$Unique_ID{COW03740} $Pretitle{289} $Title{Tunisia Chapter 5A. National Security} $Subtitle{} $Author{Frederick Ehrenreich} $Affiliation{HQ, Department of the Army} $Subject{tunisian government security political tunisia opposition bourguiba tunisians domestic psd} $Date{1986} $Log{Monolithic ribat*0374001.scf Figure 12.*0374002.scf } Country: Tunisia Book: Tunisia, A Country Study Author: Frederick Ehrenreich Affiliation: HQ, Department of the Army Date: 1986 Chapter 5A. National Security [See Monolithic ribat: Monolithic ribat (fort) at Monastir"] Although it had long been regarded as the most peaceful and stable of the Maghribi countries, Tunisia faced a series of challenges in 1985 that could conceivably threaten the viability and effectiveness of the political system built up by President Habib Bourguiba. At the same time that the national leadership was encountering increased international tension, it was facing a growing challenge from organized domestic opponents. Its ability to contend with these problems was complicated by political uncertainty brought on by the advancing age and questionable health of Bourguiba, who had dominated the national leadership for three decades. Domestic security was threatened by causes deeper than the problems of presidential succession. Widespread riots that grew out of the general strike in January 1978 gave observers their first indication that the national consensus behind the leadership and policies of Bourguiba and Destourian Socialist Party was not as strong as it had once been. Estrangement between the government and the labor movement and the growth of Islamist opposition continued in the 1980s and concerned government officials. To a degree, the emergence of a strong, political opposition reflected the relative openness of Tunisian society. It also indicated the existence of widespread dissatisfaction with the ruling Destourian Socialist Party, the pace of economic growth and development, high unemployment, official corruption, and the apparent rejection of Islamic values by some of the top national leaders. The fact that limited government reforms had not sufficiently ameliorated the causes of dissent was emphasized in January 1984 by rioting throughout the country that was triggered by an increase in the price of bread and other staples. The republic's domestic difficulties have been compounded by problems with neighboring states. Tunisia is flanked by Algeria and Libya, two much larger and militarily stronger states whose militancy on Third World and Pan-Arab issues contrasted with Bourguiba's more pro-Western attitudes. During the early 1980s relations with Algeria began to improve, and a treaty of friendship and concord made the countries virtual allies. At the same time, however, Libya has repeatedly posed a potential threat to the Bourguiba' government. By periodically threatening Tunisia with greater military strength and by instigating at least one armed rebellion in Tunisia, Libyan leader Colonel Muammar al Qadhaafi has proved himself a dangerous neighbor. Tunisian vulnerabilities were also demonstrated by the October 1985 air raid by Israeli warplanes on the headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organization near Tunis. Lacking any hope of absolute defense and preferring to invest in domestic programs, the Tunisian government had long been content to maintain a military establishment of modest size and limited combat effectiveness compared with those of its neighbors. By the 1980s, however, even Tunisia's relatively small armed forces become extremely costly. In 1985 the defense force consisted of a predominant army of 30,000 officers and men, a small navy of 2,600, and an air force and 2,500; collectively these forces were designated the Tunisian National Army. The military and a largely paramilitary police system were key elements in a defense strategy that called on the security forces to provide credible deterrence against external aggressive threats and, failing that, to deal effectively with minor incursions until assistance arrived from friendly states. International Security Concerns Since the nation's formal independence from France in 1956, the Tunisian government has generally attempted to concentrate its efforts and resources on domestic development while maintaining harmonious relations with its neighbors and other powers. Despite these efforts, Tunisia's location between Algeria and Libya-two states long characterized by their oil wealth and revolutionary ethos-its identity as an Arab and Islamic state, and the generally pro-Western, modernist tendencies of Bourguiba's leadership have prevented the country from avoiding regional disputes. In the first years after independence the Bourguiba government was concerned with clashes and threats from France and Egypt (then known as the United Arab Republic). France, occupied with the revolution in Algeria, had kept a large number of troops on Tunisian