Lower rank officials needed only to inform their superiors in joining an organization, however. In 1982 it was unclear whether the political party law was strictly enforced. In an interview with the Far Eastern Economic Review shortly after the May 1982 elections, Vice President Adam Malik gave the impression that the political organizations were still not allowed to carry out activities at the village level except during election campaigns and that partisan politicking would remain proscribed until the country reached a higher level of political maturity. In the parliamentary elections of May 1977, Golkar campaigned on a platform reflecting the aims and development-centered policies of the government and repeated its impressive performance of 1971. The military again played a key role in mobilizing votes for Golkar candidates. In late 1982 Golkar's status as the government's so-called "partner" and principal political vehicle appeared likely to continue. In the parliamentary elections held in May, it improved on its share of popular votes from the 1977 level of 62.1 percent to 64.3 percent, returning 246 seats out of the total contested seats of 364. It could additionally count on support from 75 appointed members from the armed forces and perhaps as many as 15 more appointed members representing various functional and regional constituencies. The jubilant government leaders maintained that Golkar's landslide victory was irrefutable proof of popular endorsement of Soeharto's policies and leadership. Critics wondered aloud, though, whether Golkar could have fared that well without the advantage of solid bureaucratic blessings and support. Development Unity Party The PPP is a loose assemblage of four old Muslim parties, which until 1973 competed for electoral support not only among themselves but also against non-Muslim parties. The 1973 merger notwithstanding, the four parties continued to maintain their separate party identity, reflecting the circumstances of their sectarian stance and regional roots. In 1982 two of the four parties were still considered to be more influential than the others. There were the Muslim Scholars League (NU), the traditionalist group that had been popular in eastern and central Java; and the Indonesian Muslim Party (Parmusi), successor to the Council of Indonesian Muslim Associations (Masyumi), which had been banned in 1960 for refusing to endorse Sukarno's Guided Democracy. (It was not until 1968 that the Sumatra-based Masyumi was allowed by the Soeharto government to resume its activity under the new name of Parmusi.) The two remaining members were the Indonesian Islamic Association Party, with scattered support in western Java, southern Sumatra, and Sulawesi; and the Islamic Education Party, based mainly in Sumatra. The PPP is not an Islamic alliance against Soeharto, since the 1973 merger was dictated more or less by the government. Apart from the commonality of Islam, it has been divided along sectarian and regional grounds, having neither a populist leader nor an effective platform that could be embraced in earnest by all groups. Besides, the concept of an orthodox Islamic state seemed unappealing to the majority of Indonesian Muslims. Nonetheless, the authorities have been ever watchful of the possibility of a resurgent Islam and the possibility of Muslim groups of all persuasions uniting against the secularist Soeharto government. Given the potential of Islam's being politicized as the rallying point of antigovernment actions, official policy has been, however, one of accommodation rather than confrontation. Thus, when confronted with the strong sentiments within the PPP favoring the adoption of the Kaabah (Islam's holy shrine at Mecca) as the party's official symbol, official objections were withdrawn. Another example was the 1975 concession whereby Islam was allowed to be mentioned as an underlying principle of the PPP-but along with pancasila. The tolerant policy, which was premised on the view that Islam could become a constructive force for national unity so long as it was not exploited as a political tool, was brought into question after the 1977 elections in which the PPP not only outpolled Golkar in the national capital region but also fared well elsewhere. In 1978 the Department of Religious Affairs was placed under an army general, PPP representatives were dropped from the cabinet, and the government intensified the effort to expand Muslim representation through Golkar. Another tactic was to have frequent dialogues with PPP leaders and to lend support to the moderate nonpolitical Muslims within the PPP against those who were believed to be orthodox hardliners. The PPP has sought to improve its image as the true defender and promoter of Islam. Some of its election campaigners in fact insisted occasionally that a vote for Golkar was a vote for the heathen. A notable tendency has been an emphasis since the late 1970s on socioeconomic issues, as the party has attempted to broaden its popular appeal. Articulated more among younger Muslims than the older generation, these issues were related to the growing popular perception of a widening gap between haves and have-nots and of corruption in government. Another issue on which the PPP was taking a strong stand was whether gambling should be allowed to flourish in cities. Gambling was denounced as contrary to Quranic teaching and even to pancasila. Devout Muslims were joined by many university students in demanding a government ban on it-the latter group apparently because of the fact that the people most often frequenting casinos were believed to be Chinese. In any case, the party's growing interest in socioeconomic issues appeared to indicate its realistic recognition that the task of party-building necessitated greater sensitivity to practical matters. Factional infighting appeared to be a continuing problem for the party. In the early 1980s the party was still split on how to define the nature of its relationship with the