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Conserving Africa's Elephants

Controlling Illegal Trade in Elephant Products

The combination of legal and illegal trade in ivory has had a significant impact on elephant populations throughout history. More recently, the effects of this trade on elephant numbers in Africa has become difficult to disentangle from the effects of the loss of habitat, due largely to agricultural expansion. Records of the amount of ivory leaving Africa before the turn of the 20th century are sketchy, but better records have been kept since then. One difficulty in evaluating the history of the ivory tra de, however, has been the inability to differentiate between legally and illegally acquired ivory.

There have been two major peaks in recorded history for total ivory exports leaving Africa. Legal ivory cannot be distinguished from illegal ivory in either case. The first, in the late 19th and early 20th century, coincided with the spread of white colon ists, the slave trade, and hunters. This period may have had a disproportionate impact upon the elephants of southern, central, and west Africa. The second, which began in the late 1960s and reached a peak during the early 1980s, was fuelled by the demand for ivory from European, North American, and East Asian markets, and in particular, from Japan. By 1987, it was recognized that the combined level of legal and illegal off-take was unsustainable. It is estimated that during this period, almost half of Af rica's elephants may have been eliminated, and perhaps as many as 80 per cent of the elephants in East Africa.

Elephant Tusks

1. International Policy, Legislation, and Enforcement:
The CITES Ban

1.1 Ivory
In 1977, the Parties to CITES agreed that trade in ivory should be regulated by putting the African elephant on Appendix II of CITES, and in 1985 they agreed to put in place a quota system for tightening controls on the ivory trade. While there was eviden ce indicating that ivory trade volumes had been reduced as a result of efforts under CITES (Figure4), continuing illegal trade and the cumulative impact of large-scale unsustainable exploitation from the 1970s through the mid-1980s, led many to conclude t hat the measures under CITES were insufficient to halt the overall decline of the African elephant.

In mid-1989, against a backdrop of growing international pressure, numerous importing countries began introducing domestic legislation to stop the importation of raw ivory. In July of that year, the Kenya Wildlife Service publicly burned 13 tonnes of ivor y from Kenya's stocks, an event that succeeded in focusing world attention on the elephant's plight.

In October 1989, the various international efforts to halt the ivory trade culminated in the Seventh Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to CITES, in Lausanne, Switzerland. The Parties voted by a significant majority to place the African elephant on Appendix I, thereby banning all international trade in ivory and other elephant products. In doing so, however, the Parties rejected a straight Appendix I up-listing and opted for a special compromise solution. The so-called Somalia Amendment, adopted by resolution, explicitly noted that not all elephant populations qualified for placement on Appendix I under the terms of CITES. It established specific down-listing criteria for the transfer of stable or increasing elephant populations back to Appendix II. This resolution required that a specially-appointed Panel of Experts review future down-listing proposals. The CITES ban came into effect in January 1990.

WWF publicly supported both the ban and this resolution, as did most African countries -- many of which had lost significant numbers of elephants to poaching -- in the belief that only a complete cessation of the ivory trade would prevent continued losses to poachers. Contrarily, however, a group of range states in southern Africa (Botswana, Malawi, Mozambique, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe), along with Cameroon, Congo, and Gabon, voted against the amended Appendix I listing proposal as they did not consider their own elephant populations to be threatened with extinction as a consequence of the international ivory trade (the key criteria for listing on Appendix I at that time).

As some of these countries had not suffered the catastrophic elephant population declines seen elsewhere in Africa, they believed that the ban would seriously undermine their options for funding elephant conservation programmes, which, in Zimbabwe and Sou th Africa, were largely funded through revenues derived from marketing of elephant meat, hides, and ivory. The southern African countries are of particular significance as they are estimated to hold approximately 40 per cent of Africa's remaining elephant s.