soil after 1956. Intent on limiting Tunisia's role as a sanctuary for Algerian revolutionaries or as a conduit for material assistance, the French on several occasions used force against Tunisians who were giving support to the Algerians. The most notable example was the French bombing in 1958 of the Tunisian border village of Sakiet Sidi Youssef. Later, Tunisian attempts to end the French military presence by mobilizing civilian demonstrators and irregular militias resulted in some 1,000 Tunisian deaths in the so-called Battle of Bizerte in 1961 (see Relations with France, ch. 1). The Egyptian government, then led by radical Pan-Arabist president Gamal Abdul Nasser, presented even more of a threat to the Bourguiba government during this period than did the French. Although the French experienced major differences with Bourguiba over the war in Algeria, the presence of French troops and the disposition of French-owned assets in Tunisia, these issues were eventually resolved without a serious breach. The Egyptians, by contrast, were known to be active supporters of the domestic opposition linked to Bourguiba's Neo-Destour Party rival, Salah Ben Youssef. In October 1958 Tunisia broke diplomatic relations with Cairo over its alleged involvement in a "Youssefist" attempt to assassinate Bourguiba. Relations with Cairo remained strained for years because of Egypt's continued support for Youssefists and because of Nasser's criticisms of Tunisia's unwillingness to subscribe to the Egyptian leader's brand of Pan-Arabism. After its independence from France in 1962, Algeria soon moved to the forefront of Tunisian external security concerns. Under the leadership of its first president, Ahmed Ben Bella, Algeria took an active role in supporting "progressive" and "revolutionary" forces in Africa and the Middle East, including Tunisian opponents of Bourguiba. In January 1963 the Tunisian government recalled its ambassador to Algiers because of alleged Algerian involvement in an aborted coup attempt the previous month involving Youssefists and army officers. The Tunisian government was not known to have supported any actions against the Algerian government, but Algerian dissidents found assistance and sanctuary in Tunisia. Relations between Algeria and Tunisia improved somewhat after Ben Bella was replaced by Houari Boumediene, but sharp political disagreements over Tunisia's generally pro-Western ties and its moderation on the Arab-Israeli problem remained a source of tension. From the perspective of the Tunisian government, the significance of the dissension was magnified by Algeria's overwhelming military strength (see fig. 12). In 1980 the Algerian government was briefly suspected of seeking to foment a rebellion inside Tunisia when it became known that a group of Libyan-backed insurgents who attacked the Tunisian town of Gafsa had entered the country from Algeria. Subsequently, low-ranking Algerian officials were implicated in the operation, but Chadli Bendjedid, who had replaced Boumediene in 1979, made overtures to convince the Tunisians that he and his government were not involved. In the early 1980s Tunisia and Algeria steadily strengthened their relationship into a de facto alliance. The treaty of friendship and concord signed by the leaders of the two countries in March 1983, hailed as the first step in forming a "Great Arab Maghrib," called for military liaison and consultation as well as economic cooperation and settlement of border issues. In late 1985, in the context of a Libyan troop buildup on the Tunisian border and the Israeli air attack, frequent discussions between Tunisian and Algerian officials appeared to indicate a further tightening of their security relationship. [See Figure 12.: Balance of Power in the Maghrib, 1985] Libya's destabilizing activities have troubled Tunisian leaders since the mid-1970s. Before the 1969 coup that brought Qadhaafi to power, Libya under the conservative King Idris I was regarded as a weak, sparsely populated wasteland whose friendship with Tunisia was symbolized by a 1957 treaty of good neighborliness. The military coup led by Qadhaafi and the increase in oil prices during the 1970s, however, gave rise to a more difficult security relationship between the two states. Relations chilled in 1974 when the Tunisian government hastily backed away from a merger agreement between the two countries, to which Bourguiba had earlier agreed. Abusive Libyan propaganda combined with military power-growing rapidly with new stocks of Soviet-supplied weapons-to induce the Tunisian government to begin the most extensive (although modest by regional standards) modernization of its armed forces undertaken since independence (see Armed Forces, this ch.). The raid on the mining town of Gafsa focused attention on the potential danger from Libyan subversion or intervention. Early on January 27, 1980, a band of 50 or 60 armed Tunisians, equipped and trained in