

Sheet1

SUBJE	AUTHOR,C,50	YEAR,MONTH,C,9
Micro	Brown, Donald J., W.P. Heller, R.M. Starr	1989 January
Game	Crawford, Vicent P.	1989 March
EMT	Kuan, Chung-Ming	1989 May
Inf	McAfee, R.P. and J. McMillan	1989 April
I.O.	Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts	1989 March
Game	Stinchcombe, Maxwell B.	1989 April
Game	Banks J.S. and Joel Sobel	1987 May
Game	Cho In-Koo and Joel Sobel	1987
I.O.	Crawford, V. P. and J. Sobel	1982 November
I.O.	Guasch, J.L. and J. Sobel	1983
Game	Sobel, J.	1983
Game	Cho, In-Koo and J. Sobel	
I.O.	Emons W. and J. Sobel	1988
I.O.	Sobel, Joel	1988

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TITLE,C,102

Two-Part Marginal Cost Pricing Equilibria

An "Envolutionary" Explanation of Van Huyck, Battalio and Beil's Experimental Results on Coordination

Learning Recurrent Networks by the Dynamic and Standard Back-Propagation Methods

Organizational Diseconomies of Scale

Rationalizability, Learning and Equilibrium in Games with Strategic Complementarities

Continuous-time Game Theory

Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Game

Strategic Stability and Uniqueness in Signaling Games

Strategic Information Transmission

Breeding and Raiding: A Theory of Strategic Production of Skills

Disclosure of Evidence and Resolution of Disputes: Who should Bear the Burden of Proof?

Unique Outcomes in signalling Games

On the Effectiveness of Liability Rules when Agents are not Identical

How (and When) to Communicate to Enemies

JOURNALVOLNUMPP0,C PP1,(KEYWD,C,100

UCSD coordination equilibrium refinement experimental economics multiple equilibria

IRPS Incentive compatilbe principal agents Incentive Compatibility

Stanford

UCSD

EMT 55 3 647 661 refinement

UCSD 87 10 refinement

EMT 50 6 1431 51 234A 88F

UCSD 83 1

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UCSD 88 39

UCSD 88 36

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