Tuesdays game. - Blackburne
commenced
with the Scotch gambit, in the same way as in the fourth game, and
Steinitz
defended again by P to Q R 3; Blackburne retreated the K Kt at once to
Q R 3 before bringing out the Q Kt. This might appear a measure
adopted
to prevent the K Kt being blocked out by P to Q Kt 4, as happened in the
fourth game, since this expedient would have been unadvisable for Black
to adopt at that point, on account of the reply of B to B 3. But
Mr Blackburne assures us that his retreating the Kt at once was only a
finger-slip, caused by his attention being diverted at the time in
consequence
of his desire to assist the scorers, who could not follow the players,
owing to the rapidity in which the opening moves were played on both
sides.
Finding he had thus lost time he gave up a second pawn, in order to keep
up the attack. On the twenty-second move, Steinitz gave up the
exchange,
in order to simplify the game; but his opponent, in his turn, elected to
give up a piece for the very opposite purpose. On Blacks
31st move
the game was adjourned, and Steinitz, whose turn it was to play, had in
accordance with custom, to write down his move, and to hand it over to
the secretary in a closed envelope. Just at that time the alarum
bell of his clock gave the sign of his having completed the second hour,
and, being under the impression that it was his 30th move, he hurriedly
put his move down, which subjected him to a tremendous attack after the
adjournment. Ultimately, however, he succeeded in exchanging
queens,
remaining with a rook behind for six pawns, three of which were bound to
fall; but, having his king near to support the other three pawns, he
succeeded
in a difficult and long ending to force the game.
The Field, London,
1876.03.04
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Blackburne,JH Steinitz,W
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(6)
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C45/04 |
Scotch: Pulling (Horwitz)
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1876.02.29 |
GBR London (West-End Chess
Club)
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Annotations by Blackburne &
Steinitz
1.e4 e5 2.Nf3 Nc6 3.d4 exd4 4.Nxd4 Qh4 5.Nb5 Bb4+ 6.Bd2
Qxe4+ 7.Be2 Kd8 8.0-0 Bxd2 9.Qxd2 a6 10.N5a3
** |
At first sight this seems a
feasible
attempt to prevent the maneuver successfully adopted by Steinitz in the
fourth game of the match, namely to shut out the kings
knight by 10...b5. This object is certainly now attained; for in
answer to 10...b5, White would obtain a strong attack by 11.Bf3 followed
by 12.c4 upon the adverse queen retreating to g6, e.g.: 10...b5
11.Bf3 Qg6 (best) 12.c4 b4 13.Nc2 a5 14.a3, with an excellent
game.
Blackburne assures us, however, that his retreating the knight at once
was a simple slip. He contemplated playing the same attack as in
the fourth game, placing reliance upon a slow attack, to be fortified
later
on by bringing the a-knight to the succour, which, as he thinks, would
be extricated by pawn to c4, or pawn to c3, after removing the
b-knight.
Blacks following answer is plain, and
it
is made chiefly with the purpose of getting the queen on the a1-h8
diagonal,
where she is better placed for defensive purposes, and out of the reach
of the hostile rooks and minor pieces. |
10...Qd4 11.Qg5+
** |
The immediate retreat of the queen
to c1, though rather humble in an attacking game if this sort, would
have
been sounder play, for it might have afforded the f-rook an opportunity
of occupying the d-file without loss of time, if Black in answer
developed
his g-knight. In that case it would not have been advantageous for
Black to advance pawn to b5 so long as the c-pawn was available for an
attack by pawn to c4. |
11...Qf6 12.Qd2
** |
In our opinion White places here
more
faith in the chances of an error on the part of the adversary than in
the
requirements of the position for relinquishing the attack and adopting
a temporary patient defense. Blackburne maintains, however, that
the sacrifice of the second pawn was quite legitimate, since it enabled
him to gain the point at a3 with his queen, for the purpose of delaying
the advance of the hostile d-pawn. |
12...Qxb2 13.Nc4 Qd4
** |
Black would have gained two rooks
for the queen even if he had taken the rook, and the opponent had shut
out the queen by 14.Nc3; but his position would then have become
extremely
difficult to defend, and, besides, he could in the present situation be
well satisfied with the surplus of two pawns. |
14.Qc1 Nge7
** |
Had Black now taken the rook, the
opponent would have replied 15.Qa3, threatening mate, and must have
afterwards
won the queen by 16.Nc3. |
15.Nbd2 d6 16.Rd1 Be6 17.Qa3 Nd5
18.Nb3 Qc3 [1:00-?:??] 19.Bf1
** |
19.Kh1 was preferable.
Blacks
d-knight could not then attack by 19...Nf4, on account of the winning
reply,
20.Nxd6; and if Black proceeded in the same way as the text, namely by
19...Ndb4, it must have saved at least a move for White that his king
would
have been already in the corner. See Blacks
24th move. |
19...Ndb4 20.Ne3 Re8 [?:??-1:00]
21.Rd2
** |
In this kind of position the attack
must be proceeded with any hazard, and, though Black had well protected
his most vulnerable point, the d-pawn, the assualt could only be
directed
against that spot. With two pawns behind already, White could only
hope to confuse the opponent, who was pressed for time, and had a
difficult
game to defend. |
21...Bxb3 22.Rad1 Rxe3
** |
The sacrifice makes matters more
smooth
and clear for the defense, and forces the opponent to give up a piece
and
two pawns, or to submit to a ruinous exchange of queens, which would
have
left Black with an extremely easy position in the ending game, and with
the overwhelming superiority of four pawns and a knight against the
rook.
