$Unique_ID{COW04235} $Pretitle{371} $Title{Zimbabwe Chapter 4C. Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front} $Subtitle{} $Author{Jean R. Tartter} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{government party african zanu-pf white mugabe pf-zapu minister zimbabwe members} $Date{1982} $Log{Animals of Zimbabwe*0423501.scf Figure 18.*0423502.scf } Country: Zimbabwe Book: Zimbabwe, A Country Study Author: Jean R. Tartter Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1982 Chapter 4C. Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front [See Animals of Zimbabwe: Courtesy Embassy of Zimbabwe, Washington DC.] At independence ZANU-PF was by no means a cohesive party. Its leaders had been hastily reassembled, some of them guerrillas who had conducted years of bitter bush warfare. Many had just been released from political detention; others had been in exile promoting the nationalist cause in Africa and other world capitals. They were not motivated by a single ideology, their attitudes ranging from strident Marxism to old-style African nationalism. ZANU-PF's policymaking body, the central committee, was crisscrossed by conflicting interests, although these could be traced more to tribal and personality clashes than to ideological differences. [See Figure 18.: Results of Common Voter Roll Election to House of Assembly, 1980 Source: Based on information from Colin Legum (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record, New York, 1981, pp. 977-78.] Within the predominant Shona group of the ZANU-PF leadership, the leading political figures were loosely identified with either of two factions: the Karanga and the Zezuru-Manyika. A leading figure in the Karanga faction was said to be the deputy prime minister. Simon Muzenda; the leader of the other faction was Edgar Tekere, the party's secretary general and minister of manpower, planning, and development. The Muzenda group was said to be more conservative and cautious and more inclined to cooperation or merger with PF-ZAPU. The Zezuru-Manyika group was identified with the bellicose radicalism of Tekere and his personal animosity toward Nkomo and PF-ZAPU. Tekere's forced retirement from the government and later from his high party post after his acquittal on charges of murdering a white farmer left others of like temperament in the cabinet. They were reputed to include Ernest Kadungura (minister, of youth, sport, and recreation) and Herbert Ushewokunze (minister of home affairs). Ushewokunze, an impetuous individual, had been given his important portfolio with responsibility for the police in spite of earlier dismissal as minister of health after accusing white hospital personnel of discriminating against African patients and the Public Service Commission of favoring whites. Other prominent cabinet figures selected by Mugabe were not closely identified with either of these factions. They included Eddison Zvobgo, minister of legal and parliamentary affairs, who had been charged with recommending revisions in the governmental structure and had been a leading campaigner for a one-party state. Nkala, outspoken on many issues, had a political style close to the Zezuru group in spite of his Ndebele background. Reassigned from finance to the lesser portfolio of national supplies, he was still regarded as politically influential. Several cabinet ministers were clearly selected for their professional and technical qualifications rather than their party standing. Bernard Chidzero, an official of a United Nations (UN) agency, returned to Zimbabwe to accept the portfolio of economic planning and development; this was later combined with finance to give him preeminence in economic matters. Mugabe, a Zezuru, was regarded as being among those of leftist convictions in the ZANU-PF spectrum. However, he remained above the factionalism, balancing the two tendencies while solidifying his own authority. His tolerance, which was greater than that of some of the more impulsive and radical cabinet members, was evident in his willingness to appoint new PF-ZAPU members to the cabinet even after accusing the party leadership of plotting insurrection. The party's central committee was subject to election by a national congress of ZANU-PF. The committee had been constituted in 1977, although the only party congress that had been held was in 1964. The committee originally consisted of thirty-three members, but seven denounced as a left-wing clique had been removed and detained in Mozambique. The composition of the remaining twenty-six posts had changed little. Some of the important positions like those of secretary general and secretary for defense had not been filled after they became vacant pending elections at a party congress planned for 1983. In 1982 most of the central committee members concurrently held ministerial or military positions. Most members of the central committee had party titles of secretary or deputy secretary and responsibilities roughly corresponding to the various government