$Unique_ID{COW04160}
$Pretitle{267}
$Title{Zaire
Chapter 1E.   Independence, Secessions, and Assumption of Power by Mobutu}
$Subtitle{}
$Author{H. Mark Roth}
$Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army}
$Subject{government
congo
un
tshombe
katanga
political
lumumba
kasavubu
belgian
adoula}
$Date{1978}
$Log{}
Country:     Zaire
Book:        Zaire, A Country Study
Author:      H. Mark Roth
Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army
Date:        1978

Chapter 1E.   Independence, Secessions, and Assumption of Power by Mobutu

The Breakdown of Authority

     The Lumumba government lasted for two months. The first days of
independence were relatively peaceful, although there were clashes between the
Kongo and Yaka ethnic groups in Leopoldville and renewed fighting between the
Lulua and Luba in Kasai Province. The first major difficulty began with the
mutiny of the Force Publique on July 5, 1960.

     The basic cause of the mutiny was the soldiers' expectation that
immediate Africanization would accompany independence. Africanization had been
a frequent demand during 1959 but, because of the opposition by senior Belgian
military officers to swift advancement of Africans, there were still no
Africans in positions of command when independence was secured. Discontented
over the lack of change in policy for advancement, the soldiers mutinied
against their Belgian officers. There were several instances of act of
violence and humiliation of Europeans. An atmosphere of panic and mass
hysteria quickly developed, leading to an evacuation of Europeans from most
areas. On July 10 Belgian paratroopers landed at Luluabourg and
Elisabethville to restore order (see Evolution of the Forces, ch. 5).

     Prime Minister Lumumba was under strong pressure to treat the mutinies as
a political problem, as they were in part directed against him. When a mass
upgrading of the soldiers by one rank and other measures failed to appease the
insurgents, Lumumba agreed that an African should replace the Belgian
commanding officer. Lumumba appointed his uncle, Victor Lundula, commander in
chief, and Joseph-Desire Mobutu as chief of staff. The name of the army was
changed to Armee Nationale Congolaise (ANC), and further reorganization and
Africanization were begun.

     Two related issues at this time resulted in the rupture of diplomatic
relations between the Congo and Belgium. They were the declaration of Katangan
independence on July 11 by Tshombe, an act supported by Belgians in Katanga,
and the landing of Belgian troops at Matadi, Elisabethville, and Luluabourg.
The troop landings were a breach of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
signed by the two countries the day before independence. They convinced the
Congolese authorities that Belgium was attempting to reoccupy the country. On
July 12 Kasavubu and Lumumba formally requested military assistance from the
United Nations (UN) to protect the Congo from foreign aggression.

Internationalization of the Conflict

     A UN Security Council resolution on July 14, 1960, responding to the
Congo government's request for aid, called for the withdrawal of Belgian
troops and authorized Secretary General Dag Hammerskjold to take the
necessary steps in consultation with the Congo government to provide military
and technical assistance for the Congolese security forces. Although the first
UN troops landed in Leopoldville the next day, Kasavubu and Lumumba were
dissatisfied with the pace of UN action and threatened to request Soviet help
unless Belgian troops were withdrawn in two days. By July 20 the UN had
several thousand troops under its command, and Lumumba withdrew the threat
when Belgium agreed to remove its troops from Leopoldville.

     In this rapidly deteriorating situation, mistrust, suspicion, and
bitterness increased between the Congolese and the Belgians. The new
government, preoccupied with soliciting external aid, had been unable to
attack the massive problems of organizing its administration, and
administrative problems were compounded by the mass departure of Belgian civil
servants and technicians. In the meantime the Katanga secessionist regime was
consolidating its position. Given the restrictive mandate that the UN could
not interfere in the Congo's internal conflicts, it soon became evident that
the Katanga secession was about to become another major problem for the
Lumumba government.

The Secession of Katanga and South Kasai

     Katanga was already a special case in 1910 when responsibility for its
administration was taken from the private Comite Special du Katanga, which had
been set up under the Free State, and given to a vice governor general. The
administrative reorganization of 1933, bringing Katanga administratively in
line with the rest of the provinces under Leopoldville, was strongly
criticized by many Katangan Europeans. The predominant role Katanga played in
the Congo's economy, contributing almost half of the country's resources in
1957, also promoted regional pride. In the months preceding independence,
pressures grew to preserve a traditional, paternalistic king of society.