government, which had sought to influence party affairs through "friendly dialogue" with PPP leaders. A dialogue of this nature took place intermittently through an advisory Indonesian Ulemas Council set up in 1975 or directly between the party leaders on the one side and the ministers in charge of religious affairs and home affairs and the head of Kopkamtib on the other, depending on the nature of problems at hand. Whether because of the dialogue or because of the party's independent assessment, the PPP in August 1981 announced its decision to support Soeharto as the nominee for the presidential election slated for March 1983. On balance, the group favoring cooperation with the government-Parmusi-appeared to be quite assertive in intraparty affairs, despite its minority status within the PPP. This was evident in November 1981 when Parmusi prepared the list of PPP parliamentary candidates for the May 1982 elections without consulting the majority NU. The NU filed a protest with the minister of home affairs, who is responsible for the management of general elections as head of the General Election Institute. The minister was called on to reject the list, which was said to have been drawn up to favor the progovernment Parmusi candidates. The protest was rejected on the grounds that the list submitted was legal and that, in any event, the government should not intervene in the party's "internal disputes." The NU threatened to boycott the 1982 elections; the threat was later withdrawn, but the damage-the widely perceived malleability of some PPP leaders in government hands-had been done. In the 1982 election the PPP did not fare as well as it had hoped (see The New Order since 1978, this ch.). Indonesian Democratic Party The Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) is an amalgamation of three nationalist and two Christian parties; the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI); the Indonesian Christian Party (Parkindo); the Catholic Party; the Association of the Supporters of Indonesian Independence (IPKI); and the Party of the Masses (Murba). The PNI, founded by Sukarno, was traditionally strong in eastern and central Java and Jakarta-especially among the Javanese civil servants and hence resented by non-Javanese in the Outer Islands. The anticommunist Parkindo represented the Protestant Christian minorities in the eastern islands and the Batak area of Sumatra. The Catholic Party drew much of its strength from the eastern Lesser Sunda Islands and parts of Java. The IPKI was strongly anticommunist. Murba was leftist but not communist. Given its heterogeneous background, the PDI has since its 1973 merger been troubled by factional feuding, especially within the dominant PNI component. Personality clashes made it difficult for the PDI to devise a coherent program or an effective leadership. In November 1978, for example, then-PDI leader, Sanusi Hardjadinata, dismissed Sunawar Sukowati, a leading PNI figure, from a 21-member central leadership body on the grounds of having established rival PDI branches at the provincial level. Confronted with the imminency of the party's disintegration, Kopkamtib and Bakin were constrained to intervene thereafter in party affairs ostensibly as peacemakers or arbiters. The intervention was perhaps unavoidable if only because the government had counted on the PDI to neutralize the PPP. The collapse of the PDI would have meant the squaring of Golkar against the PPP-and the possibility of polarizing the political scene along the lines of secularism versus Islam. Intra-PDI conflict persisted through 1980 until the party's national congress convened in January 1981 to formalize a shift in leadership, which had in fact been consumated by late 1980. The congress formally elected Sukowati as the party's new general chairman and pledged full support for the Soeharto leadership as the best means of continuing stability and development. The new leadership also expressed unqualified endorsement of pancasila as the sole guiding principle of the PDI; obviously this was an affront to other PNI adherents who were still attached to Sukarno's concept of Marhaenism (see Sukarno and the National Movement, ch. 1). The new leadership also announced its decision to support the nomination of Soeharto for another term in 1983. The mainstream PDI group under Sunawar Sukowati sought to rationalize its progovernment stand by maintaining that the New Order political system was merely an improvement on Sukarno's system and not a contradiction or discontinuity. But dissidents led by Abdul Madjid, a confirmed Sukarno loyalist, leveled charges of sellout at the new leadership group. In 1982 the intraparty tensions appeared likely to persist, compounded by the party's dismal performance in the May 1982 elections. The reduction of its parliamentary representation from 10 to six in the party's stronghold in central Java proved to be a major psychological setback. Although it still managed to return a total of 24 seats (29 in 1977), the PDI was undergoing a period of soul-searching about its identity, future, and relationship with the Soeharto administration. Pancasila The widely held political values of the Indonesian people reflect a synthesis of the traditional Hindu-Buddhist-Islamic influences, modern nationalist ideology, and to an extent Western notions of democracy and popular participation. Tradition weighs heavily in grass-roots perceptions of authority, power, control, and social harmony. To some persons, the value system is seemingly incompatible with the Western tradition of political liberalism and accountability because of its authoritarian, paternalistic bent. But Indonesian nationalists and intellectuals who fought for independence and then led the nation found that the traditional and Western strains of political ideas were not altogether mutually exclusive. They became convinced that democracy was not the monopoly or invention of Western countries and that the Indonesian people had their own