THE seventh game, played at
the St. Georges, on Monday, the 11th inst. This game, which
was
due to be played on the previous Saturday, was adjourned to the above
date
in consequence of Mr Blackburne having felt indisposed. By the
rules
of the match each player is entitled to claim two days exemption
within
eight weeks ; but we understand that Mr Zukertort agreeably consented
not
to count this postponement ; and thus each player retains his full
privilege
for two adjournments. |
The usual dull and heavy French defence adopted
by Blackburn [sic] led this time to early complications of an
interesting
character. The first critical situation arose on the eleventh
move,
when Zukertort left himself open to his K B P being doubled by taking
the
Kt. It has always been one of the most difficult points in this
opening
to decide when such an exchange may be allowed ; for the player who
permits
his pawns on the K side to be thus weakened, obtains often a strong
attack
with his rooks on the open K Kt file, and retains two bishops.
When,
however, as was here the case, the Q could already gain early entrance
on the K R file, and White would have been forced to block one of the
two
bishops by the compulsory advance of the K B P, we believe that Black
would
have had the best of the struggle with his two knights, as he could soon
bring over the Q Kt to the K side viá K 2.
Blackburne,
however, made a strong preparatory move, whereupon White, of course,
withdrew
the K Kt to R 4, and soon obtained an attack by the advance of the K B
P. The chief crisis then came on Blacks sixteenth move, when
Blackburne,
in his usual attacking style, decided on giving up a P in the hope of
recovering
it with an augmented position. Mr Blackburnes anti-drawing
inclination
makes him one of the most dangerous rivals in tournaments where the
draws
count half ; but the same characteristic places him at great
disadvantage
in a single-handed match, more especially when he stands already behind
in the score. In such a case it is most dangerous policy to try to
force a win at some hazard, for this amounts actually to giving the
large
odds of the draw, which, in the opinion of some authorities, is
equivalent
to pawn and move, while it is clearly the wiser plan for the party who
stands at a disadvantage in the score to take such odds for himself by
keeping on the defensive, and watching for more positive opportunities
of increasing his score. This is proved by the experience gained
from previous great contests, and the famous match between Harrwitz and
Lowenthal furnishes an extraordinary example. The winner of the
first
eleven games was to be declared victor, and at one time Harrwitz had
only
won two games, while Lowenthal already scored nine. The final
issue
was the almost incredible event that Harrwitz won the match, and, in the
opinion of good authorities, his victory was chiefly due to his having
mostly adopted purely defensive tactics. Another most remarkable
case in point is the match between Kolisch and Paulsen for the first
eleven
games up, in which the latter stood at once time with five games against
one ahead in the score. Kolisch then contented himself to draw
game
after game, occasionally adding a victory, until at last the match was
given up as undecided, with the final score ofPaulsen 7, Kolisch
6, and
17 drawn. However, it should be pointed out that the two
above-named
contests occurred before the introduction of the time limit, and it is
difficult to say how far the modern time restriction would interfere
with
such defensive tactics, which seem also not to be congenial to
Blackburnes
style. |
Under any circumstances, we do not think that
Blackburnes
sacrifice of the P was sound, though we do not approve of the mode which
his opponent chose for retaining it, and much prefer the process
indicated
below in our notes. For, as it happened, Blackburne had an
excellent
opportunity on the 24th move of fully equalising the game by P to B
4.
He, however, missed that, and later on, on the 29th move, he became
still
more flurried under the pressure of time limit. He had then a fine
prospect of saving the game by Kt to B 4 ; but, instead of adopting this
salvation resource, he actually committed a blunder in retreating the Kt
to Kt 4, at the cost of his protective P on the K side. Blackburne
resorted to Kt to B 4 at the wrong time on the 31st move, and his
opponent
made a good enough answer with Q to R 3, though he could have won the
game
more elegantly and in a shorter way by B to R 6. After one more
ingenious
but futile attempt to retrieve himself on the next move, by leaving the
Q en prise and threatening to recover with the check of the Kt at
B 7, to which Zukertort gave the proper repartee Blacks defence
broke
down completely, and the game ended by Zukertort announcing mate in five
moves. Duration four hours and a half. |
The Field, London,
1881.07.16
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Zukertort,JH Blackburne,JH
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(7)
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C01/03 |
French: Exchange (Svenonius)
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1881.07.11 |
GBR London (St. Georges Chess
Club)
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Annotations by Wilhelm