     The politically powerful Katangan organization of colonialists-the Union
for Colonization (Union pour la Colonisation-UCOL), founded in 1944 to promote
European colonization, constantly pressed for restoration of Katangan
autonomy. The activist Katangan Union (Union Katangaise) was an outgrowth of a
political committee of the UCOL. In June 1959 the CONAKAT accepted the union
into its membership and, from that time on, advocated an autonomous Katanga
within a federated Congo.

     On August 8, 1960, Kalonji, Lumumba's political enemy, proclaimed the
independence of the Mining State of South Kasai. In late August the ANC moved
against Bakwanga, the capital of South Kasai, an operation in which many
civilians were killed. Military discipline of the ANC broke down, and Kasavubu
ordered the withdrawal of the ANC forces. Meanwhile Tshombe and Kalonji formed
a confederation between Katanga and South Kasai.

The Fall of the Lumumba Government and its Aftermath

     Although the Lumumba cabinet included representatives from most of the
larger parties, it was dominated by a radical coalition led by Antoine Gizenga
and Anicet Kashamura. Opposition from the more conservative group, led by Ileo
and Jean Bolikango, developed over policies adopted toward Belgium, the UN,
and Katanga.

     Against the warning of a number of his colleagues, Lumumba made a trip
abroad with a number of his officials from July 21 to August 8, a critical
time for the country and the new government. After his return Lumumba
intensified his quarrel with the UN authorities, especially when he failed to
secure UN aid to force the end of the Katanga secession. In late August, amid
more intense opposition, Lumumba declared martial law for six months and
arrested a number of his political opponents, including Bolikango and Gabriel
Markoso, editor of Le Courrier d'Afrique, the main Leopoldville daily.

     The decision by Lumumba to accept substantial Soviet aid in order to
attack the secessionist areas brought to a climax the issue of communist
influence, and on September 5 President Kasavubu announced the dismissal of
Lumumba, Gizenga, Kashamura, and three others from the government. He also
appointed Mobutu to replace Lundula as head of the ANC. Ileo was chosen as the
new prime minister and began trying to form a new government.

     Lumumba and his cabinet responded by accusing Kasavubu of high treason
and voted to dismiss him. Parliament refused to confirm the dismissal of
either Lumumba or Kasavubu and sought to bring about a reconciliation between
them. After a week's deadlock Mobutu announced that he was assuming power
until December 31, 1960, in order to "neutralize" parliament.

     When Mobutu made his announcement, the ANC was still in a state of
disorganization. In the weeks after the mutinies, however, Mobutu, as chief of
staff, had managed to establish good relations with the commanding officers at
the Leopoldville and Thysville camps. His service from 1950 to 1956 as a clerk
in the Force Publique had given him valuable experience with the army. After
leaving the Force Publique, he worked as a journalist, and in 1959 he was sent
to Brussels for a year to study public relations. He joined the MNC in 1958
and was a close friend of Lumumba's.

     Mobutu emphasized from the beginning that his action was not an army coup
but was rather a "peaceful revolution" during which the country would be run
by a group of technicians. Mobutu's first acts were an ultimatum demanding
the departure within forty-eight hours of Soviet-bloc diplomatic personnel and
the release by troops loyal to him of political prisoners in Leopoldville and
Orientale Province. He announced that government departments were to be run by
the College of Commissioners made up of recent university graduates, students,
and a few members of Lumumba's cabinet. The college would be headed by
Justin-Marie Bomboko.

     The period of government by the College of Commissioners, formally
installed on September 29, was marked by constant political conflict. The
legitimacy of the government was challenged by political factions within the
Congo and by the more radical African nations and communist countries.
Relations between the college and the UN became progressively worse. The UN,
not formally recognizing the legality of the college, worked whenever possible
with individual commissioners. The recruitment of Belgian technicians by the
college made it suspect among politicians opposed to the return of Belgian
influence, as well as complicating administrative problems with the UN. In the
meantime the inability of the central government to regain any significant
amount of authority enabled the secessionists to strengthen their governments
and armies. As 1960 drew to a close there were four governments in the Congo.