departments. The president, secretary general, and secretaries comprised a senior group of about ten members known as the national executive. There was little evidence, however, that the national executive acted as an inner core of leaders, such as those in the political bureaus of Marxist-oriented parties elsewhere. Mugabe has indicated that the central committee leadership might be simplified in conjunction with the planned national congress, leaving as its officers only the president, secretary general, national political commissar, organizing secretary, treasurer, publicity chief, and the secretaries for youth and for women. During the civil war ZANU-PF was effectively organized at the grass roots in the eastern provinces where its guerrilla operations were centered. A network of councils and committees provided supplies to the guerrillas and looked after the needs of the local population in areas where the Salisbury government no longer had administrative control. When Mugabe came to power, many local party functionaries assumed posts in government at the district level. The party apparatus thus has been closely linked with administration in Shona rural areas, and party cadres have been effective in organizing community activity or mobilizing support at election time. In an effort to reinvigorate the party machinery, the central committee was reported in March 1982 to have called for a new structure whose basic unit, the cell, would consist of 100 people headed by an executive committee comprising a chairman, secretary-treasurer, commissar, and security officer, and two additional members. There would be men's, women's, and youth wings. At the next level a branch would be made up of 500 people and a leadership committee of fourteen individuals. District membership would total 5,000, and province organizations would be formed from the district groups. Whether or not such an orderly plan could be successfully introduced, Mugabe has advocated a policy of mass membership rather than an elite party where membership must be earned over a lengthy period. Thus former members of other parties, including whites, have been welcomed. The prime minister has declared that white candidates would be put forward in the elections scheduled for 1985. It was conceded that many voters were joining ZANU-PF out of self-interest, but in Mugabe's judgment it was better to have them under the party's control where some kind of transformation might take place. Membership dues were minimal. The party was seeking to pay for its postindependence debts and the reconstruction of party headquarters after it had been bombed by embarking on various business ventures, including farms, real estate holdings, and manufacturing. In 1982 debate over policy direction of ZANU-PF was confined within the central committee; its conclusions were then expected to be reflected in day-to-day operating decisions of the cabinet. This could lead to difficulties when the government was confronted with realities that resisted solution by doctrinaire approaches and when some degree of acceptance of its policies had to be obtained from other members of the coalition cabinet, from the caucus of ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU in the assembly, and from senior administrators of the ministries. There were signs of restlessness by central committee members over whether Mugabe's pragmatic course was consistent with decisions of the committee and the party's socialist principles. After a lengthy central committee meeting at the close of 1981, the prime minister reiterated that the cabinet would only adopt and reflect those policies that the committee had approved. His vitriolic attacks on the RF, on Muzorewa, and on Nkomo in the same period and the announcement of a three-year program for socialization of the economy were similarly regarded as efforts to refurbish his radical image while carrying on with moderate policies as head of the government. Nkomo and the Patriotic Front Coalition A charismatic personality to his followers among the Ndebele and Kalanga groups in the western and southwestern sections of Zimbabwe, Nkomo had been an eminent figure in the nationalist movement from the time he assumed the presidency of the African National Congress in 1957. To others Nkomo was sometimes seen as an untrustworthy opportunist. Dissatisfaction over Nkomo's leadership mounted with his decision to move the headquarters of the movement, which had become known as ZAPU, to Tanzania after its banning in Rhodesia in 1963. This step precipitated the formation of a rival nationalist group, ZANU, under Sithole and Mugabe, among others (see African Nationalist Opposition, ch. 1). Detained by the Salisbury authorities for a decade between 1964 and 1974, Nkomo later superintended ZAPU's participation in the civil war from headquarters in Lusaka, Zambia. The group's Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) was better equipped than ZANU's force, the Zimabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA), being