Libya, captured the police and army barracks in Gafsa, seized several hostages, and drove through the town calling on local Tunisians to rise up against the Bourguiba government. Accounts differed as to how much support they received from townspeople, but it was apparently not significant. Tunisian security forces were sent to Gafsa, and, in the heavy fighting that followed, official sources reported the 22 security personnel, 15 civilians, and four insurgents were killed. The attack, in concert with a sustained propaganda barrage from Libyan radio, was apparently intended to catalyze a popular uprising against the Bourguiba government. Its failure caused Tunisians from across the political spectrum to unite behind Bourguiba during the crisis. The Gafsa raid demonstrated for most Tunisians the magnitude of the threat posed by Libya and drew the immediate support of France and the United States, Tunisia's two closest Western allies. The French quickly dispatched a squadron of ships to the coast off Tunisia and Libya in a show of force, and the United States subsequently sent a military mission to evaluate Tunisian security needs. After Gafsa, Qadhaafi made gradual moves to restore ties with Tunisia and was rewarded with the resumption of diplomatic relations, which had been broken at the time of the raid, and by agreements aimed at intensifying economic links. At the same time, however, he provided the Tunisian government with cause for continued concern. In the early 1980s some 2,000 Tunisians were reportedly receiving military training in Libyan camps. Members of the so-called Islamic Legion, they were purportedly being trained to liberate Palestine, but, given the precedent of Gafsa, officials in Tunis worried that they could be used against Tunisia. (In 1982 a small-scale attack on Kasserine, ostensibly supported by Libya, reminded Tunisians of this capability.) Although there was no direct evidence of Libyan involvement in the January 1984 riots, Qadhaafi's reputation led many Tunisians to suspect Libyan involvement. Tunisians were suspicious because at the time of the riots the price of Libyan bread was lowered, and major oil pipeline in Tunisian territory near the Libyan border was sabotaged. A concurrent Libyan offer to provide Tunisia with security assistance-which could be viewed either as an olive branch or a threat-was refused by Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali. Later in 1984 a Libyan show of force on the Tunisian border, the kidnapping of three Tunisian border guards in Tunisian territory, and ongoing rumors of Libyan arms shipments to Bourguiba's domestic opponents also kept Tunisian officials suspicious of their neighbor. The basis for Tunisian-Libyan estrangement was reinforced in August 1984 when Qadhaafi and Morocco's King Hassan II announced a "merger" of their two countries. Rejected by the Tunisian-Algeria alliance (which had expanded to include Mauritania), it appeared that Morocco and Libya were directing their pact against Algeria and its allies. Despite the diplomatic efforts of the Tunisians to lessen regional tensions, the states of the Maghrib polarized into two contending blocs (see Maghribi Affairs, ch. 4). The large-scale expulsions of Tunisian citizens from Libya in August and September 1985 appeared to bring Tunisian-Libyan relations to their most dangerous state since Gafsa. The expulsion of some 30,000 of the 90,000 to 100,000 Tunisian workers living in Libya threatened Tunisian security on two levels. First, the new arrivals exacerbated an already serious domestic unemployment problem, and, second, Tunisian officials feared the infiltration of dissidents who had received military training in Libya. Background checks on the returnees indicated that they were simply Tunisian workers forced to leave Libya when the Libyan economy could no longer afford their services. These expulsions were followed by Tunisia's ejection of some 300 Libyan officials and residents, the breaking of diplomatic relations and, according to Tunisian reports, the massing of Libyan troops on the border and flights of Libyan military aircraft into Tunisian airspace. The episode served to reaffirm Tunisian mistrust of the Qadhaafi regime and caused the government in Tunis to seek stronger security ties with the United States and Algeria. Immediately thereafter, the raid by Israeli warplanes on the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters at HammanLif on the outskirts of Tunis on October 1, 1985, raised new concerns in Tunis over national security. The raid, which killed as many as 20 Tunisians in addition to scores of Palestinians, demonstrated that Tunisia was not immune from involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict although the Israeli government stated that it "had nothing against Tunisia" in striking "the headquarters of those who make the decisions, plan, and carry out terrorist actions." Bourguiba had previously sent small