     The major event leading to the move by the Lumumbists to establish
themselves at Stanleyville, the area of Lumumba's strongest support, was the
recommendation by the UN Credentials Committee on November 10 to seat the
rival Kasavubu delegation at the UN. Gizenga left for Stanleyville on November
13. Soon thereafter Lundula and Lumumba, who had been under UN protection
since their dismissal by Kasavubu, left for Stanleyville to assume control of
the ANC troops and the government. Lundula succeeded, but Lumumba was arrested
in the Kikwit region and was interned at Camp Hardy, Thysville. Lumumba and
two members of his former government were transferred to Katanga, where they
were assassinated under mysterious circumstances shortly after their arrival.
The assassinations, when announced on February 13, 1961, led to anarchy in
many areas. The incident helped Gizenga consolidate his regime, and several
African and Soviet bloc countries accorded it official recognition.

     Tshombe's position seemed unassailable in the aftermath of Lumumba's
death. Though unsuccessful in subduing the Luba of North Katanga, the
Katangan administration was well-supported economically from extensive mineral
exports and both materially and politically by Belgium, the colonial nations
of Europe, and South Africa. Belgium, however, never officially recognized
Katanga. On February 2, 1961, Tshombe and the leaders of South Kasai, where
Kalonji had established himself, providing internal autonomy for the region
without breaking with Leopoldville, reached an agreement for economic,
financial, and military cooperation.

     During the prolonged crisis after Lumumba's arrest and death, a new
government was finally established in Leopoldville. On February 9, 1961, the
College of Commissioners was dissolved, and a provisional government formed by
Ileo around a nucleus composed of Adoula as minister of interior, Bomboko as
minister of foreign affairs, and Bolikango as deputy prime minister. The
events of February had so weakened Leopoldville's position, however, that the
provisional government was unable to exert its authority beyond the provinces
of Leopoldville, Equateur, and a part of Kasai.

     The UN Security Council resolution on February 21, 1961, was an attempt
to check the trend toward total anarchy in the Congo and to bring about
international pressure for reintegration of the Congo. The resolution gave the
UN forces greater authority to act in order to prevent civil war and called
for the removal of foreign personnel attached to the Congo governments, the
convening of parliament, and the reorganization of the ANC. Kasavubu and Ileo
protested strenuously certain parts of the resolution as being violations of
Congolese sovereignty.

     In a move to counter the UN action, Kasavubu and Ileo achieved a
rapprochement with the Elisabethville and Bakwanga governments, leading to an
agreement with them for military cooperation and for a round table conference
to be held at Tananarive, Madagascar, beginning March 3. The Tananarive
conference called for the annulment of the Security Council resolution of
February and agreed to a confederated form of government, thus indicating the
extent of Katangan influence over Congolese politics.

The Restoration of Legal Government

     Strong opposition in Leopoldville to the Tananarive agreements made
necessary another conference that took place in Coquilhatville from April 23
to May 30, 1961. This conference established federalism as opposed to
confederalism as the future form of government. When Tshombe opposed this plan
and walked out of the meeting, he was promptly arrested by the central
government. Meanwhile Leopoldville had initiated genuine political and
military negotiations with Stanleyville, and Kasavubu began a gradual
reconciliation with the UN. Finally, after extensive negotiations during which
Tshombe was released after he agreed to send a delegation and Gizenga agreed
to participate, parliament reopened on July 25, under UN protection, at
Lovanium University on the edge of Leopoldville. All areas of the Congo were
represented except Katanga, despite Tshombe's agreement.

     A broad coalition government, headed by Adoula as prime minister, was
approved by parliament by an overwhelming vote. Soon afterward Adoula
announced that Gizenga would join the government as first vice prime minister,
although Gizenga elected to remain in Stanleyville. Diplomatic relations were
reestablished with Belgium, an action made possible largely by the appointment
of Paul-Henri Spaak as minister of African affairs in a new Belgian
government. Spaak had a much less favorable attitude toward the Katanga
secession than his predecessor. A measure of political stability was gradually
restored with the return to legality, but the basic problems remained,
particularly that of Katanga.