supplied with modern weaponry and training from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Risking only minimal contact with Rhodesian forces from its Zambian stronghold, Nkomo was suspected of being reluctant to commit fully his military power for future political advantage. This belief, as well as Nkomo's private contacts with Ian Smith, were continuing sources of discord. Nevertheless the alliance between the two externally based parties just before the Geneva Conference in late 1976 proved to be a cohesive negotiating partnership through the Lancaster House Conference of late 1979. The coalition government formed after the 1980 elections left Nkomo discontented when his party was offered only four lesser cabinet portfolios out of twenty-three and when it secured few civil service and diplomatic appointments. Relations within the ZANU-PF-dominated cabinet were troubled by lingering suspicions over the disarming of ZIPRA units, which were believed to be hiding weapons. Nkomo cooperated, however, in the sensitive process of combining ZIPRA guerrillas into an integrated army with the numerically larger forces of ZANU-PF. In November 1980 severe fighting broke out between ZIPRA and ZANLA units in and around Nkomo's stronghold of Bulawayo. Mixed army patrols composed of former ZIPRA and ZANLA forces succeeded in imposing a truce. Violence involving several battalions of recently integrated units erupted again in February 1981 on a wide scale (see Public Order and Internal Security, ch. 5). There was no imputation of connivance by PF-ZAPU; in fact Nkomo and the leading ZIPRA general, Lookout Masuku, helped to defuse the conflict. Nevertheless the result was to deepen the rift. In spite of his responsibility for the police as minister of home affairs, Nkomo said he felt like an "ornament" in the coalition after nine senior PF-ZAPU officials were detained without his knowledge. An attempt was made in early 1981 to reduce the strains in the alliance. A cabinet reshuffling resulted in withdrawal of the home affairs portfolio from Nkomo. Josiah Chinamano (vice president of PF-ZAPU) was added to the cabinet as minister of transport, and three other party members were made deputy ministers, giving PF-ZAPU a total of eight at cabinet and subcabinet level. After rejecting the proferred post of minister of public service, Nkomo agreed to stay on as minister without portfolio with an understanding that he would have special responsibilities in the security area. Several meetings were held on the eventual unification of ZANU-PF with PF-ZAPU, and it was agreed that the two parties would desist from attacking each other publicly. A major rupture occurred a year later when, after the discovery of several large caches of modern arms on farms owned by PF-ZAPU, the government seized twelve companies controlled by the party on whose properties the arms were found and expelled Nkomo and two other PF-ZAPU ministers from the cabinet. Mugabe said that Nkomo and his party had been like a "cobra in the house." The expulsions seemed at first to portend an end to the tempestuous two-year coalition phase of the independence government. But Mugabe, explaining that he would distinguish between those intriguing against the government and others believed innocent, offered portfolios to two other PF-ZAPU members, leaving the party with four seats in the cabinet. Reflecting a division (or at least uncertainty) over continued participation in the coalition, the 150-member PF-ZAPU central committee at first rejected Nkomo's wishes by allowing its remaining members to remain in the government. Later, however, it condemned the two new ministers for accepting portfolios. Both ZANU-PF and PF-ZANU had sought to maintain a party structure in which each of the two main tribal groups were represented and had not confined their campaigning to the area where their main support was found. In spite of this, tribal affiliations seemed to have become accentuated in voting patterns of the national election of 1980 and in subsequent local elections. The preponderance of Shona over Ndebele in the population condemned PF-ZAPU to the status of a permanent minority party, In not formally repudiating the coalition after the buffeting it received from Mugabe, many on the PF-ZAPU central committee no doubt concluded that this tenuous link was needed if the party was to have any impact on government policies. PF-ZAPU has generally been regarded as subject to stricter central control than ZANU-PF. Nkomo's followers were said to remain loyal in spite of the party's misfortunes. At one time there were reported to be two identifiable factions in the PF-ZAPU leadership: old-guard nationalists and younger doctrinaire socialists. More recently certain leaders appeared more inclined than others to reach accommodation with Mugabe. PF-ZAPU had deliberately appointed a high proportion of Shona to its national executive, but it was problematic whether ethnic origin could be correlated with