In support of their position at the time the ivory ban took effect, five southern African countries (Botswana, Malawi, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe) took out reservations against the inclusion of their elephants on Appendix I. China and the United K ingdom (on behalf of Hong Kong) also took out reservations to ensure they could continue to trade their existing ivory stocks. Under the terms of the convention, countries with reservations can continue to treat their elephant populations and/or ivory sto cks as if they were on Appendix II, thus making trade in ivory and other elephant products legal between non-Party states or Parties which hold a corresponding reservation.

Namibia has since joined CITES with a reservation on its elephant populations, the United Kingdom and China formally withdrew their reservations to trade in ivory and other elephant products, and Zambia has indicated its intention to withdraw its reservat ion as of 1992, but has yet to follow through with the required documentation. In a move which underscored their ideological solidarity on the issue of trade in ivory, Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and at the time, Zambia, established the Southern African Centre for Ivory Marketing (SACIM), now known as the Southern African Convention for Wildlife Management (SACWM), signalling their intention to eventually resume trade in ivory and other wildlife products.

In the run-up to the Eighth Conference of the Parties to CITES, in Kyoto, Japan, in 1992, and following the submission for down-listing the elephant populations of the five SACIM countries and South Africa, a CITES-appointed Panel of Experts found that Bo tswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe met the established criteria for the transfer of their elephant populations to Appendix II.

Despite these technical findings, however, none of the southern African proposals gained widespread support at the meeting, even after the proponents agreed to a continued moratorium on all trade in ivory. All proposals were eventually withdrawn, and Zamb ia resigned from SACIM after disassociating itself from the down-listing proposal. Of particular concern during this debate was the need for strict controls on trade to be in place in both importing and exporting countries before any consideration could b e given by the Parties to the possibility of resuming such trade. Another important concern was the possibility of speculative killing of elephants due to indications that the ban might be weakened.

Two years later, at the November 1994 Ninth Conference of the Parties to CITES, South Africa again proposed to transfer its elephant population to Appendix II, this time limiting international trade options exclusively to non-ivory products from the Kruge r National Park elephant population, consisting mainly of hide of which more than 100 tonnes now rest in their warehouses. Sudan also sought to allow a "one-off" disposal of nearly 50 tonnes of ivory which had been held under government custody since 1988 . It became clear during the meeting that the proposals did not have the support of the majority of African elephant range states, and, as a result, they were withdrawn. The African elephant range states, however, agreed to embark on an inter-sessional di alogue to determine whether a common position could be found for future consideration of trade-related matters, particularly the issue of growing ivory stocks.

The first dialogue took place in Dakar, Senegal in November 1996 and covered a broad range of topics including: ivory stocks; the status of illegal ivory trade on the continent; conditions for the resumption of legal trade in elephant products; the develo pment of sustainable funding mechanisms for elephant conservation; and the desire to build consensus among the range states on these issues. It was agreed to hold a second dialogue prior to the Tenth Conference of the Parties to CITES, to be held in Harar e in June 1997. Among other issues, this prior meeting will consider the proposals for down-listing that have been forwarded to the CITES secretariat, in order to resume a restricted legal trade in ivory.

The international ivory trade ban has been voluntarily upheld by the SACIM states since 1990, in part because there is a lack of viable trading partners as long as the CITES ban continues. Three southern African countries, Namibia, Botswana, and Zimbabwe have, however, submitted proposals to down-list their elephant populations from AppendixI to AppendixII to enable trade in existing ivory stocks of national origin. The proposals specify one trading partner, Japan, and export quotas for two years only, to be reviewed at the Eleventh Conference of the Parties to CITES.

The southern African range states argue that they need to be able to employ the full range of options to secure the resources necessary for conservation. They believe that revenue from elephant products should be used to offset the cost of their conservat ion efforts, as well as contributing to national and local economies. To this end, the proposing countries believe they should be allowed to trade legally in ivory acquired through elephant management activities, or natural mortality within their own bord ers.