End of the Katanga Secession and of the Gizenga Regime

     After the formation of the Adoula government the UN took measures to
implement the UN resolution of February 21, calling for the removal from the
Congo of foreign personnel whose presence was a hindrance to the settlement of
internal political conflicts. In September 1961 there were some 500 European
mercenaries, most of them Belgian, in the service of Katanga. The most serious
of many crises over Katanga began in September 1961 when the UN, in
cooperation with the central government, sought to expel the mercenaries. The
UN action led to serious fighting, which was temporarily halted after the
death of Hammerskjold on September 18 in a plane crash enroute to Ndola,
Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia), for negotiations with Tshombe.

     The September cease-fire was broken in December when UN troops moved
again to expel the mercenaries. In the ensuing fighting the UN achieved a
commanding position, and Tshombe wired United States President John F. Kennedy
indicating willingness to enter into negotiations. Tshombe was flown to Kitona
where he and Adoula signed an eight-point agreement calling for recognition of
the authority of the central government, the integration of the Katangan army
into the ANC, the recognition of the Fundamental Law, and the expulsion of the
remaining mercenaries from Katanga.

     Despite the signing the Katangans gave only qualified acceptance to the
Kitona agreement. It took another year of discussions and another round of
fighting before Tshombe and his Katangan ministers declared on January 14,
1963, that they were "ready to proclaim to the world that the Katanga
secession is ended." A few months later Tshombe flew to exile in Madrid.

     After the Kitona agreement Adoula turned his attention to Stanleyville.
Gizenga's strength had begun to erode in the latter half of 1961, first
because of the participation of several of his MNC members in the Adoula
cabinet, then by the success of the Adoula government in removing Gizenga
supporters from senior government posts in Kivu, and finally by Lundula's
transfer of loyalty back to the central government. In January 1962, on orders
from Adoula and with the support of the UN, Lundula arrested Gizenga and ended
the rival Stanleyville regime. Gizenga was placed in detention on Bula-Bemba
Island in the mouth of the Congo River. Adoula won a major victory when
parliament approved the government's handling of the problem.

The Tshombe Administration

     With the Katanga secession ended and Gizenga and Kalonji under arrest,
the government could afford to act on other pressing domestic problems, even
though a dissident government held out in Bakwanga for a few months longer.
Work was intensified on drafting a new constitution, which was begun with the
guidance of UN experts in 1961 to replace the Fundamental Law. By mid-1963
opposition to the Adoula government had again become serious. When parliament
became deadlocked after a prolonged debate over a draft of the new
constitution, Kasavubu, on September 29, 1963, prorogued parliament
indefinitely. After numerous acts of sabotage endangered the peace of the
capital, Kasavubu decreed a state of emergency for six months.

     The inability of the Adoula government to deal with the Congo's growing
problems became more evident during the first half of 1964. In January a
rebellion broke out in Kwilu, followed by violence and revolution four months
later in Kivu. It was soon obvious that the ANC was unable to crush the
movement. The UN forces were scheduled to leave the Congo by June 30, also the
expiration date of the first elected legislature. A few days before the
departure of the UN troops Kasavubu made another attempt to achieve order by
dismissing Adoula and recalling Tshombe to assume power as the Congo's fourth
prime minister.

     While in exile Tshombe had kept in touch with both moderate and radical
Congolese groups, seeking a way to return to political life. Adoula had at
first said that Tshombe could return anytime he wished as a private citizen,
but a break came between the two in February 1964 when Tshombe implicated
Adoula in Lumumba's assassination in an article in Pourquoi Pas?, a popular
Brussels periodical. With the weakening of the Adoula government and the
rebellion sweeping across the northeastern part of the Congo, Tshombe's major
asset was the existence of organized units of the Katangan gendarmerie in
neighboring Angola. After several days of consultation Kasavubu asked Tshombe
to form a transitional government with the tasks of ending the wave of
rebellions and preparing for national elections in nine months.