Had he taken the c-pawn at once with the knight, he would have obviously
lost a piece without releasing his position, for White would have simply
retaken 23.Nxc2. |
23.fxe3 Nxc2 24.Qc1 Qxe3+ 25.Kh1 Ba4 26.Bc4
N2d4
** |
By a singular infatuation, Steinitz
greedily plays here, and subsequently, for preserving the piece, totally
contrary to his own principle, which usually aims at a simplification of
the game. He ought to have moved 26...Kd7, liberating the rook,
and
winning must have become an easy matter; for White could not gain the
piece
without exchanging queens, and then there was nothing left to counteract
the march of Blacks
pawns. |
27.Re1 Qf4 28.Rf1 Qh6 29.Qb2
[2:00-?:??]
29...Qe3 30.Bxf7
** |
Better than taking with the rook;
for Black would have answered 30...Ne5, since he could safely move the
king to e7 if White then proceeded with 31.Rf8+. |
30...Bb5 31.Rfd1 (Adjourned)
31...Nf5
(Sealed) [?:??-2:00] 32.a4
** |
We explained in our last number how
Blacks error on the previous move,
when the
game was adjourned, arose. The latter ought to have played the
king
to d7 or to e7, and there would have been no more complication to give
White a chance of a mistake. But it is only due to Blackburne to
state that, with inferior forces, he had skillfully managed to perplex
the opponent with the most puzzling moves, while the latter was pressed
for time; and Whites clever maneuver
at this
juncture was also one which could not be easily foreseen. |
32...Ne5
** |
Black could not capture the a-pawn
without resigning his best chance of winning and being content with a
probable
draw. For instance: 32...Bxa4 33.Re2 Qh6 34.Re6 Qh4 35.Qxb7 Rb8 36.Re8+
Kd7 37.Rxb8 Nxb8 38.Qxb8, and Black cannot take the other rook, and he
can only check with the knight at g3 and e2; for White would certainly
avoid coming out to f1 on account of the reply ...Qf4+, etc. Giving up
a clear piece by 32...Ncd4 might have been, however, even better than
the
move in the text; for if 33.axb5, Black, by 32...axb5, opening the
a-file,
would have had more than enough for the exchange he lost.
Blacks
knight would then have been quite safe at d4, though White had three
pieces
on it, for the latter dared not capture it on account of the mate
threatened
either with the queen at e1, or with the rook at a1 after exchanging
queens.
Nor could White get rid of the other knight by 34.g4, on account of the
reply 34...Qf3+. |
33.axb5 Nxf7 34.Re2 Qh6 35.Qb3 axb5 36.g4
Nd4
** |
One piece was lost and this way of
giving it up was no doubt better than going in for winning another pawn
by 36...Qf6. Black would have had no time to take that pawn, since
White threatened to win by doubling the rooks on the e-file. |
37.Rxd4 Ra1+ 38.Kg2 Qf6 39.Rde4
** |
39.Qxb5, though it threatened a
mate,
would have been disastrous, for Black would have answered 39...Qf1+,
followed
by 40...Ra3+. If White then interposed 41.Rd3, Black would capture
41...Qxe2, the other rook remaining pinned. |
39...Ne5 40.Rf2 Qg6 41.Ref4 c6 42.Qe3
** |
This fine move cuts off the retreat
of Blacks king, and keeps the
latters
queen also fixed. It will be seen that later on
Blacks
queen could neither move to e6, or to e8, or b1, on account of
Whites
check with the rook at f7. |
42...Kc7 43.h3 h5 44.Rf5 hxg4
45.Rg5
[3:00-?:??] 45...gxh3+ 46.Kh2 Ra3
** |
Had he checked with the knight at
g4, White would have taken off the knight with the rook, and then at
least
have drawn the game by checking backwards and forwards with the other
rook
at f7 and f8. Whites ingenious
reply
enables him to come out with a rook ahead, but the best experts declare
that Blacks pawns must win by force
afterwards. |
47.Qxe5 dxe5 48.Rxg6 b4
[?:??-3:00]
49.Rb2
** |
Had he played 49.Re2, Black would
have protected the e-pawn by 49...Ra5, followed, according to
circumstances,
either by rook to b5 or d5, which would have enabled Black to lead his
combined pawns to victory, supported by the king. |
49...c5 50.Rf2 Rd3
** |
Necessary to keep up communication
between Black's king and his passed pawns. White threatened to
check
with the rook at f7, followed by the other rook taking the g-pawn,
attacking
the b-pawn doubly. |
51.Rc2 b6 52.Re6 b3 53.Rb2 c4
54.Rxe5
Kc6 55.Rg5 Rd5 56.Rxg7 Kc5 57.Kxh3 Kb4 58.Rb1 b5 59.Rg4 [4:00-?:??]
59...Rd2
** |
White's king being cut off, and
Black's
king having crossed the front to support his pawns, the cautious advance
of the latter must win easily and surely. |
60.Rg5 b2 61.Kg3 c3 62.Kf3 Kc4 63.Rgg1 Kb3 64.Ke3 Rd8
65.Rgf1 c2 66.Ke2 Ka2 0-1.
The Field, London, 1876.03.04
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