1.2. Hides
Although both Zimbabwe and South Africa have argued that conservation efforts in their respective countries would ultimately fail if they were not allowed to trade in hides, following an unsuccessful attempt to reopen their hide trade in 1994, no further proposals have since been made by South Africa. In 1997, Zimbabwe requested that the Tenth Conference of the Parties to CITES consider the resumption of the international trade in their legally acquired elephant hides as, Zimbabwe argues that, on conserva tion grounds, it has a strong case for trading in hides. About 20 per cent of hide production derives from sport hunting in Zimbabwe's communal lands involved in the CAMPFIRE programme. Revenues from these hide sales alone, if allowed, could bring an esti mated US$100,000 to local communities annually (based on pre'ban prices).

The topic of hide trade was discussed at length in the November 1996 Africa elephant range states dialogue meeting in Senegal, where it was broadly agreed that such trade would not endanger elephant populations as there was no demonstrated link between th e trade in hides and poaching. As individual hides weigh 65 to 150kg on average, removing and tanning the hides is a cumbersome and lengthy operation and cannot be done swiftly and secretly. Owing to their weight and bulk, hides are difficult, if not impo ssible, to conceal and transport.

2. Current International Trade in Ivory

Illicit trade in ivory continues and significant seizures of ivory, both within and outside Africa, have taken place since 1990. In 1995, an IUCN study, co-sponsored by WWF and the United States Fish & Wildlife Service (USFWS), assessed comparative develo pments in nine elephant range states, and found evidence of increased poaching following the significant drop in ivory prices in the wake of the unilateral and CITES trade bans of 1989 and 1990. At least 18 tonnes of ivory were confiscated within these co untriesÀÀ borders over the period of five years. The study also found that outside of Africa more than 8,700 ivory artefacts from the target countries, representing at least two tonnes of raw or semi-worked ivory, had been confiscated over the same peri od.

In 1996, TRAFFIC updated the figures on worldwide ivory seizures to include a total of more than 69 tonnes of ivory seized since 1989, comprising 11,756 tusks and pieces of raw ivory, 111,065 semi-worked ivory blocks, and 65,235 worked ivory products. Whi le these trade volumes are certainly less than the amount of ivory leaving these countries prior to the ban, the data, nonetheless, indicates a continuing and possibly growing trade. An unknown number of shipments have clearly slipped by undetected.

While there is evidence that some of the ivory leaving the continent is "leaking" out of government-held stocks, the origin of most illegal ivory shipments is not always clear. With the enactment of the CITES ban, there has been a loss of official trade s tatistics, although these have always been patchy. This has made it difficult to accurately assess trends in the patterns and magnitude of the ivory trade. In an attempt to grapple with this information gap, TRAFFIC has established an extensive database o n ivory seizures. Drawing principally from official government sources, it has logged over 4,100 records from 40 countries on illicit ivory movements around the world since 1989.

TRAFFIC's efforts reveal developments which give cause for great concern, such as the relatively new appearance and expansion of African-based, Asian-run carving industries. The primary output of these operations are small, semi-worked ivory blocks, desti ned for the growing East Asian name seal market (detailed in TRAFFIC's 1997 report, "Still in Business"). Prior to the CITES trade ban, Asian-run ivory processing within Africa was documented in only two countries; TRAFFIC's data now indicates the emergen ce of such operations in at least sixteen. Highly adaptable, and requiring little capital investment, such operations have the potential to develop into a high-volume industry.

While the dynamics are still not clearly understood, this development may be fuelled by the apparent drop in ivory prices within Africa. An indication of its potential growth is the recent increase in confiscations with at least ten seizures involving 900 kg of pre-cut ivory blocks, sometimes painted and disguised to look like wood. The small, crudely-cut blocks are easy to conceal and transport, often passing unnoticed through the international postal system in small parcels. Detection and control of this illicit industry presents a serious challenge to conventional law-enforcement efforts, at both ends of the trade.