     In his government of transition, installed on July 6, Tshombe retained
five of the most important ministries. His former Katangan compatriot,
Munongo, headed two, including the Ministry of Interior. Kalonji, having
previously escaped from the custody of central government forces, returned
from exile in Spain to head the Ministry of Agriculture. Tshombe launched his
government by opening negotiations with the leaders of the rebellion,
releasing Gizenga from detention, and making moves to hire mercenaries.

     The immediate and most critical problem confronting Tshombe was the
success of the rebels. At one time or another almost two-thirds of the country
was under direct rebel control or influence. There were, in fact, two main
rebel movements: the Kwilu Rebellion in the area east of Leopoldville and the
Eastern Rebellion in large areas of the northeastern and eastern regions of
the country.

     The Kwilu Rebellion began in January 1964 under the direction of Pierre
Mulele, former secretary general of the regional African Solidarity Party
(Parti Solidaire Africaine-PSA) and a one-time minister in Lumumba's cabinet.
Mulele had spent several months in exile in Egypt and the People's Republic of
China (PRC). When Mulele returned to Kwilu in 1963, he reorganized
revolutionary "partisan" camps for youth indoctrination. When the rebellion
began six months later, it swept rapidly through the Mbunda and Pende regions,
destroying administrative centers, mission stations, and almost anything
considered European. Mulele had made a definite effort to develop an
ideologically (crude Maoist) oriented guerrilla force, but once his followers
moved outside his home territory in Kwilu they were presented as Mbunda and
Pende rather than Congolese.

     There are no specific indications of what may have prompted the Eastern
Rebellion, although its instigators may have been influenced by the success of
the Kwilu Rebellion. When Kasavubu dismissed parliament in September 1963, a
group of the more radical political leaders went into exile in Brazzaville,
forming the National Liberation Committee (Conseil Nationale de
Liberation-CNL). They claimed leadership of all revolutionary activities in
the Congo, although available sources gave no indication that Mulele ever
recognized this leadership.

     In early 1964 the CNL sent emissaries to various areas of the Congo. One
of these agents was Gaston Soumialot, who entered eastern Congo through
Burundi. Soumialot was able to exploit a factional dispute between two Fulero
in Kivu who were contending for the chieftainship and, shortly thereafter, a
dispute within the BALUBAKAT created a political vacuum in north Katanga. The
disputes offered the immediate occasion and circumstance for the commencement
of the Eastern Rebellion.

     The rapidity with which the rebellions spread and the extent of popular
support behind them reflected existing social, economic, and political
conditions. There was widespread disillusionment with independence,
particularly in the rural areas. The modern elite, especially the politicians,
were the chief beneficiaries of the newly won freedom. Contact was lost
between the people and political parties as the politicians migrated to the
national and provincial capitals. Government was represented in rural areas by
an inefficient and economically bankrupt administration and the abusive acts
of ANC soldiers.

     Particularly volatile were the youth, composing a large segment of the
society in 1964, generally having only a primary education and few job
opportunities or outlets for constructive activity. Many of them, often young
teenagers, had for the time being, at least, abandoned many of their
traditional beliefs and respect for authority. Without any real vested
interests, they were eager recruits for revolution.

     The leaders of the rebellions exploited the youth to form the movement's
combat units. Some units were loosely organized under local leaders. Others
were organized into what became the Armee Populaire de Liberation, the members
of which were more popularly known as Simbas (Swahili for "lions"), after
intense initiation ceremonies that involved a baptism and the purchase of
amulets. The Simbas were supposed to follow a strict code of behavior and were
given magical potions, prepared by a medicine man or woman, which were
believed to make them invulnerable in battle. As the Simbas marched toward the
ANC, chanting their magical slogans, the ANC soldiers usually defected or
fled, leaving substantial quantities of military equipment behind.

     As the rebel movement spread, discipline became more difficult, and acts
of violence and terror increased. Thousands of Congolese were executed,
including government officials, political leaders of opposition parties,
provincial and local police, and others believed to have been Westernized.

