A Middle-Man in Place

by Syed Talat Hussain

Elections for the Indian-held Kashmir's 87 member state legislature are over and Farooq Abdullah of the National Conference now heads the new government. In Pakistan, response to this development has been standard. As with the electoral process, the results and formation of government have been roundly condemned. The whole exercise is described in the most unflattering terms, and is being thought to be of little consequence. The emotionally loaded reaction is nothing to be surprised about. Kashmir is an issue of the heart in Pakistan, and emotions boil easily. Yet, a cool headed view of the formation of the government in occupied Kashmir would reveal that the development is not as inconsequential as it might appear to some.

India stands to gain major advantages from this move: it can confuse the world public opinion about the crux of the Kashmir matter while it slowly absorbs the disputed state into the Indian Union. It also provides Delhi an opportunity to penetrate the grassroot opinion in Kashmir and divide it by opening the floodgates of concessions and different types of incentives through the new government. Before the elections, the Indian propaganda machinery was firing from all cylinders about the salutary changes the elections will bring about in the disputed state. Many countries believed it. The United States and Britain were notable for pleading for the election option and their various representatives made it clear that they saw the elections as the one way to end killings in Kashmir. If this happened, their argument ran, it could be considered an achievement in itself, in view of Kashmir's impossible situation.

Now, with a political government in place in occupied Kashmir, chances are fair of this happening. Political representatives, even of dubious credibility, can work as a buffer between the occupation troops and the Kashmiri mujahids, mitigating what has so far been a face to face deadly combat and thus lessening the level of violence. Also, a representative government, even with a "made in India" logo, is much more presentable than direct rule through sheer might and repression. If nothing else, it gives the violent tactics of the state in the Valley a different colouring. The killings and trouble which will now take place in Kashmir will be projected by Delhi to be a fight between those who want political independence (greater autonomy), which India is willing to grant, and those who insist on violently breaking away, which India says it will never let happen.

This can influence the world's assessment of what is happening in Kashmir. While Pakistan would legitimately claim that the Farooq Abdullah pack in occupied Kashmir dances to Delhi's tune, it should not be shocked to find the claim fall on deaf ears. From the point of view of a weary world community, a Kashmir that is seen to be moving towards some sort of stability is better than a Kashmir that is in a state of permanent turmoil. By this token, it would see those who stand for stability, to be standing for peace and those who are demanding freedom, to be only a bit too demanding.

Of no less significance is the fact that Delhi has now reconstructed the political arm of its strategy to control occupied Kashmir. An inevitable result of its policy of indiscriminate killing has been elimination of Kashmiri field commanders. On the other hand, ceaseless repression has also driven myriad political parties onto one platform, that of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC). As Delhi has experienced, talking to even "pliant" Kashmiri leaders is hugely difficult without a middle-man. The new government is just that middle-man. Also, for psychological as well as political reasons, Kashmiris will feel more comfortable talking to other Kashmiris than to Delhi itself. This may not mean any more credibility for the Farooq Abdullah government than it already has, which is not much. But does it matter? After all, even in the fold of the APHC there are political leaders who took part in the previous elections for occupied Kashmir's State Assembly.

In addition to this, the influence of the Farooq Abdullah government can also trickle down to the grassroots. One of the most powerful factors, which has sustained Kashmir's freedom struggle, has been the support of the people, without which no movement is viable. But while the push of this support is still pulsating through the struggle, there is a body of opinion, not large, which yearns for some kind, any kind, of peace. The government of Farooq Abdullah is the channel that Delhi will employ to reach out to this 'for peace sentiment', and nourish it. The effort can succeed. A functioning government with massive development funds and dollops of aid at its disposal is a powerful buyer and not every loyalty is so strong as to resist the offer. In any case, a politician, even one who does not have a big constituency, has a greater reach and appeal among the public than military regiments with blood of the locals on their hands.

Politicians work through social and family networks. They have connections, relatives, friends, friends of friends. They utilise these linkages and multiply them. They are even more effective if they can negotiate the release of prisoners, help poor families build a house or start a business, and launch community development projects. For them, penetration to the grassroots is not an insurmountable problem. For all these reasons, Pakistan must pay keener attention to the change that has occurred in occupied Kashmir and seriously analyse its repercussions for its policy on Kashmir. If it does not, it might soon find that the Indian post polls options have increased in reverse proportion to its own.


S.T. Hussain is a columnist for The News, Pakistan.
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