attitudes toward cooperation with ZANU-PF. Other African Parties Aside from ZANU-PF and PF-ZAPU, the African political groups that participated in the 1980 national elections have gone into eclipse or been disbanded. Even the UANC, which under Muzorewa won a majority of seats in the House of Assembly to lead the internal settlement government of May 1979, barely secured representation in the 1980 parliament. While regularly attending sessions of the assembly, Muzorewa's attitude has been described as one of defiance and bitterness over the loss of power that he attributed to illegal campaign tactics by ZANU-PF. Muzorewa has continued to hold party rallies but has complained that he felt free to campaign only in Ndebele areas; fear of ZANU-PF intimidation has limited his contact with the Manyika people where his strength was believed to be centered. Muzorewa has rejected the one-party concept saying that it would lead to a nation of sheep. He has vehemently denied repeated assertions by Mugabe that the UANC was plotting insurrection with South African bacing and that UANC paramilitary forces were being trained inside South Africas's borders. Able to attract only 2 percent of the vote in the 1980 election, Sithole's ZANU failed to qualify for any seats under the proportional representation system in effect. During 1980 and 1981 a number of leading ZANU officials shifted to ZANU-PF, including Sithole's own brother, arguing that they no longer saw a need for the party and recommending its merger with Mugabe's group. A third African party that joined with Muzorewa's UANC and Sithole's ZANU on the interim executive council of April 1978 was the Zimbabwe United People's Organization (ZUPO), formed among the traditional chiefs after the failure of the Geneva Conference in December 1976. It did not win any seats in the internal settlement election of April 1979 and did not contest the 1980 elections, supporting instead Nkomo's PF-ZAPU. In March 1982 ZUPO leader Jeremiah Chirau, then president of the Council of Chiefs, announced the dissolution of the party, declaring his support for a one-party state and recommending that ZUPO members join ZANU-PF. Another veteran African nationalist, James Chikerema, who had been vice president of the UANC, led a breakaway movement of seven UANC parliamentarians in June 1979, accusing Muzorewa of favoring the Manyika over the Zezuru within the party. Chikerema's faction contested the 1980 election as the Zimbabwe Democratic Party but failed to win any seats. White Political Forces Since its formation in 1962 the Rhodesian Front (RF)-renamed the Republican Front in 1981-has been the dominant source of political expression among the white electorate. Although small groups have arisen from time to time to the right or left of the RF on the paramount issue of black political rights, the RF has consistently held the allegiance of three-quarters or more of the white voters. In every general election between 1965 and 1979 the party secured all white seats in parliament. In the separate balloting by white voters that preceded Mugabe's victory in February 1980, the RF showed its continued mastery by winning fourteen seats unopposed and over whelming independent candidates in the remaining six seats. Although Ian Smith conceded that he had been surprised by the moderation and competence shown by the Mugabe as prime minister, the white members of the assembly antagonized the government side by adopting the traditional stance of an opposition party under a parliamentary system. The ZANU-PF legislators were exasperated by what they interpreted as white obstructionism aimed at thwarting the fundamental changes in the Zimbabwean economy and society demanded by the electorate. Mugabe refused to acknowledge the RF as the official opposition party, noting that it had no prospect under the Constitution of replacing the existing government. Mugabe urged the whites to abandon "erosion, sneers, insults, and political confrontation" and to emerge from their "fog of racist prejudice" by identifying themselves with his aim of bringing dignity, health, prosperity, and education to all groups. After two years of groping for its proper role as a minority party, the unity of the RF was finally breached over its leaders' policy of unreconstructed antagonism to the Mugabe government. A series of defections among RF legislators began in June 1981 when Andre Holland resigned his seat to form the Democratic Party, committed to cooperation with the government. In March 1982 nine other RF members defected to sit as independents, including several who had held important portfolios in previous RF cabinets. Their actions were dictated by the belief that they could serve their white constituents better if they enjoyed greater access to the government. They also wished to dissociate themselves from the slurs addressed to African legislators by some of their former colleagues, behavior that they said verged on racism. With one member in detention and one having