democratic concepts and practices based on consultation, deliberation, and consensus in the spirit of family togetherness. The attributes of indigenous democracy do no readily lend themselves to the evolution of a political system based on freely expressed desire for political accountability, representation, or participation. Most Indonesians do not subscribe to the Western notion that people are born equal and that society should be egalitarian. Clear hierarchies of social division are seen as a part of the cosmic order, and authoritarianism is accepted, sometimes fatalistically, so long as it is perceived to be tempered by fairness and benevolence. In practical terms the time-honored value structure based on deference to authority and acceptance of hierarchy has been conducive to the evolution of paternalistic leadership. It is also expressed in the popular desire for government employment; preoccupation with prestige, status, and wealth; and an almost exclusive concentration of political power in Jakarta. Leadership in the sense of political tutelage from the top, or in the manner of patriarchal dictates within a family or clan, came to constitute the foundation of Sukarno's Guided Democracy, which he said was "democracy with leadership, but still democracy." Since 1966 Soeharto has essentially continued his predecessor's aphorism that democracy without leadership is anarchy. Realizing Sukarno's mistakes, Soeharto has sought to strike a balance between leadership and democracy by proclaiming that "leadership without democracy is dictatorship." In his effort to rationalize the need for a balance between the two political aspects, Soeharto has turned to the ideology of pancasila, which was first enunciated by Sukarno in a June 1945 speech and later incorporated into the preamble to the 1945 Constitution. As envisaged by its formulators, pancasila was to become the unifying symbol for the country's numerous and widely scattered ethnic and religious groups. In listing the five universally appealing concepts of belief in one God, humanitarianism, national unity, democracy, and social justice, however, the formulators did not give precise definitions of these concepts, rendering pancasila susceptible to varying interpretations. There was no question, however, that among the principal aims of pancasila was to promote the idea that Indonesia, though predominantly Islamic, should evolve as a secular state. That premise remains the governing assumption of the Soeharto leadership, but the manner in which pancasila is extolled as the fundamental state ideology has not been without some controversy. Since 1967 the New Order government has sought to elevate the status of pancasila not only as the centerpiece of Indonesian political values but also as the ideological premise for what is called pancasila democracy. Such a democracy was to be nourished through the indigenous practices of consultation, consensus, and mutual aid-practices that were said to be well suited to the development strategy of the government because of their supposed capacity to inspire motivation and commitment. Official effort has fallen short of arousing popular enthusiasm if only because of the vagueness of pancasila as an ideology and of the lingering Muslim distrust of it as a means of downgrading Islam. In 1978 the government launched an ambitious indoctrination program for the popularization of pancasila. Timed to coincide with the start of the third five-year plan, Repelita III, the program was directed by a newly formed body called the Board for the Promotion of Education and Practicing of Guidelines for the Perception and Implementation of Pancasila. It was intended initially for about 2 million civil servants, whose participation in a two-week seminar was mandatory. Later it was extended to youths, university students, religious leaders, journalists, and businessmen. Orientation courses were also organized for foreign businessmen to explain the aims and rationale of pancasila and their relevance to the government's development programs. Pancasila is officially presented as a system of values and a harmonious ideal anchored on what Soeharto calls "family principle" that has "no room for individualism, liberalism, or totalitarianism." It is supposed to guide the Indonesians in arousing "the spirit of harmony, cohesion, unity, equality, solidarity, and mutual assistance" in a true family spirit-and thus be the embodiment of the Indonesian way of life, unpolluted by foreign ideas on "individual freedom, basic rights, criticism, opposition, expression, and democracy." In August 1979 Soeharto told the nation that Indonesia "has often become tired and weak because of the intensity of different views among us in responding to these ideas." He said that the people must respond to these alien concepts with an open-minded attitude of neither accepting them nor rejecting them outright in order to see if these ideas conform with "our family principle" and the Indonesian patterns of thought and culture. Such an attitude is said to be important in promoting pancasila democracy, which Soeharto said represents the integration of "the universal democratic ideals with our way of life," and which is "free of both domination by the majority and tyranny of the minority." Implications of the official position have been fairly obvious. Broadly stated, pancasila has become the criterion against which all political concepts, traditional and foreign, and political activities are to be measured. The government, designed to operate on consensus rather than the foreign concept of majority rule, has become the interpreter and enforcer of pancasila, and any activity contrary to the ideology has come to be viewed as a threat to the constitutional stability of the nation. From the official perspective, the threat to pancasila, to the Constitution, and the state is seen as coming from "right- and left-wing extremists"-meaning some Muslim fundamentalists and the remnants of the outlawed