contingents of Tunisian troops and materiel to Egypt after the Middle East wars in 1967 and 1973, but the Arab-Israeli problem had always been on the periphery of Tunisian security concerns and outside the scope of Tunisian military planning. Beyond that, Bourguiba has long been considered the most moderate of the Arab leaders; his 1965 call for the recognition of Israel, which was based on the 1948 United Nations (UN) partition resolution, had led to difficulty for Tunisia in the League of Arab States (Arab League) during the Nasser era. Tunisian involvement in the issue intensified when Tunis was made the headquarters of the Arab League in 1979 and when the PLO moved its headquarters there in 1982 after being expelled from Beirut. Before the Israeli raid, however, the PLO presence-strictly limited by the Tunisian authorities-was a source of concern mainly as a potential threat to domestic stability (as it had been in Lebanon) rather than as a magnet for an Israeli attack. Initially, the Israeli raid and the short-lived American support for it as a "legitimate response" to terrorist attacks made it appear that Tunisia had lost a friend and source of security assistance. The United States immediately adopted a more evenhanded approach to the issue and indicated a willingness to continue the two countries' longstanding security relationship The Tunisian government, after initial shock and disbelief over the incident, also indicated that it did not intend to interrupt its security relationship with the United States (see Foreign Military Assistance, this ch.). It appeared, however, that Tunisian officials might become more circumspect and less inclined to advertise those ties because of sensitivity to criticism from both allies and enemies. Domestic Security Issues and Policies Between the 1960s and the mid-1980s, the Bourguiba government's vulnerability to perceived challenges from domestic opponents-and its methods of dealing with them-changed markedly. At the beginning of the period, Tunisia was a one-party state with a broad base of popular support where almost all opposition outside the Destourian Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste Destourien-PSD) was considered to be a threat to national security. In the 1970s the government continued to refuse to recognize the legitimacy of any critics outside the PSD, but the party's base of support was shrinking considerably even as opponents were becoming more numerous, more vocal, and more dangerous. In the period after 1980, Mzali, with Bourguiba's support, was apparently attempting to redefine what constituted a security threat. By taking steps toward allowing some of the opposition to vie for power through legitimate channels, it was thought that the prime minister was seeking to weaken and divide the government's most dangerous rivals while making government institutions (and the PSD itself) stronger, more vital, and more relevant to Tunisians. The Tunisian experiment was complicated, however, by a PSD leadership that was concerned about presidential succession and was divided over whether and how fast to proceed with liberalization of the political system. Even if the government did decide to hold elections that included broadly representative opposition groups, there were doubts as to whether the regime's strongest opponents, the Islamists (see Glossary), could be persuaded to participate. Roots of Domestic Security Difficulties During the 1960s a strong and popular party organization built on patronage and two-way communication with constituents served as the eyes and ears of the PSD leadership. In this environment, dissent was seldom expressed publicly except within the context of party loyalty, and civil disorders were kept to a minimum. Opposition was often placated by compromises on the part of the national leadership, but when this proved ineffective the government was able to act swiftly and effectively against dissidents. In the early years of independence, the most prominent opponents of the government were the supporters of Ben Youssef. Religious and cultural traditionalists objecting to the government's moves to build a more secular society occasionally demonstrated their contempt for the Bourguiba government, but they were a declining force during that time. The roots of Tunisian stability were weakened somewhat during the 1970s. Despite unprecedented economic growth and a high standard of living by regional standards, popular dissatisfaction with the Bourguiba government increased as some of the structural shortcomings of the politico-economic system appeared to have become intractable. The gap between rich and poor Tunisians had grown since independence and showed no signs of narrowing. The citizens of the southern desert areas saw themselves excluded from the country's political elite and from sharing in the nation's economic growth. Partly as a result, large numbers of young unemployed Tunisian