fled the country in fear of arrest on a charge of subversion, the RF had only nine active members in parliament as of July 1982. One of the defectors from the party, Chris Andersen, was subsequently taken into Mugabe's cabinet as minister of state in the prime minister's office with special responsibility for the public service. He joined Denis Norman, who had been serving as minister of agriculture since the Mugabe cabinet was formed in 1980. Another former RF member, John Landau, was named deputy minister for trade and commerce. Disputes among white parliamentarians over their function as a permanent minority body did not appear to extend to the white electorate, which returned RF candidates in the four by-elections held since independence. Apathy induced by the irrelevance of white politics seemed to afflict the electorate, turnouts falling below 30 percent of registered voters. After a succession of by-election failures, Holland disbanded the Democratic Party, citing the unwillingness of white voters to support an enlightened progovernment party. The Government's Ideology and Program Preindependence declarations by ZANU-PF nourished fears that the party's objective was a thoroughgoing system of state socialism acting in close association with world communist forces. An official party statement said: "In idealogy ZANU is guided by the Marxist-Leninist Principle. Zanu aims to achieve a socialist revolution....All the means of production and exchange will be publicly owned by the people of Zimbabwe....Economic cooperation will be established and strengthened with the socialist world so as to bring capitalist USA, Britain, West Germany, etc., to ultimate doom." Mugabe himself was regarded as a dedicated Marxist before the Lancaster House settlement, but his statements took on a moderate tone during the election campaign and as he gathered up the reins of office in 1980. Elaborating on his beliefs for Western audiences, Mugabe said that although certain fundamental principles had been derived from Marxism and Leninism, these had been blended with Christian values and those from Zimbabwe's own traditions to produce a distinctive socialist outlook and philosophy. Mugabe identified his most urgent postindependence priorities as pacifying the former fighting forces, affording relief to the refugees from the civil war, and introducing tangible change in Zimbabwean society that would give substance to the advent of African rule. His forceful suppression of factional fighting between ZIPRA and ZANLA veterans eased the threat to internal stability arising from the coexistence of idled former guerrillas. The integration of three armies recently at war and having unassimilated racial, ethnic, and ideological differences was a noteworthy achievement of the new government. Nevertheless the large army and the assemblages of demobilized guerrillas still receiving generous allowances were economically burdensome and a potential source of disorder. Checking his socialist inclinations, Mugabe sought to address the pressing issue of disparities between high and low wage earners and between incomes in the modern sector and the communal-based rural economy without causing disruption of existing economic patterns. Reassurances were tendered to the private sector, foreign investors were courted, and it was acknowledged that the Western countries he had previously castigated were indispensable sources of aid for development and resettlement. The needs of landless and impoverished refugees were to be met without dispossessing efficient white farmers, and the acquisition of land was to proceed on a basis of fair compensation. The compelling pressures of the land issue produced many instances of Africans squatting on white-owned farms, which the government firmly resisted. In spite of the government's preference for cooperative farming, it accepted the fact that the majority of the displaced African peasantry desired individual plots. Its main concern was to ensure that the newly allocated land would not be used for subsistence cultivation but would produce reasonable incomes and thereby deflect rural-urban migratory pressures (see Land Use and Ownership, ch. 3). The government's revenue programs of 1980 and 1981 were designed to bring gradual improvement in economic conditions for the African population. Sales taxes were removed for a number of basic consumption goods but raised on cars and home furnishings, and a capital gains tax was introduced. Steep increases in expenditures for health and African education were needed to finance free medical care for those below minimum income levels and free primary schools for all (see Education, ch. 2; Health, ch. 2; Government Finance, ch. 3). Measures to increase minimum wages and place limits on wage increases at the upper levels were introduced, factory committees were established to represent worker interests, and dismissals were subjected to government review. Many white employers complained that the government's policies