PKI. In any case, despite the government reassurances that pancasila is compatible with all religions and is not directed against Islam, tension remains between Islam and pancasila. In the early 1980s, however, it was difficult to ascertain how widely pancasila had been implanted in the hearts of the Indonesians and whether this ideology, in the absence of government sponsorship, can become a viable focus of loyalty for all Indonesians. Foreign Affairs Indonesia has continued to carry out what it calls an "active and independent foreign policy" in a prudent and pragmatic fashion. This contrasts sharply with the 1963-65 period when Sukarno embarked on a policy of ultranationalist and anti-Western confrontation, alienating neighboring countries in general and Malaysia in particular, and leading the country to a virtual anti-imperialist alliance with the communist nations and other countries predisposed to a strident anti-Western line. That confrontation proved to be costly at home, not only with respect to the mismanaged, deteriorating economy; the later became a major source of mounting popular disenchantment with the once-popular, charismatic Sukarno. Thus, the new leadership under Soeharto, formed in the wake of the ill-fated communist coup attempt in September 1965, has opted for a good neighbor policy, moderation, and friendship with all nations regardless of ideological differences. This has been done within the framework of nonalignment, which has been a major foreign policy theme since 1955. Thereafter relations with neighboring countries improved, and -much to the dismay of China and the Soviet Union-ties with the United States and other Western countries were strengthened as well. Generally, the expansion of economic linkages with the West has been a policy imperative since 1966. Foreign policy has been refashioned to expand economic and technical cooperation, to create a stable regional environment, to stay clear of any external crisis situation, and to secure a maximum degree of freedom with which to pursue national self-interest. That freedom has been judiciously used to promote economic links with the industrialized-chiefly Western-nations from which to obtain capital and advanced technology. At no time, however, has Indonesia publicly identified itself as a member of the "Western camp," restating frequently that foreign assistance from whatever sources should have no purposes other than complementing Indonesia's developmental efforts. Ideology and cultural affinity have continued as part of the foreign policy evolution, tempered by pragmatism. Officially, at least, Indonesia in 1982 professed no hostility on ideological grounds against any country, but its relations with the Soviet Union were at best correct and with China, suspended since 1967. Jakarta's caution in the early 1980s appeared to have more to do, however, with fears of subversive activities by these powers than a rejection of communism as an ideology. Officially, also, the country has remained committed to the struggle against colonialism and imperialism as expressed in the Constitution, but this posture has been largely rhetorical. As the most populous Islamic state in the world, Indonesia has continued to identify with the aspirations of other Islamic states and has extended full moral support to the Arab stance on the Palestinian struggle against Israel. On practical grounds, however, it has refrained from joining the Arab oil embargo, maintaining that its principal export commodity should not be abused for political ends. In a similar vein, prudence appeared to dictate the decision in September 1980 to reject the request by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to open a representative office in Jakarta. The Indonesian action was reportedly prompted by the concern that the PLO's presence in Jakarta could have disturbed, as one Indonesian source put it, "Western interest" in the country. Dialogue with other nations has remained a major instrument of diplomacy for Jakarta, which has continued to maintain, for example, that the settlement of the Kampuchean question could be facilitated through active dialogue with Vietnam rather than through "confrontation." The usefulness of mutual consultation and exchange has been a major reason for the decision of Indonesia and other members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to inaugurate, since 1978, annual ministerial conferences with industrialized nations, such as Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, the United States, and the members of the European Economic Community. Relations with these nations were close and cordial in the early 1980s, although Indonesia seemed a bit irritated by what it regarded as Australia's misguided and biased perceptions of the Indonesian political situation. Generally, foreign relations have been relatively free of frictions. Notable exceptions have been those with China and Portugal. Diplomatic ties with Beijing have been suspended (rather than severed) since 1967. Official relations with Portugal, by contrast, have actually been broken off since December 7, 1975, when Indonesian troops, officially described as "volunteers," landed in East Timor and gained control of an area that had been ruled by the Portuguese for over 450 years. Indonesia had been concerned that an independent East Timor, controlled by a leftist, anti-Indonesian political group, could pose a threat to its own security by providing an opening for communist influence and subversion. The United Nations Security Council immediately adopted a resolution deploring Indonesian intervention and regretting at the same time Portugal's failure to address the issue of self-determination for the people of East Timor. Indonesia maintained that the people of East Timor exercised their right to self-determination in late December 1975 when they petitioned Indonesia for integration. In July 1976 East Timor was formally annexed to Indonesia as the twenty-seventh province.