Although the major pre-ban markets for ivory in Europe and the United States have largely disappeared, some old markets in East Asia, particularly China, may actually be growing. Other traditional markets such as Japan and India continue, and new consumer markets, including parts of the former Soviet Union, Lebanon, and South Korea, may be emerging. Customs seizures in recent years have identified Taiwan, Japan, China, Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Thailand among the final destinations for illega l ivory. An analysis of TRAFFIC's database disclosed that, since 1989, 80 per cent of the major ivory seizures for which a destination could be ascertained were for Asian markets

3. National Policies, Legislation, and Enforcement

Visitors to many countries in Africa find ivory carvings and jewellery for sale in the duty-free shops and around street stalls in Harare or Abidjan. A number of African countries, including Angola, Botswana, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Eth iopia, Ghana, Malawi, Namibia, Nigeria, South Africa, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, and Zimbabwe still allow domestic trade in ivory: it is neither illegal nor controlled under CITES, which addresses only international, cross-border trade.

While it may be perfectly legal to buy ivory in these countries, it is generally only legal to take ivory into another country which is not a Party to CITES, (some 130 countries have acceded to the Treaty). Any American, British, or French tourist, for ex ample, who buys an ivory bangle from a country with legal domestic trade and takes it home, is in violation of the international treaty or national law. Although they may not account for a significant volume of the current illegal trade, TRAFFIC's databas e shows that ivory confiscations from returning travellers is the single most common ivory trade infraction in the world.

Surprising volumes of ivory can pass through seemingly innocuous local curio markets. A recent study by the Wildlife Conservation Society in one such market in Brazzaville, Congo, focused on four desktop-sized booths, only two of which dealt exclusively i n ivory carvings. A year of observation resulted in an estimated sale of nearly 700kg of ivory in over 1,100different transactions. French, Senegalese, Chinese, Russians, and Italians were the most prominent foreign buyers, and some 14 per cent of the sal es involved the diplomatic community. These thriving local ivory markets may have a significant impact on elephant poaching in the Congo, and are hardly affected by the policy initiatives taken within the CITES arena.

In the wake of the ban, many range states are also grappling with the issue of legal ivory stocks. TRAFFIC's current efforts to identify, record, mark, and monitor the accumulation of ivory within Africa provide a conservative estimate of 600 tonnes of iv ory legally in the hands of government authorities or authorised dealers, with Botswana, Burundi, Namibia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe holding the largest confirmed stocks. This figure doubles the volume estimated at the time the CITES ban came into effect. The picture, however, is not spread evenly across the continent. The largest, best-managed, and most secure stocks, are found in eastern and southern Africa, while only a few confirmed ivory stocks are held in western or central African countries. The general practice in the western and central African countries appears to be the disposal, official or otherwise, of government-held ivory onto local markets. The fate of what could be substantial, privately-held stocks is, for the most par t, unknown. Although ivory stocks have traditionally represented an economic asset, they are becoming a liability, requiring constant investment in terms of management and security, while their economic value stagnates. Where this investment is insufficient, ivory th efts from government stores are occurring; a situation which has troubled Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Nigeria, Swaziland, and Tanzania in recent years. Sudan's stock, in storage in Khartoum since 1988, lost 15 per cent of its weight due to the evaporati on of moisture over five years. The ivory became brittle and lost some of its quality as a result. Faced with equally arid conditions, Namibia has invested in expensive humidifying equipment and storerooms to safeguard the future value of its ivory stock. Thus, the value of some countries' ivory can seriously depreciate with the passage of time.

The cost of managing ivory stocks is not unnoticed by politicians and policy makers in some of the poorest countries in the world. As the ivory stocks grow, they become a potent economic and political factor both at home and within CITES. Indeed, Sudan's down-listing proposal in 1994 stemmed partly from its desire for CITES to find a solution to the ivory stock issue, and partly from its interest in benefiting from this potentially valuable commodity. The problem of growing ivory stocks will not simply go away and, therefore, the search for a lasting solution must remain high on the conservation agenda.