men flocked to the major cities, swelling the ranks of the urban poor. Ordinary crime, previously a negligible problem, increased with the influx of migrants, although reliable statistical data on the magnitude were not available. More important, the growth of a large mass of disaffected and disenfranchised young Tunisians had ominous implications for national security. Government policies and the increasingly rigid and arbitrary style of Bourguiba's leadership also contributed to the growth of public discontent. In the early 1970s Bourguiba rejected the nation's socialist economic policies as well as new proposals to move toward the establishment of a multiparty democracy. In ousting officials most closely linked with those initiatives, the aging president indicated that he feared being overthrown by subordinates who had built up independent power bases. Political expression had always been limited in Tunisia, but the president and then-Prime Minister Hedi Nouria appeared to be unwilling to tolerate any dissent or accept any criticism, even from within the PSD. The regime's increasing remoteness combined with the rise in domestic criticism of its leadership to stifle the PSD's grass-roots dynamism, which had been the foundation of the government's security and effectiveness. The 1970s were characterized as a decade of increasing civil unrest in Tunisia. At the beginning of the period, large numbers of students for the first time began to object publicly to the direction of government policies. Dominated by Marxist critics during this time, student dissent resulted in growing numbers of disturbances at Tunisian universities, unrest that continued despite the government's demonstrated willingness to arrest and impose strict prison sentences on offenders. At the same time, organized labor showed itself to be an important opposition force. The General Union of Tunisian Workers (Union Generale des Travailleurs Tunisiens-UGTT), which had long been closely allied with the PSD, became increasingly militant in demanding better working conditions and wages, criticizing growing unemployment, and protesting the economic gap between the affluent and poor elements in the society. Illegal strikes, rare before the mid-1970s, became more and more frequent, numbering approximately 600 between 1976 and early 1978 alone. When strike actions were joined by large numbers of unemployed urban youths and supplemented by the persistent dissidence of students who viewed the PSD as an outdated and increasingly ineffectual political party, they posed a direct challenge to the government. The scope of Tunisia's discontent was first dramatically demonstrated by the violence connected with the general strike of January 26, 1978, a day Tunisians remember as Black Thursday. The strike, coming after months of what observers called government intimidation of the UGTT leadership, was interpreted by the government as a direct threat to its authority. The violence was controlled after two days by army units equipped with infantry weapons and armored vehicles after police were overwhelmed by demonstrators. According to official Tunisian figures, 42 were killed and 325 were wounded before government forces restored order; other, unofficial, sources put the number of casualties far higher. Over 1,000 were arrested, and many, including the entire UGTT leadership, were brought before the State Security Court on charges of subversion. Even before the trials began, pro-PSD elements moved into positions of power within the UGTT. The new union leaders immediately expressed regret for the riots and pledged to cooperate with the government. After the 1978 unrest, the national government increasingly found antigovernment dissidence expressed in religious terms. The conservative Muslim imams had long opposed Bourguiba's secularist social reforms, but during the 1970s the authorities had supported Islamists as a counter to the influence of Marxist groups on Tunisian campuses. The Islamists only became regarded as a threat after the Iranian revolution of 1979 demonstrated that, even in the late twentieth century, Islam could generate great social and political upheavals. In the early 1980s a variety of Islamist groups came into existence, most of them drawing their strength from university students and other educated young Tunisians disaffected by the PSD and the secular Marxist alternative (see Opposition Groups, ch. 4). The largest and most important of these groups was the Islamic Tendency Movement (Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique-MTI), which was formed in 1981. Because of its leadership's political sophistication and calls for democratization of the political process, the MTI was considered to be among the most "moderate" of similar groups in existence throughout the Islamic world. The MTI's popularity, however, its calls for the rejection of Western values, and the militancy of some of its members (especially