discouraged them from expanding production or providing jobs for Africans who had limited skills. Reports of violations of the new wage minimums, particularly among domestic and farm laborers, were widespread (see Employment, Income Distribution, and Prices, ch. 3). Concerned over wildcat strikes, which broke out even before Mugabe took office and which reflected pent-up grievances and demands for redress of wage inequities, the government undertook to impose greater control over the labor movement. It encouraged the formation of an umbrella federation, the Zimbabwe Trade Union Congress (ZTUC), by replacing the five existing federations. Four of them had links to African political parties, while the fifth was multiracial but white dominated. ZANU-PF also backed several new unions as rivals to long-standing unions and, on the grounds of bringing greater order to the labor scene, proposed to reduce the total number of unions from fifty-two to about twenty, organized on an industrywide basis. The founding congress of the ZTUC (later renamed the Zimbabwe Federation of Trade Unions) was held in February 1981; Africans held the top positions, but four whites were named to the twenty-five-member general council. Although most of the leadership, including the president, Alfred Makwarimba, was from ZANU-PF, a PF-ZAPU faction was also present, headed by the acting general secretary, Ismael Nedziwe. The government's ultimate objective appeared to be a politically reliable labor movement that would not compound the country's economic problems with unrealistic demands or major work stoppages. The government continuously sought to reassure foreign investors and the white settler group controlling the country's modern agricultural and industrial enterprises that its goals were pragmatic and that no policy of nationalization had been instituted. Special circumstances had dictated its takeover of a South African-owned bank and a South African-controlled publishing empire, acquisitions that had come about through equity purchases. The new government corporation for marketing the country's mineral products was said to be needed to reduce abuses in pricing practices, tax evasion, and exchange control violations (see Mining, ch. 3). Unwilling to conceded that the government had been diverted from its long-term socialist goals, Mugabe declared in early 1982 that, at the proper time, the country's resources and means of production must move out of the grip of the "capitalist burgeoise" into the hands of the peasantry, the proletariat, and the state. The government's policies had affected only marginally the privileged social and economic position of white society. Nevertheless, reduced subsidies to private schools, desegregation of hospitals, strict limits on the goods and funds that emigrants could export, and plans to revoke the dual citizenship clause of the Constitution contributed to the demoralization of many whites. A number of symbolic acts caused momentary indignation-the removal of Cecil Rhodes' statue from a central square in Harare, the Africanization of names of cities and towns, and the renaming of streets after African nationalist leaders. The partisan nature of the daily press and the broadcast media was a constant reminder of the reversal of white political fortunes. In spite of the de facto concentration of power in the hands of Mugabe and ZANU-PF, party leaders have given unremitting stress to their ambition of realizing a one-party state. They have noted that the multiparty system was imposed on Zimbabwe by the Lancaster House settlement and that such a system has generally proved unworkable in African countries because political parties have almost invariably been ethnically oriented. It has been asserted that in Africa the one-party system can be a device for moderating intertribal conflict in the political process. Terming them a "political luxury," Mugabe has been critical of other parties that have adopted a role of opposing the government's programs during times that call for a strong spirit of national unity. He did not see a one-party system as monolithic, noting that several candidates from a single integrated political party could compete for elective posts, preserving for the voters a choice from left to right in the political spectrum. The right to form politician associations is guaranteed under the Constitution and cannot be revoked during the first ten years except by unanimous vote of the House of Assembly. Although other ZANU-PF leaders like Minister of Legal and Parliamentary Affairs Zvobgo have shown little patience with the existing system, Mugabe has declared that he would proceed constitutionally in introducing any changes. Talks were held with PF-ZAPU in 1981 on the integration of the two Patriotic Front parties, but the heightened distrust after the discovery of hidden arms and Nkomo's dismissal from the cabinet made an uncoerced merger of the two parties seem unlikely as of mid-1982. Government and the News Media Several newspapers, numerous