     By August 4, 1964, the rebels captured Stanleyville, the country's third
largest city. Tshombe had brought back from Angola the former Katangan
gendarmerie units and white mercenaries. Supported by air strikes, these units
spearheaded attacks against rebel strongholds. As the white mercenaries took
the offensive and, with their technical superiority and discipline, began to
recapture rebel strongholds, the fighting grew progressively brutal, and
numerous atrocities were committed by all sides.

     In the final days of the Stanleyville regime under Christophe Gbenye, the
leaders desperately tried to use white hostages as a means of halting the
mercenaries and the ANC advance. When negotiations offered little hope for
release of hostages, the Belgian and American governments arranged for a
rescue operation. Belgian paratroopers landed in Stanleyville on November 24,
1964, forcing release of the hostages. But some 200 Europeans were killed
before all the rebel areas were liberated.

     Tshombe's popularity within the Congo and his prestige throughout Africa
were severely damaged by the Belgo-American operation against Stanleyville,
which had also provoked heated debates in the UN. The mercenaries soon smashed
the remnants of the rebel military force with a successful attack on Paulis,
but political opposition to Tshombe's conduct of government greatly increased
in the capital. In particular, Tshombe had antagonized both President Kasavubu
and General Mobutu.

     During his first months in power Tshombe had established a political
power base through his alliance of political parties, the National
Confederation of Congolese Associations (Confederation Nationale des
Associations Congolaise-CONACO) and had won a majority in the new
parliamentary elections of March 1965. As a result, Tshombe emerged as a
strong competitor to Kasavubu for the presidency under a new constitution,
which had been approved shortly after Tshombe became prime minister. On
October 13, 1965, however, Kasavubu dismissed Tshombe and appointed Evariste
Kimba of the BALUBAKAT to form a new government. As Tshombe had a clear
majority in parliament, Kimba could not get confirmation for his new
government. The result was an impasse.

Mobutu Takes Power

     As political tension heightened, parliament remained deadlocked, and
Mobutu called a meeting of the ANC high command in Leopoldville. On November
24, 1965, the ANC took command and ended the Kasavubu-Tshombe conflict,
confiding the direction of the country to Mobutu as president and Colonel
Leonard Mulamba as prime minister of a "government of national union." The new
government announced that it would remain in office for five years under a
state of emergency and that the presidential election scheduled for early 1966
was canceled. The new government was approved by parliament on November 28,
and the Congo entered a new political era.

                                      * * *

     For a general, one-volume history of Zaire there is Robert Cornevin's
Histoire du Congo Leopoldville-Kinshasa: des origines prehistoriques a la
Republique Democratique du Congo. On the expansion of the Bantu in Zaire, an
early synthesis of rival viewpoints that remained useful even in the late
1970s was "The Problem of the Bantu Expansion" by Roland Oliver. On the rise
of African kingdoms in Zaire, the basic work remains Jan Vansina's Kingdoms of
the Savanna; more recent work only supplements or modifies it. Some of the
results of later work have been included in David Birmingham's chapters, each
entitled "Central Africa from Cameroun to the Zambezi," found in volumes three
and four of The Cambridge History of Africa. For the period of Belgian rule,
the best books are Ruth Slade's King Leopold's Congo: Aspects of the
Development of Race Relations in the Congo Independent State and Robert
Anstey's King Leopold's Legacy: The Congo Under Belgian Rule, 1908-1960. Jean
Stengers has written a short history of the Congo Free State, "The Congo Free
State and the Belgian Congo," in L. H. Gann's and Peter Duignan's Colonialism
in Africa, 1870-1960, volume one.

     There has been much written on the early years of Congo independence, but
there had not yet appeared a complete history of the period written from the
perspective of the late 1970s. The first work consulted should be Crawford
Young's Politics in the Congo. Decolonization and Independence, supplemented
by Colin Legum's Congo Disaster; Catherine Hoskyns' The Congo since
Independence, January 1960-December 1961; Herbert Weiss' Political Protest in
the Congo: The Parti Solidaire Africain during the Independence Struggle;
Thomas Kanza's Conflict in the Congo: the Rise and Fall of Lumumba; and Rene
Lemarchand's Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo. Young's chapter on
Zaire in The Politics of Cultural Pluralism does a good job on the subject of
the 1950s and 1960s. (For further information see Bibliography.)