those on college campuses) made the government deeply concerned about the movement's potential as a threat to national security. Government Security Policy under Mohamad Mzali By early 1980, when militant Islam was beginning to be identified as a security problem in Tunisia, it was obvious that the government's hard line against dissidents had been unsuccessful in bringing back the order and stability that the country had known in the 1960s. Shortly after the shock of the Gafsa incident, then-Prime Minister Nouria-the person most closely associated with the government's strict security policies-reportedly became seriously ill and was replaced by Mzali. The new prime minister quickly made it clear that he would seek to deal with the regime's opponents in a different manner than had his predecessor. Forming a cabinet that included some of the PSD officials who had resigned in protest over the government's strict policies against the UGTT in 1977, Mzali in his first year in power released almost all Tunisian political prisoners and pardoned some 1,000 unionists who had been jailed for their participation in the 1978 riots. The UGTT was allowed a freer rein, press restrictions were eased, and the president and Mzali indicated that opposition parties would be allowed to compete against the PSD in elections. It soon became clear that the moves to open the political system to opposition groups would be limited, cautious, and gradual. The Tunisian Communist Party-which had a very small popular following-was granted official recognition and allowed to contest the 1981 parliamentary elections. By contrast, the MTI-which probably was the country's most popular political grouping-had its application for recognition denied. In July 1981 the government arrested virtually the entire MTI leadership after a number of violent incidents blamed on Islamic extremists. In the trials that followed, 89 Islamist leaders were sentenced to prison for up to 11 years for offending the head of state, spreading disinformation, and belonging to an unauthorized organization. The severity of the sentences in what was thought to be a relatively liberal political environment was criticized by many, including the non-Islamist opposition parties. That the government was still not used to the concept of a loyal opposition was demonstrated in November 1981 when three opposition parties that had been allowed to contest the parliamentary election received only some 5 percent of the popular vote between them; widespread voting irregularities were reported (see The 1981 Election: Opposition Parties Sanctioned, ch. 4). In the early 1980s other smaller Islamist and secular groups emerged and were perceived as threatening by Tunisian authorities. In 1982 and 1983 a number of dissidents linked to the Islamic Liberation Party, the Popular Revolutionary Movement, and the National Arab Rally-all of which were linked to Pan-Arab and Islamist causes-were arrested and convicted of criminal and political offenses (see Opposition Groups, ch. 4). During this period, the escalating conflict between Islamists and Marxists on University of Tunis campuses also worried the government insofar as the power and aggressiveness of the two radical groups resulted in the de facto suppression of student organizations affiliated with the PSD (see Interest Groups, ch. 4). The January 1984 rioting, the most extensive in Tunisian history, clearly indicated that the government's political reforms had not removed the causes of popular discontent. The disturbances, which started in the south, spread nationwide and reportedly involved half a million Tunisians, 10 times the number in the 1978 violence. As in 1978, the police were overwhelmed by the protesters, and the army had to be called in to help restore order. The riots had heavy political overtones. Demonstrators, mostly young unemployed males, shouted slogans condemning Bourguiba, his wife Wassila, Mzali, and other PSD leaders and stoned the president's car in his hometown, Monastir. Although some observers suspected at the time that the riots were planned by regime opponents, later analyses indicated that they broke out spontaneously at the time of the price increases in bread and other staples. After the disturbances began, however, it appeared that government opponents, especially Islamists, were active in organizing antigovernment demonstrations. According to official sources, 89 Tunisians were killed in the disturbances and nearly 1,000 were injured. Over 1,000 others were arrested, some of whom were detained for as long as six months before being brought to trial. The 1984 riots and their aftermath starkly revealed some of the regime's vulnerabilities. That the disturbances were completely unforseen showed the ineffectiveness of the PSD's local organization as a source of domestic intelligence. After the violence broke out, local PSD officials appeared to be unable or unwilling to stop the protesters