In the meantime, scientific techniques for distinguishing between legally acquired ivory (from properly managed elephant populations), and illegally acquired ivory (from poached elephants), are being developed and refined. One promising approach involves the use of various atomic isotopes to identify the origin of ivory by analysing the relative proportions of carbon, nitrogen, and strontium isotopes occurring naturally in elephant tusks, as the vegetation eaten by elephants in any one area has a unique m ix of chemical isotopes which derive from the soils of that area.

The proportion of browse and grass in the diet also affects the isotope tuskprint found in the tusks of individual elephants. So, theoretically, it may be possible to pinpoint the origin of raw or worked ivory through sophisticated chemical analyses. Unfo rtunately, the method is not yet foolproof. Elephants from the same locality can have quite a wide range of isotopic tuskprints while those from distant areas, with similar habitats, may share many characteristics. For the present, baseline data on these characteristics is restricted to a small part of the total elephant range, and testing is expensive (currently around US$100 per test). Alternative ivory marking techniques include embossing with unique holograms, but none of the suggested methods have be en developed to the point of being foolproof.

Another pervasive and increasing problem is a general lack of funds for regular anti-poaching operations and other law enforcement actions in the field. Protecting elephants and maintaining the integrity of their protected areas is expensive. It is estima ted that the annual cost for guards and equipment to protect elephants was at least US$200 per square kilometre during the 1980s, and is probably much higher today. Moreover, a number of studies have demonstrated that there is a direct relationship betwee n the amount of available funds, and the effectiveness of anti-poaching efforts.

PhotoNo African country, even one as relatively rich in resources as South Africa, can sustain this kind of expenditure, and what funds are available are often whittled away by inflation and devaluati on. In addition, in countries such as Cameroon, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe, structural adjustment programmes have led to reductions in civil service staffing levels resulting, in turn, in significant cuts in law-enforcement personnel in protected area s which, for the most part, are already severely understaffed.

In reality, African countries cannot hope to provide the levels of funding required for effective elephant conservation in the long term, in the face of more pressing development priorities which absorb the limited funds available. In spite of earlier pro mises of support, foreign donors have not been forthcoming with sufficient, sustained funding for elephant conservation in Africa. Some Northern donors apparently hoped that the ivory ban, alone, would hold the illegal killing of elephants at sustainable levels. While the enactment of the ivory ban was a battle won, the war against poaching is still being fought in Africa, and may yet intensify in future, as demand in the marketplace increases. It is unrealistic to think that African governments can, or w ill, meet these costs on their own.

If people value elephants, then there appears to be only two possible approaches to their effective conservation. The first is for developed countries with healthy or robust economies to substantially help to "foot the bill" for the management and protect ion of elephants by African wildlife departments. This approach has not been very successful to date, and there is little indication that the future will be much brighter. The second approach, (perhaps -- and potentially -- more viable), is to develop tho se options that, in so far as possible, can provide for the optimal financial return (e. g. from game-viewing, sport hunting, or elephant product revenues), for communities that must share their land with elephants, and at the same time can train members of these communities in methods of sustainable elephant conservation. The likely solution is a mix, with African wildlife departments taking responsibility for elephants within protected areas, while communities take more responsibility for those living o utside of them.

4. Local Policies, Legislation, and Enforcement

Although domestic trade in ivory is permitted in some countries, the legal off-take of elephants, and use of their ivory, is no longer so common in Africa since the CITES ban. With the exception of revenue from trophies, only local communities in Zimbabwe benefit directly from ivory which is taken from problem elephants, and those hunted for trophies, that are killed on communal lands. The Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management keeps this ivory separated, and well-marked, within the national Ivory Room, on behalf of each community. This ivory can currently be sold on the domestic market, and eventually could be sold within the SACWM system, or on the international market if the ban is ever lifted.