periodicals, and modern radio and television services have long been available to Zimbabweans as primary sources of news and other information. Before national independence most of the print media were aimed at an urban white readership, and radio and television were operated by a government-owned corporation. An obediently progovernment outlook and the tendentious reporting of the civil war greatly diminished the modern media's credibility. Since 1981 the political tone and content of the press have been reoriented to cater to a growing African readership sympathetic to the government in power. Radio and television have been slanted in favor of ZANU-PF ideology and policies, and their news broadcasts generally have been based on official press releases. The Press Until 1981 the country's five main newspapers were owned by South African commercial interests. In fact, almost from the outset of white occupation of the area, the English-language press has been an extension of South African journalistic interests. In 1891 the South African Argus newspaper chain bought the publication rights to a weekly that was appearing in duplicated form among the settlers at Fort Salisbury. A subsidiary firm, the Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company, operated the newspaper, which in 1892 was renamed the Rhodesia Herald. The company moved rapidly to establish a near monopoly over major press operations in Rhodesia, founding the Umtali Post in 1893 and the Chronicle in Bulawayo the following year. With the appearance of the Sunday Mail (Salisbury) and the Sunday News (Bulawayo) in the early 1930s, the dominance of the Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company was complete except for a few weeklies in smaller communities. The company had generally backed the government until 1964 when it refused to back the Smith regime in its pursuit of UDI. Journalists serving the various newspapers began to be attacked by the security police, and the government sought to discredit the publishing chain. Additional pressures to back the Smith government came from advertisers and business organizations. Under the regime's emergency regulations, censorship was imposed, although it was relaxed somewhat in 1968 on the understanding that editors would exercise tighter self-imposed censorship in consultation with the authorities. Controls were further stiffened during the 1970s after the press became bolder, claiming that the security restrictions were being used to mask government incompetence and foreign policy blunders. It became an offense to print comments "likely to cause alarm, fear, or despondency" among readers. News items relating to public incidents, disorders, and economic conditions could be suppressed, and military censorship prevented any reporting on the civil war except official communiques and pronouncements. Dispatches of foreign correspondents were censored, enabling the Salisbury authorities to interdict reports of brutality by Rhodesian security forces. Even in the late 1970s the Muzorewa government suppressed any except official dispatches on the unsuccessful campaign to win over Patriotic Front supporters. The African Daily News, the first daily aimed at an African readership, was founded in 1956 and purchased by the Thomson newspaper chain of Britain in 1962. With higher professional standards and objective treatment of African attitudes and events, circulation rose rapidly. The newspaper's strong criticism of the RF as well as its support for African nationalism resulted in its being banned in 1964 after the RF came to power, along with other African-oriented journals of the same chain. In 1974 the Roman Catholic weekly Moto was banned for calling the guerrillas "liberators" and "freedom fighters." Another African-oriented daily, Zimbabwe Times, appeared for seventeen months until it was banned in 1978, reportedly on the initiative of Muzorewa, after opposing the internal settlement and advocating an all-party conference with the Patriotic Front. After Mugabe's election victory, the daily newspapers made an effort to adjust to the new situation. The Sunday Mail editorialized: "We will continue our policy of supporting the lawfully elected government of the day as far as possible-not totally, not without question, but in the interests of the country and all its people." The press continued, however, to orient its coverage toward the small white community. The new government was critical of the attention assigned to matters of importance only to whites and for what it regarded as negative treatment of factionalism and unrest. Ownership of Zimbabwe's newspapers by a South African chain, even one whose publications in South Africa were critical of its government's apartheid policies, was an embarrassment. In January 1981 it was announced that, with assistance from Nigeria, the 42 percent of the Rhodesian Printing and Publishing Company owned by Argus would be acquired by Zimbabwe, giving the government financial