Steinitz
1.e4 e6 2.d4 d5 3.Nc3 Nf6 4.exd5 exd5 5.Nf3 Bd6 6.Bd3
0-0 7.0-0 Nc6
** |
The best theoretical authorities, including Zukertort,
consider
this the strongest defensive development at this point. |
8.Bg5 Bg4 9.Kh1
** |
In order to capture the d-pawn without remaining
subjected
to the answer of ...Bxh2+. |
9...Be7 10.Be3
** |
White has obtained a change of post for his bishop,
which,
in the opinion of Zukertort, is of some importance for his
development. |
10...Qd7 11.Qd2
11...Bd6
** |
For we think that Blacks having developed the queen
at
d7 makes a material difference in enabling him now to capture the knight
with advantage (see introduction). The game might then have proceeded
thus:
11...Bxf3 12.gxf3 Qh3 13.Be2 Bd6 14.f4 Ne7 15.Rg1 Nf5 with a good
game. |
12.Nh4
** |
The knight was bound to remove now, and this was the best
plan, in order to avoid an offer of exchange by 12...Bf5. |
12...Rae8 13.f3 Be6
** |
13...Qd8, though tempting, would have been bad, e.g.:
13...Qd8
14.fxg4 Ne4 (if 14...Nxg4, the answer is 15.Nf5) 15.Nxe4 dxe4 (if
15...Qxh4,
the answer is obviously 16.Nxd6) 16.Bg5, and wins; for, in reply to
16...f6,
he first checks with 17.Bc4+. |
14.f4 Qd8 15.Nf3 Bb4 16.f5 Ne4
** |
See introduction. 16...Bc8 was the proper play. If White
then pinned the knight by 17.Bg5, he could reply 17...Be7; and, though
his position would have become cramped, it apparently only called for
exercise
of patience, and he had nothing in reality to fear. |
17.Bxe4 dxe4 [?:??-1:00] 18.fxe6 exf3 19.exf7+ Rxf7
20.Rxf3
Rd7
** |
Exchanging rooks, followed by ...Bxc3, and afterwards
...Qd5,
would have afforded him no compensation for the pawn lost, for White
would
retake the knight with the queen, followed by Bg1, and he would have
ample
time for advancing the a-pawn, and then protecting his f-pawn with the
rook, if necessary, when doubly attacked. |
21.Rf4 [1:00-?:??]
** |
An awkward sort of defense, which should only have led to
an even game while we believe that the advantage gained could have been
better secured by 21.Bg1, e.g.: 21.Bg1 Ne5 (This seems best; if
21...Nxd4
the answer is 22.Rd3, followed by Rd1; and, though Black will in the
meanwhile
protect the knight by ...c5, he will not gain sufficient time to
extricate
both the e8-rook and the queen from the pinning action of the adverse
pieces,
and White will ultimately win by the advance of the a-pawn, followed by
b4, and ultimately Nb5) 22.Rh3 c5 (best; if 22...Nc4, of course White
wins
by 23.Qd3 threatening Qxh7+) 23.a3 Ba5 (This seems best; though it
apparently
loses time, for he gains his object of compelling the adverse d-pawn to
advance and loosen it from its pawn support. 23...cxd4 is obviously
inferior;
and, if 23...Bxc3, the pawn retakes and White then threatens to remove
the queen to e2, which will have the effect of compelling Black either
to exchange pawns, or else to abandon another pawn on the c-file. White,
in the latter case, ought to be able to bring his two pawns ahead to
account
in the ending, albeit, their being trebled on one file) 24.d5 Bxc3
25.Qxc3
b6 26.Re3, and Black dare not capture the d-pawn, or White will bring
the
other rook at e1, and afterwards the bishop to bear upon the
knight. |
21...Ne7 22.Qd3 Bxc3 23.bxc3 Nd5 24.Rf3 Rde7
** |
24...c5 was now the correct move to equalize the game,
for
we cannot see how White could keep any advantage after that.
25.Qc4
would be bad in reply, as Black could attack the queen by 25...b5.
If 25.Rd1, Black could also reply 25...b5; and, if 25.Bf2, the knight
would
retreat to b6, followed by ...c5; and, subsequently, as soon as
Blacks
c-pawn is unattacked or sufficiently protected, the knight would gain an
unassailable position at d5, which, in combination with the pressure of
the knight against the adverse front c-pawn, would make the game quite
even. |
25.Bd2 Qd6 26.Raf1 Nf6 27.Bf4 Qd5 28.Be5 Ne4
29.Rf4
** |
29.Rf5 at once would have compelled the advance of
29...g6,
which would have apparently weakened Blacks position on the
kingside.
But on the other hand it would give Black opportunities of reaching g7
with his knight via e6, after resorting to ...Nc5, which he had always
at his disposal, even if his own queen were in the meanwhile to be
attacked
by c4. |
29...Ng5
** |
A flagrant error which loses his most important pawn, and
disintegrates his position on the kingside. 29...Nc5 would have
enabled
him to make a good fight for a draw, whether White offered the exchange
of queens at f3 or not. |
30.Rf5
** |
Promptly taking advantage. After this Blacks game
becomes
hopeless. |
30...Ne6 [?:??-2:00] 31.Bxg7 Nc5
** |
Much too late now. White was not likely to submit
to the exchange of queens. |
32.Qh3
** |
This wins no doubt, but 32.Bh6 threatening mate with the
doubled rooks, and also 33.Qg3+, was more precise, and finer style. We
give a diagram of the position. |
32...Ne4
** |
Just on the chance that White would take the queen at
once
which led to mere exchange by the answer 33...Nf2+. |
33.Be5 Rxe5 (# in 5), 1-0.
** |
Commencing with 34.Qg4+. The knight must then
interpose,
and the queen takes, followed by 36.Rf8+. |
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The Field, London,
1881.07.16
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