Except in Zimbabwe and a few other countries, the danger of mixing illegal and legal ivory in the name of "problem animal control" is very real. Most elephant range states lack an efficient system for marking and storing elephant tusks. A clear separation of ivory originating from all forms of mortality: natural deaths, elephants killed by government culling or problem animal control operations, and ivory confiscated from poachers or dealers is a prerequisite for determining sustainable levels of off-take and any consideration of lifting the ban on ivory sales. Without such accountability, elephants could be unsustainably harvested and "ivory laundering" could take place.

Local communities which are particularly disenchanted with the ability or willingness of their local wildlife authorities to deal with problem elephants, may also take matters into their own hands. Small-scale illegal killing of elephants in defence of li fe and property is quite common and does not pose a grave threat to elephant populations on the whole. If, however, frustrated farmers start to collaborate with commercial poachers, the ramifications for elephant populations both inside and outside of pro tected areas could be very serious. In fact, the possibility for a situation like this to arise has recently been a cause for concern in the Dande, Gokwe, and Binga districts of Zimbabwe. As clashes between people and elephants become more common and poli tically contentious, the potential for this "joining of forces" needs to be recognized and addressed.

Some years ago, in the South Luangwa valley of Zambia, local people helped outsiders to poach elephants on their land. Subsequently, a community-based natural resource programme, the Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas (ADMADE), was initiated. Once local people began to reap benefits through the ADMADE programme, poachers were deterred, or reported to the authorities, resulting in a marked drop in poaching. Over time, elephant densities became higher in the associated ADMADE areas o utside of, rather than within, the South Luangwa National Park where the government's anti-poaching efforts were woefully inadequate

5. Protecting Elephants from Unsustainable, Illegal Off-take for the Ivory Trade

Although the levels of illegal killing of elephants are lower in some elephant range states than they were before the ban, they are higher in others. The fact is that poaching for ivory continues and the indications are that it may be increasing. Several factors combine to give rise to poaching and illegal trade on both the producing and consuming sides of the equation.

In the range states, the first factor -- given the handicap of limited capacity and shrinking resources -- is the inability of individual countries to control poaching and ivory trafficking. The second factor, in areas where elephants and people come into conflict, is increasing pressure for the elephants to be "removed". If the removal is undertaken by a competent management authority, the off-take and the ivory may be controlled. But, given the state of many of Africa's wildlife management authorities, rural communities may be driven to take "problem animal control" into their own hands and the destiny of the ivory from this off-take will be largely uncontrollable.

The third factor is that ivory stocks are growing in many of the African range states, and at present there are no means for their legal disposal on the international market. This means that the true value of a commodity seen as a valuable and renewable r esource by most range states, cannot be realised. Domestic markets cannot currently absorb the available supply, while countries have an incentive to hold onto their ivory in case, as some hope, the trade moratorium is eventually lifted. Where controls ar e stringent, stocks may be secure and safe, but in many countries stocks may provide a conduit for illegal trade. Clearly the ivory stock question cannot remain unresolved indefinitely.

The fourth factor is that on the consuming side, there is a continuing demand from Far Eastern countries where economic growth provides disposal income, and ivory is still valued as a luxury product. These countries are increasingly present on the African continent and engaged in development activities such as road and dam construction, and, perhaps of most relevance here, are involving themselves in central Africa's growing timber industry. Nationals of these same countries have been implicated in the es tablishment of ivory processing operations in a number of African countries. Lastly, in many countries, but particularly those of west and central Africa, wildlife legislation (and the accompanying penalties), to foster and enable the enforcement of national obligations under international treaties, such as CITES, is woefully inad equate and outdated. Control of elephant poaching and illegal trade in ivory should remain a major objective in the conservation of Africa's elephants.

Next: Determining the Status of Populations



Copyright 1997, The World Wide Fund For Nature