or moderate their actions. Shortly after calm was restored, the PSD's internal disputes were also highlighted when the government's strongest reactions against the violence were reserved for one of Mzali's political rivals, Minister of Interior Driss Guiga. The minister and his director of the Surete Nationale were dismissed from their positions, tried, and convicted of treason and corruption. After Mzali and his appointees came to dominate the ministry, some observers criticized the prime minister for being more interested in finding scapegoats and consolidating his political position within the PSD than in addressing the root causes of the violence. After the riots, some suspected that the government would toughen its stand against domestic opposition and return to the domestic security attitudes and policies of the 1970s. In January 1984 Mzali's appointment of Brigadier General Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, who had a reputation as a hardliner on security issues, as the director of national security within the Ministry of Interior appeared to confirm this view (see Internal Security Forces, this ch.). Mzali, however, continued to indicate that government attempts to integrate the opposition (including, perhaps, the MTI) into the political system would continue. The release from prison in August 1984 of the last of the Islamist leaders, jailed three years earlier, was the most tangible evidence that Mzali was still seeking to reshape the government's domestic security policies. Despite the prime minister's assurances, government policy in 1984-85 had in many ways become more repressive. The government was accused of supporting divisive tendencies within the labor movement. Opposition parties that had been given legal sanction complained of renewed suppression (including attacks on members by groups of PSD loyalists), destruction of offices, unjustified arrests by police, and general harassment. Censorship of the information media, relaxed in 1980, again became increasingly prevalent and was directed against opposition publications (see Politics and the Information Media, ch. 4). The situation led the recognized opposition parties to boycott the 1985 local elections and Ahmed Mestiri of the Social Democratic Movement to conclude that "those responsible within the [Destourian Socialist] party are not yet ready for opposition." In late 1985, after nearly six years of erratic moves to liberalize the political system, the party's and the regime's security did not appear to have been significantly improved. There was no sign that its most serious opponents-Islamists, unionists, the urban unemployed, southerners, and students-had moderated their attitudes toward the regime. There was cynicism in some quarters that the liberalization effort was simply a method for Mzali to enhance his status and eliminate potential rivals as he positioned himself to take power after Bourguiba's passing. Others noted that the prime minister's ability to recast Tunisian security policy had been frustrated by opposition from other elements within the PSD, notably Minister of Public Works and Housing Mohamed Sayah, who was reputed to favor a tougher attitude toward dissidence; by Bourguiba, who opposed Mzali's accumulation of too much political power; by those Tunisians who opposed Mzali as Bourguiba's successor; and by those PSD officials whose power would be diminished by the reforms. It was generally thought that as long as PSD leaders were more concerned with political maneuvering among themselves than with the potential threat posed by the country's disenfranchised opponents, disturbances such as those of 1978 and 1984 could become increasingly common, and the risk of domestic chaos or military involvement in the government might grow (see The Military and Politics, this ch.). Armed Forces The Tunisian National Army (Armee Nationale Tunisienne-ANT), which was divided into army, air force, and naval components, had a threefold mission: to defend the country's territorial integrity against hostile foreign powers, to assist the police as necessary in maintaining internal security, and to participate actively in government-sponsored civic action programs. The government has also sought to ensure, largely with success, that the ANT had little influence in the political sphere. Since the late 1970s, all of the armed services have been undergoing expansion and modernization designed to improve their defenses against attack from potentially hostile states. Although the improvements have been extremely costly, the worsened relationship with Libya and the vulnerability demonstrated by the Israeli raid have heightened concern about Tunisia's military weaknesses. The president in 1985 therefore directed his government to explore with its friends and allies in the Arab world and the West the possibility of assistance in making new large-scale purchases of aircraft, armor, and naval vessels.