control. Promising that freedom of the press would not be impaired, the government brought policy control and senior editorial appointments under the new Mass Media Trust. An African chairman was named to head this body, which included four other African members and two whites, one of whom was the wife of former Prime Minister Garfield Todd; none had strong party ties. A few months earlier the South African Press Association relinquished its interest in the Harare-based Inter African News Agency to the Zimbabwe government. The new national news agency was renamed the Zimbabwe Inter African News Agency (ZIANA). Soon after the government takeover of the press, the white editors of the two Harare newspapers (the Herald and the Sunday Mail) and Bulawayo's Chronicle were replaced by Africans. Feature stories and news reports dealing with African interests were expanded. The editor of the Chronicle asserted that the paper's circulation had risen in a little more than a year from 38,000 to 59,000 as a result of the growing African readership. The Herald reported that its circulation reached 107,000 during the first half of 1982, nearly 17 percent higher than a year earlier. The United States Department of State's human rights report for 1981 stated that the editorial policy of the daily press was uniformly progovernment. Although some parliamentary and other criticisms of the government had been reported, there were numerous allegations that many events reflecting poorly on the current leadership had been suppressed. In 1981 the minister of information and tourism explained that the government welcomed discussion and dialogue in the press but that the debate must have certain parameters. Such topics as housing, welfare, the economic system, ideological direction, or the one-party state controversy were acceptable. He defended the removal of the white editor of the weekly Umtali Post after publication of an editorial critical of the presence of military advisers from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea). According to the minister, the editor's expressed attitude, i.e., that anyone from a socialist country represents a red menace in the region, reflected racist, neocolonial, and South African thinking. In April 1982 the ZANU-PF journal, Zimbabwe News, began to appear on a monthly basis, and there were plans to publish it weekly and eventually daily. It was to be produced by the private Jongwe Printing and Publishing Company under a ZANU-PF directorship. Jongwe had also won government printing contracts, including the official record of debates in parliament. A PF-ZAPU newspaper had previously discontinued publication, although it was not forced to do so. Radio and Television Radio transmissions could be heard in every part of the country, and this probably has been the most influential modern medium of mass communication in Zimbabwe. In 1981 over 250,000 receivers were in use, and broadcasting was conducted in English as well as the main indigenous languages. The television service, originating from studios in Harare and Bulawayo, provided programming for the country's 70,000 or more television receivers. Before national independence, television catered almost exclusively to the white community. All forms of broadcasting in Zimbabwe have been a monopoly of the government since 1964 when a private television company was taken over and its board members and news staff were replaced by RF supporters. The Smith government also brought the program content of local radiobroadcasts under its control and reconstituted the board of governors of the Rhodesian Broadcasting Corporation (RBC), which had previously maintained its independence. The electronic media became the primary domestic propaganda tool of the RF; in news reports and analysis the Salisbury regime was depicted as the target of a conspiracy headed by world communism, aided by its agents and dupes in other anti-Rhodesian groups. Ian Smith declared openly that radio and television were to be employed to counter what he regarded as a hostile attitude of the domestic press. After the Mugabe government came to power, the board of governors of the renamed Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation was presided over by Donal Muvuti, deputy secretary general of ZANU-PF. The corporation's membership included four other Africans and two whites, one of whom was the former chairman of the RBC. The former general, African, and commercial services were renamed Radio 1 (general programming and news in English); Radio 2 (for Shona and Ndebele listeners); Radio 3 (a commercial service carrying youth programs, music, and current affairs); and Radio 4 (an educational and instructional service in the planning stage). Both radio and television relied heavily on official versions of events in their news and commentaries, adopting a pronounced pro-ZANU-PF tone. The Department of State's human rights report noted that the imbalance in radio and television coverage had, if anything, grown during 1981.